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The Guardian
9 hours ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
US attacks on Iran redraw calculus of use of force for allies and rivals around globe
For US allies and rivals around the world, Donald Trump's strikes on Iran have redrawn the calculus of the White House's readiness to use force in the kind of direct interventions that the president said he would make a thing of the past under his isolationist 'America First' foreign policy. From Russia and China to Europe and across the global south, the president's decision to launch the largest strategic bombing strike in US history indicates a White House that is ready to employ force abroad – but reluctantly and under the extremely temperamental and unpredictable leadership of the president. 'Trump being able to act and being willing to act when he saw an opportunity will definitely give [Vladimir] Putin pause,' said Fiona Hill, a former Trump national security adviser and one of the principal authors of the UK's strategic defence review. While Trump has pulled back from his earlier warnings about potential regime change in Iran, going from tweeting 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' to 'NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!' within 72 hours, he has nonetheless reinforced Russian perceptions of the United States as an unpredictable and aggressive rival that will not unilaterally abandon its ability to use force abroad. 'It has some pretty dire warnings for Putin himself about what could happen at a time of weakness,' Hill said. 'It will just convince Putin even more that no matter what the intent of a US president, the capability to destroy is something that has to be taken seriously.' It also shows a shift in the calculus in Washington DC, where hawks – along with Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu – were able to convince Trump that launching a strike on Iran was preferable to pursuing negotiations that had not yet failed. That could have knock-on effects for the war in Ukraine, where Republicans and foreign policy hardliners have grown more vocal about Putin's attacks on cities and the need for a tougher sanctions strategy. Although he hasn't changed his policy on resuming military support to Ukraine, Trump is publicly more exasperated with Putin. When Putin offered Trump to mediate between Israel and Iran, Trump said he responded: 'No, I don't need help with Iran. I need help with you.' In the immediate term, however, the strikes on Iran are unlikely to have an impact on Russia's war in Ukraine. 'I don't see it as having a big impact on the Ukraine war, because although Iran was very helpful at the beginning stages in providing Russia with [Shahed] drones, Russia has now started manufacturing their own version and have actually souped them up,' said Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, during a roundtable discussion. More broadly, Trump's attacks could undermine a growing 'axis of resistance' including Russia and China, given the pair's reluctance to come to Iran's aid beyond issuing strong condemnations of the attacks during security discussions under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) being held in China this week. 'It also shows that Russia is not a very valuable friend, because they're not really lifting a finger to help their allies in Iran and returning all the help that they've received,' Boot added. The strike could also have implications for China, which has escalated military pressure around Taiwan in recent months and has been holding 'dress rehearsals' for a forced reunification despite US support for the island, according to testimony from Adm Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. Trump had promised a tough line on China, and many of his top advisers are either China hawks or believe that the US military should reposition its forces and focus from Europe and the Middle East to Asia in order to manage China as a 'pacing threat'. Sign up to This Week in Trumpland A deep dive into the policies, controversies and oddities surrounding the Trump administration after newsletter promotion Yet his previous hesitancy to use US force abroad could have emboldened Beijing to believe that the US would not come to the direct aid of Taiwan if a military conflict would break out – the one wild card in what would otherwise probably be a lopsided conflict between China and Taiwan. Experts cautioned that the stakes were far different, and the conflicts too far removed, to draw direct conclusions about Trump's readiness to intervene if a conflict broke out between China and Taiwan. Trump's administration appears further embroiled in Middle East diplomacy than it wanted and its pivot to focus on China has been delayed as well. And while some close to the military say the strikes have regained credibility lost after some recent setbacks, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, others have said that it won't send the same message for military planners in Moscow or Beijing. 'We shouldn't conflate willingness to use force in a very low risk situation with deterring other types of conflicts or using force when it's going to be incredibly costly – which is what it would be if we were to come to the defence of Taiwan,' said Dr Stacie Pettyjohn of the Center for a New American Security during an episode of the Defense & Aerospace Air Power podcast. Around the world, US rivals may use the strikes to reinforce the image of the US as an aggressive power that prefers to use force rather than negotiate – a message that may break through with countries already exhausted with a temperamental White House. 'The fact that it all happened so fast, there wasn't much multilateral involvement or chance for diplomacy, I think, is something Russians can point to as an indication of, you know, imperialism to the global south,' said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings during a conference call. 'But also in their talking points to United States and western allies, they will definitely make a point of highlighting this as something great powers do, and in a way that normalizes Russia's language on its own [conflicts].
