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Balkan Insight
18 hours ago
- Politics
- Balkan Insight
Poland and France, towards a promising reset?
June 27, 2025 - Cyrille Bret - Articles and Commentary Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a groundbreaking treaty in Nancy on May 9th 2025. Photo: Office of the Prime Minister of Poland / Over the last month, Poland has been very high on the French political agenda. Or perhaps we should say, once more. French leaders, diplomats and analysts have been scrutinizing both the diplomatic rapprochement between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Emmanuel Macron on May 9th, as well as the presidential election leading to the victory of the PiS supported candidate, Karol Nawrocki, on June 1st. Closely followed by Paris, these two major political events can appear to be puzzling. On the one hand, the Polish leadership is taking important steps in reviving its relation with Paris, Brussels and the 'European liberal mainstream'. Yet, on the other hand, the Polish voters sent a conservative and Eurosceptic message to its own coalition government and to all the liberal European leaders. But let us focus on the bilateral relations between France and Poland and on the perception that the French have now acquired of Poland's fast-growing role in Europe. Back to square one? Since the appointment of Donald Tusk as prime minister on December 13th, after a tense general election, the French government had been experiencing a 'Polish relief'. The 'PiS decade' seemed to be over, the Weimar Triangle was back on track and political and economic ties could be revamped. Cooperation at the European level was to overcome the stumbling blocks of the constitutional and judicial system reforms implemented by the previous Morawiecki government and the Duda presidency. However, the victory of Nawrocki in the second highly disputed round of the presidential election has been seen in Paris as a setback to the potential reset in bilateral relations, as well as the 'Polish normalization' hoped for by Macron. Assessing Polish political life by their own standards, the French elites branded those electoral results as 'mixed messages' to Warsaw's partners in Europe. Indeed, the PiS candidate, now president elect, who will take office on August 6th, has often been labelled in France as the 'Polish Trump'. He is continuously criticized for his Eurosceptic stance by the ruling parties. What seems to be mixed messages from Paris are in fact domestically understandable. The Polish political stage is, has been, and probably will remain, divided, disputed and heated. Thus, Paris must live with a recurring question: can Poland be trusted as a reliable partner (to Macron) on the European stage? Or is the promising reset established in Nancy already ailing? Is there now any 'Polish relief' or is it 'back to square one'? A personal and electoral rapprochement To France, in the long, rich and sometimes tumultuous alliance between Warsaw and Paris, a significant milestone was reached on May 9th in Nancy. Back then, the two countries added a new comprehensive bilateral treaty to their multilateral agreements (EU, NATO, Weimar Triangle, etc.) that have bound them together since the end of the communist bloc and the 2004 EU enlargement. To Paris, Macron and the liberal Europhile elites of the business circles, this strategic agreement is of real substance. Many pro-government French media outlets have been highlighting the mutual assistance clause of the treaty, comparing it to the pre-war alliance against Nazi Germany and underlining its importance for the European Union's defence initiatives. Within NATO and Europe, such bilateral military agreements are rare: during the Macron presidency, the only precedent is the strategic agreement signed with Greece in 2021. And outside of Europe, France is striking such deals only with prominent military powers such as India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This has been done in support of the country's defence industry campaigns. To a lesser extent, some diplomats and observers have emphasized that the new course taken by the bilateral relationship has put an end to a decade-long period of partisan frictions between the PiS Polish governments and the diplomacy of Hollande and Macron. With the Morawiecki government and Macron's time in office, relations have been at their lowest for many years. The 'Nancy sequence' is nonetheless not deprived of ambiguity from the French perspective. First, with this treaty, Paris is a 'diplomatic follower' rather than a strategic pioneer. Indeed, it has been a while now since Poland has become an economic superpower in the EU. The more recent military build-up of Warsaw has also already taken place. Second, it can be contended that France's rapprochement with Poland is taking place quite late because it is prompted by partisan affinities between Macron and Tusk. The new treaty can even be seen as direct partisan support to the Civic Coalition campaign for the Polish presidential election. The strategic rapprochement is in the making but the electoral mutual support is even more obvious. Catching up with a lost decade This agreement is meant to trigger a 'reset' between Paris and Warsaw. It has been branded as a 'new chapter' by President Macron. The French authorities have given their best to make it symbolic and solemn, by choosing the right place and time. As for the place, all French kids learn at school that Nancy