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The Print
02-07-2025
- Business
- The Print
India needs foreign parts for Tejas. Defence atmanirbharta can't become a weakness
India's pursuit of self-reliance in defence aviation, especially in the field of domestic jet fighter production, is a saga of ambition and innovation. It is also a tale of bureaucratic bungling, lack of accountability, and the absence of inter-department coordination. We tend to make the same mistakes over and over again. Surprisingly, the A tmanirbharta Ayatollahs of social media, otherwise quick to assign monikers like 'Import Bahadur' to any veteran or journalist who makes the case for importing necessary tech until we can make it domestically, have been silent on the decision. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's decision not to equip the Tejas Mk1A aircraft with the indigenous Uttam AESA radar and Swayam Raksha Kavach electronic warfare suite—made by the Defence Research and Development Organisation—preferring instead the Israeli ELTA systems, has sparked significant debate. For the domestic defence industry, the template remains unchanged: overpromise, underdeliver, blame the delays on external factors, and then accuse the forces of not being supportive of domestic programmes. Different aircraft, same story India was the first Asian country to domestically design and produce a modern jet fighter aircraft. On 24 June 1961, HF-24 Marut undertook its first flight; barely five years after the programme approval and only 14 years after Independence. It was a tremendous achievement. However, what could have been a stupendous base for the development of India's domestic defence aviation industry fizzled out in a damp squib. In 2025, we find ourselves at the cusp of greatness again, in the form of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas programme. The challenges remain the same: financial, technological, institutional, and political. And we're repeating some of the old mistakes. Both HF-24 Marut and the Tejas—its modern successor—aimed to equip the Indian Air Force (IAF) with homegrown combat aircraft. Despite great potential, the former failed to deliver, and the latter is muddling along. Also read: Pakistan suffers violence of its own making. West's refusal to learn is even more tragic Marut vs Tejas The HF-24 Marut, developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), was a pivotal achievement. A relatively poor Asian country had pulled off an engineering miracle. Led by German designer Kurt Tank and later Dr Raj Mahindra, it was an ambitious programme. Incidentally, Tank was the lead designer of the legendary Focke-Wulf 190, the German single-engine fighter of World War 2. India's recruitment of Tank in the 1950s was a strategic effort driven by Prime Minister Nehru and shepherded by defence minister VK Krishna Menon. At the time, Tank was working on the design of the FMA IAe 33 Pulqui II, one of Latin America's first jet fighters. But political instability and economic challenges under Juan Perón's regime made Tank consider other opportunities. India capitalised on the development, offering him a stable job and an ambitious project. The IAF's air staff quality requirements (ASQR) were ambitious too. It wanted Marut to achieve 1.5 Mach initially and 2 Mach eventually. It was intended to be a supersonic, multi-role fighter for ground attack as well as air superiority roles, with a combat radius of at least 500 miles. The programme tasted initial success, and the first production aircraft was delivered to the IAF on 1 April 1967. The first challenge was also felt early on, as it was observed that the aircraft was grossly underpowered. The Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 703 engine could provide only 4,850 lbs of thrust, barely adequate to reach 0.95 Mach, well below the intended target. The aircraft could not achieve supersonic speed. This deficiency in the engine was well known, but it happened to be the only one readily available. Orpheus 703 was also used in the British aircraft Folland Gnat and was being license-produced by HAL in India. Tank was not happy with this selection and reluctantly agreed to its use as an interim solution due to India's limited technological and financial resources. Tank wanted an uprated Bristol BOr12 Orpheus afterburning turbojet engine that could produce 8,150 lbs of thrust, to power his twin-engine, swept-wing fighter. Unfortunately, New Delhi was unwilling to invest £13 million in the customised engine. Alternatives were few and far between. Engine options from Russia, the US, Britain, and even Egypt