The Guardian
a day ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
US attacks on Iran redraw calculus of use of force for allies and rivals around globe
For US allies and rivals around the world, Donald Trump's strikes on Iran have redrawn the calculus of the White House's readiness to use force in the kind of direct interventions that the president said he would make a thing of the past under his isolationist 'America First' foreign policy. From Russia and China to Europe and across the global south, the president's decision to launch the largest strategic bombing strike in US history indicates a White House that is ready to employ force abroad – but reluctantly and under the extremely temperamental and unpredictable leadership of the president. 'Trump being able to act and being willing to act when he saw an opportunity will definitely give [Vladimir] Putin pause,' said Fiona Hill, a former Trump national security adviser and one of the principal authors of the UK's strategic defence review. While Trump has pulled back from his earlier warnings about potential regime in Iran, going from tweeting 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' to 'NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!' within 72 hours, he has nonetheless reinforced Russian perceptions of the United States as an unpredictable and aggressive rival that will not unilaterally abandon its ability to use force abroad. 'It has some pretty dire warnings for Putin himself about what could happen at a time of weakness,' Hill said. 'It will just convince Putin even more that no matter what the intent of a US president, the capability to destroy is something that has to be taken seriously.' It also shows a shift in the calculus in Washington DC, where hawks – along with Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu – were able to convince Trump that launching a strike on Iran was preferable to pursuing negotiations that had not yet failed. That could have knock-on effects for the war in Ukraine, where Republicans and foreign policy hardliners have grown more vocal about Putin's attacks on cities and the need for a tougher sanctions strategy. Although he hasn't changed his policy on resuming military support to Ukraine, Trump has is publicly more exasperated with Putin. When Putin offered Trump to mediate between Israel and Iran, Trump said he responded: 'No, I don't need help with Iran. I need help with you.' In the immediate term, however, the strikes on Iran are unlikely to have an impact on Russia's war in Ukraine. 'I don't see it as having a big impact on the Ukraine war, because although Iran was very helpful at the beginning stages in providing Russia with [Shahed] drones, Russia has now started manufacturing their own version and have actually souped them up,' said Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, during a roundtable discussion. More broadly, Trump's attacks could undermine a growing 'axis of resistance' including Russia and China, given the pair's reluctance to come to Iran's aid beyond issuing strong condemnations of the attacks during security discussions under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) being held in China this week. 'It also shows that Russia is not a very valuable friend, because they're not really lifting a finger to help their allies in Iran and returning all the help that they've received,' Boot added. The strike could also have implications for China, which has escalated military pressure around Taiwan in recent months and has been holding 'dress rehearsals' for a forced reunification despite US support for the island, according to testimony from Adm Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. Trump had promised a tough line on China, and many of his top advisers are either China hawks or believe that the US military should reposition its forces and focus from Europe and the Middle East to Asia in order to manage China as a 'pacing threat'. Sign up to This Week in Trumpland A deep dive into the policies, controversies and oddities surrounding the Trump administration after newsletter promotion Yet his previous hesitance to use US force abroad could have emboldened Beijing to believe that the US would not come to the direct aid of Taiwan if a military conflict would break out – the one wild card in what would otherwise likely be a lopsided conflict between China and Taiwan. Experts cautioned that the stakes are far different, and the conflicts too far removed, in order to draw direct conclusions about Trump's readiness to intervene if a conflict broke out between China and Taiwan. Trump's administration appears further embroiled in Middle East diplomacy than it wanted and its pivot to focus on China has been delayed as well. And while some close to the military say the strikes have regained credibility lost after some recent setbacks, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, others have said that it won't send the same message for military planners in Moscow or Beijing. 'We shouldn't conflate willingness to use force in a very low risk situation with deterring other types of conflicts or using force when it's going to be incredibly costly – which is what it would be if we were to come to the defence of Taiwan,' said Dr Stacie Pettyjohn of the Center for a New American Security during an episode of the Defense & Aerospace Air Power podcast. Around the world, US rivals may use the strikes to reinforce the image of the US as an aggressive power that prefers to use force rather than negotiate – a message that may break through with countries already exhausted with a temperamental White House. 'The fact that it all happened so fast, there wasn't much multilateral involvement or chance for diplomacy, I think, is something Russians can point to as an indication of, you know, imperialism to the global south,' said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings during a conference call. 'But also in their talking points to United States and western allies, they will definitely make a point of highlighting this as something great powers do, and in a way that normalizes Russia's language on its own [conflicts].