is the urban embodiment of Polish influence in France due to the role of the Duke of Lorraine, Stanislas Leszczynski. The city shows the traditional yet structural impact of Poland in France, along with the musical works of Chopin and the scientific achievement of Curie. Undisputedly, the new treaty has been signed in the most Polish town of France. As for the time, the French presidency has chosen to sign the treaty exactly when Warsaw and Paris have converged in supporting Ukraine, resisting the new US presidential administration and launching a new European defence initiative. Killing two birds with one stone, President Macron is catching up with the Polish economic miracle and supporting the Civic Coalition electoral campaign. Indeed, the treaty goes far beyond security and defence cooperation and cements various economic ties and endeavours. France and Poland have been partnering for a long time in order to bolster an ambitious EU Common Agriculture Policy. They even had a clear, objective alliance throughout the PiS versus Macron controversies to protect this almost federal policy against fiscal cuts. New fields of cooperation are now being opened up by the 'Nancy spirit', such as nuclear energy. This is likely to create business opportunities in Poland regarding the jewels of the (French) crown, such as the major state companies EDF, Orano and Framatome. Nuclear energy, defence, agriculture… All these topics are very dear to French (political) hearts and to Macron's policies. One can say that the Polish charm offensive in France has been impressive. And that France has ultimately been rewarded for initiatives it did not take over the last decade. Towards a common roadmap? Can this agreement lead to concrete outcomes for France, Poland and the European Union? Let us put aside the tactical rapprochement, the electoral fight and the PR operations. Instead, it is better to assess the real level of potential that exists after the PiS victory in the presidential election. At their heart, the structural needs of the two countries can be combined and realigned. But at this stage we only are witnessing a convergence in the making. Poland – even with a president supported by PiS – needs to diversify its alliance network and enlarge its risk mitigation tools. The second Trump administration could prove be attractive for many PiS politicians. But it cannot be seen as reliable regarding the security of the country in the long run: all Polish citizens have witnessed the way Ukraine is constantly bullied by the US, the pro-Russian stance taken by President Trump, and his negligence towards NATO commitments. In a way, Poland can use the French strategic stance on the US to rebalance its influence on the US and in NATO. Both countries need also to make the most of the ReARM initiative. After all, they have large needs, enjoy solid defence industrial companies, and fear the German market share in the domain. Moreover, on Ukraine, Poland has gradually set the tone in Paris. For example, both countries now converge in their 'unwavering support' to Kyiv; they share the proposition to put 'boots on the ground' to secure any potential peace agreement; and they want to shape the ceasefire talks on Ukraine. May aspects of the structural bonds remain to be strengthened and disagreements to be bridged. First, economic and trade links are weak: Poland is only the tenth trade partner of France, while France is the fifth trade partner of Poland. Second, the Weimar Triangle (often declining but regularly revived) needs to be stabilized to become a more efficient scheme. The window of opportunity is there: Macron, Merz and Tusk have common goals. But Germany is obviously tempted to sing its own song. The 'Nancy spirit' can only become a real common roadmap if concrete actions are taken together in the long run. Reality checks The real impact of the 2025 bilateral treaty and the materialization of the 'Nancy spirit' are to be assessed in the coming months and years. Reality checks are to be performed, especially at times when the Macron presidency is entering its last period. Stumbling blocks are to be overcome on migration policies, Ukraine's EU accession process (France is tempted to delay it), economic ties (Poland relies on Germany, not on France) and domestic political fights (PiS will remain the main target of Macron's European politics). Progress is also to be made in the economic field, and fast. Yet, Poland and France can make all the difference in making sure that Europeans have a seat at the negotiation table on Ukraine and that Germany will seriously rearm. As of today, relations between the two countries are proving to be promising. Let us closely follow whether the administrations will keep their promises. The reset is on its way. However, it is far from its destination. Cyrille Bret is an associate researcher at Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. Donald Tusk, Eastern flank, Emmanuel Macron, EU, Europe, France, Poland, Polish foreign policy, Polish-French relations
New York Post
21 hours ago
- Politics
- New York Post
EU leaders call for immediate cease-fire in Gaza
