Latest news with #HusseinIbish
ABC News
01-07-2025
- Politics
- ABC News
Will Netanyahu's Iran ‘win' lead to a Gaza ceasefire?
Sydney Pead: Fresh from a military win against Iran, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is turning his focus back to the conflict in Gaza, where he still faces immense public pressure to bring home Israeli hostages and end the war with Hamas. Today, Hussein Ibish from the Arab Gulf States Institute on whether new talks with the US could deliver a lasting ceasefire. I'm Sydney Pead, filling in for Sam Hawley. On Gadigal land in Sydney, this is ABC News Daily. Hussein, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he's going to visit the White House next week for talks with President Donald Trump. And that comes after Sunday, when Donald Trump took to social media to declare, in all caps, make the deal in Gaza, get the hostages back. So, Trump fancies himself a peacemaker. What do you make of this meeting and Trump's words? Hussein Ibish: Well yeah, and in fact, Netanyahu has similarly been talking about opportunities having been opened up for ending the conflict, for getting hostages out and for resolving the war. He's been very vague. He hasn't said what they are. He hasn't drawn a direct line between the bombing campaign between Israel and Iran. But there is the implication that that somehow opens new possibilities. And that's what he said. It's pretty vague. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister: We have fought with strength against Iran and achieved a great victory. That victory opens an opportunity for a dramatic expansion of the peace agreements. We are working vigorously on that, along with the release of our hostages and the defeat of Hamas. There is a window of opportunity here that must not be wasted. Hussein Ibish: I'm not sure exactly what they're talking about, but Israel does seem to think that its success against Iran has created a new aura of strength and a new freedom of action. And that's, I think, an intimidating thought, especially given the intensification of the war. Sydney Pead: There has been an intensification just overnight. There's been a wave of fresh Israeli attacks across Gaza. And they came after one of the largest evacuation orders was issued in the Strip since fighting resumed in March. So, you know, while the world's attention has been on Iran in that so-called 12-day war, things are going from bad to worse in Gaza. Hussein Ibish: In Gaza, it's been an utter disaster, right? And we've absolutely lost track of how many people have been killed. You know, to give you a sense of how bad things are in Gaza, 74 people have been killed in the past 24 hours, including a strike on a cafe where people were sheltering. ABC Newsreader: The cafe had become a well-known spot for journalists and activists with seating and internet access among the dead, women and children. Hussein Ibish: And again, you know, huge numbers of people and dozens of people killed at these food distribution centres. One of the things the Israelis have done is virtually eliminate the activities of the UN and credible humanitarian aid agencies that are usually responsible for distributing food in these situations. And they've kind of replaced that with a shadowy fund called the Gaza Humanitarian Fund, which is overseen by the Israeli military. And almost 600 Palestinians have been killed since late May at these food distribution centres because if the least thing seems to go wrong, the Israeli military just opens fire. ABC Newsreader: Anger is palpable. Hunger, hunger, hunger, this man yells. These people had gone to eat. They went to get a morsel of food to eat. They said they were distributing aid. How do you call it aid and then shoot at people's children, he said. Sydney Pead: The Israeli Defence Force has now acknowledged what it called inaccurate and uncalculated fire did kill civilians over the past month. It also says aid sites have now been reorganised and access improved to prevent further incidents. Benjamin Netanyahu has said all along the war could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders and lays down its arms and all the hostages are returned. But what's changed for Israel's leaders? One major success for Netanyahu was that he was able to draw Trump into the Iran conflict and convince him to use the US military to pound Iran's nuclear sites. So how significant was that? Hussein Ibish: Well, I think it looks great on paper because on paper you would say, well Israel has been trying to get the US to strike Iranian nuclear sites for 20 plus years and it never happened and then Netanyahu got it to happen. So good on Netanyahu. But that is a superficial reading. Because the one time, one strike, one and done as we say in the US, deal that Trump entered into with Iran and then enforced a ceasefire on the Israelis, which is not really what they were looking for, is not the strike at all that they were hoping for. This is not what they wanted to draw the United States into. They wanted to draw the United States into a protracted campaign of a couple of weeks to a month or even two months to destroy, really destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, not damage them. There's a great deal of damage but it's not smouldering embers. Sydney Pead: Well, the US officials are pushing back on reports that doubted the level of damage to the Iranian nuclear program. The Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was adamant about that. Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of Defense: There's been a lot of discussion about what happened and what didn't happen. Step back for a second. Because of decisive military action, President Trump created the conditions to end the war, decimating, choose your word, obliterating, destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities. Sydney Pead: But even if the conflict wasn't everything Netanyahu was hoping for, he was quick to play it off as a win. So how did it play out domestically for him? Because he's been under a lot of pressure from the Israeli public. Hussein Ibish: Well, it looks great. It looks wonderful. It looks like Israel, and in fact it's true, that Israel itself went to war against Iran's nuclear facilities and scored terrific victories. We really don't know much about the impact of Iran's retaliation because of the extent of Israeli censorship. But it was, whatever it was, it was well within the acceptable range from an Israeli point of view. So this was highly successful. And so Netanyahu right now is in a great situation politically in Israel. He looks like the man who took the war to Hezbollah and won, to Iran and won, who was there when Assad fell, and who now only has to deal with Hamas to have dealt comprehensively with all of Israel's enemies one after another. And that's a very strong position for him to be in. The problem is he hasn't finished the Gaza war. There are still these hostages, and the war is by no means resolved. And it's just much harder to see how that finishes in a satisfactory way. Sydney Pead: I guess I'm wondering if that sort of apparent success in the conflict has strengthened his political position within Israel, and will it enable Netanyahu to push back against some of the people within his own government who want to continue to expand the war? Hussein Ibish: Yeah, I think so. I think he has the upper hand in Israel, and I think he has, to a very large extent, the upper hand against people inside his cabinet. On the other hand, he is still beholden to a couple of extremist parties, and they can bring him down, and he is still on trial. ABC Newsreader: The Prime Minister has been on trial for corruption charges, which he denies, since 2020. Mr Netanyahu argued that he needs to deal with pressing national security and diplomatic matters, sparking speculation a Gaza ceasefire may be imminent. Hussein Ibish: He still has a tiny majority, which means that small groups of extremists