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News18
3 days ago
- Politics
- News18
History In Motion: Razeen Sally's Journey Through Sri Lanka's Past And Present
In his book "Return to Sri Lanka – Travels in a Paradoxical Island," Razeen Sally skillfully blends the narrative styles of George Orwell and Bill Aitken. Razeen Sally's transition from his traditional academic and policy advisory roles into travel writing marks a significant breakthrough. In his book ' Return to Sri Lanka – Travels in a Paradoxical Island," he skillfully blends the narrative styles of George Orwell and Bill Aitken. The work is both scholarly and engaging, combining elements of history, religion, people, and politics, as Sally explores his Sri Lankan roots. Although raised in England, Sally is of Sri Lankan Muslim descent, with family ties in and around Colombo. He describes himself as 'half and half," born to an Anglo-Welsh mother and a Sinhalese Muslim father, yet he has grown into a Sri Lankan British writer. The book is divided into two parts: Sally's Sri Lankan childhood and his adult travels across the island. Accompanied by two trusted drivers, Nihal and Joseph, Sally traverses the teardrop-shaped island, formerly known as Ceylon. His narrative is enriched with quotations from renowned explorers and pioneers of Sri Lanka, primarily British, who once made the island their home. Sally's historical account begins with the arrival of Muslim traders from Arabia and Java, who were predominantly Sunnis. His personal recollections start from the 1960s Ceylon to modern-day Sri Lanka. The author's empathy with the country stems from his experiences with the IPKF, which aimed to subdue ethnic conflict, and his enduring affection for Sri Lankan friends. This bond drew him back to the island repeatedly, retracing familiar paths. Both Sinhalese and Tamils migrated from India, with frequent Tamil Chola invasions from South India. These invasions fostered a paradox: a minority complex among the majority Sinhalese and a majority complex among the minority Tamils. This dynamic prompted the Sinhalese to move their citadel from Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa, then to Kandy, and finally to Colombo—places Sally vividly describes. The Sinhalese-Tamil tensions were also influenced by four and a half centuries of colonial rule, which ended with the British period beginning in 1815 with the capture of the Kandyan kingdom. The Sinhalese attempts to reverse their minority psyche are symbolised by two military victories: King Dutugemunu's triumph over King Elara at Anuradhapura and the defeat of Tamil Tiger leader Prabhakaran's insurgent forces at Nandikadal by Sri Lankan security forces. The Sri Lankan Army Chief's office features a portrait of Elara's surrender. Domestic racial conflicts were not limited to Sinhalese and Tamils but also involved Sinhalese-Muslim and Muslim-Tamil tensions. The Burgher community largely avoided these conflicts. Sally highlights the distortions in Theravada Buddhism that led to Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, fuelled by post-independence political leadership. The origins of political parties and their ideological paths for electoral victory contributed to recent history, culminating in the rise of the Rajapaksa dynasty. Following the 30-year civil war, Sri Lanka faced the COVID pandemic, Easter Sunday bombings by indigenous Muslim terrorists, and a 2022 economic meltdown due to a sovereign default. The Argalaya movement and the subsequent fleeing of President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa mark a sad chapter in contemporary Sinhalese Buddhist politics. Between 2015 and 2018, Sally served as a policy advisor to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, gaining insight into the disastrous rule of the first Unity government. A major irony was the resurgence of the urban Marxist JVP movement, which twice failed to seize power in Colombo, reinventing itself through the Argalaya movement as the ruling NPP. This movement secured a massive parliamentary majority, with the little-known Marxist leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake becoming President. Sally covers Dissanayake's narrow victory in the presidential elections. At the heart of Sri Lanka's issues lies the 1978 Republican constitution, which no president or political elite has sought to alter despite promises. Sally's encapsulation of political history is facilitated by his engaging writing style. The book's narration of ancient history, including Buddhism, is equally superb. Few books offer such comprehensive knowledge about a country, seamlessly blending with the author's travels. Sally describes Buddhism's arrival from India, the preservation of the Theravada tradition distinct from the Mahayana tradition, and Anuradhapura as the cradle of Theravada Buddhism. He details the Bodh tree sapling from Bodh Gaya in India, where Buddha attained enlightenment, and Buddha's relics in