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News18
5 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Opinion: China Plays Games Of Sabotage As India Shuns Old Equations For Good
China using every trick in the book to contain India, scuttle its self-reliance push, and stall its arrival as a great power on the world stage: an inevitability it fails to digest India trashing the joint statement drafted at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) exposes the tragedy of the China-dominated bloc — a forum meant to fight terrorism, now compromised by China and its terror-breeding ally Pakistan. This, however, is just the tip of the iceberg– as much more is simmering between India and China right now– from Xi Jinping skipping the BRICS Summit, Chinese economic sabotage, Beijing's backing of Pakistan's military against India, and tense negotiations on the new rules of engagement are unfolding behind the scenes. This is less about restoration of ties, and more about redirection. As Defence Minister Rajnath Singh flipped through the pages, he put down his pen and refused to sign, resulting in the absence of a joint statement from the SCO. This move shreds China's cover for Pakistan's terror-sponsoring regime as China seeks to corner India diplomatically, economically and militarily— all at once. The proposed joint statement gave it all away — it made direct references to incidents in Balochistan but skipped the Pahalgam terror attack— a brazen attempt to cover up Pakistan's hand in terror. The SCO was started to address the security concerns of the region, founded by China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India joined in 2017, and today the organisation has 10 members, including Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. Its anti-terror committee, RATS, is headquartered in Uzbekistan, while its secretariat operates from Beijing. While the SCO is largely meant to focus on terrorism, separatism and extremism, in recent years, it has become a vehicle for China to play out its larger geopolitical agenda against the West, extend its influence with Russia and other post-soviet members, and shield Pakistan from global scrutiny— especially by suppressing references to Pakistani terrorism. India's defence minister highlighted the role of Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in terror attacks and said that there should be no room for double standards in the SCO. This is not the first time that India has rejected a joint statement at the SCO as in 2023, it rejected references to China's Belt and Road Initiative and opposed a BRICS currency basket plan proposed by China. While China is the dominant player in this grouping, India has actively opposed China's designs to turn the SCO into a personal fiefdom. By exposing the double standards, India maintains a crucial position in the SCO, souring China's attempts to align it fully with its own agenda. This is ultimately a diplomatic failure of the Chinese for whom the SCO is a flagship organisation to elevate China's stature as opposed to the West. When India dissents internally, it shows the contradictions of the forum, and the limitations of Chinese leadership and diplomacy. Turning to Brazil, where the BRICS Summit is set for next month, reports say Xi Jinping will skip the summit for the first time since he took office 12 years ago. The likely reason is that Brazil has invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a state dinner following the BRICS summit. According to a report by the South China Morning Post or SCMP, Beijing's decision came because Xi could have been 'perceived as a supporting actor" at the summit. Officially China has told Brazil that there are scheduling issues as Beijing is more focused on the SCO summit which may be as late as September. But there is a lot going on between India and China behind the scenes which may explain this clash of egos. Post-Galwan relations between India and China froze until a mild thaw in 2024, when PM Modi met Chinese President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. Since then, discussions on disengagement and de-escalation at the border, and normalisation of economic relations are on. This is a period of extensive and exhaustive negotiations between the two nations. China has weaponised its economic heft, with control on supply of strategic goods like rare earth magnets, specialty fertilisers, tunnel boring machines, and so on. China is leveraging its dominance in rare earths to achieve its political goals not just with the US but also with other nations like Japan, South Korea and India. It has restricted exports of magnets like Samarium which is crucial in defence production. This compromises capabilities to produce automobiles, especially electric vehicles, defence equipment, wind turbines and other electronics Recently, India decided to suspend a pact with Japan where it supplied neodymium to Tokyo, in light of the global crunch caused by Chinese export restrictions. India, with the fifth largest rare-earth reserves globally, is making a push for indigenous mining and production which can be a strategic game changer in the long run. It is calling for investments and has issued production-linked incentive schemes to sweeten deals. It is also collaborating with foreign nations like Australia and the larger Quad to extract rare earths, diversifying supply nations. China is afraid that India's recent showing at the recent G7 summit will lead to a joint effort against China's rare