Latest news with #EmmanuelMacron
News18
7 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
Macron Gets 'Spun Like A Beyblade' By Erdogan In Awkward Handshake At NATO Watch
A brief yet awkward interaction between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron has caught widespread attention on social incident took place on Wednesday during their meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands. A video clip of the greeting, shared by Russia's RT network, quickly went viral ğan Source: Reuters News18 Mobile App -
Balkan Insight
7 hours ago
- Politics
- Balkan Insight
Poland and France, towards a promising reset?
June 27, 2025 - Cyrille Bret - Articles and Commentary Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a groundbreaking treaty in Nancy on May 9th 2025. Photo: Office of the Prime Minister of Poland / Over the last month, Poland has been very high on the French political agenda. Or perhaps we should say, once more. French leaders, diplomats and analysts have been scrutinizing both the diplomatic rapprochement between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Emmanuel Macron on May 9th, as well as the presidential election leading to the victory of the PiS supported candidate, Karol Nawrocki, on June 1st. Closely followed by Paris, these two major political events can appear to be puzzling. On the one hand, the Polish leadership is taking important steps in reviving its relation with Paris, Brussels and the 'European liberal mainstream'. Yet, on the other hand, the Polish voters sent a conservative and Eurosceptic message to its own coalition government and to all the liberal European leaders. But let us focus on the bilateral relations between France and Poland and on the perception that the French have now acquired of Poland's fast-growing role in Europe. Back to square one? Since the appointment of Donald Tusk as prime minister on December 13th, after a tense general election, the French government had been experiencing a 'Polish relief'. The 'PiS decade' seemed to be over, the Weimar Triangle was back on track and political and economic ties could be revamped. Cooperation at the European level was to overcome the stumbling blocks of the constitutional and judicial system reforms implemented by the previous Morawiecki government and the Duda presidency. However, the victory of Nawrocki in the second highly disputed round of the presidential election has been seen in Paris as a setback to the potential reset in bilateral relations, as well as the 'Polish normalization' hoped for by Macron. Assessing Polish political life by their own standards, the French elites branded those electoral results as 'mixed messages' to Warsaw's partners in Europe. Indeed, the PiS candidate, now president elect, who will take office on August 6th, has often been labelled in France as the 'Polish Trump'. He is continuously criticized for his Eurosceptic stance by the ruling parties. What seems to be mixed messages from Paris are in fact domestically understandable. The Polish political stage is, has been, and probably will remain, divided, disputed and heated. Thus, Paris must live with a recurring question: can Poland be trusted as a reliable partner (to Macron) on the European stage? Or is the promising reset established in Nancy already ailing? Is there now any 'Polish relief' or is it 'back to square one'? A personal and electoral rapprochement To France, in the long, rich and sometimes tumultuous alliance between Warsaw and Paris, a significant milestone was reached on May 9th in Nancy. Back then, the two countries added a new comprehensive bilateral treaty to their multilateral agreements (EU, NATO, Weimar Triangle, etc.) that have bound them together since the end of the communist bloc and the 2004 EU enlargement. To Paris, Macron and the liberal Europhile elites of the business circles, this strategic agreement is of real substance. Many pro-government French media outlets have been highlighting the mutual assistance clause of the treaty, comparing it to the pre-war alliance against Nazi Germany and underlining its importance for the European Union's defence initiatives. Within NATO and Europe, such bilateral military agreements are rare: during the Macron presidency, the only precedent is the strategic agreement signed with Greece in 2021. And outside of Europe, France is striking such deals only with prominent military powers such as India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This has been done in support of the country's defence industry campaigns. To a lesser extent, some diplomats and observers have emphasized that the new course taken