can really twist his arm, and he dare not fall, because he faces the prospect of conviction and incarceration. Sydney Pead: Okay, so Hussein, Netanyahu, he's sort of been facing unpopularity among his own people because of his inability to bring all the hostages home, but he's had what looks like this successful campaign in Iran, and he's convinced Trump to get involved. Now there are these new talks which will happen between Trump and Netanyahu next week. So where does he stand now with the US President? Because Trump was extremely angry when it looked like the ceasefire he brokered was on shaky ground. So what does that relationship look like now? Hussein Ibish: Yeah, well, Trump had a fit. I mean, let's face it. Donald Trump, US President: We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don't know what the f*** they're doing. Do you understand that? Hussein Ibish: We've never seen a public meltdown like that, with Trump swearing at Netanyahu. He pretended he was swearing at the Iranian leaders too, but he really wasn't. He was swearing at Netanyahu, and that public swearing on television was followed by angry social media posts, and then finally an angry phone call. So personally, I think the relationship is very weak. But that doesn't matter, because politically, it's strong because both men needed to be strong. And as long as that's the case, it'll remain functional, and, you know, they don't have to like each other. They need each other to do what they need the other one to do. Sydney Pead: At the NATO conference last week, Trump said he thought that he was very close to striking a deal on the conflict in Gaza. Donald Trump, US President: I think great progress is being made on Gaza. I think because of this attack that we made, I think we're going to have some very good news... Sydney Pead: There were two months of relative peace earlier this year when they came to a ceasefire deal and there were some hostages released by Hamas. What do we know about what this meeting between Trump and Netanyahu could deliver? Could they secure another ceasefire deal? Hussein Ibish: I guess so. You know, it's definitely possible. Look, that ceasefire held until Netanyahu decided to break it. Steve Witkoff, who is Trump's envoy for these negotiations, has apparently issued another proposal calling for a 60-day ceasefire in exchange for the release of 10 living hostages and 18 corpses, and for also Palestinian prisoners. And then during that 60-day ceasefire, the two sides would negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire to end the war, which I think is necessary for Hamas to agree to anything. Hamas is not going to agree to anything that doesn't have the possibility of ending the war at some future extrapolated date. And, you know, Netanyahu wants nothing to do with a ceasefire that does not involve some form of categorical defeat for Hamas. I don't know what that looks like, frankly, because Hamas is not a list of people who can be killed or captured or a list of objects that can be destroyed. It's a brand name. It's a political brand. So you can't really defeat it in the long run. And certainly as long as there are a group of Palestinians in Gaza who say they're Hamas, then there is a Hamas. Sydney Pead: Hussein Ibish is a resident senior scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington DC. This episode was produced by Kara Jensen-Mackinnon, audio production by Sam Dunn. Our supervising producer is David Coady. I am Sydney Pead. ABC News Daily will be back on air tomorrow. Thanks for listening.
The National
23-06-2025
- Politics
- The National
US braces for cyber attacks by 'pro-Iranian hacktivists'
Following the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Department of Homeland Security has warned of retaliation in the form of cyber attacks. A national terrorism advisory system bulletin, issued on Sunday, stated that "hactivists" and Iranian government-affiliated actors are routinely targeting poorly secured US networks and internet-connected devices for disruptive cyber attacks. Warnings about nefarious cyber activity from Iran and other external actors come as Tehran limits internet access for its citizens. But those who need internet access for cyber attacks can find ways to get online, or are granted access. Cyber attacks "might be a very tempting kind of direction for them to go,' Kristin Diwan, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, said during a panel discussion about the recent US strikes. 'In a way Iran doesn't have that battlefield supremacy, but this sort of thing, cyber crime or cyber attacks, a kind of subterfuge for the longer term in the overall disruptive battle might be attractive,' she added when asked by The National about the possibility that Iran might prefer cyber attacks. Hussein Ibish, also with the Arab Gulf States Institute and a columnist for this publication, agreed. "It would make sense because it would involve deniability and it also wouldn't cause President [Donald] Trump to go on some chest-beating rampage,' he said, pointing to the ambiguity of digital attacks as opposed to military attacks. Iran is generally acknowledged in the cyber security community as a major state sponsor of cyber attacks. The country was featured prominently throughout Microsoft's 2024 Digital Defence Report. While many of the mentions in the report referred to political-influence operations and the spread of disinformation, it also touched on other Iranian cyber operations. 'In July 2022, Iran launched a devastating cyberattack designed to cripple Albania's digital infrastructure,' Microsoft said, noting that Albania was able identify and prevent the threat from causing harm. During the 2024 US presidential election, the FBI said that it was investigating a claim from Donald Trump's presidential campaign that it was the target of a hack orchestrated by Iran. Iran is also home to two cyber crime groups that have come to be known in cyber security circles as Cotton Sandstorm and Mint Sandstorm. Microsoft's threat intelligence group describes Mint Sandstorm as an Iran-affiliated group 'known to primarily target dissidents protesting the Iranian government, as well as activist leaders, the defence industrial base, journalists, think tanks, universities, and multiple government agencies and services, including targets in Israel and the US'. It has been widely speculated that Mint Sandstorm was behind the attempted hack and potential breach of communications within Mr Trump's recent presidential campaign, using a method known as 'data harvesting'. In May, an Iranian man pleaded guilty to using ransomware to extort millions from governments and organisations in the US. Sina Gholinejad, 37, admitted to computer fraud and abuse, as well as conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Ransomware is a type of malware designed to deny users, businesses or organisations access to their data stored on computers or servers. Although not unique to Iranian cyber criminals, as a result of the US strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, one of the biggest cyber threats may come in the form of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. A DDoS is a cyber attack in which perpetrators use co-ordination and several computers to overwhelm a network server with internet traffic, which then prevents users from accessing services and websites. If critical infrastructure such as water or energy facilities are affected by DDoS attacks, millions could be affected. A report released by NetScout Systems, a provider of cyber protection solutions, indicated that countries such as Israel, Georgia, Mexico and Turkey experienced a major spike in DDoS attacks over the course of the year. 'DDoS has emerged as the go-to tool for cyber warfare,' Richard Hummel, director o f threat intelligence at NetScout, told The National in April.
ABC News
15-06-2025
- Politics
- ABC News
Will Israel's conflict with Iran draw in the US?