Sri Lanka—a collar bone, a foot, and a tooth. The descriptions of the world's largest standing, recumbent, and seated Buddha statues in Gala Vihara are mesmerising. The travelogue begins in Sally's hometown of Colombo and its surroundings, followed by trips to the south, including Galle, Tangalle, Hambantota, and Kathiragama, Sri Lanka's national shrine. The Kandy road takes him to hill areas, tea and coffee estates, and stunning landscapes. He also travels to Rajarata, the original Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms, ending in Anuradhapura. Sally's longest journey takes him to the northeast, a region scarred by the civil war. Amparai district, with its significant Muslim population, and Kathankudy in Batticaloa, home to Sri Lanka's largest mosque, are significant stops. Sally recounts the war and post-conflict situations well, also noting that JVP rebel leader Rohan Wijeweera was captured from a tea estate in 1990 and shot on the 13th tee. Sally's prognosis for Sri Lanka's future is bleak: 'Drift, Relapse and Take off." He believes the country will oscillate between drift and relapse, never achieving take-off. This dire prediction is a harsh truth. Prompted by his driver Nihal, Sally's journey of Sri Lanka culminates in a self-discovery. The 'half and half" Sally realises that his true home is Sri Lanka. view comments First Published: July 14, 2025, 12:16 IST News opinion Book Review | History In Motion: Razeen Sally's Journey Through Sri Lanka's Past And Present Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. 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Indian Express
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
How Rajiv Gandhi's decision to send troops to Sri Lanka cost him his life
When the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived in Sri Lanka on July 30, 1987, New Delhi did not expect to be embroiled in a bloody conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord of July 29, 1987 was expected to bring an end to the civil war; Indian troops were meant to simply maintain law and order in the Tamil north. As things turned out, when the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka in 1990, it had suffered more than 8,000 casualties, LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran was more powerful than ever, and after breakdown of peace talks, the second phase of the Eelam War raged on, even more brutal than the first. Then on May 21, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi, who as Prime Minister had sent in the IPKF to the Emeral Isle, was assasinated by an LTTE suicide bomber at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, tragically culminating the country's Sri Lanka misadventure that has long been described as 'India's Vietnam'. With the latest Nagesh Kukunoor-directed show The Hunt telling the story of the CBI's investigation into the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, here's a recall of the events and decisions that led to the killing. Seeds of the conflict The origins of civil strife in Sri Lanka lay in the discrimination and persecution of the country's minority Tamils by the Sinhala Buddhist majority which dominated in all spheres of life in the post-colonial state. By the late 1970s, dozens of militant Tamil groups had emerged, demanding autonomy or independence for Sri Lanka's Tamil regions — Tamils form a majority in the Northern Province and have a significant presence in the Eastern Province. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Tamil Nadu government, and later New Delhi, began providing limited support in the form of training, supplies, and finances to Tamil separatists. This was largely borne out of deep sympathies held by India's Tamil population for their Sri Lankan brethren. Founded in 1976, Prabhakaran's LTTE soon emerged as the most dominant Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka by the early 1980s. It was the LTTE's deadly ambush of a Sri Lankan army patrol in 1983 that led to the 'Black July' riots which sparked the two-and-a-half decade civil war in Sri Lanka. As Samanth Subramanian wrote in his book The Divided Island: Life, Death, and the Sri Lankan War (2014), 'The riots were brought under control, but the violence never truly ceased thereafter.' India's decision to intervene India's (successful) intervention in the Bangladesh Liberation War had created a template for responding to civil strife in nearby countries. When the civil war broke out in 1983, India did not want to intervene directly; it simply wanted to resolve the crisis. While New Delhi held sympathies for Sri Lankan Tamils, it was also wary of the possibility of Tamil secession in Sri Lanka leading to demands of a greater Tamil homeland which could endanger its own sovereignty — as such, India simply wanted to be an impartial mediator. At the time, however, both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government were looking only at a military solution. Things