by the bilateral relationship has put an end to a decade-long period of partisan frictions between the PiS Polish governments and the diplomacy of Hollande and Macron. With the Morawiecki government and Macron's time in office, relations have been at their lowest for many years. The 'Nancy sequence' is nonetheless not deprived of ambiguity from the French perspective. First, with this treaty, Paris is a 'diplomatic follower' rather than a strategic pioneer. Indeed, it has been a while now since Poland has become an economic superpower in the EU. The more recent military build-up of Warsaw has also already taken place. Second, it can be contended that France's rapprochement with Poland is taking place quite late because it is prompted by partisan affinities between Macron and Tusk. The new treaty can even be seen as direct partisan support to the Civic Coalition campaign for the Polish presidential election. The strategic rapprochement is in the making but the electoral mutual support is even more obvious. Catching up with a lost decade This agreement is meant to trigger a 'reset' between Paris and Warsaw. It has been branded as a 'new chapter' by President Macron. The French authorities have given their best to make it symbolic and solemn, by choosing the right place and time. As for the place, all French kids learn at school that Nancy is the urban embodiment of Polish influence in France due to the role of the Duke of Lorraine, Stanislas Leszczynski. The city shows the traditional yet structural impact of Poland in France, along with the musical works of Chopin and the scientific achievement of Curie. Undisputedly, the new treaty has been signed in the most Polish town of France. As for the time, the French presidency has chosen to sign the treaty exactly when Warsaw and Paris have converged in supporting Ukraine, resisting the new US presidential administration and launching a new European defence initiative. Killing two birds with one stone, President Macron is catching up with the Polish economic miracle and supporting the Civic Coalition electoral campaign. Indeed, the treaty goes far beyond security and defence cooperation and cements various economic ties and endeavours. France and Poland have been partnering for a long time in order to bolster an ambitious EU Common Agriculture Policy. They even had a clear, objective alliance throughout the PiS versus Macron controversies to protect this almost federal policy against fiscal cuts. New fields of cooperation are now being opened up by the 'Nancy spirit', such as nuclear energy. This is likely to create business opportunities in Poland regarding the jewels of the (French) crown, such as the major state companies EDF, Orano and Framatome. Nuclear energy, defence, agriculture… All these topics are very dear to French (political) hearts and to Macron's policies. One can say that the Polish charm offensive in France has been impressive. And that France has ultimately been rewarded for initiatives it did not take over the last decade. Towards a common roadmap? Can this agreement lead to concrete outcomes for France, Poland and the European Union? Let us put aside the tactical rapprochement, the electoral fight and the PR operations. Instead, it is better to assess the real level of potential that exists after the PiS victory in the presidential election. At their heart, the structural needs of the two countries can be combined and realigned. But at this stage we only are witnessing a convergence in the making. Poland – even with a president supported by PiS – needs to diversify its alliance network and enlarge its risk mitigation tools. The second Trump administration could prove be attractive for many PiS politicians. But it cannot be seen as reliable regarding the security of the country in the long run: all Polish citizens have witnessed the way Ukraine is constantly bullied by the US, the pro-Russian stance taken by President Trump, and his negligence towards NATO commitments. In a way, Poland can use the French strategic stance on the US to rebalance its influence on the US and in NATO. Both countries need also to make the most of the ReARM initiative. After all, they have large needs, enjoy solid defence industrial companies, and fear the German market share in the domain. Moreover, on Ukraine, Poland has gradually set the tone in Paris. For example, both countries now converge in their 'unwavering support' to Kyiv; they share the proposition to put 'boots on the ground' to secure any potential peace agreement; and they want to shape the ceasefire talks on Ukraine. May aspects of the structural bonds remain to be strengthened and