Sam Hawley: Benjamin Netanyahu insists his sweeping attacks on Iran are a necessity to protect Israel from a nuclear holocaust. But why has the Israeli leader decided to strike now and what is his ultimate aim? Today, Hussein Ibish from the Arab Gulf States Institute on the risk of a further escalation and America being drawn into the conflict. I'm Sam Hawley on Gadigal land in Sydney. This is ABC News Daily. News report: After weeks of threats, explosions across Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister: Moments ago Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a targeted military operation to roll back the Iranian threat to Israel's very survival. News report: Israel striking what it says were dozens of Iranian military and nuclear sites as well as key officials and scientists. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister: If not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time. This is a clear and present danger to Israel's very survival. News report: Explosions and plumes of smoke have filled the Tel Aviv skyline as a barrage of retaliatory strikes rains down. News report: The Israeli government has said that it expects this offensive is going to ramp up and continue perhaps for as long as two weeks. Sam Hawley: Hussein, this is the most fierce fighting between Israel and Iran in decades. Do we describe it as a war at this point? Hussein Ibish: Yeah, definitely it's a war. It's the first war between Israel and Iran ever. Those two countries had never exchanged direct kinetic military blows before last year when they had more limited missile strikes against each other. In this case, it seems to be with the Israelis hitting the Iranians as hard as possible and then something like that in return. The Israelis appear to be trying to strike Iran with some form of a knockout blow. Although how they would calculate the success or failure, what the metric is for that is not yet clear. But it's definitely a war. Now, it's the kind of war that's very much in the modern era. This is a war that isn't likely to involve ground forces. This is a war that's going to be conducted by air. Sam Hawley: Well, Rising Lion, which is what the Israelis have dubbed this operation, it's pretty sophisticated, isn't it? Not many militaries could pull something like this off. Hussein Ibish: No, I think that's right. I think it is sophisticated. I mean, first, it's sophisticated in terms of targeting and accuracy. They are able to hit the targets they want to hit with more accuracy than most militaries could dream of having. And so that's one aspect. And another aspect is not only can they hit what they want to hit, they know what to hit in Iran. A lot of times, countries would have a general sense of, well, there's this buildup here and there's this installation there, but we don't really have the details there. In the case of Israel and Iran, I think that's not the case. Sam Hawley: So they have, of course, Israel damaged Iran's nuclear facilities. I guess the question, Hussein, is can Israel actually destroy Iran's nuclear program? Is that actually possible? Hussein Ibish: Well, the working assumption until now has been probably not. And I'm not sure we've seen anything that changes our minds on that. I mean, the general sense, my sense, certainly, going into this was Israel could give Iran a bloody nose, possibly a few broken bones, and really harm the nuclear program and do great damage to it, but not kick it back, say, 20 years, not make it so badly damaged that it's non-functional for a generation. And I think my sense was the United States had the bunker-buster capabilities to do that, and to do it in a few days through round-the-clock bombing with huge-scale conventional weapons. The U.S. has not given these in large numbers to Israel or anybody else. So the question is, is Israeli intelligence so sophisticated and thoroughgoing? And is their capability just barely sufficient to carry them over the threshold? And I have to say I'd be surprised. I think the Israeli plan must be either to force the Iranians into a humiliating and damaging agreement with the United States that renders it non-nuclear for a generation or two, or to instigate regime change in Iran. The idea is to force a still robust elite in Iran to say, these guys, this Islamic Republic crew, has mishandled Persian national interests that has a 6,000-year history so badly. They've got to go or be radically reformed in ways that will change policies and attitudes. Sam Hawley: Benjamin Netanyahu, of course, in a video address, spoke directly to the Iranian people, saying this is your moment to overthrow this brutal regime. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister: The time has come for you to unite around your flag and your historic legacy by standing up for your freedom from an evil and oppressive regime. Brave people of Iran, your light will defeat the darkness. I'm with you. The people of Israel are with you. Hussein Ibish: Yeah, that's I think the Israeli hope, is that they could either engineer street-level unrest that's sufficient to bring down the regime or force radical change. And I think that's very unlikely. That really doesn't usually happen. Like a foreign power smashes up your national resources. And most Iranians agree with the nuclear program, by the way. It's not about the nature of the regime. This is something that Iranians generally feel deeply about. So I think it's unlikely that people will pour out into the street. The bigger target of Netanyahu and the Americans is the Iranian elite. And saying to them, you know, these people are mismanaging your national resources to the point of disaster. Do something about it. Sam Hawley: All right. Well, Israel defied, of course, Donald Trump by launching this action. He had warned Benjamin Netanyahu not to do anything that could undermine the US nuclear talks with Iran, which are, of course, now off altogether. Hussein Ibish: I wonder about that. Sam Hawley: Well, what does his disregard for Trump tell us, if anything? Hussein Ibish: Well, OK. So there are many ways of reading this. One is that, yeah, the administration didn't do anything in word or deed that is known to encourage Israel in doing this. But so there was no green light as such. Certainly nothing that is attributable. But there also was no red light. Trump has said he knew the date of the attack, which means he knew about it in advance. And he didn't go to the mat to stop it. He didn't tell the Israelis, if you do this, I will no longer talk to you, etc. In fact, he's been quite nice to the Israelis after this. Not endorsing it, but not condemning it either. So what the Americans are doing is what is known in American diplomatic circles as constructive ambiguity. That's what they call it. What they mean is that they've adopted a position that allows the Israelis to say, well, we have American backing. Because they haven't said no. And so, you know, we're still in good standing with Washington. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister: This is what Israel is doing with the support, the clear support of the president of the United States, Donald Trump, and the American people. Hussein Ibish: And for the Iranians to be able to tell themselves and their own people that, well, the Americans have not been part of this. So if we do end up going back to negotiations with Washington, which they might, let me tell you, then it wouldn't be under duress. And the Americans, similarly, the neo-isolationists around Trump in the kind of fascist wing of his constituency led by Steve Bannon, could say, oh, good, he's staying out of this conflict. No more Middle East wars. Whereas the kind of pro-Israel faction that includes the religious right led by J.D. Vance and also the Jewish right wingers can say, oh, he's got Israel's back. Both readings are plausible. Sam Hawley: All right. Well, Hussein, what are the risks now that this could escalate into a wider regional war? And who would be drawn into that if it did happen? Hussein Ibish: There are serious risks, but the players who would join the Iranian camp are limited. When Bashar al-Assad fell, they lost the linchpin of their network. Everything centered around Syria was their one state ally, state level ally in the Arab world and in the Middle East. And the Turkish engineer downfall of al-Assad. But without Assad, it's these disparate gangs. So you've got the popular mobilization front groups in Iraq with their little missiles. You got the Houthis with the kind of dangerous stuff, but very limited they can do. And Hezbollah still exists in Lebanon. They may try to do some things, but Iran's reach now is going to be much more, I think, you know, restricted to what they can do themselves. And maybe the Houthis, possibly some missile strikes from Hezbollah. But I would look to Iranian proxies and sponsored groups and intelligence services to attack soft targets around the world. You know, engage in classical forms of terrorism that we generally haven't seen for a while. And, you know, so I would beef up security at Israeli and pro-Israel Jewish centers around the world. I would be very cautious. And I think the Iranian regime is of a mentality to do that and has the capabilities to do that. Sam Hawley: Is there a chance America could be dragged into this, do you think? Hussein Ibish: Of course, yes. If the Americans are attacked, they will respond directly. And maybe the biggest threat of that in Iraq, where there are these hot-headed militia groups that Iran has created but doesn't fully control. So you have all these different little groups, some of them bigger like Kata'ib Hezbollah and others that are larger and some of them small. And all of them armed and all of them hopping mad. And who knows who's saying what to whom. And there are lots of American targets around, lots of American military targets and American-related targets. So look to Iraq as one place that could happen. And, of course, the Houthis in Yemen have the capability of doing crazy and dangerous things with regard to shipping. But I think the Iranians, if they get that way, will have the U.S. not get dragged into this. And they will be trying to prevent adding Washington's power to the list of horribles they have to deal with. They don't need more firepower aimed at them right now. Sam Hawley: All right. Well, Hussein, if nothing else, this does show us, doesn't it, that the world can change very slowly. But it can also change very, very quickly, particularly if there's a change or a shift in global power. Hussein Ibish: Oh, yeah. Well, change generally happens in the blink of an eye. The Soviet Union is mighty superpower until it's gone. Apartheid in South Africa is immovable until Nelson Mandela is suddenly the president. Things that seem impossible, until they happen, they are far-fetched. Sam Hawley: Hussein Ibsih is from the Arab Gulf States Institute, a Washington-based think tank. This episode was produced by Sydney Pead. Audio production by Adair Sheppard. Our supervising producer is David Coady. I'm Sam Hawley. Thanks for listening.