The European Council, composed of the heads of state or of government of the 27 E.U. member states, the president of the European Council and the president of the European Commission, called for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza on Thursday. The council, meeting in Brussels, called for a 'cease-fire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities,' it said in its conclusions issued at an E.U. summit meeting in Brussels where developments in the Middle East were discussed. The council said it 'deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation. The European Council calls on Israel to fully lift its blockade on Gaza, to allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza and to enable the U.N. and its agencies, and humanitarian organizations, to work independently and impartially to save lives and reduce suffering,' the conclusions read. 6 The European Council met in Brussels and called for a 'cease-fire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages.' dts News Agency Germany/Shutterstock 6 European Council President Antonio Costa (L), Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk (C) and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the end of a press conference after working sessions at the European Council. AFP via Getty Images The text continued: 'Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. The European Council recalls the imperative of ensuring the protection of all civilians, including humanitarian workers, at all times, as well as of civilian infrastructure, including medical facilities, schools and U.N. premises.' The European Council also deplored 'the refusal of Hamas to hand over the remaining hostages.' The E.U. leaders took note of the review report prepared by the E.U.'s External Service on Israel's compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and invited the E.U.'s foreign ministers to continue discussions on a follow-up, as appropriate, in July, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground. 6 According to conclusions issued at an E.U. summit, the council said it 'deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation.' AFP via Getty Images 6 Palestinians searching through the rubble of heavily damaged and collapsed buildings after Israeli attacks on Al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza City. The review report concluded that there were 'indications' that Israel was in breach of its human rights obligations under Article 2 of the Association Agreement with its actions in Gaza. The Association Agreement At a meeting of the E.U. foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday, E.U. foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced that she would address the report results with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar. The E.U. foreign ministers will discuss the topic again in July to see if they decide to take measures against Israel. 'Our first goal is to change the situation on the ground [in Gaza] and help the humanitarian aid get in and help the people. So today was the beginning of the debate and not the end,' Kallas told reporters after the ministerial meeting. 6 Internally displaced Palestinians gather in a charity kitchen to receive limited rations amid a food shortage in Nuseirat Palestinian refugee camp. 'If the situation does not improve, then we can also discuss further measures and come back to this at the next Foreign Affairs Council in July,' she said. The review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement was decided in May after a majority of E.U. member states supported a proposal of Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp. In a letter to Kallas, Sa'ar requested to shelve the report prepared by the E.U. on Article 2 of the Association Agreement, writing: 'In the name of fairness, the flaws in the composition of the report should be addressed and it should be completely disregarded.' The report, he continued, 'completely ignores our detailed answers to the questions submitted to us.' 6 People walk away as smoke erupts from a fire following an Israeli strike at the UNRWA's Osama bin Zaid school in the northern Gaza Strip. AFP via Getty Images During the Article 2 review process, the E.U. submitted a series of question to Israel. In its answers to the questions, the Israeli foreign ministry recalled the 'strategic reality Israel is facing: since October 7, Israel has been fighting a war on seven fronts. Iran, with its extremist ideology, is aiming to eliminate the State of Israel. Iran's regime has long pursued the annihilation of the Jewish state through a nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and a network of terrorist proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. 'This plan erupted violently on October 7, when Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped hundreds, marking the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust,' the ministry added. 'It is against this backdrop—Israel's combat with a host of brutal enemies—that the E.U. was tasked with doing a 'rush job,' compiling a biased and extremely one-sided summary of many anti-Israeli voices and documents into a so-called 'honest report' for the member states of the E.U.''
Bloomberg
a day ago
- Politics
- Bloomberg
Tusk Says Ballot Recount Unlikely to Reverse Presidential Result
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said suspected voting irregularities in the country's June 1 presidential election were unlikely to lead to a reversal of the victory of nationalist Karol Nawrocki. The premier called for a recount of votes from some polling station in the contest, in which his ally, Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski, was narrowly defeated. Poland's Supreme Court, which validates the election, received thousands of complaints after the tight election.