would change in 1987. That January, Sri Lankan forces placed an embargo on the entire Tamil North, cutting off supplies of even food and medicines. Indian relief ships headed to Jaffna were sent back, prompting Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to send in supplies via Air Force transport aircraft accompanied by Mirage-2000 fighters. This show of force brought Sri Lanka President J R Jayewardene to the negotiating table with Rajiv Gandhi. The two inked the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord on July 29, 1987 which kept Lanka whole but forced Colombo to agree to greater provincial autonomy and withdraw troops from Tamil regions. Rebels were to surrender arms and engage in the political process. The IPKF moved into the Tamil regions vacated by the Lankan troops in order to maintain law and order, seting up its headquarters in Palali, near Jaffna. From keeping peace to waging war While technically a part of the agreement, the LTTE never truly came on board, and unlike most other rebel groups, refused to surrender arms. Colombo too was not all that happy. 'There was much dissension within Jayewardene's cabinet… The masses, particularly in the Sinhala regions, vehemently opposed the Accord,' Roshani M Gunewardene wrote in 'Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: Intervention by Invitation or Forced Intervention' (1991). At the end of the day, the underlying political reasons behind the conflict were far from resolved: the 'peace' enforced by the IPKF was tenuous at best, just waiting to come crumbling down. And that's what happened after Sri Lankan forces detained two LTTE commanders in Jaffna early in October. The duo consumed cyanide pills while in joint custody of the IPKF and the Sri Lankan military, triggering retaliation by the rebels: the IPKF was now at war with the LTTE. Initially, New Delhi expected a quick, decisive victory. Army Chief General K Sundarji promised Rajiv Gandhi that it would take '72 hours to seven days' to finish off the Tigers. By mid-October, however, all illusions to this end were shattered. A disastrous heliborne mission to take out the LTTE's top leadership in Jaffna University on October 12 led to the death of 36 Indian troops, the capture of one soldier, injuries to many more, and damage to Indian helicopters. Brigade-level forces and tanks tasked to rescue the soldiers from the compound also suffered heavy losses. Between October 12 and October 13, the IPKF lost at least 70 men, many of whose bodies were never recovered. The next 20-odd days saw brutal combat between the IPKF, tasked with taking Jaffna, and the Tigers. By the end of October, 1,100 rebels were killed, but the IPKF too lost 319 soldiers, and more than a 1,000 Indian troops were wounded. While Jaffna was captured , the LTTE's main fighting force and leadership had escaped to the jungles of Vanni in the north. What followed was two-and-a-half years of bitter fighting against an enemy proficient in guerilla tactics and steadfast in its resolve. Casualties mounted on all sides with no end to the war in sight, even as the IPKF presence in the Emerald Isle became ever more popular in both India and Sri Lanka. By the time the last Indian soldier had left Sri Lankan shores in 1990, after 32 months, some 1,165 Indian soldiers had died and as had more than 5,000 Sri Lankans. The fallout of the debacle The pullout of Indian troops finally began in 1989, after Rajiv Gandhi lost the elections to V P Singh — the Sri Lanka debacle undoubtedly played a part in the electoral result. For India, this episode left deep scars. 'Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan operation ended in disaster and, with the IPKF pulling out without achieving its objectives, it became the most powerful argument against future Indian military involvement overseas,' journalist and former Indian Army officer Sushant Singh wrote in his book Mission Overseas: Daring Operations by the Indian Military (2017). In Sri Lanka, the Indian intervention was extremely unpopular, and the IPKF was accused of extra-judicial abductions, tortuere, rape, and killing. Even among the Sinhala population, the lengthy presence of an 80,000-strong Indian occupation force was detested: Colombo itself began arming the Tigers by 1989, in a bid to hasten IPKF's departure. The V P Singh government that succeeded Rajiv Gandhi in 1989 was short-lived. By 1991, India was once again preparing for a general election — and Rajiv had kept a door open for re-entering the Sri Lankan civil war. In an interview with Sunday magazine in 1990, the former PM said he would send the IPKF to disarm the LTTE if he returned to power. This would be the final straw for Prabhakaran, who held deep seated grievances against the former PM for sending Indian troops to Sri Lanka. The Tigers sent their feared suicide bombers, a 22-year-old by the name Kalaivani Rajaratnam, to take Rajiv Gandhi out. At least 15 other bystanders were killed in the bombing.
