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Atlantic
09-07-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
A New Western Alliance Against a Nuclear Iran
At the June Group of Seven meeting in Canada, Germany's chancellor, Friedrich Merz, answered a reporter's question about Israel's attacks on Iran that were then taking place: 'This is the dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us.' He added to the German journalist, 'We are also affected by this regime. This mullah regime has brought death and destruction to the world.' The chancellor's candor was notable, and he wasn't finished. A few days later, back in Germany, after the United States had joined Israel in striking Iran's nuclear-weapons program, Merz said: 'There is no reason for us and also for me personally to criticize what Israel started a week ago and also no reason to criticize what America did last weekend. It is not without risk, but leaving it as it was wasn't an option either.' Such insights are important coming from any European leader, but especially from Germany's. Rather than condemning military action, Merz acknowledged the reality that, in effect, Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism and one of its most dangerous nuclear proliferators. He said out loud what many of his fellow European leaders knew but couldn't bring themselves to admit, and in doing so, reversed two decades of European Union policy in support of failed diplomacy with Iran. Merz now recognized that the logic of force, whether in self-defense in Israel's case or preemptively in America's, had become overwhelming. The rationale for military action had become only more compelling when Tehran unleashed its 'ring of fire' assaults against Israel after Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack. If the Trump administration had any strategic sense, it would immediately seize the opportunity Merz has provided. Regardless of whether European leaders might ever have initiated the strikes against Iran, they have now occurred—and they define a new reality about Iran's nuclear-proliferation threat. President Donald Trump has been offered a great chance to lead a united Western alliance that can reconsolidate tactics against Iran's nuclear efforts. Listen: What does Khamenei do now? The EU's efforts to cajole the mullahs into giving up their nuclear ambitions date back to 2003. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3, as they called themselves then) wanted to prove that they could thwart Iran's quest for weapons of mass destruction through diplomacy, in pointed contrast to George W. Bush's military action against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. The EU aspired to a higher purpose, as two commentators noted in Foreign Affairs in 2007: 'The European doctrine of managed globalization envisions a world of multilateral rules that will supersede U.S. power.' Over a dozen years and through many permutations, these negotiations with Tehran led to the deeply flawed 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The EU-3 efforts did have one virtue. From the start, they pressured Iran to forswear uranium-enrichment activity before being permitted access to Western nuclear-reactor technology. The Europeans also insisted that Iran refrain from reprocessing spent reactor fuel to extract plutonium, the alternative source of fissile material for a bomb. These crucial prohibitions, the EU-3 believed, would block Iranian nuclear-weapons ambitions while affording Tehran the benefit of civil uses of atomic energy for electrical power, medical research, and the like. When President Bush agreed in 2006 to join the European diplomatic initiative, he did so on the express precondition that Iran suspend its enrichment activities. He wanted to oblige the mullahs to renounce both ends of the nuclear-fuel cycle in exchange for receiving civil nuclear technology. Initially, the Obama administration continued with the no-enrichment, no-reprocessing position that Bush had established—until desperation to get a deal ultimately meant caving on this central element of the EU-3's long-standing strategy. That concession to Tehran was the 2015 deal's original sin. President Trump was right to withdraw from the Obama administration's misbegotten project in 2018—even though the EU signatories remain pledged to the zombie agreement to this day. Iran, of course, never had the slightest interest in renouncing domestic mastery of the entire nuclear-fuel cycle. As a practical matter, this was perfectly logical for a regime that saw getting the bomb as central to its survival: How else could the Iranians produce nuclear weapons free from external reliance and therefore vulnerability? These self-evident truths demonstrated so palpably Iran's intention to become a nuclear-weapons state, rather than merely a green-energy success story, that I was always baffled by how anyone could mistake Tehran's true objective. After last month's Israeli and American military strikes, including Israel's targeting of Iran's senior nuclear scientists, that historical issue is now moot. Iran has neither shown remorse nor indicated any inclination to give up its long quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran's immediate response to the attacks was to declare Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ' enemies of God,' which, coming from a theocracy, sounds serious. The regime immediately began work to excavate the deeply buried nuclear facilities at Fordo that had been struck by U.S. bunker-buster bombs. After personally threatening the International Atomic Energy Agency's director general, Rafael Grossi, Tehran suspended all cooperation with the agency. These are not the actions of a government seeking serious diplomacy. By contrast, amid all its problems, Israel is helping Ukraine repair damage to water systems caused by Russian attacks. The 2015 deal has become a dead letter, but its nominal expiration date of October 18 coincides with the Trump administration's new opportunity to pull in its EU partners to create a solid Western position that would put more international pressure on Iran's highly stressed leadership. Even more important, a resolute West would encourage internal Iranian dissidents to express their opposition to the regime more forcefully, encouraging fragmentation within its senior ranks. A renewed Western alliance has no guarantee of success against Iran. Its restoration would not ensure solidarity on other fronts, such as Ukraine, where the Trump administration may be pulling away from the international support for Kyiv. Nor would it ensure the future of NATO, whose superficially friendly summit in The Hague last month merely carried its members past one more potential flash point. But revived Western cooperation on Iran might at least give those inside the Trump administration who still prize America's alliances hope that all is not yet lost.
