Latest news with #DannyCitrinowicz
Telegraph
25-06-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
What will Iran do next? How they could copy North Korea and race for the bomb
Sometimes, just not being killed is a victory. After 12 days being bombed by everything Israel and the United States could throw at it, the Islamic Republic still stands. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is still alive, and still in power. And as far as the rest of the world knows, he still has some 400kg of highly enriched uranium to play with. 'In Israel we are sure we have won,' says Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli military intelligence officer focused on Iran. 'But in every sense, the Iranians will think they managed to stay for 12 days, bravely. They will say they withstood Israel and America, and they managed to hurt Israel too. So they were not defeated and that in a sense is a victory.' One-and-a-half out of three Israel had two – possibly three – military objectives. The destruction of Iran's nuclear programme; the degrading of its military; and the collapse of its regime. The last, and grandest, has clearly failed – at least for now. Iranians did not take to the streets in an uprising, and nor did Khamenei's inner circle mount a coup to force the old man into retirement in the interests of preserving the regime. If anything, he may be more secure. The hunt for possible traitors has already begun. If previous crackdowns are any guide, the purge will be both ruthless and bloody. The second objective – degrading Iran's military – looks to have been a roaring tactical success, although both the Iranians and Israelis will keep the details of the destruction secret. But it is clear Iran's military has taken a mauling. But the first and most important objective – and the only one shared by the United States – is shrouded in uncertainty. No one seems to know how badly the bombing damaged Iran's enrichment and processing facilities. No one seems to know the location of Iran's 400kg of 60 per cent-enriched uranium – enough for almost a dozen bombs. And nor is it clear that all Iran's nuclear facilities were even known to the Israelis. 'I'm sure they have a hidden place somewhere with some hundreds, if not thousands of centrifuge[s], and they have material all there in several places all over Iran,' Sima Shine, a former head of Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence service, told The Telegraph. 'They cannot do anything now, tomorrow, but in the future, they have all the capabilities [to build a bomb].' More important of all is political calculus. بهت گفته بودم – or 'I told you so' in Farsi For years, hardline Iranian commanders have urged Khamenei to stop procrastinating and just build a damned bomb. No other deterrent, they argued, could protect the regime from American or Israeli attack. Until now, Khamenei has resisted those calls, instead hoping that just the ability to build a bomb could provide the deterrent, but avoid the costs, of actually doing so. With the 12-day war proving that theory useless, the weaponeers will now feel vindicated, and will push their views even harder in Tehran. 'It's exactly the kind of debate that [they will] have at the Supreme National Security Council in Iran, and the Supreme Leader will have to decide about it,' says Citrinowicz. 'If you had asked me before this, I would say Khamenei will not during his lifetime instruct the scientists to build a nuclear bomb, because he understands that the price is too grave. But now they have already paid the price. Do they want to continue to pay future prices? They don't want to be exposed to the mercy of the West.' The backlash In Iran, a backlash against nuclear cooperation with the international community is already underway. Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran's parliament, announced on Tuesday that MPs were 'seeking to pass a bill that will suspend Iran's cooperation with the [International Atomic Energy] Agency (IAEA) until we receive concrete assurances of its professional conduct as an international organisation'. Previously, such rhetoric might have been seen as largely theatrical, rather than evidence of imminent intent to weaponise. But 'everything we thought we knew about Iran has been changed by this war,' says Citrinowicz. 'Until the current war, Iran preferred to do everything by its own capabilities,' he says. 'But if they understand that they need something quick, they might change their nuclear strategy regarding that, and prefer to buy a bomb. For example, from North Korea.' The North Korean model North Korea may provide inspiration in other ways. After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iran shelved its nuclear weapons programme to avoid a similar fate. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi did the same. But North Korea, the third member of George W Bush's 'axis of evil' after Iran and Iraq, instead doubled down, and in 2006 tested its first nuclear weapon. The subsequent fates of those regimes have been very different. Gaddafi was killed by an uprising backed by Nato in 2011. Iran has just been bombed comprehensively by Israel and America. From the point of view of regime survival, perhaps Kim Jong-il and his son Kim Jon Un made the right choice. But can Iran replicate its nuclear dash? In many ways, Iran is – or was – well ahead of the North Korean starting point. It has already mastered domestic uranium enrichment and has studied weaponisation. It has a large domestic resource of scientists trained in nuclear physics. And it already has a chunk of highly-enriched material to start working with. The North Koreans, by contrast, began by building a plutonium bomb with material bred in an ordinary nuclear reactor – a technology they learnt from the Soviets. That is a complicated, painstaking process that limited them to building one bomb a year. It was only later, with information bought from a corrupt Pakistani scientist, that they mastered uranium enrichment and were able to churn out simpler and quicker to build uranium based bombs. If Sima Shine is right that the Iranians have managed to preserve some centrifuges, they could spin up their 400kg of 60 per cent enriched material to weapons-grade 90 per cent in just a couple of days. The tricky bit is moulding the fissile material into the right shape and fitting it with explosive charge and a neutron initiator designed to provoke a chain reaction at just the right moment. Once the mechanism is built, it must be fitted onto a warhead and mounted on a delivery system – in Iran's case, a Shabab-3 liquid-fuelled ballistic missile. Those are fiddly engineering problems, but ones that Iran is known to have already made progress on, says David Albright, a former weapons inspector. 