were considered, but the geopolitical situation for India at the time was precarious. The recent war with China, disappointment from the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), increasing differences with the US, and growing closeness to the USSR—all these developments played a role. The options were unsuitable either financially, technically or geopolitically. Eventually, IAF was forced to make do with a non-afterburning Orpheus 703 engine on the HF 24. By the time it entered service in 1967, Marut was considered close to obsolescence. It could not keep up with supersonic fighters of that era—Indian MiG-21s or Pakistani F-104 Starfighters. The IAF shelved plans for upgrading Marut with radar and air-to-air missile capabilities, and relegated the jet to ground attack roles. Proposals for advanced variants like the HF-71 and HF-72 were abandoned, and the programme ended in the 1980s after producing only 147 aircraft. In comparison, the LCA Tejas has had a long timeline from conception to deployment. Initiated in 1983, the programme achieved its first flight only in January 2001. It took another 18 years to achieve Final Operational Clearance (FOC). The first squadron was raised on 27 May 2020 with only four serial production FOC aircraft. So far, 38 aircraft have been delivered to the IAF, out of the 83 on order. Plans for an additional 97 Mk1A/B and nearly 200 LCA Mk2 are at various stages of approvals. The first batch of LCA Mk1A was to be delivered to the IAF in March 2024; none has been delivered to date. Also read: Trump has driven up NATO's defence spending. Why that's good for India Achilles' heel Like the Marut, the aeroengine is proving to be the Achilles' heel for LCA. For the Marut, several engine options were explored by HAL. Besides evaluating the Soviet-made Klimov K-7 and RD-9F engines, the option to collaborate with Egypt on the development of the EL-300 engine was also considered. The Soviet engines were found incompatible with the Marut's airframe, and Egypt gave up on EL-300 after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The proposal from Rolls-Royce to further develop the Orpheus for the Marut was rejected by the Indian government, likely due to cost and political considerations. The Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a lab under India's Defence Research and Development Organisation, was also tasked with enhancing the performance of the Orpheus 703 engine. The GTRE attempted to build an afterburning (reheated) version of the Orpheus 703. However, the programme failed to deliver the desired outcomes. On similar lines, the Tejas was intended to be powered by the indigenous Kaveri engine, but its development faced setbacks. Unable to meet performance targets of weight and thrust, the Kaveri was sidelined in favour of imported engines. The GE F404 engine, meant only as a stopgap arrangement for the early variants, has now become the mainstay. At the moment, India is incapable of avoiding reliance on foreign engines. Supply delays from GE are causing inordinate delays in the production of LCA Mk1A. Hopefully, lessons will be learned and HAL will secure the supplies of GE 404 and GE 414 engines in sufficient numbers for the upcoming production targets. Another issue that raises questions on our ability to absorb technology has been in the field of engine manufacturing. Despite license-producing various jet engines such as Orpheus 703, Tumansky R-25, Rolls-Royce Adour, AL-31FP, and AL-55I, we have not been able to master the technology adequately enough to fix the flaws in Kaveri. Also read: Chinese J-20 isn't just a fighter jet—it's a signal to US, Japan and India Operational performance Despite bad programme management, both Tejas and Marut turned out to be reasonably good in operations. The HF-24 Marut was operational in three IAF squadrons in 1971: Number 10 (Winged Daggers), 31 (Lions), and 220 (Desert Tigers). These squadrons saw significant action during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, flying about 200 missions. Three aircraft were lost in the air, and one was lost on the ground. Squadron Leader KK Bakshi, while flying a Marut, shot down a Pakistani F-86 Sabre on 7 December. Marut was much liked by the pilots, as it had a spacious and well-laid-out cockpit, and was easy to handle at low levels. Since it was built tough, it could survive several hits from ground fire. On account of two engines with redundant systems, it also had better survivability against bird ingestion and system failure. The details of LCA's performance in Operation Sindoor are not available in the open domain. However, Tejas