NDTV
04-07-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
The Hunt: The 'One-Eyed Jack' Who Masterminded Rajiv Gandhi Assassination
The 'wedding' was set for May 21. It was 1991, and a 33-year-old 5'4" swarthy, thickset man with one eye had been planning the 'wedding' for about a year. He had been entrusted with the task of changing the course of history of the subcontinent and he didn't want anything off. Sivarasan was confident. He got together a hit squad and landed in Tamil Nadu on May 1. Twenty days later, India's former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was dead in Sriperumbudur. A human bomb had killed him. India's most sensational political murder was "cunning in conception, meticulous in planning and ruthless in execution", said DR Karthikeyan, the IPS officer who led the Special Investigation Team that eventually cracked the case. The planning was LTTE. The execution was Sivarasan. 'One-Eyed Jack' Chandrasekharampillai Packiachandran AKA Sivarasan hailed from Udupiddy, a town 32 kilometres from Jaffna in Sri Lanka. Sivarasan rose swiftly through the ranks of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the separatist organisation founded in 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran and operational in Sri Lanka till 2009. Sivarasan's fluency in Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Hindi helped him become LTTE's prime hitman. His Tamil, devoid of a Lankan accent, helped him evade suspicion. Added to that was the fact that he knew the Indian topography like the back of his hand. His linguistic prowess and knowledge of India made him practically impossible to nab. Sivarasan lost an eye in a firefight with the Sri Lankan Army in 1987. Since then, his comrades called him "Ottaraikkannan" or "one-eyed person". The name got a Marlon Brando makeover in mainstream media and Sivarasan became known as "One-Eyed Jack" after the 1961 Hollywood film. In June 1990, Sivarasan killed K Padmanabha, a leader of the pro-India organisation EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front) in Chennai (then Madras) in broad daylight. Thirteen of Padmanabha's associates were killed in the same attack. Sivarasan caught the eye of the LTTE's intelligence chief Pottu Amman. Sivarasan was chosen for the LTTE's most daring operation yet: the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE, The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, And The War Against IPKF Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was fighting the 1990 general elections with AIADMK's Jayalalitha as an ally. Rajiv Gandhi had served as the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha till December 1990, after serving as the Prime Minister of India from 1984 to 1989. When Rajiv Gandhi was in power, India signed with Sri Lankan President JR Jayawardane the Indo-Sri Lanka accord in July 1987 that dissolved the LTTE and "envisaged a devolution of power to the Tamil-majority areas". After the Sri Lanka accord was signed, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF, an Indian military contingent) was deployed to Sri Lanka for three years to enforce it. The LTTE denounced the accord. Several months of tension followed. On October 7, 1987, the LTTE declared war on the IPKF. The last members of the IPKF left Sri Lanka in March 1990. The LTTE regained territorial control. In early 1990, LTTE founder Prabhakaran emerged from the jungles of Sri Lanka. He wanted revenge. Against the Indian Army, and against the Indian Prime Minister who signed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The Assassination Of Rajiv Gandhi The LTTE leadership was alarmed by the Congress's 1991 election manifesto, which spoke of the party's commitment to upholding the 1987 Sri Lanka accord. The idea of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was born in the mind of the battle-scarred Prabhakaran and conveyed to Pottu Amman, the LTTE's intelligence chief. Pottu Amman handpicked Sivarasan for the operation, codenamed the 'wedding'. The Tigers smuggled 5 kilograms of gold into Tamil Nadu. Sivarasan sold it for Rs 19.36 lakh, which was then used to fund the 'wedding' expenses. Two women were of the utmost importance in Sivarasan's hit squad: Dhanu, the bomber; and Shubha, the backup bomber. The plan was hatched. Rajiv Gandhi, Jayalalithaa's ally, was almost certainly going to visit Tamil Nadu as part of his general election campaigns. May 21 was the day he was going to be in Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu. The Tigers were to strike him there. A Blast In Sriperumbudur Dhanu, in a loose-fitting green-and-orange salwar kameez, had boarded a state transport bus to Sriperumbudur along with Sivarasan and other members of the LTTE squad. Sivarasan was disguised as a journalist. He was dressed in a white kurta-pyjama and had a cloth bag and a notepad in his hand; identifiers you usually associated with journalists back in the day. Sivarasan was to 'cover' the Sriperumbudur poll rally of Rajiv Gandhi. He gained access to the venue. It was lightly guarded. There were no metal detectors or frisking at the poll rally. Sivarasan, along with Dhanu, melted into the mob. Rajiv Gandhi walked down the red coir carpet at the Sriperumbudur