Yahoo
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Trump and the Crown Prince
Subscribe here: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube | Overcast | Pocket Casts Three years ago, Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia and was pointedly not greeted at the airport by any of the kingdom's major leaders (a mere governor of a province was the highest-ranking official who showed up). This week when President Trump landed in Riyadh, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met him at the end of the jetway, shook his hand warmly, and walked him down the purple carpet. In Qatar, his entourage was greeted by red Cybertrucks, camels, and dancers. The affection appears mutual and genuine. That is in part because Trump speaks the transactional language of the Gulf leaders he met with this week, and they appreciate him for it. As a gift, he gets a luxury jet from Qatar while U.S. citizens get … ? That remains to be seen. In this episode of Radio Atlantic, we talk with Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, about this new era of chumminess among the American president and Gulf leaders. What does it mean that Trump has not brought up any of Saudi Arabia's human-rights violations? Is that luxury jet just norm breaking or illegal? And how might this friendship influence Trump in his dealings with Israel as its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, threatens to escalate attacks on Gaza?Hanna Rosin: Have you been seeing the pictures of Trump on the tarmac being greeted by various royals? Hussein Ibish: Yeah. Rosin: I wonder if you read it this way: He seems very relaxed. Ibish: He is very relaxed. He's home. He's come home. This is, like—outside the U.S., this is his favorite place. [] Rosin: I'm Hanna Rosin. This is Radio Atlantic, and that is Hussein Ibish. Ibish: I'm Hussein Ibish, and I'm a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, and I write for many publications, especially The Atlantic. Rosin: This week, we're watching the president's visit to the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The pictures we're referring to show Trump at the airport tarmac in Saudi Arabia being greeted by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a royal welcome. Lavender carpets. Golden swords. Arabian horses. And Trump smiling through all of it. This is a stark contrast to a few years ago, when MBS, as bin Salman is known, was a pariah in the West for his human-rights violations. So what does Donald Trump's new approach to the Gulf states mean for our Middle East policy? And why is Trump so at home there? Ibish: He lives in a world of patrons and clients. He lives in a world where authority is not questionable. And that's very familiar. It's a very familiar space to—especially the Saudi royals, but—all of them. And he understands them, and they understand him. And he loves them, and they love him. He can be himself, the unedited version. He doesn't have to check his instincts. He just go[es] with it. And that's kind of unusual for Trump. Rosin: The word that seems to summarize Trump's approach is transactional. That's the word that a lot of people use. So what are Middle East leaders getting from America, and what is Trump getting from them? Ibish: Yeah, it's pretty straightforward, right? The Middle Eastern—not leaders, but—countries, what they're getting, ultimately, is protection. They're getting military protection, which is often unsatisfactory from their point of view. But they don't really have a good alternative to the United States, so they have to try to work to make it as good as possible. And that's what they're doing. They're buying goodwill from the U.S. They're also buying weapons, which they want and need. It's not, you know, purely just gifting. However, what Trump is getting in return is lots of money, and more for himself than for the country. There is money coming for the country. There are these large weapons sales of missiles and other things to Saudi Arabia, the biggest weapons sale in U.S. history. And the U.A.E. is looking at buying over a million semiconductor chips from Nvidia. And so on. All three countries are buying lots of American stuff, which is a big boon to Trump's bid to revitalize American manufacturing. But there's also a grifting angle here, right? Trump is getting a lot of money for his own company. We've never seen this before. We've never seen, even in the first Trump term: The level to which this state visit is also a private-business visit is amazing, because the projects include a Trump Tower in both Riyadh and Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia; another Trump Tower in Dubai, in the U.A.E.; and a Trump International Golf [Club] and resort in Qatar. There's also a cryptocurrency scheme connected to his sons, in which a U.A.E.-linked company has just agreed to invest $2 billion, with a B—$2 billion. The company is not going to look the same after this trip. It's going to go from being a very-successful-for-its-size mom-and-pop shop built on the vast inheritance that Trump's had from his father, Fred—but now he's taking it into the stratosphere. I mean, the amount of financial clout that's coming to his family-owned, privately held business is just amazing. And what the Arabs are doing here is buying goodwill. It's an investment. It's an investment in Trump as a friend and, you know, ultimately also with the U.S. But right now Trump has, you know, instituted l'état c'est moi: 'He is the country, and the country is him.' And until somebody stops him or until he leaves the White House, that's the way it's going to be. And this is very understandable to a group of people who deal in patron-client relations as a matter of course. Rosin: Okay, so just to summarize, the transaction is: They get protection, and what Trump gets is money for the country and money for himself. Ibish: Exactly. They get protection and he gets money. We get money. Rosin: Yeah, it's very clear when you describe it: The symbol, the concrete thing that is going to symbolize this trip for a long time, is this luxury jet from Qatar. How should we understand what this transaction is? Ibish: Well, it's the absolute—I was waiting for you to bring it up, because it is exactly the kind of icon, the avatar of this trip. It says it all. Qatar, which is an unbelievably rich country, has 300,000—maybe 400,000—citizens. Most of the country, between 2 and 3 million people, are ex-pat laborers, foreign workers, Arab and Western technocrats. But collectively, those 350,000 or so Qataris are the largest single exporter in the world of liquid natural gas. And obviously, all of the wealth goes to the citizens. I mean, it's just amazing. You've never seen a country with this level of per-capita wealth. And it uses that money for national interests. In this case, what they've done is: One of the former prime ministers who is a royal has a jet, a luxury Boeing 747 that's kitted out not for a president but for a wealthy man who enjoys luxury travel on his own private plane. So what the Qataris have done is they've said: You can have the plane for use as president while you're in office, and after that it will be transferred to your presidential library, meaning he could still use it after that. So it's sort of been—they've very cleverly muddied the waters or blurred the line between private and public here, in order to give this plane to Donald Trump as an individual. They can say that they haven't, that they've given it to his presidency, right? Rosin: This is so interesting. Basically, what you're saying is this is the president that the Gulf leaders have been waiting for. Trump is the man that they can finally deal with in the way that they want to. Ibish: Yeah. Well, in a lot of ways I think that's true. I remember a certain high-ranking—or formerly very high-ranking—Gulf individual who said just as much in 2016, after he was elected. They said, He does the same things—and he listed a bunch of verbs that were unlawful actions—and said, We do that. And he does that. It's not, obviously, unlawful in their countries. It's normative, but traditionally not allowed in the United States and in Western countries in general. And I think this man was absolutely correct when he said, We do this and he does that, and we do this and he does that, and that they would feel very comfortable with him. They certainly would disagree about how much pressure he should put on Israel regarding Gaza, things like that. But I was thinking yesterday that there's really no daylight between Trump's positions on all the really most-important issues and those of Saudi Arabia. You can't find a major irritant there, which is really amazing. Rosin: Such as what? What issues? Ibish: Well, I mean, anything you think of—the war in Ukraine, the nature of U.S.