Latest news with #Hwasong-18
India.com
23-05-2025
- Business
- India.com
The golden dome: A bold vision or an overpriced dream?
The golden dome: A bold vision or an overpriced dream? Donald Trump has unveiled an ambitious plan to shield America from missile attacks with a space-based defense system called the 'Golden Dome.' Inspired by Ronald Reagan's vision from decades ago, Trump claims today's advanced technology makes this dream achievable. Unlike Israel's Iron Dome, which protects against short-range rockets, the Golden Dome aims to cover the entire United States using thousands of satellites. These satellites would detect enemy missiles and destroy them before they reach American soil. During his campaign, Trump promised to fund this project through a 'big and beautiful' tax bill, allocating $25 billion to kickstart it, with total costs estimated at $175 billion. However, Congress has yet to approve this funding, and experts warn the price tag could balloon to over $500 billion, taking decades to complete. Trump's timeline of two and a half to three years is also considered overly optimistic. The promise of 'close to 100% protection' sounds reassuring, but it's not that simple. A recent study by the American Physical Society highlights the challenge: to stop just ten North Korean Hwasong-18 missiles, the U.S. would need around 16,000 defensive missiles in space. Why so many? Hitting a missile in space is like shooting a bullet with another bullet at incredible speeds. Even the best systems aren't perfect, so multiple interceptors are needed for each incoming threat. Add to that the vastness of space, unpredictable missile paths, and enemy decoys, and the numbers grow quickly. The challenge gets tougher with time and territory. If decision-makers want just 30 seconds to think before launching interceptors, the number of defensive missiles jumps to 36,000. Protecting additional areas like Alaska or the Midwest would require thousands more. It's like guarding a massive fence line that stretches in every direction—each new section needs its own network of defenders. The Golden Dome is a response to a rapidly changing threat. For years, U.S. defenses focused on missiles coming over the North Pole from places like Russia. But new hypersonic missiles can change direction mid-flight, and 'fractional orbital' missiles circle the Earth before striking. Intelligence reports now show potential attacks from all directions—north, south, east, and west. Canada, a close ally, is even considering joining the project, as it faces similar risks. But the Golden Dome isn't just about defense—it's part of a larger battle for control of space. Russia and China are developing weapons to destroy satellites, which the Golden Dome would rely on. Russia's Cosmos 2553 satellite, for instance, is suspected to be a test for a nuclear bomb that could wipe out satellites across vast areas. China, meanwhile, is building anti-satellite weapons at an alarming pace, according to U.S. Space Command. Space is no longer just for exploration or communication. It's a new battleground where nations are racing to build defenses while creating weapons to disable each other's satellites. This creates a dangerous cycle: America plans to deploy thousands of satellites for the Golden Dome, while Russia and China develop tools to take them out. The stakes are higher than military defense. Satellites power everyday life—phone calls, internet, GPS navigation, even banking and power grids rely on precise timing from space. Attacks like jamming (blocking GPS signals) or spoofing (sending fake signals) are already on the rise. If space weapons destroy these satellites, it could disrupt everything from ATMs to traffic lights. The competition in space is getting intense. Russia's Cosmos 2576 satellite recently shadowed an American spy satellite, raising fears of a potential space weapon. China's TJS-4 satellite cleverly used the sun's shadow to hide from an American surveillance satellite. France is now exploring 'bodyguard' systems to protect its satellites with robots or lasers. Even the U.S. is playing this game—last month, an American satellite 'buzzed' two Chinese satellites, coming dangerously close in a provocative move. This cat-and-mouse game in space shows how nations are using satellites to stalk, intimidate, and outsmart each other. What was once a peaceful frontier is now a high-tech battlefield, with each side accusing the other of the same aggressive tactics they use themselves. The Golden Dome is a bold idea, but it comes with big questions. Can America afford a project that could cost half a trillion dollars? Will it deliver the near-perfect protection Trump promises? And how will it fare in a space increasingly crowded with threats? As the U.S. pushes forward, it must balance ambition with reality, ensuring this shield doesn't become a golden dream too costly to achieve. ( Girish Linganna is an award-winning science communicator and a Defence, Aerospace & Geopolitical Analyst. He is the Managing Director of ADD Engineering Components India Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. Contact: girishlinganna@
AllAfrica
18-02-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
N Korea missile puts all of US mainland in nuclear attack range
North Korea is building its missile capabilities to strike the US mainland, threatening to overwhelm US defenses and intensifying fears of a strategic shift in the Korean Peninsula's power balance. In a statement this month before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee, General Gregory Guillot, head of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), said that North Korea's growing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities pose a direct threat to the US mainland, with its latest solid-propellant Hwasong-19 missile likely capable of delivering a nuclear payload to targets across North America. The new missile's solid-fuel design significantly reduces launch preparation time, complicating preemptive detection and interception efforts. Guillot warned that North Korea's rapid transition from missile development to serial production could soon outpace US ballistic missile defenses, particularly if North Korea expands its arsenal beyond current estimates. He also highlighted the risk of technological exchanges between North Korea and Russia, with potential quid pro quo arrangements bolstering the former's advanced strategic weapons