temple grounds. A hectic day of poll rallies in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh had left him tired and by the time he reached Sriperumbudur. An enthusiastic crowd met him there. It was twenty past 10 in the night. Sivarasan's job was to steer Dhanu towards Rajiv Gandhi. He did. She garlanded Gandhi with a sandalwood necklace and bent as if to touch his feet. Dhanu flicked a switch. Half a kilo of plastic explosives in her suicide vest exploded. Rajiv Gandhi was dead. So were 17 others in the blast. Sivarasan and his remaining squad disappeared from the Sriperumbudur grounds in the melee. But they left something behind. Haribabu's Camera Among the 18 people who died in the blast was also Haribabu, a photographer hired by Sivarasan to document the attack on Rajiv Gandhi. Haribabu's 35 mm Chinon camera lay at the blast site. It was picked up by the agencies and reached the Special Investigation Team investigating Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. The camera had photos of the entire assassination squad. It had a shot of Sivarasan's profile too. A question that baffled the investigating agencies in the days after the attack was why the LTTE would leave behind a wealth of documentary evidence at the scene of crime. The answer was simple: the LTTE had a compulsive need for documenting their struggle. Photos of the cadres kept them motivated. Such was the need for documenting every step of their mission that the LTTE had a battlefield camera unit that filmed and photographed their cadres in action. The unit was called 'Nitharsanam' (which means reality or evidence in Tamil). True to its name, Nitharsanam served as the chronicler of the LTTE's reality. The camera played a key role in the SIT zeroing in on the LTTE operatives involved in the attack. It took the DR Karthikeyan-led team two months to round up most of the key suspects. But Sivarasan was still at large. Sivarasan On The Run After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Sivarasan fled from one hideout to another in Tamil Nadu till he ran out of safehouses in the state. He found 11 LTTE boys who resembled him and sent them to various places in Tamil Nadu in various disguises to waylay the agencies. So, Sivarasan would be 'spotted' in the state as a bald Hindu priest, a turbaned Sikh, a Muslim cleric and a Catholic priest, all at the same time. But Sivarasan knew that he couldn't keep up with it for too long. The agencies were closing in, and he had no place to hide in Tamil Nadu anymore. So, Sivarasan travelled 350 kilometres from Chennai to Bangalore in a water tanker, evading about a dozen police checkpoints on the way. He holed himself up in a single-storeyed house in Konanakunte on the outskirts of the Karnataka capital. He had a reward of Rs 15 lakh on his head and eluding the forces was not easy. In his book Ninety Days: The True Story of the Hunt for Rajiv Gandhi's Assassins (Haper Collins India, 2022), journalist-author Anirudhya Mitra writes, "When he [Sivarasan] found that the police had surrounded his hideout in Konanakunte, he didn't immediately die by suicide. He knew the agencies would like to catch him alive, and yet he waited thirty-six hours for them to finally break into his hideout. It's only then that he shot himself through his temple. He was cunning, ruthless, brutal and devoted to his Tamil cause." Death Of An Assassin When Sivarasan left his last Chennai hideout two days after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, he took only a 9 mm pistol with him. Sivarasan was confident he would return to the Chennai safehouse. He could not. The Tiger safehouse at 158 Muthamil Nagar, Kodungaiyur in Chennai played an important role in the SIT cracking the assassination case. LTTE operative Jayakumar, a suspect in the May 21 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, told K Ragothaman, CBI's chief investigator, that the Kodungaiyur safehouse had a hole in the kitchen that seemed important to Sivarasan. Whenever Sivarasan went to the kitchen, he would send Jayakumar out of the room. The latter did not know what lay in the hole in the kitchen. The hole, cut under a two-foot-by-two-foot kitchen tile, had in it a thick Tamil-English dictionary with a 9 mm pistol in it. This is the pistol Sivarasan shot himself with. The hole also held two small pocket diaries, a notebook, and a fake glass eye. The diaries helped the SIT piece together the Rajiv Gandhi assassination plot. The diaries contained twenty days' worth of telephone numbers, addresses, financial transactions and codenames. Sivarasan began scribbling in them on May 1, 1991, when he landed in Tamil Nadu. His last entry was from May 23, two days after the assassination, when he fled the Chennai safehouse for Konanakunte, where he killed himself on August 19, 1991. When the crack team from the National Security Guard broke open the door of the Konanakunte safehouse, they found six of Sivarasan's comrades dead inside. They had all bitten into the capsule of cyanide that they wore around their neck. The women died embracing each other; the men, with their arms around each other's backs. Sivarasan, the 'One-Eyed Jack' with a 15-lakh reward on his head, lay at a distance, dead from a bullet wound to his head.