Indian Express
22-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
India wary about Iran's nuclear project: Voted against in 2005, abstained in 2024
Almost 20 years after India voted against Iran's nuclear programme for the first time, Delhi's careful balancing act — between Israel and the US on one side and Iran on the other side — has come into play. While India has always tried to walk the diplomatic tightrope walk, its discomfort over Iran with a nuclear weapon was apparent then. On September 24, 2005, India voted with 21 other countries on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) resolution (GOV/2005/77) which found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. This was seen as a departure from the past, as India had voted with the US and the western bloc against Iran, which was in its extended neighbourhood and with whom it has a historical and civilisational relationship. This was the time when India had just started negotiating its agreement with the US on its civilian nuclear programme, and Washington was able to lean on Delhi to vote against Tehran. Delhi, which was keen to portray its responsible behaviour as a nuclear power, went along with the idea that voting against Iran's nuclear programme would burnish its reputation. However, the resolution did not refer the matter immediately to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and India was one of the countries which urged the western bloc of European countries — UK, France and Germany (EU-3) — to keep the issue at the IAEA. According to Indian officials, India voted for the resolution at that time, against the majority of NAM members who abstained, because it felt obligated to do so after having pressured the EU-3 to omit reference to immediate referral to the UNSC. Months later, on February 4, 2006, India again sided with the US when the IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. 'As a signatory to the NPT, Iran has the legal right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international commitments and obligations… (But) it is incumbent upon Iran to exercise these rights in the context of safeguards that it has voluntarily accepted upon its nuclear programme under the IAEA,' then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Parliament on February 17, 2006. Over the years, as India negotiated the nuclear deal with the US, Delhi came out of the pressure to vote against Tehran as the issue went to the UNSC. Sources said that once the matter went to the UNSC, India did not have to take any position on Iran's nuclear programme between 2007 and 2024. In between, the US administration under President Barack Obama negotiated the JCPOA (joint comprehensive plan of action) with Iran in 2015 — which was a deal between P-5+1 and Iran. US President Donald Trump walked out of the JCPOA in 2017, and Iran's nuclear programme once again came under scrutiny. India was forced to stop oil imports from Iran, although its Chabahar port project development was going on. While it did not have to take any firm position against Iran's nuclear programme, that changed last year when the US brought in a resolution against Iran. In June 2024, India abstained from a vote at the IAEA regarding Iran. The vote, initiated by the US, aimed to censure Iran for its nuclear programme. While the resolution passed, with 19 out of 35 board members voting to censure Iran, India was among the 16 countries that abstained. This decision reflected India's balancing act between its deep defence and security relationship with Israel and its historical ties with Iran. In September 2024, India again abstained from voting on a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors that censured Iran for its lack of cooperation with the agency's investigations into its nuclear programme. The resolution, brought by France, the UK, and Germany (E3) along with the US, followed an IAEA report noting Iran's increased uranium enrichment. In June this year too, India abstained on the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution strongly criticising Iran's nuclear programme and declaring it in breach of its 1974 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This time, India's decision to abstain from the vote reflected its balanced stance — recognising Iran's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy programme while calling upon Tehran to adhere to its non-proliferation commitments. While the change, from voting against to abstention, marks Delhi's shifting positions as geopolitical alignments changed, India's concern about the Iranian nuclear programme was evident. Shubhajit Roy, Diplomatic Editor at The Indian Express, has been a journalist for more than 25 years now. Roy joined The Indian Express in October 2003 and has been reporting on foreign affairs for more than 17 years now. Based in Delhi, he has also led the National government and political bureau at The Indian Express in Delhi — a team of reporters who cover the national government and politics for the newspaper. He has got the Ramnath Goenka Journalism award for Excellence in Journalism '2016. He got this award for his coverage of the Holey Bakery attack in Dhaka and its aftermath. He also got the IIMCAA Award for the Journalist of the Year, 2022, (Jury's special mention) for his coverage of the fall of Kabul in August 2021 — he was one of the few Indian journalists in Kabul and the only mainstream newspaper to have covered the Taliban's capture of power in mid-August, 2021. ... Read More
Al Arabiya
13-02-2025
- Business
- Al Arabiya
Reinstatement of maximum pressure: What does that mean for Iran?