has consistently performed well in air exercises like Gagan Shakti, fire power demonstrations, Akraman, Trishul, and so on. The most stellar thing about LCA Tejas has been its flight safety record in the development phase. It did not suffer even a single catastrophic failure in the testing and development phase, which is unheard of in the case of a single-engine fighter programme anywhere in the world. Also read: Asim Munir is playing good jihadi-bad jihadi game. Suicide bombing shows he's failing IAF's role The IAF is often accused of lacking enthusiasm for domestic programmes and placing greater reliance on imported equipment. This presumption stems from ignorance about how the IAF draws out its ASQRs and how the defence ministry sanctions capital procurements. The IAF lists out quality requirements (QRs) based on existing and evolving aerial threats. On the other hand, the decision about whether to procure particular equipment (or not) is made by the government. Whether to source this equipment from the local market or procure it globally is another decision the government makes. It has the final say on ASQRs as well, and has the right to modify QRs to enable domestic industry participation. Once the equipment and vendor are finalised, the quantity and the delivery dates are inked in the contract. The threats are not static, and the enemy has a vote. As the delivery timelines slip by, the threats evolve on account of the emergence of new technology and new acquisitions by the adversary. The IAF would want the equipment to be the latest on the day it is fielded in an operational unit and not on the day it was ordered. The threat is not static—the ASQR shouldn't be either. The Marut faced deficiencies in operational performance due to engine issues, while the Tejas took nearly 20 years from first flight to the FOC. For the Marut, the IAF's initial excitement waned due to its subsonic performance and engine limitations, leading to a preference for the Jaguar. Tejas faces similar IAF scepticism, with concerns about its performance, delivery delays, and the reliance on foreign components. There is also a growing concern that with China making great progress in the field of aeroengines, aerial weapons, and fighter aircraft development, future variants of Tejas could be obsolete even before they enter squadron service. China, the primary adversary for India, has fielded two variants of fifth-generation fighters, J-20 and J-35. It also has reportedly fast-tracked sixth-generation fighters such as J-36 and J-50. There are reports that Pakistan will soon be receiving J-35 fighters from China. In that environment, Tejas Mk1A and Tejas Mk2, which are 4.5 generation aircraft and are yet to enter squadron service in the IAF, would find it difficult to hold ground in an aerial encounter. The threats are evolving rapidly, so the demands from the services would evolve too. It would be foolhardy to assume that the IAF would not revise ASQRs as the deliveries are delayed and newer, more potent threats emerge. The bottom line remains unchanged. The onus of equipping the IAF and other services is on the government. Delays cause capability degradation, therefore the government must seek accountability from weapon suppliers, whether foreign or domestic. Atmanirbharta is our strength—it should not be allowed to become our vulnerability. Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat is a retired IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @Ahlawat2012. Views are personal. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Time of India
25-06-2025
- General
- Time of India
The forgotten Indian fighter that could have changed defence history
The forgotten Indian fighter that could have changed defence history Rajesh SharmaJairaj Singh Updated: Jun 25, 2025, 19:38 IST IST In 1961, India became the first non-Western nation to build a supersonic-capable jet. Designed with German help, the HF-24 Marut was bold, homegrown and ahead of its time, but it crashed before it could truly soar In 1961, India made global aerospace history. On a Bangalore airstrip, a silver-grey fighter jet lifted off the tarmac and soared into the sky. The aircraft was the HF-24 . The man in the cockpit was Wing Commander Suranjan Das. And the moment marked India's entry into a one-of-a-kind club. The Hindustan Fighter-24 (HF-24), designed in India and capable of supersonic speeds, was the first such aircraft to be built outside the Western world. For a country just 14 years into independence, whose industrial base was still emerging from colonial rule and exploits, it was a feat of staggering ambition.