The Hindu
11-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Sri Lankan refugees of 1990: A dark chapter in T.N.'s otherwise proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need
Tamil Nadu has an enviable track record of providing shelter to those in distress, regardless of their place of origin. But an episode in March 1990, concerning Sri Lankan refugees, marks an aberration to the State's tradition. This episode, involving 1,612 refugees — 353 women and 400 children —remains less discussed in public discourse, and its recall assumes relevance in light of World Refugee Day falling on June 20. Ranasinghe Premadasa's assumption of office of the President of Sri Lanka in January 1989 made a perceptible difference to the presence of Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in the neighbouring country. Five months later, Premadasa openly demanded the ouster of the IPFK, which went there in July 1987 on the request of his predecessor, J.R. Jayawardene, following the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The new incumbent made the demand, keeping in mind the separate anti-IPKF campaigns by two diverse militant groups, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, which had subsequently abandoned its militant path and joined the political mainstream) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After the IPKF's de-induction commenced by the end of July 1989, the LTTE began taking control of areas in the northern and eastern regions. As the end of the political set-up in the then North East Provincial Council (NEPC), headed by A. Varatharaja Perumal of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), became evident, the influx of refugees to Tamil Nadu resumed in a big way. It was against this backdrop that two ships, Harsh Vardhana and Tippu Sultan, carrying about 1,250 refugees, were not permitted for disembarkation of passengers at what was then known as the Madras harbour, on March 8 and 9. Both were diverted to Visakhapatnam, after which the passengers were taken to Odisha (then Orissa) for transit camps in Malkangiri, about 125 km from Koraput town. A report of The Hindu, published on March 10, quoting 'official and other sources,' stated that 'the decision to ferry the refugees from Trincomalee to Madras was taken at a meeting' of the External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral and the NEPC Chief Minister in New Delhi in January/February 1990. Only on the basis of that decision, both Harsh Vardhana and Tippu Sultan were hired to transport about 1,300 refugees. The report went on to state that 'most probably, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister [M. Karunanidhi] does not know about it.' K. Premachandran, Sri Lanka's Member of Parliament belonging to the EPRLF, was bitter about the treatment. The passengers, at the time of embarkation at Trincomalee, were assured they could disembark at Madras. 'Imagine their mental agony. They were in the middle of the sea, not knowing what was happening,' the report added, quoting him as having said. P. Upendra, Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the National Front government led by V.P. Singh, told reporters in the city on March 9 that there were doubts whether the passengers aboard the ship were 'real refugees or EPRLF cadres.' On the apprehension that the refugees could be the cadres of the EPRLF and Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), who could have spirited off weapons on board the vessels, Mr. Premachandran said, 'each and everyone was thoroughly checked at China Bay in Trincomalee and the IPKF also made sure that there was not a single weapon on board the ships.' According to Anil Dhir, Bhubaneshwar-based researcher-writer, the then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister M. Channa Reddy, who allowed the ships to drop anchor at the outer harbour of Visakhapatnam port and gave food and water, however, refused disembarkation of the passengers. A similar stand was taken by other Chief Ministers too, who did not want any trouble in their respective States. Eventually, it was Biju Patnaik who had agreed to take the refugees. 'The fact that he had been sworn in as the Chief Minister just four days earlier (March 5) did not deter him from taking such a vital decision.' Patnaik, who became Chief Minister again after a gap of over 26 years, had again responded to Singh's request for accommodating the EPRLF general secretary, K. Padmanabha along with others, a fact acknowledged by Mr. Perumal in a recent conversation with this writer. That Odisha, despite its modest economic condition, had come forward to accept the refugees did not go unnoticed among parliamentarians. On March 29, 1990, A.N. Singh Deo, Member of Parliament from the Aska constituency in the eastern State, called his State 'a very poor State' and asked Gujral whether the Centre would bear the whole cost of providing shelter to the refugees. The Minister assured the Member that the Centre would bear the entire burden. It was a fact that there were EPRLF cadres among the refugees. But they claimed that they were not 'more dreadful than the LTTE militants,' Sukumar, an activist of the (EPRLF) and an inmate of the Malkangiri camps, told The Hindu, as published in a report on March 13, 1990. But Karunanidhi had reasons to justify his government's refusal to provide asylum to the seekers. On April 26, 1990, intervening in a discussion in the Assembly, the Chief Minister cited law and order as the main reason for the move. 