Less than a month into President Donald Trump's second term, he reintroduced the 'Maximum Pressure' policy against Iran, aiming to increase economic and political pressure to curtail the country's nuclear ambitions and regional influence. This was a strategy that Trump implemented during his first term, and the renewed version could have even more devastating consequences for a country already facing significant challenges. For all the latest headlines follow our Google News channel online or via the app. Before Donald Trump took office, Iran was increasingly worried about the possibility of renewed US sanctions under the incoming administration. In anticipation of such actions, the Iranian government took proactive measures, including initiating nuclear talks with the EU-3 (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) and showing an unexpected willingness to engage in diplomacy. In fact, Iran signaled openness to negotiating a new deal. This gesture was widely seen as a tactical move on the part of the Iranian government. While it appeared as if Iran was ready for diplomacy, analysts believed this overture was primarily aimed at avoiding the economic pressure that had plagued the country during the first years of Trump's presidency. Moreover, many skeptics argued that Iran's diplomatic offer was more about buying time and weakening the potential international coalition against them, rather than a genuine willingness to resolve longstanding issues. Despite these moves, the Trump administration remained steadfast in its commitment to the 'maximum pressure' policy. It was clear that Iran's attempt at engaging diplomatically would not deter the Trump administration. Trump and his allies, particularly within the Republican Party, are opposed to any form of negotiations with the Iranian regime. The Republican stance is rooted in the belief that Iran could not be trusted to comply with any agreement, citing violations of previous deals and the Islamic Republic's continued destabilizing behavior in the region. Thus, diplomatic efforts were sidelined, and the 'maximum pressure' campaign would move forward full force, with the promise of severe sanctions targeting all aspects of Iran's economy. When the campaign was first implemented during Trump's first term, Iran felt the brunt of a multifaceted sanctions strategy that aimed to cut off its oil exports, freeze its access to international banking systems, and severely limit its economic transactions with the outside world. The consequences of these measures were profound, affecting the Iranian economy, the political landscape, and the social fabric of the country. The most immediate effect of the reimposed sanctions was on Iran's economy. As the sanctions cut off Iranian oil exports, which had long been a key source of government revenue, the country's economic growth came to a screeching halt. Iran's GDP contracted significantly, and unemployment surged as businesses shuttered due to the lack of raw materials, the collapse of credit, and the shrinking pool of consumers with purchasing power. Inflation reached alarming levels, with the Iranian rial losing more than 90 percent of its value against the US dollar. This devaluation made basic goods and services, from food to medicine, significantly more expensive, leading to widespread poverty and social instability. Politically, the sanctions not only crippled the economy but also fueled internal dissent. The Iranian government faced increasing pressure from both the public and opposition groups, who blamed the government for mismanaging the country's resources and failing to address the economic downturn. Protests broke out in major cities, with citizens taking to the streets to demand better living conditions and an end to government corruption. In some instances, the unrest took on a political nature, with demands for regime change and calls for greater freedoms. Despite heavy crackdowns on demonstrators, the unrest continued, showcasing the political fragility of the Iranian regime in the face of economic collapse. Now, in 2025, the reimposition of the 'maximum pressure' policy finds Iran in a significantly weaker position than it was when the campaign was first launched. Several factors contribute to this vulnerability, each of which will likely exacerbate the impact of the renewed sanctions. One of the most significant blows to Iran's regional influence came with the loss of its ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose regime, once a staunch partner in Iran's regional ambitions, was recently toppled. Syria was crucial for Iran, allowing it to establish a foothold in the Levant, supply Hezbollah in Lebanon, and exert influence in the broader Middle East. With al-Assad's fall, Iran's presence in Syria was eradicated, and the new Syrian government made it clear that it would not maintain the same alliance with Iran. This loss of an important strategic partner has stripped Iran of much of its influence in the region. On the global stage, Russia, already bogged down in its own military conflict with Ukraine, has limited capacity to assist Iran in mitigating the effects of US sanctions. As the 'maximum pressure' policy kicks in once again, it is clear that Iran will face a far harsher set of consequences than during the first implementation of the strategy. Several factors suggest that the Iranian economy will experience even deeper declines than before, and the social and political ramifications could lead to an even more volatile situation. The rial will likely depreciate further, and inflation could spiral out of control, making basic goods unaffordable for most of the population. Sanctions will continue to isolate Iran from the global financial system, cutting off critical revenue streams and hindering the government's ability to function effectively. The already fragile Iranian political system could be pushed to the brink of collapse. The economic downturn, coupled with the failure of the government to address the demands of the population, could spark widespread protests and calls for regime change. Political instability could grow as factions within the government jockey for power and public trust in the leadership continues to erode. The social impact of the sanctions could be catastrophic. The public's frustration will likely reach a boiling point. The Iranian people, who have already endured years of hardship, may no longer tolerate the government's inability to provide for their basic needs. The potential for large-scale social unrest and uprisings is high, as the population reacts to both the economic pressures and the perceived failure of the government to secure the nation's future. In conclusion, while Iran has made some attempts to change tactics and offer diplomacy in a last-ditch effort to avoid further sanctions, the 'maximum pressure' campaign has been fully reimplemented. Given Iran's weakened position due to regional losses, military strain, and global isolation, this renewed pressure is expected to have far more severe consequences than before. The Iranian government is in a much weaker position to withstand the pressure, and the likelihood of economic, political, and social crises is significantly higher. The coming months will likely see escalating tensions, with Iran facing a precarious future as it grapples with the renewed pressure from the United States.