The Hindu
20-06-2025
- Automotive
- The Hindu
Why India should address its propulsion gap
The story so far: There has been growing excitement in military and industrial circles over the fast-tracked indigenous fifth generation stealth Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Touted as a multi-role fighter with super-cruise capability, internal weapons bays, advanced avionics, and diverter-less supersonic intakes enhancing stealth and reliability, the AMCA is being hailed as a milestone in Indian aerospace history. However, a dose of historical realism is warranted particularly since India has a persistent propulsion gap, and is overly reliant on imported engines. Nearly seven decades of fighter development reveal cautionary lessons, starting with India's first indigenously designed fighter jet, the HF-24 Marut (Spirit of the Tempest). What happened to the HF-24 Marut? Launched in the 1950s by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under famed German engineer Kurt Tank — designer of several WWII Luftwaffe fighters — the twin-engine, swept-wing Marut was, like the AMCA, an ambitious project of its time. Sleek and capable of transonic speeds, it embodied post-colonial India's drive for self-reliance and entered service amid high hopes in the late 1960s. However, the Marut never reached its full potential, not because of design flaws, but entirely due to its underpowered British Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 703 turbojets. Although Tank had envisioned a more powerful engine, it never materialised, leaving the Marut's performance underwhelming. And, while it performed reasonably well in ground-attack roles during the 1971 war on the western front, its propulsion limitations ultimately proved crippling. HAL produced only 147 of these high-maintenance, low-output fighters, which were eventually 'number-plated' or retired by 1990. Indian Air Force (IAF) veterans who flew the Marut consistently cited the lack of a powerful engine as its Achilles' heel — highlighting the enduring reality that high-end fighters live or die by propulsion technology. Engines, after all, are not mere technical parts but the core of sovereign aerospace capability, shaping a combat aircraft's power, range, and mission effectiveness. Did India develop its own engines? Following the Marut's disappointing engine performance, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) assigned its Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) laboratory in 1989 to develop the Kaveri GTX-35VS afterburning turbofan for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which had been under design development since 1981-82. Over the next 35 years, GTRE spent around ₹2032 crore, as of 2020, on the project, but without success. Despite producing nine full-scale prototypes and four core engines — logging over 3,000 hours of ground testing and 73 hours of flight trials on an Ilyushin IL-76 flying test bed in Russia — the Kaveri failed to meet the LCA's performance benchmarks. It struggled with thrust-to-weight ratio, reliability, and thermal management under sustained high-performance conditions. Though spinoff versions were proposed for tanks, ships, and locomotives, none have so far entered operational use. A revival attempt in 2016, in collaboration with French engine-maker Snecma (linked to offset obligations from the IAF's Rafale deal) also collapsed. A parallel proposal by its partner Safran to co-develop a new engine for the Tejas MkII and AMCA met a similar fate, reportedly rejected by the DRDO due to institutional pride. Meanwhile, Kaveri's failure forced the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), responsible for the LCA's design, to adopt the U.S.-made General Electric (GE) F404-IN20 afterburning turbofan engine (producing 78-80 kN of thrust) around 2004. Although barely adequate — restricting Tejas' payload and high-angle-of-attack capabilities — the engine was eventually approved by the IAF, which inducted two Mk1 squadrons from 2015 onwards, with one squadron operating without full operational clearance, nearly 34 years after the LCA programme's inception. How is India affected by engine dependency? India's engine dependency issues resurfaced recently when GE delayed delivery of 99 F404 engines by 13 months for the upgraded LCA Mk1A — a lighter, more capable variant equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, advanced electronic warfare suites, and mid-air refuelling capability. Under a $716 million contract signed in 2021, engine deliveries were scheduled to begin by March 2024, but the first power pack arrived only in April 2025, as part of an initial batch of 12 expected by the end of the year. GE cited 'unprecedented supply chain pressures,' including disruptions from suppliers, as the cause for the delay, but for India it jeopardised the MK1As commissioning by deferring it further. This triggered sharp criticism from Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh, who publicly rebuked HAL for chronic slippages in fighter deliveries amid a steep decline in IAF combat strength from a sanctioned 42.5 fighter squadrons to around 30 presently. Further reductions loom with two legacy MiG-21 'Bis' squadrons slated for imminent retirement. 