disagreements to be bridged. First, economic and trade links are weak: Poland is only the tenth trade partner of France, while France is the fifth trade partner of Poland. Second, the Weimar Triangle (often declining but regularly revived) needs to be stabilized to become a more efficient scheme. The window of opportunity is there: Macron, Merz and Tusk have common goals. But Germany is obviously tempted to sing its own song. The 'Nancy spirit' can only become a real common roadmap if concrete actions are taken together in the long run. Reality checks The real impact of the 2025 bilateral treaty and the materialization of the 'Nancy spirit' are to be assessed in the coming months and years. Reality checks are to be performed, especially at times when the Macron presidency is entering its last period. Stumbling blocks are to be overcome on migration policies, Ukraine's EU accession process (France is tempted to delay it), economic ties (Poland relies on Germany, not on France) and domestic political fights (PiS will remain the main target of Macron's European politics). Progress is also to be made in the economic field, and fast. Yet, Poland and France can make all the difference in making sure that Europeans have a seat at the negotiation table on Ukraine and that Germany will seriously rearm. As of today, relations between the two countries are proving to be promising. Let us closely follow whether the administrations will keep their promises. The reset is on its way. However, it is far from its destination. Cyrille Bret is an associate researcher at Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. Donald Tusk, Eastern flank, Emmanuel Macron, EU, Europe, France, Poland, Polish foreign policy, Polish-French relations
Russia Today
7 hours ago
- Business
- Russia Today
European NATO states wary of buying US arms
European NATO members have expressed growing unease about increasing their reliance on US weapons amid a sweeping rearmament push, Bloomberg has reported on Friday. During a summit in The Hague this week, NATO states committed to raising military spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 to counter what they described as a 'long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security' – a claim that Moscow has repeatedly denied. Concerns have reportedly emerged about deepening dependence on the American defense industry, particularly under the leadership of President Donald Trump. According to Bloomberg, leaders fear they could be exposed to greater risks, especially in light of Trump's efforts to improve ties with Russia and past threats to annex allied territory. Boosting reliance on US arms has become 'an increasingly hard sell at home,' the outlet noted. French President Emmanuel Macron has long championed the idea of securing greater defense autonomy for European NATO states, urging the development of a self-sufficient military industrial base. Canada, a key NATO ally, is reportedly reconsidering its involvement in the US-led F-35 fighter jet program and may switch to Swedish alternatives. 'We should no longer send three-quarters of our defense capital spending to America,' Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated earlier this month. Copenhagen has also displayed some resistance, telling Washington that American arms deals have become 'politically difficult' given Trump's suggestion that the US annex Greenland, which is currently controlled by Denmark, Bloomberg reported. Unease in the alliance has also been stoked by Trump's move to cut intelligence sharing with Ukraine earlier this year. According to unnamed officials cited by Bloomberg, this decision 'alarmed allies,' as it raised concerns over how much control the US might wield over weapons exports in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, a lack of viable domestic alternatives continues to bind European nations to US suppliers, according to the outlet. Decades of underinvestment have left Europe's defense manufacturing capacity underdeveloped. As a result, countries will likely keep buying American equipment to meet rearmament targets, particularly as stockpiles have been depleted by shipments of military aid to Ukraine. Moscow has condemned the EU's militarization trend and arms transfers to Kiev, characterizing the conflict as a NATO proxy war. President Vladimir Putin has dismissed NATO's concerns of Russian aggression as 'nonsense,' instead blaming the alliance's expansion and 'aggressive behavior' for escalating tensions.
The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Reframing the French Indo-Pacific: French Polynesia, a Model of Shared Sovereignty?