The Guardian
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
Without dignity, leaders fell at Trump's feet in The Hague – and for what? All Nato's key problems remain
Nato's Hague summit was an orchestrated grovel at the feet of Donald Trump. The originally planned two-day meeting was truncated into a single morning's official business to flatter the president's ego and accommodate his short attention span. The agenda was cynically narrowed to focus on the defence spending hikes he demands from US allies. Issues that may provoke or embarrass Trump – the Ukraine conflict, or whether the Iranian nuclear threat has actually been eliminated by US bombing – were relegated to the sidelines. Instead, the flattery throttle was opened up to maximum, with Nato's secretary general Mark Rutte leading the assembled fawning. On Tuesday, Rutte hymned Trump's brilliance over Iran; yesterday, he garlanded him as the vindicated visionary of Nato's drive towards the 5% of GDP spending goal. No one spoiled the party. As the president's own former adviser Fiona Hill put it yesterday, Nato seemed briefly to have turned into the North Atlantic Trump Organization. For Rutte and most of the alliance leaders, however, this was 24 hours of self-abasement with a specific goal. The purpose of this first Nato summit of the second Trump presidency was to keep the US as fully on board as possible with the transatlantic alliance. Nothing else mattered. Any repetition of the shocks that JD Vance and Pete Hegseth delivered to Europe at the Munich security conference in February was to be avoided at all costs. In pursuit of that objective, no humiliation or hypocrisy was too gross. So, was it mission accomplished for Nato? Maybe yes, judging by Trump's generally good behaviour in The Hague. The 5% pledge was 'very big news', he announced. The US was still committed to Nato's article 5 collective-defence doctrine, he appeared to say at his post-summit press conference, though his curious choice of words – 'We are here to help them protect their country' – will not reassure everyone. The leaders have nevertheless emerged with what Henry James called 'the equanimity of a result'. The Nato summit got what it was designed to get. But in every longer term way, this appeasement of Trump solves nothing. In political terms the Hague summit does not mark the resumption of normal relationships, let alone the beginning of a new Nato golden age. Such things are not possible in the Trump era. Politically, the summit was a bunker buster dodged. True, things have not got worse, an outcome that many, including Rutte, will regard as a kind of achievement. However, none of Nato's other preexisting difficulties has been solved. Most remain firmly in place. Of these, four stand out. The first and most immediate is Ukraine. There has been no change in Trump's impatience with Ukraine, his belief in a ceasefire or his unwillingness to renew US military aid. But nor can the other Nato members supply the aid that Ukraine needs. So the war grinds on, in part because of Trump. Some believe the war could even become permanent. 'Rather than assuming the war can be ended through a comprehensive battlefield victory or a negotiated compromise,' the Carnegie Endowment analyst and former Ukrainian defence minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk wrote earlier this month, 'Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign and secure state under constant military pressure.' Trump would not be interested in that. The second difficulty is Trump's sheer unpredictability. Everything was well choreographed in The Hague, but for how long will this last? No one can say for sure. The world is still absorbing the implications of Trump's impulsive handling of Iran, in which military action was repudiated in favour of diplomacy one day, before war was launched the next, followed by the proclamation of peace on the one after that. The Iran bombing has reminded the US's Nato allies of just how little sway they actually possess over the president, and has underscored the difficulty of second-guessing Trump's actions. This feeds through into the third problem. The commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defence is a policy goal not a present reality. The UK, for instance, aims to get to 5% by 2035, and it will only do so through some jiggery-pokery over what can legitimately be classified as security, as the government's new national security strategy document, published on Tuesday to coincide with the Nato summit, makes clear. Ten years is a long time. Much will change. Trump's successors may be more committed to Nato, or they may be even more unreliable than he is. There could be regime change in other places too. No one knows. Warfare is certain to change, as the drone revolution has shown. Nato needs to be careful