-Saudi relations, you know, how business should be conducted, the Yemen war, talks with Iran (they both want a deal). They convinced him that lifting the sanctions on Syria was a good idea. They just agree, more or less, on just about any issue. That can change overnight, because if there was a spike in oil prices, they would disagree right away. But I was contrasting that in my mind with the problems that the U.S. and Trump have with Israel right now, where there's disagreement about Gaza, about the cease-fire with the Houthis, about the talks with Iran, about the negotiations with Hamas. There are many irritants. Now, that's not to say the U.S. is closer to Saudi Arabia than it is Israel. I don't think that's true. The Israeli relationship with the U.S. is very deeply ingrained and protected by political influence in the U.S., especially from evangelical Christians on the right. But yeah, I think Trump is sort of ideal in many ways from, say, a Saudi point of view. [] Rosin: So now that we've established the nature of this relationship and where we are now, I want to understand what it means—to the rest of us, not to Trump and his family. So when you hear about U.S. relations with Gulf states in the past, especially Saudi Arabia, human rights enters as a factor. Not always forcefully, but it's always— Ibish: Well, it's definitely a rhetorical factor with most administrations. Whether they're Republican or Democrat, they do bring it up. Trump doesn't—ever, at all. Rosin: Right. So how important is that departure or shift? Ibish: Well, I mean, MBS has learned—and one of the big questions about him when he was a young, rash leader, you know, beginning in 2015, when he came in as defense minister, and a quick rise to where he is now, which is head of government. That is to say he is the prime minister of Saudi Arabia, so he runs the government. And human-rights issues became very serious in his early years with the arrest of the dissidents, the sort of adventure in Yemen that was ill-advised and badly done, to put it mildly, and also the jailing of important people who are not perhaps on board fully with the changes—the reforms, the social liberalization, or other concerns that MBS had about them—who were jailed at the Ritz Carlton. Rosin: Yeah, and of course, the 2018 murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which the CIA concluded MBS ordered, although he denied it. Ibish: I was coming to that. That's the big enchilada—right?—for many people, including me, because he was a friend of mine for 15 years. And I, you know, I was just—I'm still scarred by it, and I think I always will be. [] Ibish: MBS, what we've learned about him is that, you know, he's not a sociopath, in the sense that he's educable. The question about him was always, Is he young and, you know, rash and doing these things because he doesn't know better, or is he kind of nuts? And the answer is, No, he's educable. He's evolving. He's maturing. Saudi Arabia remains a real human-rights violator from the point of view of human-rights norms. It executes a lot of people. Rule of law does not apply in the way we would expect. Dissidents—when they're found, when they exist—suffer, you know, arrest and imprisonment and long sentences. And even if they go as far as saying, Parts of the country should secede or leave Saudi Arabia, they can be executed. And they are sometimes. So it's not, you know, a happy story on human rights at all. But it's just way better than it was. And, you know, there are certainly more-alarming cases around the world. Rosin: Okay, so we need to take a quick break, but when we come back, I want to talk about what this trip means for the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and U.S.'s role in them. That's when we're back. [] Rosin: Okay, we're back. So I want to put this Gulf visit in the broader Middle East context. As Trump was heading to this trip, he made a number of deals that seemed like they were trying to clear away American entanglements in the region—so the U.S. cease-fire agreement with the Houthis and Yemen, the agreement with Hamas to release the last living U.S. citizen held hostage in Gaza, and then the announcement that the U.S. was going to lift sanctions on Syria. Do you see a pattern in this series of deals? Do you see a common goal? What is it? Ibish: Yes. I think he's trying to reduce American exposure and involvement in conflict in the region—not only in the region, but in regional conflicts. So for example, the lifting of sanctions on Syria is a response to Gulf countries saying to him, in effect, You say you want us to handle our problems. Fine. We want to, you know, invest in Syria and build. We can't have any influence in Syria if we don't spend money there, because we don't have a militia or an army in Syria. The only way to get their attention is by investing in reconstruction and in other services where we can build constituencies of friends who will represent our interests and, by extension, yours. And we can't do that if every time we write a check, we have to worry about the Treasury Department slamming us. So if you want us to handle our business, you gotta take these sanctions off. The deal with the Houthis in Yemen is undoubtedly directly connected to another conflict-ending or conflict-containing policy of Trump, which is the negotiations with Iran. Trump definitely wants a deal with the Iranians, another version of the Obama peace deal—which he railed against but is trying to resurrect—but he wants it to be longer and stronger and tougher on Iran. And he can get all of that because of what happened to the Iranians under Biden. I mean, he'll never give Biden the credit for having put Iran in this situation, but it was under his presidency that Iran was crippled in its regional status, and the biggest blow by miles was the Turkish-engineered downfall of Assad in Syria. You know, that's why the—letting the Saudis and the Emiratis and others, you know, do what they can in Syria without sanctions is part of that. You know, he needs to take advantage of this moment of Iranian weakness and the fact that they need 20, 25 years to rebuild their power and to rethink their national-security strategy, because it was all based on the idea that Arab militia groups led by Hezbollah in Lebanon would provide a powerful forward defense against Israel and, ultimately, the United States. And that was tested and proved untrue. Hezbollah was decimated by Israel. So Iran is in very bad shape. It needs to rethink everything, and it needs time. And Trump understands this, and Trump wants a deal because he doesn't want to be put in a situation of having to confront the Iranians militarily. And Iran wants a deal, and the only country left that doesn't want such a deal is Israel. With Obama, the Arabs were totally against it, but now they're all for it because they want calm and regional stability. Rosin: So that is the one big, obvious point of disagreement, which you