French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific – and offers a compelling case study for shared sovereignty within the French Republic. As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France's commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN. Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region. The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France's specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy. Notably, 93 percent of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently. The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory. A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France's Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on French Polynesia. Encompassing five archipelagos and 118 islands, French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering nearly 4.8 million square kilometers, accounts for almost half of the total French EEZ – which is the second largest globally. Beyond its maritime significance, French Polynesia offers a compelling case study of how post-colonial legacies, nuclear trauma, and political evolution have shaped a successful model of shared sovereignty within the French Republic. Colonial Imprint and Nuclear Legacy Eastern Polynesia was among the last regions on Earth to be explored and settled by humans. In the case of French Polynesia, archaeological evidence suggests an initial wave of settlement beginning around 800 CE in Tahiti, between 800 and 900 CE in the Marquesas and Gambier Islands, around 1000 CE in the Tuamotu atolls and the eastern parts of the Society Islands, and approximately 1100 CE in the Austral Islands. French influence began formally in 1842 with the establishment of a protectorate, in a context of heated rivalries between French and British colonial power in the region. The territory underwent a major transformation in the 1960s, when France established its Pacific Experimentation Center (CEP), triggering a wave of modernization – and deep trauma. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests, including 41 atmospheric and 152 underground at Moruroa and Fangataufa (Tuamotu archipelago). These experiments left lasting social and environmental scars. Although long taboo in Paris, the nuclear legacy has since entered public debate. The current political party in power, the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira, has historically opposed nuclear testing and pushed for transparency and reparations. In 2010, a national law established a right to compensation for individuals recognized as victims of French nuclear testing. In a gesture of appeasement and openness, the French state granted access to the Moruroa site in March 2024 to a high-level Polynesian delegation, including President Moetai Brotherson, marking a shift from opacity to cautious transparency. The change is a rational response considering the evolving political dynamics between Paris and Papeete. Increased Autonomy French Polynesia's political evolution reflects France's gradual accommodation of demands for self-government. From a protectorate (1842–1880) to a colony (1880–1946), and then an overseas territory (1946–2003), the territory has undergone significant institutional transformations. Today, as an overseas collectivity, it enjoys broad autonomy, with its own laws and institutions – including a president, a government, and a parliament – managing key areas such as the budget, foreign investment, and resource exploitation. While sovereign competencies – such as national defense, justice, public order, internal security and currency issuance – remain under the authority of the French state and are implemented by the High Commissioner, foreign affairs may, in certain cases, be the subject of shared competence. A Quiet Model? French Polynesia represents a rare example of international agency of a non-state actor, as it holds formal membership in several interregional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. Successive presidents of French Polynesia have engaged in high-level meetings with foreign heads of state – a development that underscores the territory's growing diplomatic autonomy. This trend was exemplified by then-President Edouard Fritch's attendance at the first U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, and Brotherson's visit in 2023 to Washington for the second summit, where he met with U.S. President Joe Biden. This ad hoc model of shared competences in foreign affairs can at times create ambiguity. While French Polynesia is at the forefront of France's Indo-Pacific ambitions, local voices – including Brotherson – have expressed skepticism about the wider strategy. But this ad hoc relationship often functions harmoniously, as French presidents have repeatedly associated their counterparts from French Polynesia in the France-Oceania Summits, and even during presidential trips abroad, such as President Macron's visit to Vanuatu in 2023. Despite the enduring legacies of sensitive issues, including the public health consequences of nuclear testing, French Polynesia offers a relatively stable model of negotiated autonomy within the French constitutional order. The most recent example came when Brotherson and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly announced at the U.N. Ocean Conference in Nice that nearly the entire EEZ of the archipelago – 4.55 million sq km, or 47 percent of France's EEZ – would be designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA), in a mutually beneficial act of environmental diplomacy. Shared sovereignty in French Polynesia diverges from the impasse faced by New Caledonia, suggesting that calibrated devolution and respectful partnership can reconcile historical grievances while maintaining continued political association.
New York Times
10 hours ago
- Entertainment
- New York Times
France Opens Competition to Expand Overcrowded Louvre
France on Friday started an architectural competition for the daunting task of expanding the Louvre in Paris, in a bid to ease overcrowding at the world's biggest and most visited museum. The project, which will create a new entrance and give the Mona Lisa a new exhibition space, was first announced in January by President Emmanuel Macron. He set the ambitious target of welcoming 12 million visitors per year — three million more than today — while also solving crowd-management headaches at the museum. The architectural competition will be decided by a 21-person international jury, which will choose five finalists in October. A winner will be announced in early 2026, according to the Louvre. Part of the brief is to design a new gallery for the Mona Lisa, the 16th-century masterpiece by Leonardo da Vinci that attracts droves of visitors. The museum's management said on Friday that the new exhibition space would be about 33,000 square feet and should also include room to explain the painting's history, its famous 1911 theft, and its modern-day iconic status. 'Our aim is to offer a high-quality encounter with this masterpiece,' Laurence des Cars, the Louvre's president, said in an interview with Le Monde published on Friday, arguing that the space needed to offer 'a genuine time for contemplation.' Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
