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South China Morning Post
13-06-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
South China Sea needs US-China ‘security talks mechanism' to prevent conflict: think tank
China and the US should consider setting up a 'security dialogue mechanism' on the South China Sea to help prevent conflict in the contested waterway, a noted independent Chinese think tank has suggested. According to analysts at the Beijing-based Grandview Institution, US-China aerial and maritime interactions in the South China Sea have been marked by confrontational, complex and unpredictable dynamics. However, competition in the strategic waterway was still 'manageable', though it was likely to be prolonged 'structurally', they said in a report published on Thursday. The report, titled 'Competition and Risk Reduction on the South China Sea – Views from China and the United States', was prepared in collaboration with the Pacific Forum, a Hawaii-based foreign policy research institute. Both China and the United States recognised the risk of inadvertent escalation and had developed several crisis management tools, according to the executive summary of the report. 'However, implementation remains inconsistent,' it said. Liu Xiaobo and Sophie Wushuang Yi, both researchers with Grandview, called on both sides to consider 'institutionalised' dialogue mechanisms focused on the regional security architecture, maritime legal order and law enforcement norms, and crisis response protocols. Liu and Yi co-wrote one of the three papers making up the report. Jeffrey Ordaniel, a non-resident adjunct senior fellow and director of maritime programmes at the Pacific Forum, authored another, while the third was by Thomas Shattuck, another Pacific Forum non-resident fellow.
New Straits Times
08-06-2025
- Automotive
- New Straits Times
China's rare earth dominance reshapes trade war battlefield
China has signalled for more than 15 years that it was looking to wea-ponise areas of the global supply chain, a strategy modelled on longstanding American export controls Beijing views as aimed at stalling its rise. The scramble in recent weeks to secure export licences for rare earths, capped by Thursday's telephone call between US and Chinese leaders Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, shows China has devised a better, more precisely targeted weapon for trade war. Industry executives and analysts say while China is showing signs of approving more exports of the key elements, it will not dismantle its new system. Modelled on the United States' own, Beijing's export licence system gives it unprecedented insight into supplier chokepoints in areas ranging from motors for electric vehicles to flight-control systems for guided missiles. "China originally took inspiration for these export control methods from the comprehensive US sanctions regime," said Zhu Junwei, a scholar at the Grandview Institution, a Beijing-based think tank focused on international relations. "China has been trying to build its own export control systems since then, to be used as a last resort." After Thursday's call, Trump said both leaders had been "straightening out some of the points, having to do mostly with rare earth magnets and some other things". He did not say whether China committed to speeding up licences for exports of rare earth magnets, after Washington curbed exports of chip design software and jet engines to Beijing in response to its perceived slow-rolling on licences. China holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, a crucial component in EV motors. In April, it added some of the most sophisticated types to an export control list in its trade war with the US, forcing all exporters to apply to Beijing for licences. That put a once-obscure department of China's commerce ministry, with a staff of about 60, in charge of a chokepoint for global manufacturing. Several European auto suppliers shut down production lines last week after running out of supplies. While China's April curbs coincided with a broader package of retaliation against Washington's tariffs, the measures apply globally. "Beijing has a degree of plausible deniability — no one can prove China is doing this on purpose," said Noah Barkin, senior adviser at Rhodium Group, a China-focused US think tank. "But the rate of approvals is a pretty clear signal that China is sending a message, exerting pressure to prevent trade negotiations with the US leading to additional technology control." Even if the pace of export approvals quickens as Trump suggested, the new system gives Beijing unprecedented glimpses of how companies in a supply chain deploy the rare earths it processes, European and US executives have warned. Other governments are denied that insight because of the complexity of supply chain operations. For example, hundreds of Japanese suppliers are believed to need China to approve export licences for rare earth magnets in coming weeks to avert production disruptions, said a person who has lobbied on their behalf with Beijing. "It's sharpening China's scal-pel," said a US-based executive at a company seeking to piece together an alternative supply chain.. As early as 1992, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying, "The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths". Beijing's landmark 2020 Export Control Law broadened curbs to cover any items affecting national security — from critical goods and materials to technology and data. China has since built its own sanctions power while pouring the equivalent of billions of dollars into developing work-arounds in response to US policies. In 2022, the US put sweeping curbs on sales of advanced semiconductor chips and tools to China over concerns the technology could advance Beijing's military power. But the move failed to halt China's development of advanced chips and artificial intelligence, analysts have said. Beijing punched back a year later by introducing export licences for gallium and germanium, and some graphite products. Exports to the US of the two critical minerals, along with germanium, were banned last December. In February, China restricted exports of five more metals key to the defence and clean energy industries.