earth dominance. China is rattled by India calling it out globally for being an unreliable partner even as negotiations are on. This Chinese insecurity has reportedly even come up in discussions. Beijing is essentially threatened by New Delhi's Aatmanirbhar Bharat plans and is pulling strings to scuttle it. Recently, reports have emerged of China holding up exports of specialty fertiliser used in fruit production, which may hurt Indian agriculture. A similar non-tariff barrier was seen with tunnel boarding machines— built by a German firm in China, bought and paid for by India, but delivery to India held up by Chinese authorities. Such tactics are being used across sectors to deter companies from moving to India. China wants India to reopen its doors to Chinese investment and resume direct flights. These are essential for sustaining economic linkages, but India has remained cautious, especially given Beijing's opaque policies and supply chain manipulation. China is also eager to showcase the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage as a gesture of goodwill, highlighting supposed efforts to boost people-to-people ties. But this should not fool anyone: at the same time, China continues to support Pakistan militarily against India and shields its terror wielding hand in every global forum, including the UN. Chinese missiles, drones and fighter jets were used extensively by Pakistan during India's Operation Sindoor. Moreover, a recent interview by defence minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Asif, confirmed– China has been sharing intelligence against India with Islamabad. This is China using every trick in the book from diplomatic to economic and military to contain India, scuttle its self-reliance push, and stall its arrival as a great power on the world stage: an inevitability it fails to digest. And yet dialogue continues with new terms of engagement being negotiated. Rather than returning to old equations as the Chinese hope, India is preparing for a future where China cannot easily undermine Indian interests. India is simply unrelenting on all counts, navigating through the Chinese challenge diplomatically with certainty and precision, and prioritising its military goals and economic ambitions above all. While the question of preparedness throws up a significant challenge for India's leadership, indications are that the pivot to self-reliance is a strategic shift that China cannot stop. And that explains Chinese frustration in backroom talks. About the Author Shubhangi Sharma Shubhangi Sharma is News Editor - Special Projects at News18. She covers foreign affairs and geopolitics, and also keeps a close watch on the national pulse of India. tags : India China view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 30, 2025, 13:39 IST News opinion Opinion: China Plays Games Of Sabotage As India Shuns Old Equations For Good Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Indian Express
11-07-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
Best of Both Sides: BRICS is China's playground
As an emerging power, India's interests are arguably served best by aligning with multiple major powers, which according to conventional wisdom allows Delhi to limit its dependence on any one power and instead work with each on specific issues of common interest. India's membership of multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has been justified along the lines that these provide platforms to push for a more multipolar world order that limits the dominance of Western powers and West-led institutions. Indeed, BRICS emerged as a group focused on challenging the norms that shaped multilateral economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. BRICS offered another avenue for India's aspirations for global leadership as it, along with Brazil, China and Russia, negotiated a larger proportion of quotas and votes at these institutions. In recent years, as BRICS has expanded its membership, it has arguably provided India another platform to develop ties with countries in the Global South. One could argue that as the US under the Donald Trump administration pursues an unpredictable and more volatile foreign policy, it might be even more imperative for India to build ties with such institutions. But does membership of BRICS really serve India's interests? What specific foreign policy goals can it pursue through this? The international order is going through a transformation and the contours of the new order are not yet clear, and it is pertinent to ask whether China-dominated institutions such as BRICS will help India or drag it down. I argue that while BRICS and the SCO still provide India platforms to push for multipolarity, they do not further many of its key foreign policy goals. In some cases, its interests might even be adversely affected through the collective positions taken. Clearly, China's economic size, assertive foreign policy and dominance in these institutions limit the extent to which India can exert its influence and secure its interests. China's GDP, at $17.79 trillion, is nearly five times the size of India's at $3.56 trillion. This economic might, along with China's extensive trade and investment ties with other BRICS countries, allow it to exert greater political influence. At the BRICS summits, Beijing has used its leverage to promote goals such as de-dollarisation and expansion of the organisation's membership. It has also used the venue to advocate for a larger role in global governance