'They have some challenges in finishing up the design and other development steps. So I think six months is what they would need from start to finish' to make the actual weapon, and maybe 'several more months' to mount it on a missile, he told The Telegraph before the American attack on Fordow. 'The weapon-grade uranium part could be done very quickly and probably would be done toward the end of that six months,' he adds. There is another lesson from Korea, he says. 'The Iranians designed their bomb so that it wouldn't need a nuclear test in order to have assurance it would work. But they may indeed test one if they wanted to assert their nuclear status. 'North Korea did that same kind of programme and it fired at one tenth of the expected yield. So you can make a mistake. In the North Korean case, they then saw their mistake and corrected it. The same thing could happen to Iran. That's why I think it takes longer than a couple months from start to finish on the design. I mean, they have to be careful because things can misfire.' Iran's missile forces have also been decimated by Israeli strikes, so it is unclear how many shahabs they still have, or how quickly they could build more. Israeli officials have claimed the bombing raids set the Iranian nuclear program back by up to two years. But can Khamenei wait that long? North Korea is believed to have sold nuclear weapons technology in the past. Specifically, it provided the technology for the Syrian reactor at Al Kibar that Israel destroyed in 2007. They are the only country known to have done so, says Citrinowicz, making them the logical candidate for the Iranians to approach, especially given both countries' alliance with Russia in Ukraine. Rule nothing out But there is a big problem. All of this would depend on the Iranian nuclear programme remaining so secret that neither Israel or America could discover it and destroy it. Given the level of intelligence penetration Iran suffered over the past two weeks, there is no guarantee of that. 'I'm not saying this is going to happen, but I'm saying that we have to look outside the box. We have to be ready for the unexpected,' says Citrinowicz. 'Everything that we knew about Iran changed dramatically after our attack. In this situation right now, we cannot rule out anything.'
New Indian Express
21-06-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Does Trump believe that Iran will not give up its nuclear programme
In this episode of Global Express, we will talk to Danny Citrinowicz, Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, who explains Iran's nuclear situation and why Donald Trump has taken a firm stance against the country.
Newsweek
21-06-2025
- Newsweek
Satellite Images Show Underground Military Installations Around the World
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. Iran's Fordow nuclear facility, buried beneath a mountain near the city of Qom, has become a focus of global military attention following the most recent Israeli airstrikes. It is one of the most heavily fortified military sites in the world, and its resilience highlights a broader pattern: nations around the world have built underground bases to shield key military infrastructure from attack. Fordow is dug half a mile underground, lined with reinforced concrete, and surrounded by air defenses. It was built to survive a direct air strike and keep functioning. "Fordow is the be-all and end-all of Iran's nuclear operation," Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the Financial Times. The site could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for nine nuclear bombs in about three weeks, according to estimates by the Institute for Science and International Security. PlanetScope image of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant captured on June 14, 2025. PlanetScope image of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant captured on June 14, 2025. Planet Labs PBC Iran said the facility was attacked last week, though damage was limited. Most military analysts believe the site could only be heavily damaged or destroyed with an American-made bunker-buster bomb and the B-2 stealth fighter configured to drop it. And even then, it is far from a certainty. Danny Citrinowicz, an analyst at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, told Vijesti, "Without U.S. help, Fordow will be a big challenge. It's heavily fortified and deep in the mountain. I'm not sure how much damage we can do there." Fordow is one of many such facilities. Most major military powers have built underground bunkers—some dating back to the Cold War, others still active. While estimates suggest there could be over 10,000 of these sites worldwide, only a handful are widely known. U.S. Sites In the United States, Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Pennsylvania—also known as the "Underground Pentagon"—connects to Mount Weather in Virginia and Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. These sites are built to maintain government operations in a crisis. Satellite view of the Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Pennsylvania, known as the "Underground Pentagon." The facility includes multiple tunnel entrances and surface structures supporting one of the United States' primary Continuity of Government sites. Satellite view of the Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Pennsylvania, known as the "Underground Pentagon." The facility includes multiple tunnel entrances and surface structures supporting one of the United States' primary Continuity of Government sites. Google Earth Cheyenne Mountain houses NORAD operations and was built to withstand a 30-megaton nuclear blast. In North Dakota, Minot Air Force Base hosts a network of underground silos for nuclear missiles. Texas's West Fort Hood once stored nuclear weapons in tunnels carved into the hillside. During the Cold War, Project Iceworm