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First Post
07-06-2025
- Business
- First Post
The Deng doctrine: How China weaponises rare earths to gain leverage in trade war with the US
China has signalled for more than 15 years that it was looking to weaponise areas of the global supply chain, a strategy modelled on longstanding American export controls Beijing views as aimed at stalling its rise. read more China has long indicated its intention to weaponise parts of the global supply chain—a strategy now visibly playing out through tighter control of rare earth exports. Modelled on longstanding US export restrictions that Beijing believes are designed to limit its technological rise, China is now turning similar tools to its own advantage. The recent rush by companies to secure export licences for rare earth materials, culminating in a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday, highlights how Beijing has refined a powerful lever in the ongoing trade war. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Industry experts say China may approve more shipments in the near term but it has no plans to dismantle the new system underpinning those approvals. Instead, China's new export licensing regime, closely mirroring the US model grants the government deeper visibility into global supply chokepoints including critical sectors such as electric vehicle motors and precision systems used in missiles. This level of control offers Beijing a potent means to retaliate in the trade dispute while asserting dominance in strategically vital markets. China sharpens rare earth export controls in trade war playbook As relations between the two countries sour and supply chains fracture, both Washington and Beijing appear determined to shift from broad tariffs to more focused, technical barriers—ones that could have lasting implications for industries worldwide. 'China originally took inspiration for these export control methods from the comprehensive U.S. sanctions regime,' Zhu Junwei, a scholar at the Grandview Institution, a Beijing-based think tank focused on international relations told Reuters. 'China has been trying to build its own export control systems since then, to be used as a last resort.' After a phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping, President Trump said the two leaders were 'straightening out some of the points,' particularly regarding rare earth magnets—key components in electric vehicle (EV) motors and high-tech weaponry. But Trump did not confirm whether Beijing had agreed to speed up export licensing, a sticking point since Washington imposed restrictions on chip design software and jet engines over what it calls China's deliberate slow-walking of approvals. China, which holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, added some of the most advanced types to its export control list in April. The move forces all exporters to seek government licences before shipping these materials, turning a once-obscure division of the commerce ministry—staffed by around 60 people—into a powerful gatekeeper of global manufacturing. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The export curbs, part of a broader retaliation package against US tariffs, have had ripple effects well beyond the US. Several European auto parts manufacturers were forced to shut down production lines this week after exhausting their supply of rare earth magnets, underscoring the global reach of Beijing's measures. Though China's commerce ministry has not publicly commented on the issue, analysts say the blanket controls offer Beijing both leverage in its trade war with Washington and a strategic tool to reshape global supply chains in its favour. 'Beijing has a degree of plausible deniability – no one can prove China is doing this on purpose,' Noah Barkin, senior adviser at Rhodium Group, a China-focused U.S. thinktank told Reuters. 'But the rate of approvals is a pretty clear signal that China is sending a message, exerting pressure to prevent trade negotiations with the U.S. leading to additional technology control.' China mines about 70% of the world's rare earths but maintains a near-monopoly on refining and processing, giving it a powerful position in global manufacturing. Even if export approvals accelerate, as U.S. President Donald Trump indicated after a call with President Xi Jinping, Beijing's new licensing system offers it unprecedented visibility into how companies use these critical materials. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD European and U.S. executives warn that by forcing exporters to apply for licences, China's government can now closely monitor supplier chokepoints in sectors ranging from electric vehicles to advanced weaponry, oversight that other governments lack due to the complexity of global supply chains. Hundreds of Japanese companies are expected to need Chinese export approvals for rare earth magnets in the coming weeks, a person lobbying on their behalf told Reuters. Without timely licences, they risk production disruptions, underscoring how Beijing's new trade tools could reshape access to materials essential to modern industry. 'It's sharpening China's scalpel,' said a US-based executive at a company seeking to piece together an alternative supply chain who sought anonymity. 'It's not a way to oversee the export of magnets, but a way to gain influence and advantage over America.' China's export controls deepen as fears grow over weaponisation of supply chain power Fears that China could weaponise its dominance in critical supply chains first emerged in 2010, when it briefly halted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute. But those concerns have intensified in recent years as Beijing sharpens its trade tools and broadens export restrictions across strategic sectors. As far back as 1992, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping noted, 'The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.' That sentiment has shaped policy: in 2020, China passed a sweeping Export Control Law allowing it to restrict exports of any items deemed vital to national security, including materials, technology and data. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Since then, China has built up its own sanctions arsenal in response to U.S. restrictions, investing heavily in alternative supply chains while tightening its grip on key exports. In 2022, the United States imposed broad curbs on chip and semiconductor tool exports to China, aiming to slow the country's military and AI advancements. But analysts say Beijing has continued to make headway despite those barriers. In retaliation, China has steadily expanded its export controls. Last year it imposed licensing requirements for gallium, germanium, and certain graphite products—vital inputs for defence, electronics, and green technologies. Shipments of these minerals to the U.S. were banned outright in December. Then in February, China added five more metals to its control list. Now, following a phone call between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, attention has turned to whether China will ease its latest rare earth export curbs. But analysts warn of a lack of transparency. 'It's virtually impossible to know what percentage of requests for non-military end users get approved because the data is not public and companies don't want to publicly confirm either way,' said Cory Combs, an analyst at China-focused consultancy Trivium. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The opaqueness of Beijing's process and its expanding powers over chokepoint materials are reinforcing Western concerns that supply chains are becoming geopolitical battlegrounds. With inputs from agencies
CTV News
06-06-2025
- Business
- CTV News
China's rare earth weapon changes contours of trade war battlefield
In this Dec. 30, 2010, photo, workers use machinery to dig at a rare earth mine in Ganxian county in central China's Jiangxi province. (Chinatopix via AP) BEIJING — China has signaled for more than 15 years that it was looking to weaponise areas of the global supply chain, a strategy modeled on longstanding American export controls Beijing views as aimed at stalling its rise. The scramble in recent weeks to secure export licenses for rare earths, capped by Thursday's telephone call between U.S. and Chinese leaders Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, shows China has devised a better, more precisely targeted weapon for trade war. Industry executives and analysts say while China is showing signs of approving more exports of the key elements, it will not dismantle its new system. Modeled on the United States' own, Beijing's export license system gives it unprecedented insight into supplier chokepoints in areas ranging from motors for electric vehicles to flight-control systems for guided missiles. 'China originally took inspiration for these export control methods from the comprehensive U.S. sanctions regime,' said Zhu Junwei, a scholar at the Grandview Institution, a Beijing-based think tank focused on international relations. 'China has been trying to build its own export control systems since then, to be used as a last resort.' After Thursday's call, Trump said both leaders had been 'straightening out some of the points, having to do mostly with rare earth magnets and some other things.' He did not say whether China committed to speeding up licenses for exports of rare earth magnets, after Washington curbed exports of chip design software and jet engines to Beijing in response to its perceived slow-rolling on licenses. China holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, a crucial component in EV motors. In April it added some of the most sophisticated types to an export control list in its trade war with the United States, forcing all exporters to apply to Beijing for licenses. That put a once-obscure department of China's commerce ministry, with a staff of about 60, in charge of a chokepoint for global manufacturing. The ministry did not immediately respond to Reuters' questions sent by fax. Several European auto suppliers shut down production lines this week after running out of supplies. While China's April curbs coincided with a broader package of retaliation against Washington's tariffs, the measures apply globally. 'Beijing has a degree of plausible deniability – no one can prove China is doing this on purpose,' said Noah Barkin, senior adviser at Rhodium Group, a China-focused U.S. thinktank. 'But the rate of approvals is a pretty clear signal that China is sending a message, exerting pressure to prevent trade negotiations with the U.S. leading to additional technology control.' China mines about 70 per cent of the world's rare earths but has a virtual monopoly on refining and processing. Even if the pace of export approvals quickens as Trump suggested, the new system gives Beijing unprecedented glimpses of how companies in a supply chain deploy the rare earths it processes, European and U.S. executives have warned. Other governments are denied that insight because of the complexity of supply chain operations. For example, hundreds of Japanese suppliers are believed to need China to approve export licenses for rare earth magnets in coming weeks to avert production disruptions, said a person who has lobbied on their behalf with Beijing. 'It's sharpening China's scalpel,' said a U.S.-based executive at a company seeking to piece together an alternative supply chain who sought anonymity. 'It's not a way to oversee the export of magnets, but a way to gain influence and advantage over America.' DECADES IN THE MAKING Fears that China could weaponise its global supply chain strength first emerged after its temporary ban of rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, following a territorial dispute. As early as 1992, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying, 'The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.' Beijing's landmark 2020 Export Control Law broadened curbs to cover any items affecting national security, from critical goods and materials to technology and data. China has since built its own sanctions power while pouring the equivalent of billions of dollars into developing workarounds in response to U.S. policies. In 2022, the United States put sweeping curbs on sales of advanced semiconductor chips and tools to China over concerns the technology could advance Beijing's military power. But the move failed to halt China's development of advanced chips and artificial intelligence, analysts have said. Beijing punched back a year later by introducing export licenses for gallium and germanium, and some graphite products. Exports to the United States of the two critical minerals, along with germanium, were banned last December. In February China restricted exports of five more metals key to the defense and clean energy industries. Analysts face a hard task in tracking the pace of China's approvals following the Trump-Xi call. 'It's virtually impossible to know what percentage of requests for non-military end users get approved because the data is not public and companies don't want to publicly confirm either way,' said Cory Combs, a critical minerals analyst with Trivium, a policy consultancy focused on China. (Reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing; additional reporting by Michael Martina in Washington and Victoria Waldersee in Berlin; editing by Kevin Krolicki and Clarence Fernandez)