The Star
4 days ago
- Business
- The Star
Poland freezes household electricity prices until year-end
WARSAW, June 24 (Xinhua) -- Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on Tuesday that electricity prices for individual consumers will remain frozen until the end of the year. The measure, which caps electricity prices at 500 zloty (136.38 U.S. dollars) per megawatt-hour (MWh), was initially set to expire in September. The extension is part of the government's broader effort to shield consumers from inflation and high energy costs amid ongoing global market volatility. "Individual electricity consumers can rest easy," Tusk said at a press briefing. "We had frozen prices until the end of September, and we have decided that we can safely extend this until the end of the year." Tusk also noted that the ongoing decline in energy market prices suggests there may be no significant changes in tariffs next year from the consumer's perspective. The decision followed consultations with Minister of Climate and Environment Paulina Hennig-Kloska, who said earlier this month that any extension would depend on an analysis of new tariffs submitted by energy companies. Under current regulations, energy providers are required to submit their proposed post-September tariffs to the Energy Regulatory Office by the end of July. (1 Polish zloty = 0.27 U.S. dollar)
The Guardian
4 days ago
- Business
- The Guardian
Armed by America: how Europe's militaries depend on the US
European leaders will meet with Donald Trump at a Nato summit on Tuesday, as the alliance prepares to approve a significant boost to defence spending. A new target for every member to spend 5% of GDP – more than double Nato's current benchmark – marks a major win for the US president, who has long railed against America footing the bill for Europe's security. That concern is now increasingly mutual. European governments are pursuing an unprecedented push for military independence, amid fears the US is no longer a reliable ally. 'Don't ask America what it can do for our security. Ask yourselves what we can do for our own security,' said the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, in an address to EU lawmakers in January. But when it comes to raw firepower, the bloc has a long way to go. Europe's militaries still overwhelmingly rely on US-made weapons and equipment, according to Guardian analysis of stockpile data that raises doubts about ambitions for European-led rearmament. Close to half of the fighter jets in active service across European air forces originate from the US, while American – rather than European – missile defence systems remain the most widely deployed on the continent. American hardware also features prominently in stocks of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery deployed by European nations. This deep reliance on Washington for key military capabilities has been starkly exposed by recent moves from the Trump administration, prompting alarm in Brussels. The suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March has been a major flashpoint, as well as Trump's recent suggestion that Europe may soon be sold downgraded American fighter jets. Yet, despite efforts to bolster homegrown defence, European states are still turning to the US to plug critical gaps. In the past five years, the EU27, the UK, Norway and Switzerland have bought more than 15,000 missiles, 2,400 armoured vehicles and 340 aircraft from the US – far outstripping what European states buy from one another. In some cases, EU countries are buying more weapons from suppliers such as Israel and South Korea than from their continental neighbours. This includes nations central to European defence concerns in 2025 – Poland and the Baltic states bordering Russia. But even among Europe's big four, only France buys more equipment from Europe than from the US. Britain, Germany and Italy still predominantly shop in Washington. The UK is notably more pro-American than other European powers. Keir Starmer, the prime minister, described the US as the UK's 'first partner in defence' when he unveiled the conclusions of a major defence review at the start of June. The Guardian analysis below, based on arms transfer data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) and stockpile figures published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), reveals just how deeply embedded the US defence industry is in European armies. Since 2020, the EU, the UK and Norway have bought a total of 26,036 missiles from other states. Less than 10% of these missiles were part of deals between European states. The lion's share were American missiles bought by Europe in same period. The rest were largely from Israel, at just under 7,000, and South Korea, at 2,000. There is a similar pattern with other weapon types – such as the armoured vehicles and aircraft purchased by Europe since 2020. American imports top the list, followed by imports from other European states and then the rest of the world. But US dominance in European arsenals goes beyond sheer quantity. Many of the most advanced weapons on the continent are American-made. These include the F series of American fighter jets, which dominate Europe's air forces. The latest model is the F-35 Lightning II, a cutting-edge aircraft developed by Lockheed Martin that is prized for its stealth and sensor fusion capabilities. 