for itself. While India seeks to pursue some of these goals, it has not been able to further its interests through BRICS. The redistribution of IMF quotas in 2015 may have been the only exception. Even then, as BRICS countries banded together to reform global governance, China emerged as the clear winner as it was able to secure a deputy managing director position at the IMF. While India seeks to expand its ties with countries in the Global South and portray itself as their leader, given the deep economic ties China enjoys with other BRICS countries, it is difficult for New Delhi to claim the leadership mantle while operating within the organisation. It might be easier for India to create a leadership narrative through its bilateral ties and in blocs where China is not present. Additionally, India is deeply conflicted on de-dollarisation. While it has not been opposed to creating alternative payment mechanisms, it has enjoyed strong and increasing trade and investment ties with the US and has sought to limit its dependence on China. Trump's threat of imposing additional tariffs on BRICS countries pursuing de-dollarisation puts India in a difficult position: Even though New Delhi was never in favour of the policy, it would need to clearly communicate that it is not retreating under threat. The economic asymmetry within BRICS has also spilled over in the way Beijing has used the New Development Bank, the group's flagship financial institution. While India has borrowed for its infrastructure projects, it is China that has been able to leverage its economic power to shape the discussion at the NDB around infrastructure and connectivity, which in turn bolsters its Belt and Road Initiative. It is not only in the realm of economics that New Delhi has seemingly played second fiddle. More recently, to maintain BRICS cohesion, India signed a joint declaration that condemned the terrorist attack in Pahalgam but did not criticise Pakistan for supporting cross-border terrorism. India has fought long and hard to convince the world that Pakistan promotes and exports terrorism — the BRICS declaration went directly against India's long-held position. In the early years of the forum, BRICS membership likely gave India a larger profile in global governance by providing a mechanism for policy coordination by emerging economies. As China's economic might has continued to grow and its foreign policy has increased in ambition and assertiveness, the forum today might constrain rather than further India's foreign policy objectives. Indian leaders might be well advised to reevaluate BRICS's utility. The writer is associate professor, political science and international affairs, University of Mary Washington
Time of India
02-07-2025
- Automotive
- Time of India
India's battery recycling sector offers lifeline to global EV players as China tightens mineral exports
As China's export restrictions on critical minerals jolt global supply chains, India's battery recycling industry could emerge as a key fallback for countries scrambling to secure rare earth elements used in electric vehicle (EV) motors. A Japanese delegation is scheduled to engage in dialogue with Indian battery recycling ecosystem players including Vedanta and Lohum this week, in what is being seen as a push to diversify away from China-dominated supply chains. The visit comes on the heels of China tightening export controls on essential rare earth elements — including neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium — that are critical to high-performance permanent magnets used in EVs, smartphones, and defence applications. The restrictions have triggered alarm among global automakers, who now face the twin challenges of production delays and rising input costs. India and Japan are learned to have initiated discussions to chart a response, with supply chain resilience high on the agenda. These talks have culminated in the Battery and Critical Minerals Ecosystem Conference being held today at the Embassy of Japan in Delhi, where government officials, OEMs, financiers, and recycling firms from Japan, India, Australia and the US are participating. The Conference will host sessions focused on challenges in refining, recycling, and securing anchor off-takers, all key gaps in India's critical minerals and battery ecosystem. While India is scaling up lithium exploration and refining capabilities, experts say recycling offers a more immediate and scalable solution. Refining and processing capacity remains heavily concentrated in a few countries, posing significant technical and geopolitical risks to global EV and clean tech growth. The conference will also feature closed-door business-to-business (B2B) meetings between Indian recyclers, global OEMs, and financial institutions such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Tata Capital's Decarbonisation Fund, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The idea is to ensure financial backing and anchor customers for new entrants in India's recycling and refining space. Discussions will cover bankability, joint R&D, and long-term offtake agreements — all seen as prerequisites for breaking the dominance of traditional players in the battery and minerals sector. China's tightening grip has forced a rethink in the way global supply chains are structured, with recycling now viewed as a strategic lever — not just an environmental necessity. For India, it opens a window to position itself as a reliable, democratic alternative for critical mineral recovery.