The Sun
06-06-2025
- Automotive
- The Sun
China sharpens rare earth controls in trade war strategy
BEIJING: China has signalled for more than 15 years that it was looking to weaponise areas of the global supply chain, a strategy modelled on longstanding American export controls Beijing views as aimed at stalling its rise. The scramble in recent weeks to secure export licences for rare earths, capped by Thursday's telephone call between U.S. and Chinese leaders Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, shows China has devised a better, more precisely targeted weapon for trade war. Industry executives and analysts say while China is showing signs of approving more exports of the key elements, it will not dismantle its new system. Modelled on the United States' own, Beijing's export licence system gives it unprecedented insight into supplier chokepoints in areas ranging from motors for electric vehicles to flight-control systems for guided missiles. 'China originally took inspiration for these export control methods from the comprehensive U.S. sanctions regime,' said Zhu Junwei, a scholar at the Grandview Institution, a Beijing-based think tank focused on international relations. 'China has been trying to build its own export control systems since then, to be used as a last resort.' After Thursday's call, Trump said both leaders had been 'straightening out some of the points, having to do mostly with rare earth magnets and some other things'. He did not say whether China committed to speeding up licences for exports of rare earth magnets, after Washington curbed exports of chip design software and jet engines to Beijing in response to its perceived slow-rolling on licences. China holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, a crucial component in EV motors. In April it added some of the most sophisticated types to an export control list in its trade war with the United States, forcing all exporters to apply to Beijing for licences. That put a once-obscure department of China's commerce ministry, with a staff of about 60, in charge of a chokepoint for global manufacturing. The ministry did not immediately respond to Reuters' questions sent by fax. Several European auto suppliers shut down production lines this week after running out of supplies. While China's April curbs coincided with a broader package of retaliation against Washington's tariffs, the measures apply globally. 'Beijing has a degree of plausible deniability – no one can prove China is doing this on purpose,' said Noah Barkin, senior adviser at Rhodium Group, a China-focused U.S. thinktank. 'But the rate of approvals is a pretty clear signal that China is sending a message, exerting pressure to prevent trade negotiations with the U.S. leading to additional technology control.' China mines about 70% of the world's rare earths but has a virtual monopoly on refining and processing. Even if the pace of export approvals quickens as Trump suggested, the new system gives Beijing unprecedented glimpses of how companies in a supply chain deploy the rare earths it processes, European and U.S. executives have warned. Other governments are denied that insight because of the complexity of supply chain operations. For example, hundreds of Japanese suppliers are believed to need China to approve export licences for rare earth magnets in coming weeks to avert production disruptions, said a person who has lobbied on their behalf with Beijing. 'It's sharpening China's scalpel,' said a U.S.-based executive at a company seeking to piece together an alternative supply chain who sought anonymity. 'It's not a way to oversee the export of magnets, but a way to gain influence and advantage over America.' DECADES IN THE MAKING Fears that China could weaponise its global supply chain strength first emerged after its temporary ban of rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, following a territorial dispute. As early as 1992, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying, 'The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.' Beijing's landmark 2020 Export Control Law broadened curbs to cover any items affecting national security, from critical goods and materials to technology and data. China has since built its own sanctions power while pouring the equivalent of billions of dollars into developing workarounds in response to U.S. policies. In 2022, the United States put sweeping curbs on sales of advanced semiconductor chips and tools to China over concerns the technology could advance Beijing's military power. But the move failed to halt China's development of advanced chips and artificial intelligence, analysts have said. Beijing punched back a year later by introducing export licenses for gallium and germanium, and some graphite products. Exports to the United States of the two critical minerals, along with germanium, were banned last December. In February China restricted exports of five more metals key to the defence and clean energy industries. Analysts face a hard task in tracking the pace of China's approvals following the Trump-Xi call. 'It's virtually impossible to know what percentage of requests for non-military end users get approved because the data is not public and companies don't want to publicly confirm either way,' said Cory Combs, a critical minerals analyst with Trivium, a policy consultancy focused on China.