mentioned, is Israel. Ibish: Yeah. Rosin: This is coming at a moment when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is warning that he's going to escalate in Gaza. As you've been seeing this Gulf trip unfold, what do you think it means for Israel, Gaza, and America's role in all of that? Ibish: I mean, it certainly incentivizes Trump to think very carefully about doing what he can to restrain Israel's worst impulses in Gaza. The situation in Gaza is so dire after more than 70 days of complete blockade—no food, no medicine, no water, no electricity, no shelter, nothing, no supplies into Gaza. People have been reduced to the point of starvation. That's where we're headed here. And it's a crime—it's certainly a war crime, and it's probably a crime against humanity. What the Israelis are proposing to do is to go back into Gaza with full force, force all the population—2.2 million who are not Hamas fighters and cadres and officials—into a tiny enclave in the south, where they will be kept supposedly protected but actually kind of herded, where they'll be kept with what the UN says is very, totally inadequate plans for their food and water and medicine and shelter. Meanwhile, Israel proclaims it will scour the entire rest of the country for anything and everything connected with Hamas and destroy it. Gaza delenda est. You know, the bottom line is: This is kind of the war that the most-extreme factions in Hamas have been waiting for. It provides them with an open-ended, long-term insurgency. Now, obviously, the Israelis can rely on brute force to crush Hamas. But I think they've started to get the hint that as long as there are Palestinians in Gaza, there will be some form of Hamas, because Hamas is not a list of people and equipment. It's a name. And if you take a bunch of Palestinians and some of them say they're Hamas, then there will be Hamas, and that's likely to persist no matter what Israel does. And we're getting closer and closer to the end goal of where I think the logic of this for Israel goes, which is depopulation. Gaza has to be, you know, depopulated of Palestinians in order to be free of Hamas. And because the two go together in Gaza, under the circumstances. Rosin: So given that that's the current situation, and given that Trump is now engaging in the Middle East, how does this change the calculus for how he and the U.S. engage? Ibish: Everything that has happened in the region incentivizes him to stop the Israelis from going ahead with this plan, at least as it has been structured now. It's too extreme. It's too brutal. It's too genocidal. It's too over the top. And I really think the fact that he made such close friends again and reinforced his relationship with these countries that don't want that, both at the emotional and the strategic registers, that need it not to happen in every possible way, is really important. It gives him every reason to hold the Israelis back and say, Guys, come on. Don't do this. Don't do this this way. Don't do it. And he's the only person in the world at the moment who has real leverage over Netanyahu, because of the nature of the Israeli-U.S. relationship. Rosin: Yeah. Well, Hussein, this has been so clarifying. I really appreciate you helping us navigate and understand what this trip to the Gulf states might mean. Ibish: Such a pleasure to be here. Thank you. [] Rosin: This episode of Radio Atlantic was produced by Kevin Townsend and Rosie Hughes. It was edited by Claudine Ebeid. We had engineering support from Rob Smierciak, fact-checking by Sara Krolewski. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor. Listeners, if you like what you hear on Radio Atlantic, you can support our work and the work of all Atlantic journalists when you subscribe to The Atlantic at I'm Hanna Rosin, and thank you for being a listener. Talk to you next week. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
Trump and the Crown Prince
Three years ago, Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia and was pointedly not greeted at the airport by any of the kingdom's major leaders (a mere governor of a province was the highest-ranking official who showed up). This week when President Trump landed in Riyadh, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met him at the end of the jetway, shook his hand warmly, and walked him down the purple carpet. In Qatar, his entourage was greeted by red Cybertrucks, camels, and dancers. The affection appears mutual and genuine. That is in part because Trump speaks the transactional language of the Gulf leaders he met with this week, and they appreciate him for it. As a gift, he gets a luxury jet from Qatar while U.S. citizens get … ? That remains to be seen. In this episode of Radio Atlantic, we talk with Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, about this new era of chumminess among the American president and Gulf leaders. What does it mean that Trump has not brought up any of Saudi Arabia's human-rights violations? Is that luxury jet just norm breaking or illegal? And how might this friendship influence Trump in his dealings with Israel as its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, threatens to escalate attacks on Gaza? The following is a transcript of the episode: Hanna Rosin: Have you been seeing the pictures of Trump on the tarmac being greeted by various royals? Hussein Ibish: Yeah. Rosin: I wonder if you read it this way: He seems very relaxed. Ibish: He is very relaxed. He's home. He's come home. This is, like—outside the U.S., this is his favorite place. [ Music ] Rosin: I'm Hanna Rosin. This is Radio Atlantic, and that is Hussein Ibish. Ibish: I'm Hussein Ibish, and I'm a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, and I write for many publications, especially The Atlantic. Rosin: This week, we're watching the president's visit to the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The pictures we're referring to show Trump at the airport tarmac in Saudi Arabia being greeted by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a royal welcome. Lavender carpets. Golden swords. Arabian horses. And Trump smiling through all of it. This is a stark contrast to a few years ago, when MBS, as bin Salman is known, was a pariah in the West for his human-rights violations. So what does Donald Trump's new approach to the Gulf states mean for our Middle East policy? And why is Trump so at home there? Ibish: He lives in a world of patrons and clients. He lives in a world where authority is not questionable. And that's very familiar. It's a very familiar space to—especially the Saudi royals, but—all of them. And he understands them, and they understand him. And he loves them, and they love him. He can be himself, the unedited version. He doesn't have to check his instincts. He just go[es] with it. And that's kind of unusual for Trump. Rosin: The word that seems to summarize Trump's approach is transactional. That's the word that a lot of people use. So what are Middle East leaders getting from America, and what is Trump getting from them? Ibish: Yeah, it's pretty straightforward, right? The Middle Eastern—not leaders, but—countries, what they're getting, ultimately, is protection. They're getting military protection, which is often unsatisfactory from their point of view. But they don't really have a good alternative to the United States, so they have to try to work to make it as good as possible. And that's what they're doing. They're buying goodwill from the U.S. They're also buying weapons, which they want and need. It's not, you know, purely just gifting. However, what Trump is getting in return is lots of money, and more for himself than for the country. There is money coming for the country. There are these large weapons sales of missiles and other things to Saudi Arabia, the biggest weapons sale in U.S. history. And the U.A.E. is looking at buying over a million semiconductor chips from Nvidia. And so on. All three countries are buying lots of American stuff, which is a big boon to Trump's bid to revitalize American manufacturing. But there's also a grifting angle here, right? Trump is getting a lot of money for his own company. We've never seen this before. We've never seen, even in the first Trump term: The level to which this state visit is also a private-business visit is amazing, because the projects include a Trump Tower in both Riyadh and Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia; another Trump Tower in Dubai, in the U.A.E.; and a Trump International Golf [Club] and resort in Qatar. There's also a cryptocurrency scheme connected to his sons, in which a U.A.E.