'There are European alternatives, but none of them compete with the F-35,' said Camille Grand, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. The aircraft's main competitors – the Eurofighter Typhoon and French-made Rafale – are in active service in only a minority of European air forces. Instead, at least 38 F-35s were delivered from the US to Europe in 2024, to countries including Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK. According to experts, the reliance on the F-35 encapsulates Europe's broader problem with advanced weapon manufacturing: a lack of pooled resources, in contrast to the deep pockets of the US military. 'The key is there is a very big cost to develop this stuff. The F-35 is a hugely expensive programme,' said Guntram Wolff, a senior fellow at the thinktank Bruegel. 'If you want this kind of fighter jet, you need a huge upfront investment. And for any individual European country to do that, it's actually quite difficult. 'After all, we are all relatively small countries compared to the US. So fiscally, that would be a huge burden.' Europe, instead, tends to manufacture older or more established forms of military technology – tanks, other armoured vehicles and artillery – where domestic industries are more mature. The German-made Leopard tank is widespread among European land forces, while the British army uses the Challenger, the French the Leclerc and the Italians the Ariete. But outside the big four, many countries lack a sizable domestic defence industry. 'Poland is the odd one out in terms of large European countries,' said Wolff. 'They don't really have a strong domestic industry, so they buy a lot from abroad'. Poland has been on a weapon-buying spree since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but it has turned to non-European countries for key pieces of equipment. In 2024 Poland had its first deliveries of M1A1 Abrams tanks, following a $1.4bn deal with the US signed in 2023. Tanks from South Korea have also been arriving – 56 units of the K2 Black Panther in 2024. 'The Poles have bought so many tanks in the last few years, from American and South Korean sources, that they will soon have more tanks than the French, British and German armies combined,' said Grand. For many European countries, the benefits of buying American go beyond the hardware. US deals often come with closer integration into wider US military systems – what defence experts call 'strategic enablers': satellite-based intelligence, secure communication channels or early warning systems. But relying on the US comes with risk, given that the demand for American weapons is global. Grand explained: 'There is misperception in Europe that the US is a gigantic Walmart with everything available off the shelf. 'The reality, and especially for complex weapons, is that you end up in a queue. So you buy something and it will be delivered in two, three, five years, depending on where you are in the queue. 'You're not only competing with other European customers, but you're also competing with the American customer, which always gets priority, and you're competing with the Israelis, the Saudis, the Emirates, the Asian market.' And yet, for nearly the entire postwar period, the US has been the main non-domestic supplier of arms to European countries. For western Europe this trade relationship has been consistent since the 1950s. For eastern European countries, arms deals with the US only took off at the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But there is now a concerted push within Brussels to deepen defence ties between member states. In March, the European Commission announced a €150bn loans scheme to prioritise more weapon purchases within the bloc and allied countries, rather than the US. EU leaders have directly framed the package, called Security Action for Europe (Safe), as a response to Russian aggression. 'We don't have a cold war, but we have a hot war on European soil, and the threat is existential. It's as real as it can get,' the bloc's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas,told reporters. For Grand, Safe is 'a step in the right direction' – the loans will include more favourable terms to joint purchases 'to incentivise Europeans to buy the same kit' and reduce fragmentation on defence. But it also raises questions: 'The commission is trying to have a sort of single market for European weapons. But then the question is, what do we mean by single market? Does it include the UK and Norway?' The new deal announced by the UK and the EU at the end of May offers some answers. A new security partnership agreed by Starmer and European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, has opened the door to British defence companies getting more lucrative contracts funded by Safe loans. The two sides must now finalise an agreement that will enable British defence companies to be part of joint procurements funded by Safe. Not all EU member states have welcomed the move towards greater defence integration, however. The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, and the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, are among those who have voiced opposition to Safe, citing concerns about the impact on EU debt and national sovereignty. But, according to Wolffe, old arguments against military cooperation in Europe are being met with a new kind of response. 'Historically, there's this notion that greater cooperation is questionable for sovereignty, and you've got to be careful not to share too much of your defence industry with your neighbours,' he said. 'But the counter argument that many are pushing is that at the moment we have a huge dependency on the US. And that means sovereignty doesn't sit in Europe – it's in Washington.'