'We need to be now ready to be future-ready,' Mr. Singh said at the CII Annual Business Summit in New Delhi on May 29. Citing HAL's blotted history of missed deadlines, he bluntly asserted that wars are won by equipping the military, not merely planning for the future. Simultaneously, HAL's negotiations with GE to locally manufacture the more powerful GE-F414 engine (90–96 kN thrust) — intended for the LCA Mk2 and initially the AMCA Mk1 — too has hit a roadblock. The deal, announced during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 2023 U.S. visit, has reportedly been stalled by GE's demand for an additional $500 million over the original $1.5 billion agreement. More critically, GE appears unwilling to share core engine technologies like single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings, and advanced cooling systems, all of which are vital for boosting engine durability and thrust. HAL continues to demand full technology transfer, but industry insiders point out that such proprietary know-how, developed at great expense, is rarely shared by global engine makers. Talks, however, are still ongoing. Both the LCA Mk2, which is under-development, and the initial AMCA Mk1 models are expected to rely on the F414 as a 'stopgap' powerplant, pending finalisation of the deal. The ADA is also scouting for a 110 kN-class engine for the AMCA Mk2, potentially via a joint venture. Intermittent discussions with France's Safran and the U.K.'s Rolls-Royce have so far yielded no concrete outcome. And, while these possibilities may serve as a short-term workaround, it reflects the same external engine dependence that had crippled the Marut. Consequently, a cross-section of IAF veterans and aerospace experts warned that unless India developed an indigenous engine to power future AMCA blocks, the programme risks being held hostage once again to geopolitical whims. How much is India dependent on external engines? India's external propulsion sourcing extends well beyond aerial platforms, affecting the Army and Navy as well, both of which are exclusively reliant on imported power packs or foreign engines assembled and built domestically under licence. The Army's Arjun Main Battle Tank, for example, is powered by the German MTU MB838 Ka-501 diesel engine paired with RENK RK-304 transmissions, while the recently trialled Zorawar Light Tank uses the U.S.-origin 1,000hp Cummins Advanced Combat Engine. The Navy too depends wholly on foreign propulsion systems — Russian, Ukrainian, French, German, and U.S. engines — that power all its indigenously designed and built frigates, destroyers, auxiliary vessels, troop carriers, corvettes, and fast attack craft. India's all-round engine development across aerospace, land, and naval platforms is critical to ensure strategic autonomy and enhance military capability. How important is autonomous engine development ? Aircraft engine development is vital for India to achieve aerospace autonomy and strategic self-reliance. Disruptions in foreign engine supplies delay production like that of the LCA Mk1A, hampers upgrades, and restricts exports as that would necessitate third-party approvals. The U.S., France, and China are able to assert dominance in global aerospace markets as they have harnessed indigenous propulsion. However, for India, mastering advanced jet engine technology is not merely a prestige project but is crucial to sustaining military readiness, ensuring credible deterrence, and insulating its defence sector from external shocks and global political vagaries. Without this core capability, India's broader ambitions in aviation and defence exports risk remaining perennially compromised. A broad spectrum of defence experts and IAF veterans contend that India's failure to develop advanced jet engines transcend technical hurdles and are fundamentally a political challenge. India's defence funding remains fragmented, largely focused on short-term projects, rather than being driven by a long-term, strategic vision. If India is genuinely committed to closing this glaring capability gap, mere slogans like Atmanirbhar Bharat will not suffice. Achieving true autonomy in engine technology demands comprehensive structural reforms, unwavering political will, and the cultivation of an innovation ecosystem which will seamlessly integrate private sector participation, academic research, and defence R&D institutions into a cohesive and competitive framework. Rahul Bedi is a veteran journalist based in New Delhi and Chandigarh specialising in military, defence and security matters.