not to bring 20th-century assumptions to bear on 21st-century planning. The national security strategy document rightly posits this period as an era of 'radical uncertainty'. Yet investors, including investors in high value hi-tech industries such as defence, abhor uncertainty. Which brings us to the fourth problem. Patching things up with Trump may solve nothing because he marches to his own drum. But the threats do not go away. This means that the European Nato nations and Canada have to forge a viable system of collective defence against hostile threats that is not dependent on the whims of the person in the White House at every turn. That is a very large task. But Washington cannot have a veto on whether the nations of Europe defend themselves against, say, Russian aggressions. There is no real choice in the circumstances. The allies are faced with the huge task of gradually reducing their long dependency on the US's technology and armaments without provoking a complete rupture with the US. At the same time, they must increase their own and Europe's defence capacity. It is a devilishly difficult course, with which Britain's political leaders, never mind Britain's security world, would be profoundly uncomfortable. Yet that is the one on which we are embarked. Martin Kettle is a Guardian columnist
The Guardian
20-06-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
There is only one warmonger on the European stage: Vladimir Putin
On 13 June, the Guardian published a collective letter concerning Russia's war and attacking Dr Fiona Hill, the chancellor of Durham University and one of the principal authors of the UK's strategic defence review. As UK-based and/or British-educated experts in matters pertaining to Russia, Ukraine and international security, we voice our profound disagreement with the letter by Robert Skidelsky, Richard Balfe, Anthony Brenton, Thomas Fazi, Anatol Lieven, Ian Proud, Geoffrey Roberts, Richard Sakwa and Brigitte Granville. They say that Dr Hill represents 'the warmongering mood of official Britain'. But there is only one warmonger on the European stage, and that is Vladimir Putin. It is neither a 'false premise' nor a 'mad conclusion' to argue that Putin's invasion of Ukraine has the goal of restoring Russia to the status of a world power, and that the departure of the US would leave Russia 'the dominant military power in all of Europe'. In reality, governments and independent experts from across Europe, ourselves included, have reached conclusions very similar to Dr Hill's, as they are supported by empirical evidence – not least by Putin's own overtly stated aspirations. One wonders what 'precautions' the signatories would advise Britain to take in the event of a US pullout from Europe. The once – and perhaps still – friendly contacts in Russian officialdom that some of the letter's authors maintain will not help. Roy Allison School of Global and Area Studies, University of OxfordTimothy Garton Ash Faculty of History, University of OxfordAnders Åslund Stockholm Free World Forum, Sweden (DPhil Oxford)Rostyslav Averchuk VoxUkraine, Kyiv (BA Oxford)Jaroslava Barbieri Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, LondonIan Bond The Centre for European Reform, LondonLaurie Bristow Ambassador to Russia 2016-20, Cambridge, UKMaksym Butkevych Principle of Hope Foundation, Kyiv (MA Sussex)Edward Hunter Christie Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki (MSc LSE)Ruth Deyermond Department of War Studies, King's College LondonSasha Dovzhyk INDEX: Institute for Documentation and Exchange, Lviv (PhD Birkbeck)Marta Dyczok Western University, London, Ontario (DPhil Oxford)Julie Fedor The University of Melbourne, Australia (PhD Cambridge)Emily Finer School of Modern Languages, University of St AndrewsRory Finnin Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages, University of CambridgeLawrence Freedman Department of War Studies, King's College LondonMischa Gabowitsch Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Germany (BA Oxford)Ian Garner Pilecki Institute, Warsaw, Poland (BA Bristol)Keir Giles Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, LondonPaul Goode Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario (DPhil Oxford)Thomas Grant Wolfson College, University of CambridgeSamuel Greene School of Politics and Economics, King's College LondonAgnia Grigas Atlantic Council, Washington, DC (DPhil Oxford)Hubertus Jahn Clare College, University of CambridgePolly Jones Faculty of Medieval and Modern Languages, University of OxfordIvan U Kłyszcz International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn (IM Glasgow)Amy W Knight Independent Scholar, Summit, New Jersey (PhD LSE)Natasha Kuhrt Department of War Studies, King's College LondonTaras Kuzio National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (PhD