in Greenland housed nuclear equipment in ice tunnels at Camp Century. At the entrance to the Cheyenne Mountain Complex headquarters for NORAD two military personnel wait to board a bus May 11, 2004 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At the entrance to the Cheyenne Mountain Complex headquarters for NORAD two military personnel wait to board a bus May 11, 2004 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Getty Images Russia and China Russia's secretive underground transport system Metro-2 system, or D-6, is thought to link key command posts beneath Moscow to facilities such as Vnukovo-2 airport. Meanwhile, the mysterious Mount Yamantau in the southern Urals is believed to conceal a vast nuclear weapons storage or command facility. The Kremlin has never confirmed its purpose. Mount Yamantau, another secretive site in the Urals, is widely believed to be a command hub for nuclear operations. Mount Yamantau, another secretive site in the Urals, is widely believed to be a command hub for nuclear operations. Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 Generic China's Longpo Naval Base, located on Hainan Island, includes a sophisticated tunnel system that enables submarines to discreetly enter and exit from the South China Sea. The facility is believed to play a critical role in supporting China's second-strike nuclear capability. It features an underground complex designed to shield nuclear submarines from aerial surveillance and potential attack. The base includes six wharves—each approximately 755 feet long—capable of accommodating up to 12 submarines. Longpo is part of the larger Yulin Naval Base complex, which serves as a strategic hub for the People's Liberation Army Navy's South Sea Fleet. Satellite view of the Longpo Naval Base on China's Yalong Peninsula. Hidden beneath the dense forest, this strategic facility is believed to house underground tunnels connecting directly to the South China Sea, allowing nuclear submarines... Satellite view of the Longpo Naval Base on China's Yalong Peninsula. Hidden beneath the dense forest, this strategic facility is believed to house underground tunnels connecting directly to the South China Sea, allowing nuclear submarines to enter and exit covertly. More Google Earth Project 131 in Hubei was another Cold War-era command site, though it has since been decommissioned. North Korea North Korea has built extensive underground missile bases, including the Kumchang-ri facility discovered in 1989. While Pyongyang claimed it was a food storage site, U.S. intelligence suspected it was used for nuclear work. These bases are carved into mountains and designed to survive strikes. Satellite imagery of the Kumchang-ri underground facility in North Korea. Discovered in the late 1990s, the site was originally claimed to be agricultural, but U.S. intelligence identified it as a suspected nuclear-related complex hidden beneath... Satellite imagery of the Kumchang-ri underground facility in North Korea. Discovered in the late 1990s, the site was originally claimed to be agricultural, but U.S. intelligence identified it as a suspected nuclear-related complex hidden beneath mountainous terrain. Its exact purpose remains classified. More Google Earth Iran's Expansion Fordow is not Iran's only secure site. Tehran is believed to be is building an even more protected facility at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La—also known as Pickaxe Mountain—south of Natanz. This site is planned to be even deeper underground, with at least four tunnel entrances and larger internal space. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been allowed to inspect it. Fordow was built in secret and revealed publicly in 2009 when U.S., British and French officials declassified intelligence on its existence. The disclosure led to increased sanctions and was central to the 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration and known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. After Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term in 2018, Iran resumed higher levels of uranium enrichment by restarting operations at Fordow.
Yahoo
14-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
UN chief Guterres calls on Israel and Iran to de-escalate
UN Secretary General António Guterres on Friday called on Israel and Iran to urgently de-escalate. "Israeli bombardment of Iranian nuclear sites. Iranian missile strikes in Tel Aviv. Enough escalation," Guterres wrote on X. "Time to stop. Peace and diplomacy must prevail." However, both Israel and Iran reported further attacks overnight as the war between the two arch enemies continued. The Iranian attacks were in response to the large-scale assault launched by Israel on Thursday night. Israel, the only nuclear power in the region, primarily targeted Iran's nuclear programme with its large-scale attack. According to Israeli reports, more than 100 targets were hit, including sites in the major cities of Tehran, Tabriz and Shiraz, as well as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. A senior Iran researcher at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies Danny Citrinowicz warned the consequences of the conflict could be far-reaching. "It's important to emphasize: we are only at the beginning of what is likely to be a very different event from previous direct clashes between Israel and Iran,' he told the Wall Street Journal. "This time, it seems to be an 'all-in' campaign, the consequences of which will be far-reaching and significant for Iran's future and the stability of the region."
Saba Yemen
29-05-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Israeli raids on Yemen are futile, Gaza is Key: Citrinowicz
Occupied Quds - Saba: Danny Citrinowicz, a researcher at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), stated that Israel's ability to exert military influence in Yemen is limited and fragmented. He noted that the airstrikes carried out by the Israeli Air Force there do not have a decisive military impact and are futile. In remarks reported by Hebrew media outlets, Citrinowicz emphasized that stopping Yemeni attacks on Israel is impossible as long as the war on the Gaza Strip continues. He pointed out that reaching a ceasefire agreement in Gaza is the only factor capable of ending this threat. Whatsapp Telegram Email Print