program. These developments and broader strategic cooperation between US adversaries increase the likelihood of simultaneous multi-domain threats to the US homeland, further stressing existing missile defense systems. In response, Guillot underscored the urgent need for next-generation missile defenses, including the timely deployment of the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) and improved domain awareness technologies to counter increasingly sophisticated adversary missile threats. In a November 2024 article for 38 North, Vann Van Diepen says North Korea's Hwasong-19 ICBM represents a significant advance in the country's strategic missile capabilities, likely incorporating a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system. Van Diepen states that the larger solid-fuel Hwasong-19, compared to the Hwasong-18, has improved boost capability that increases payload capacity without extending range, as the previous ICBM can already reach the US mainland. He notes that the Hwasong-19's launch footage shows a probable post-boost vehicle (PBV), essential for MIRV deployment. He notes that while further testing is required to ensure the MIRVs survive atmospheric reentry, a successful MIRV-equipped Hwasong-19 would increase the number of warheads per missile, improve second-strike resilience and jeopardize US missile defense. However, Thomas Newdick points out in a June 2024 article for The War Zone that while it may be technically feasible for North Korea to place multiple warheads on a missile, putting them on multiple targets is more complex. Newdick states that it isn't clear whether North Korea has mastered the capability to accurately put a warhead on a target after release from a ballistic missile. The ongoing Ukraine war may have been an enormous boon to North Korea in that area. This month, Newsweek reported that North Korean ballistic missiles used against Ukraine have become more accurate since last year, now hitting within 50 to 100 meters of their targets, compared to earlier in the conflict, where they had an accuracy of 1 to 3 kilometers. As North Korea moves to serialized ICBM production, it raises the possibility of overwhelming limited US missile defenses. Politico reported in February 2023 that North Korea might have more ICBMs than the US has interceptors after displaying 10-12 Hwasong-17 ICBMs during a nighttime parade in Pyongyang. Politico notes that if North Korea could fit four warheads on each missile, those missiles could hypothetically overwhelm the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which has only 44 interceptors. Adding to the problem of limited interceptors, the GMD has shown just 55% effectiveness in highly scripted tests and has often needed three interceptors to intercept a single warhead. Cognizant of US missile defense limitations, in January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order to build a US 'Iron Dome,' a next-generation missile defense system incorporating space-based interceptors (SBI) to defeat hypersonic weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks. However, experts are divided over the feasibility of the US Iron Dome project and whether it would increase deterrence or instability. In a Breaking Defense article this month, Ankit Panda says that the US Iron Dome does not solve the vulnerability problem and merely incentivizes US adversaries to find new delivery methods for nuclear weapons, such as nuclear torpedoes or fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) systems. In line with that, North Korea has developed the 'Haeil' nuclear-armed underwater drone designed to infiltrate enemy waters and detonate to create a radioactive tsunami to destroy enemy ports and ships. However, it is not clear whether North Korea's Haeil is a real weapon or a propaganda ploy. Further, Jessica West and Victoria Samson mention for Breaking Defense that space-based interceptors could fuel arms races and derail international norms against the militarization of space. In a January 2025 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) article, Todd Harrison says that while the cost to build a system of 1,900 SBIs could reach US$11-27 billion, such a constellation could only intercept two incoming missiles while all other interceptors remain out of range. Harrison stresses the absenteeism problem in which low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites spend most of their time above the wrong part of Earth. Such uncertainty in North Korean nuclear capabilities and US missile defenses is in line with varying views about the former's position when it comes to its nuclear arsenal. While it is believed that North Korea aims to use its nuclear weapons for coercion to achieve political and military objectives, Hwee-rhak Park and Wooyun Jo mention in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Defense & Security Analysis journal that North Korea has two goals in building its nuclear arsenal: first, to break US nuclear extended deterrence (NED) in the Korean Peninsula, and second, to reunify the Korean Peninsula under its regime. Park and Jo mention that the US may renege on its NED posture in the Korean Peninsula, fearing nuclear retaliation by North Korea against the US mainland. They say that the US may respond with tactical nuclear weapons only as long as North Korea limits the use of nuclear weapons on South Korean military targets. In the worst-case scenario, Park and Jo say that North Korea could launch several nuclear weapons against South Korean cities to cripple or demoralize the latter's warfighting capabilities before advancing ground forces into the latter's territory to force a surrender. At the same time, they say North Korea can endeavor not to attack US forces in South Korea while threatening a nuclear attack against them should they take offensive action, forcing a US withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. However, they stress that using nuclear weapons against the US or South Korea would be a life-or-death decision by the North Korean regime. Given those possibilities, Park and Jo recommend that the US and South Korea strengthen nuclear deterrence measures, such as the constant deployment of US nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) near the Korean Peninsula, deployment of nuclear gravity bombs and missiles in Guam, enter a nuclear-sharing agreement and prepare US and South Korean forces to fight a nuclear war.