-linked company has just agreed to invest $2 billion, with a B— $2 billion. The company is not going to look the same after this trip. It's going to go from being a very-successful-for-its-size mom-and-pop shop built on the vast inheritance that Trump's had from his father, Fred—but now he's taking it into the stratosphere. I mean, the amount of financial clout that's coming to his family-owned, privately held business is just amazing. And what the Arabs are doing here is buying goodwill. It's an investment. It's an investment in Trump as a friend and, you know, ultimately also with the U.S. But right now Trump has, you know, instituted l'état c'est moi: 'He is the country, and the country is him.' And until somebody stops him or until he leaves the White House, that's the way it's going to be. And this is very understandable to a group of people who deal in patron-client relations as a matter of course. Rosin: Okay, so just to summarize, the transaction is: They get protection, and what Trump gets is money for the country and money for himself. Ibish: Exactly. They get protection and he gets money. We get money. Rosin: Yeah, it's very clear when you describe it: The symbol, the concrete thing that is going to symbolize this trip for a long time, is this luxury jet from Qatar. How should we understand what this transaction is? Ibish: Well, it's the absolute—I was waiting for you to bring it up, because it is exactly the kind of icon, the avatar of this trip. It says it all. Qatar, which is an unbelievably rich country, has 300,000—maybe 400,000—citizens. Most of the country, between 2 and 3 million people, are ex-pat laborers, foreign workers, Arab and Western technocrats. But collectively, those 350,000 or so Qataris are the largest single exporter in the world of liquid natural gas. And obviously, all of the wealth goes to the citizens. I mean, it's just amazing. You've never seen a country with this level of per-capita wealth. And it uses that money for national interests. In this case, what they've done is: One of the former prime ministers who is a royal has a jet, a luxury Boeing 747 that's kitted out not for a president but for a wealthy man who enjoys luxury travel on his own private plane. So what the Qataris have done is they've said: You can have the plane for use as president while you're in office, and after that it will be transferred to your presidential library, meaning he could still use it after that. So it's sort of been—they've very cleverly muddied the waters or blurred the line between private and public here, in order to give this plane to Donald Trump as an individual. They can say that they haven't, that they've given it to his presidency, right? Rosin: This is so interesting. Basically, what you're saying is this is the president that the Gulf leaders have been waiting for. Trump is the man that they can finally deal with in the way that they want to. Ibish: Yeah. Well, in a lot of ways I think that's true. I remember a certain high-ranking—or formerly very high-ranking—Gulf individual who said just as much in 2016, after he was elected. They said, He does the same things —and he listed a bunch of verbs that were unlawful actions—and said, We do that. And he does that. It's not, obviously, unlawful in their countries. It's normative, but traditionally not allowed in the United States and in Western countries in general. And I think this man was absolutely correct when he said, We do this and he does that, and we do this and he does that, and that they would feel very comfortable with him. They certainly would disagree about how much pressure he should put on Israel regarding Gaza, things like that. But I was thinking yesterday that there's really no daylight between Trump's positions on all the really most-important issues and those of Saudi Arabia. You can't find a major irritant there, which is really amazing. Rosin: Such as what? What issues? Ibish: Well, I mean, anything you think of—the war in Ukraine, the nature of U.S.-Saudi relations, you know, how business should be conducted, the Yemen war, talks with Iran (they both want a deal). They convinced him that lifting the sanctions on Syria was a good idea. They just agree, more or less, on just about any issue. That can change overnight, because if there was a spike in oil prices, they would disagree right away. But I was contrasting that in my mind with the problems that the U.S. and Trump have with Israel right now, where there's disagreement about Gaza, about the cease-fire with the Houthis, about the talks with Iran, about the negotiations with Hamas. There are many irritants. Now, that's not to say the U.S. is closer to Saudi Arabia than it is Israel. I don't think that's true. The Israeli relationship with the U.S. is very deeply ingrained and protected by political influence in the U.S., especially from evangelical Christians on the right. But yeah, I think Trump is sort of ideal in many ways from, say, a Saudi point of view. [ Music ] Rosin: So now that we've established the nature of this relationship and where we are now, I want to understand what it means—to the rest of us, not to Trump and his family. So when you hear about U.S. relations with Gulf states in the past, especially Saudi Arabia, human rights enters as a factor. Not always forcefully, but it's always— Ibish: Well, it's definitely a rhetorical factor with most administrations. Whether they're Republican or Democrat, they do bring it up. Trump doesn't—ever, at all. Rosin: Right. So how important is that departure or shift? Ibish: Well, I mean, MBS has learned—and one of the big questions about him when he was a young, rash leader, you know, beginning in 2015, when he came in as defense minister, and a quick rise to where he is now, which is head of government. That is to say he is the prime minister of Saudi Arabia, so he runs the government. And human-rights issues became very serious in his early years with the arrest of the dissidents, the sort of adventure in Yemen that was ill-advised and badly done, to put it mildly, and also the jailing of important people who are not perhaps on board fully with the changes—the reforms, the social liberalization, or other concerns that MBS had about them—who were jailed at the Ritz Carlton. Rosin: Yeah, and of course, the 2018 murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which the CIA concluded MBS ordered, although he denied it. Ibish: I was coming to that. That's the big enchilada—right?