07-07-2025
China's nuclear triad still a one-legged giant
China's rare DF-5 missile disclosure signals growing confidence in its land-based nuclear might – but beneath the display lies a triad still plagued by imbalance and vulnerability.
Last month, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China has publicly disclosed key specifications of its DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time, marking a rare glimpse into the country's traditionally secretive nuclear program.
In a broadcast, state media CCTV described the DF-5 as China's first-generation strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of carrying a single nuclear warhead with an explosive yield of 3 to 4 megatons, approximately 200 times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The two-stage missile, developed in the 1970s and commissioned in 1981, has a maximum range of 12,000 kilometers and an accuracy of 500 meters, enabling it to strike targets across the continental United States and Western Europe. It measures 32.6 meters long, 3.35 meters in diameter, and weighs 183 tons at launch.
Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping said the DF-5 was instrumental in establishing China's nuclear credibility. He saw the disclosure as a signal that more advanced, silo-based systems may soon be introduced as China phases out older platforms.
The move comes amid China's broader modernization of its arsenal, including multiple-warhead variants of the DF-5 and mobile systems. China maintains a no-first-use nuclear policy despite the rapid expansion of its deterrent.
SCMP has also noted that China's DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs mark successive stages in the country's strategic deterrence evolution.
The DF-31, first deployed in 2006, is a three-stage solid-fuel missile with variants—DF-31A and DF-31AG—capable of striking targets up to 13,200 kilometers away and delivering up to four warheads via multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The DF-31AG is road-mobile and off-road capable, enhancing survivability through terrain flexibility.
In contrast, the DF-41, unveiled in 2019, is a fourth-generation, solid-fuel ICBM with a range of 12,000 – 15,000 kilometers and can carry up to 10 MIRVs, although experts estimate a typical load of three warheads plus decoys. With road-mobile, rail-mobile, and silo-based variants, the DF-41 represents a leap in mobility, payload, and launch survivability.
Both systems underscore China's shift toward a more flexible and survivable nuclear deterrent, with the DF-41 eclipsing its predecessors in range, speed (up to Mach 25), and strategic versatility.
Despite rapid modernization, China's nuclear triad remains unbalanced, with significant capability gaps in its sea and air-based legs. This situation forces China to rely on a nuclear strategy founded on shaping perceptions to sustain its no-first-use and assured retaliation posture amid intensifying great power competition.
Citing a March 2025 report by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) notes that China's land-based arsenal remains the cornerstone of its nuclear deterrent, as its nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) leg has far less significant capability, and that its air-based leg, still in early stages of development, is far less capable than its US counterpart.
Exploring the limitations of China's sea-based nuclear deterrent, David Logan notes in a November 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China's efforts to build a sea-based nuclear deterrent remain constrained by significant operational and technical limitations.
He adds that although China has six Type 094 ship submersible ballistic nuclear submarines, the PLA Navy's subs are reportedly noisier than Cold War-era Soviet models, raising doubts about their survivability against advanced US anti-submarine warfare capabilities. He explains that communication vulnerabilities further compound risks, as US surveillance networks across the Pacific can likely detect Chinese submarine transmissions.
He states that the JL-2 missiles carried by earlier SSBNs cannot reach the US mainland from Chinese waters, while newer JL-3 missiles offer more extended range but are not yet widely deployed. He mentions that geographic chokepoints and detection risks also challenge open-ocean patrols, while a bastion strategy near Chinese coasts limits strategic flexibility.
As for China's air-based nuclear arsenal, Aita Moriki mentions in a March 2024 National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) report that China's efforts to establish a credible air-based nuclear deterrent remain constrained by legacy platforms and technical delays.
Aita argues that while the People's Liberation Army Air Force has resumed a nuclear role with the H-6N bomber, its limited range and reliance on aerial refueling restrict its ability to strike the US mainland. He adds that the upcoming H-20 stealth bomber, intended to correct this imbalance, may be delayed to the 2030s according to US assessments, amid skepticism over China's ability to master the necessary technologies.
He expresses skepticism about whether the H-20, even if unveiled soon, will match the capabilities of US counterparts or meaningfully rebalance China's historically missile-centric nuclear triad.
But what do these capability gaps mean for China's nuclear strategy? Hongyu Zhang mentions in an article published this month in the peer-reviewed Chinese Journal of International Politics that China may be using a stopgap 'manufactured deterrence' nuclear strategy.
Despite China's stated 'assured retaliation' and 'no-first-use' policies, Zhang argues that significant second-strike capability gaps force it to pursue opaqueness and ambiguity to create uncertainty in adversary counterforce planning, thereby producing deterrent power.
In the context of great power competition, Zhang says China is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal to bridge the gap between assured retaliation and its stopgap manufactured deterrence strategy.
Adding credence to Zhang's views, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda state in a June 2025 report for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that China's nuclear arsenal totaled at least 600 warheads in January 2025, expanding faster than any other nation.
They add that since 2023, China has added approximately 100 warheads annually and completed 350 new ICBM silos. However, they point out that while this growth positions China to potentially match Russia or the US in silo count by 2030, its projected 1,500 warheads by 2035 still fall short of US and Russian stockpiles.
The DF-5 disclosure reflects confidence in China's land-based deterrent, but enduring gaps in its sea and air legs reveal a triad still built more on opacity than capability, laying bare the strategic tension between China's assured retaliation policy and its uneven nuclear evolution.