'He felt that militants should be kept off even from neighbouring States,' The Hindu reported on April 27, 1990. Karunanidhi had even suggested to the Central government to shift the refugees, sheltered in Odisha, to Andamans, as a majority of them were militants. A fortnight later, he told reporters that he had discussed his suggestion with Singh and Gujral. Parliament had also discussed the refugee matter. On March 28, 1990, the External Affairs Minister told the Rajya Sabha that 'hospitality does not mean open the door.' At the same time, in keeping with India's 'humanitarian traditions, we have never refused entry to refugees who, as in the present case, felt that their lives were at risk,' Gujral said. He added the refugees were brought by sea and air to the country. Notwithstanding the Patnaik administration's sympathetic treatment of the refugees, most of them did not find Odisha a conducive place to stay. In fact, Karunanidhi had then informed the House that the 'militants' continued to arrive in the city from Orissa camps by train and they were apprehended by the police. In the middle of May, he described the refugees' action of deserting the camps as 'wrong' and contended that 'of those who had come to Tamil Nadu, 190 persons who were militants were taken into custody. Other refugees, including women and children, had not been arrested,' stated this newspaper in its report on May 17, 1990. A few days later, after a protest-fast by 111 refugees at the Central Prison who came from the eastern State, the Chief Minister ordered their release. Within a year, the number of refugees in Odisha dwindled to 218, according to the Annual Report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs for 1990-91. [As on March 31, 1991, there were about 2.1 lakh Sri Lankan refugees living in the country.] The former CM of the NEPC recalls that a majority of those who left the camps had finally settled in the Western countries. He and his family were initially taken to Mauritius before being taken to central and northern parts of India. He now shuttles between India and Sri Lanka. The episode ended on a further sad note, as the EPRLF's general secretary and 14 others were gunned down allegedly by a killer squad of the LTTE on the evening of June 19, 1990, while he was holding a meeting in a flat at Kodambakkam, a busy locality of Chennai.
The Print
22-04-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Farewell Gen Kalkat, decorated Army officer who marched through Chhamb, led IPKF in Sri Lanka
Commissioned into the 8 Gorkha Rifles, Gen Kalkat's illustrious career encompassed significant events in the annals of Indian military history. During the 1971 India-Pakistan War, he commanded the 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, earning considerable admiration for his strategic insight and leadership capabilities in the fierce Battle of Chumb. Gen Kalkat (Retd) died earlier in the day. His last rites were attended by his immediate family members, senior officers and comrade-in-arms, a significant number of whom went through the trials and triumphs of service alongside him. New Delhi: Lieutenant General Amarjit Singh Kalkat (Retd), a highly decorated officer of the Indian Army, was cremated on Tuesday with full military honours at the Brar Square in Delhi Cantonment. Gen Kalkat is best remembered for being the Overall Commander of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from February 1988 to March 1990 during Operation Pawan. In an acknowledgement of his exemplary leadership during this pivotal operation, he was awarded the Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal (SYSM), India's foremost distinction for service in wartime. He was the first-ever recipient of the award, with only two others having been recognised since, both during the Kargil Conflict. 'He led the IPKF through its most complex period, the de-induction from Sri Lanka,' Lt Gen Hardev Singh Lidder (Retd), former Commanding Officer of the 9 Para Special Forces told ThePrint. 'During Operation Pawan, I held the position of battalion commander under his leadership and he affectionately regarded us as the finest battalion. He exemplified the essence of a true politico-military strategist,' he added. Col Vipul Talwar (Retd), who was in the same unit as Gen Kalkat and knew him from the early days of his career, fondly recollected his humility and mentorship. 'When I completed Staff College, I was posted with the battalion in Dehradun while Gen Kalkat was commanding a neighbouring formation,' recalled Col Vipul Talwar. 'I was preparing a presentation on the Battle of Chhamb – a battle he had led as the commanding officer, during which the battalion earned a Vir Chakra. Gen Kalkat came all the way to meet me and personally discuss it. That's the kind of leader he was—great, humble and genuinely invested in the growth of his juniors.' In July 1991, Kalkat assumed the role of the first General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the newly established Army Training Command (ARTRAC), where he played an instrumental part in shaping future military doctrine. Following this, he served as the Commander of the Southern Command. Upon his retirement, Gen Kalkat remained actively involved in defence policy and public discourse, exemplifying the essence of a soldier's general until the end of his days. (Edited by Ajeet Tiwari) Also Read: 'If you want to go to war, then select Amarjeet Singh Kalkat as Chief of Army Staff'