Time of India
02-07-2025
- Automotive
- Time of India
India's battery recycling sector offers lifeline to global EV players as China tightens mineral exports
New Delhi: As China's export restrictions on critical minerals jolt global supply chains, India's battery recycling industry could emerge as a key fallback for countries scrambling to secure rare earth elements used in electric vehicle (EV) motors. A Japanese delegation is scheduled to engage in dialogue with Indian battery recycling ecosystem players including Vedanta and Lohum this week, in what is being seen as a push to diversify away from China-dominated supply chains. The visit comes on the heels of China tightening export controls on essential rare earth elements — including neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium — that are critical to high-performance permanent magnets used in EVs, smartphones, and defence applications. The restrictions have triggered alarm among global automakers, who now face the twin challenges of production delays and rising input costs. India and Japan are learned to have initiated discussions to chart a response, with supply chain resilience high on the agenda. These talks have culminated in the Battery and Critical Minerals Ecosystem Conference being held today at the Embassy of Japan in Delhi, where government officials, OEMs, financiers, and recycling firms from Japan, India, Australia and the US are participating. The Conference will host sessions focused on challenges in refining, recycling, and securing anchor off-takers, all key gaps in India's critical minerals and battery ecosystem. While India is scaling up lithium exploration and refining capabilities, experts say recycling offers a more immediate and scalable solution. Refining and processing capacity remains heavily concentrated in a few countries, posing significant technical and geopolitical risks to global EV and clean tech growth. The conference will also feature closed-door business-to-business (B2B) meetings between Indian recyclers, global OEMs, and financial institutions such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Tata Capital's Decarbonisation Fund, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The idea is to ensure financial backing and anchor customers for new entrants in India's recycling and refining space. Discussions will cover bankability, joint R&D, and long-term offtake agreements — all seen as prerequisites for breaking the dominance of traditional players in the battery and minerals sector. China's tightening grip has forced a rethink in the way global supply chains are structured, with recycling now viewed as a strategic lever — not just an environmental necessity. For India, it opens a window to position itself as a reliable, democratic alternative for critical mineral recovery.
Indian Express
26-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Rajnath refuses to sign SCO draft statement: Significance, explained in 3 points
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on Thursday (June 26) refused to sign the draft statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting, after the document omitted the reference to the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, but mentioned the Jaffar Express hijacking in Pakistan in March. What is the SCO, and what is the significance of Rajnath Singh's action in a China-dominated organisation? We explain in 3 points. The SCO is a grouping of 10 countries, including India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus. The roots of the SCO lie in the 'Shanghai Five' formed in 1996, consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 into 15 independent countries, there were concerns in the region about extremist religious groups and ethnic tensions coming to the fore. To manage these issues, a grouping was created for cooperation on security matters. Building on this, the SCO was established on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai. The group is the world's largest regional organisation by geographical area and population. The SCO is one of the few international organisations with primarily Asian members that deals with security issues. Its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) regularly holds meetings and exchanges information. What happened at the SCO this year? In videos doing the rounds, Rajnath Singh can be seen putting his pen aside and refusing to sign the draft statement. Later, in a briefing, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said, 'India wanted concerns on terrorism to be reflected in the document, which was not acceptable to one particular country, and therefore, the statement was not adopted.' The reference here seems to be to Pakistan. Earlier, in his speech at the SCO, Rajnath had spoken about the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22 and Operation Sindoor. 'During the Pahalgam terror attack, victims were shot after they were profiled on religious identity. The Resistance Front, a proxy of UN-designated terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) claimed responsibility for the attack. The pattern of Pahalgam attack matches with LeT's previous terror attacks in India. India's zero tolerance for terrorism was demonstrated through its actions,' he said. When the SCO draft statement did not mention Pahalgam but talked about the train hijacking in Balochistan — India has long been accused of fomenting trouble in Pakistan's Balochistan, which wants to become an independent nation — India refused to sign the statement. In his speech, Rajnath had focused heavily on terrorism. 'Peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of non-state actors and terror groups. Dealing with these challenges requires decisive action. It is imperative that those who sponsor, nurture and utilise terrorism for their narrow and selfish ends must bear the consequences. Some countries use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide shelter to terrorists. There should be no place for such double standards. SCO should not hesitate to criticise such nations,' he said. What is the significance of Rajnath's actions? The SCO has traditionally been dominated by Russia and China. However, with Russia occupied by the war in Ukraine, China's footprint has grown. This year, Beijing is the SCO chair, and the meeting of defence ministers took place in the east China city of Qingdao. Pakistan is a major ally of China, and Beijing provided aid to Pakistan in the military confrontation with India in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. China has also long used its clout in international fora to shield Pakistan from adverse resolutions. In such a scenario, Rajnath refusing to sign the SCO draft document assumes more significance. No joint statement was issued for this year's SCO meeting as India refused to come on board. This shows India's sustained upholding of the 'no compromise on terrorism' position. India has long made it clear that terrorism and business as usual can't go together. Rajnath's action at the SCO is in line with that. Now, the SCO Council of Heads of State will meet in Tianjin in the autumn, and will be interesting to watch.