Birmingham)Simon Lewis University of Bremen, Germany (PhD Cambridge)Klara Lindström Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (BA Oxford)Bobo Lo Independent international relations analyst, Brighton, East SussexJohn Lough Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, LondonEdward Lucas Centre for European Policy Analysis, Washington/LondonOrysia Lutsevych Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, LondonClaudia Major German Marshall Fund of the US, Berlin (PhD Birmingham)Luke March School of Social and Political Science, University of EdinburghDaria Mattingly Department of History, University of ChichesterMichael McFaul Stanford University, Palo Alto, California (DPhil Oxford)Jade McGlynn Department of War Studies, King's College LondonBohdan Nahaylo Kyiv Post – Ukraine's Global Voice, Kyiv/Barcelona (BA Leeds)James Nixey Conflict Studies Research Centre, Shrivenham, OxfordshirePhillips O'Brien School of International Relations, University of St AndrewsOlga Onuch School of Social Sciences, University of ManchesterIngerid M Opdahl Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo (PhD Birmingham)Carolina Vendil Pallin Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, Stockholm (PhD LSE)Peter Rutland Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut (BA Oxford)Gwendolyn Sasse Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany (PhD LSE)Anton Shekhovtsov Central European University, Vienna (PhD UCL)James Sherr Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, LondonOxana Shevel Tufts University, Massachusetts (MPhil Cambridge)Iryna Shuvalova Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo (PhD Cambridge)Timothy D Snyder University of Toronto, Ontario (DPhil Oxford)Joanna Szostek School of Social and Political Sciences, University of GlasgowMaximilian Terhalle Hoover Institution, Stanford, California (MA SOAS)Nikolaus von Twickel Centre for Liberal Modernity, Berlin (MA King's College London)Andreas Umland Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (PhD Cambridge)Adam Ure Lvivski Consulting, London (PhD UCL)Fredrik Wesslau Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (BSc LSE)Sarah Whitmore School of Law and Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes UniversityAndrew Wilson School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCLKataryna Wolczuk School of Government, University of BirminghamStefan Wolff School of Government, University of BirminghamMychailo Wynnyckyj National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (PhD Cambridge)Yuliya Yurchenko School of Accounting, Finance & Economics, University of Greenwich
Yahoo
15-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Russia adviser Fiona Hill's alarming conclusion
Fiona Hill's assessment of the Russian threat to Britain is a classic example of how a seemingly rational argument based on a false premise and scanty evidence can lead to a mad conclusion (Russia is at war with Britain and US is no longer a reliable ally, UK adviser says, 6 June). It is especially alarming that this conclusion was reached by one of the three principal authors of the recent strategic defence review. The false premise is that Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine is the first step to make Russia 'a dominant military power in all of Europe'. Evidence that Britain is already under attack is provided by 'the poisonings, assassinations, sabotage operations … cyber-attacks and influence operations ... sensors … around critical pipelines, efforts to butcher undersea cables'. It follows that Britain's economy and society must be geared up to resist the Russian menace. Deny the premise and the argument for a 'whole society' mobilisation against Russia collapses. What it reveals is the strength of the warmongering mood of official Britain. This is not to deny that we have to take precautions against the real danger of a significant US pullout, perhaps amounting to rendering article 5 of the Nato treaty meaningless, and that the Russians can be quite ruthless in exploiting an advantage if they think they have one. But this is a far cry from proposing, as the strategic defence review does, a national mobilisation in face of an immediate and pressing Russian Skidelsky Emeritus professor of political economy, Warwick University, Richard Balfe Former MEP, Anthony Brenton British ambassador to Russia, 2004-08, Thomas Fazi Author and journalist, Anatol Lieven Senior fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statesmanship, Ian Proud Senior diplomat, British embassy, Moscow, 2014-18, Geoffrey Roberts Professor, University College Cork, Richard Sakwa Emeritus professor of Russian and east European studies, University of Kent, Brigitte Granville Professor of international economics and economic policy, Queen Mary University of London