—for many people, including me, because he was a friend of mine for 15 years. And I, you know, I was just—I'm still scarred by it, and I think I always will be. [ Music ] Ibish: MBS, what we've learned about him is that, you know, he's not a sociopath, in the sense that he's educable. The question about him was always, Is he young and, you know, rash and doing these things because he doesn't know better, or is he kind of nuts? And the answer is, No, he's educable. He's evolving. He's maturing. Saudi Arabia remains a real human-rights violator from the point of view of human-rights norms. It executes a lot of people. Rule of law does not apply in the way we would expect. Dissidents—when they're found, when they exist—suffer, you know, arrest and imprisonment and long sentences. And even if they go as far as saying, Parts of the country should secede or leave Saudi Arabia, they can be executed. And they are sometimes. So it's not, you know, a happy story on human rights at all. But it's just way better than it was. And, you know, there are certainly more-alarming cases around the world. You couldn't really say that around the time of the murder of Jamal, because Saudi Arabia was really one of the worst violators at that time. And now I think it's almost back to normative Saudi behavior, hardly a good standard—it's a very low bar—but it's very different than he was years ago. Rosin: Okay, so we need to take a quick break, but when we come back, I want to talk about what this trip means for the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and U.S.'s role in them. That's when we're back. Rosin: Okay, we're back. So I want to put this Gulf visit in the broader Middle East context. As Trump was heading to this trip, he made a number of deals that seemed like they were trying to clear away American entanglements in the region—so the U.S. cease-fire agreement with the Houthis and Yemen, the agreement with Hamas to release the last living U.S. citizen held hostage in Gaza, and then the announcement that the U.S. was going to lift sanctions on Syria. Do you see a pattern in this series of deals? Do you see a common goal? What is it? Ibish: Yes. I think he's trying to reduce American exposure and involvement in conflict in the region—not only in the region, but in regional conflicts. So for example, the lifting of sanctions on Syria is a response to Gulf countries saying to him, in effect, You say you want us to handle our problems. Fine. We want to, you know, invest in Syria and build. We can't have any influence in Syria if we don't spend money there, because we don't have a militia or an army in Syria. The only way to get their attention is by investing in reconstruction and in other services where we can build constituencies of friends who will represent our interests and, by extension, yours. And we can't do that if every time we write a check, we have to worry about the Treasury Department slamming us. So if you want us to handle our business, you gotta take these sanctions off. The deal with the Houthis in Yemen is undoubtedly directly connected to another conflict-ending or conflict-containing policy of Trump, which is the negotiations with Iran. Trump definitely wants a deal with the Iranians, another version of the Obama peace deal—which he railed against but is trying to resurrect—but he wants it to be longer and stronger and tougher on Iran. And he can get all of that because of what happened to the Iranians under Biden. I mean, he'll never give Biden the credit for having put Iran in this situation, but it was under his presidency that Iran was crippled in its regional status, and the biggest blow by miles was the Turkish-engineered downfall of Assad in Syria. You know, that's why the—letting the Saudis and the Emiratis and others, you know, do what they can in Syria without sanctions is part of that. You know, he needs to take advantage of this moment of Iranian weakness and the fact that they need 20, 25 years to rebuild their power and to rethink their national-security strategy, because it was all based on the idea that Arab militia groups led by Hezbollah in Lebanon would provide a powerful forward defense against Israel and, ultimately, the United States. And that was tested and proved untrue. Hezbollah was decimated by Israel. So Iran is in very bad shape. It needs to rethink everything, and it needs time. And Trump understands this, and Trump wants a deal because he doesn't want to be put in a situation of having to confront the Iranians militarily. And Iran wants a deal, and the only country left that doesn't want such a deal is Israel. With Obama, the Arabs were totally against it, but now they're all for it because they want calm and regional stability. Rosin: So that is the one big, obvious point of disagreement, which you mentioned, is Israel. Ibish: Yeah. Rosin: This is coming at a moment when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is warning that he's going to escalate in Gaza. As you've been seeing this Gulf trip unfold, what do you think it means for Israel, Gaza, and America's role in all of that? Ibish: I mean, it certainly incentivizes Trump to think very carefully about doing what he can to restrain Israel's worst impulses in Gaza. The situation in Gaza is so dire after more than 70 days of complete blockade—no food, no medicine, no water, no electricity, no shelter, nothing, no supplies into Gaza. People have been reduced to the point of starvation. That's where we're headed here. And it's a crime—it's certainly a war crime, and it's probably a crime against humanity. What the Israelis are proposing to do is to go back into Gaza with full force, force all the population—2.2 million who are not Hamas fighters and cadres and officials—into a tiny enclave in the south, where they will be kept supposedly protected but actually kind of herded, where they'll be kept with what the UN says is very, totally inadequate plans for their food and water and medicine and shelter. Meanwhile, Israel proclaims it will scour the entire rest of the country for anything and everything connected with Hamas and destroy it. Gaza delenda est. You know, the bottom line is: This is kind of the war that the most-extreme factions in Hamas have been waiting for. It provides them with an open-ended, long-term insurgency. Now, obviously, the Israelis can rely on brute force to crush Hamas. But I think they've started to get the hint that as long as there are Palestinians in Gaza, there will be some form of Hamas, because Hamas is not a list of people and equipment. It's a name. And if you take a bunch of Palestinians and some of them say they're Hamas, then there will be Hamas, and that's likely to persist no matter what Israel does. And we're getting closer and closer to the end goal of where I think the logic of this for Israel goes, which is depopulation. Gaza has to be, you know, depopulated of Palestinians in order to be free of Hamas. And because the two go together in Gaza, under the circumstances. Rosin: So given that that's the current situation, and given that Trump is now engaging in the Middle East, how does this change the calculus for how he and the U.S. engage? Ibish: Everything that has happened in the region incentivizes him to stop the Israelis from going ahead with this plan, at least as it has been structured now. It's too extreme. It's too brutal. It's too genocidal. It's too over the top. And I really think the fact that he made such close friends again and reinforced his relationship with these countries that don't want that, both at the emotional and the strategic registers, that need it not to happen in every possible way, is really important. It gives him every reason to hold the Israelis back and say, Guys, come on. Don't do this. Don't do this this way. Don't do it. And he's the only person in the world at the moment who has real leverage over Netanyahu, because of the nature of the Israeli-U.S. relationship. Rosin: Yeah. Well, Hussein, this has been so clarifying. I really appreciate you helping us navigate and understand what this trip to the Gulf states might mean. [ Music ] Rosin: This episode of Radio Atlantic was produced by Kevin Townsend and Rosie Hughes. It was edited by Claudine Ebeid. We had engineering support from Rob Smierciak, fact-checking by Sara Krolewski. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor. Listeners, if you like what you hear on Radio Atlantic, you can support our work and the work of all Atlantic journalists when you subscribe to The Atlantic at I'm Hanna Rosin, and thank you for being a listener. Talk to you next week.
