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The Diplomat
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province
The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control also make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. An early July counternarcotics operation by Taliban authorities triggered a week-long outbreak of violence in Khash District in central Badakhshan Province, resulting in as many as 15 dead. Protests and repression in the area are not new, as violence also broke out during last year's poppy cultivation season. The drug trade, competition over minerals, ethnic and religious tensions, and the presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) will likely continue to challenge the Taliban regime's ability to exert control over Badakhshan, a province where it historically enjoyed only limited support. Unless things escalate further, the recent unrest in Badakhshan seems unlikely to pose a threat to the Taliban's control over the country. However, the province should serve as a bellwether for the Taliban's attempts to adapt its dogmatic governance to an increasingly underserved national population. Badakhshan Province was never ruled by the Taliban during the first emirate, though the movement did enjoy some support in the area. Several key members of the Taliban are from the province, including the current Chief of Army Staff Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat. During the insurgency, the Taliban presence increased in the central districts of the province after 2014. While the Taliban lacked the manpower in the northeast to expand their base of support past a few districts, the Taliban's presence around Faizabad meant that it was only the ninth provincial capital to fall once the group began its takeover of the country in 2021. Since the takeover, the Taliban have been careful in their governance of the province, seeking to manage their lack of support in the more remote districts of the province. The ethnic disposition of the Badakhshan presents a problem for the Taliban. Tajiks and Uzbeks make up the overwhelming majority of the province's population with a limited number of Pashtuns sprinkled among the urban areas, working as traders or government officials. In an effort to accommodate local sensitivities, the Taliban has allowed Badakhshi commanders and officials to hold government posts in their local areas, something not generally allowed elsewhere in the country. However, as time as passed, there is an increasing tension between local Tajik and Uzbek Taliban members and Pashtun senior leaders from outside of the province. There are also sectarian elements to the instability in Badakhshan as the Deobandi Taliban have sought to assert control over Salafi mosques and Ismaili prayer houses and cultural centers in the province. Religious tensions in the province likely caused the killing of a local Agha Khan Foundation official on July 9 and a local Salafist Taliban leader on May 27. While it has been quiet in recent months, ISKP has a historic presence in Badakhshan, capitalizing on the area's religious and ethnic fault lines. The Taliban target ISKP cells in the province as they are identified, to mixed results. Iranian officials claimed the Islamic State's January 3, 2024 attack in Kerman was facilitated out of Badakhshan. However, ISKP only conducted four attacks inside the province in 2024, and has not claimed an attack in Badakhshan this year. Despite the group's recent decline, its actions set the stage for the current problems in the province. On June 6, 2023, ISKP killed the deputy governor of Badakhshan with a car bomb. ISKP then conducted a suicide attack on the deputy governor's funeral two days later. Recognizing the need for a firmer hand in the province, the Taliban named Muhammad Ayub Khalid, a Pashtun, to be Badakhshan's governor. Khalid's prior experience as a military commander suggests the regime is increasingly focused on security in the region. The movement of additional Pashtuns into intelligence and police positions in the province set the stage for renewed tensions with the local populace as the national government seeks to tighten its control over Badakhshan. Competition between local leaders and the national government over Badakhshan's rich mineral resources is a critical driver for instability. The province has aluminum, gold, and limestone deposits as well as jewels such as rubies and lapis lazuli. The Taliban regime awarded mining contracts in 2024 for the region's large deposits and tried to crack down on illegal mines run by the local population. Control over the province's mines is no trivial matter. The Taliban seek to exploit Afghanistan's mineral wealth in order to mitigate the pressure of Western sanctions and impact of persistent budget shortfalls. For Badakshis, the mines provide a critical revenue stream for many to meet their basic needs as the government provides only minimal services and the terrain and climate limit agricultural opportunities in the province. Conflict over the drug trade is also increasing in Badakhshan. After the Taliban banned poppy cultivation across the country, Badakhshan has emerged as the new center of the Afghan drug trade. The Taliban anti-drug efforts largely depend on deterrence of farmers, rather than aggressive eradication or interdiction campaigns. The Taliban was able to deter poppy cultivation in other parts of the country through strong networks of supporters and allies that convinced the population of the rectitude of the ban. The Taliban in Badakhshan lacked that support network. In fact, many local Taliban commanders did not enforce the ban. Further, southern Pashtun drug traffickers established connections with Badakhshi growers to refine their opium to heroin for shipment to international markets. The eruption of cultivation eventually became something Taliban senior leadership could not ignore. As the Taliban began eradication in the province in spring of 2024, they moved largely Pashtun fighters into Badakhshan from other provinces. The new troops almost immediately began fighting not only with the local population, but eventually with local Badakhshi Taliban as well. As they seek to smooth over ethnic and religious turbulence and improve control, the Taliban have made significant investments in Badakhshan. The government has built canals and bridges in addition to a terminal for international cargo handling. The most notable, and ambitious, infrastructure project is a road through the Wakhan Corridor to connect the province with China. A road project to better connect Badakhshan to Panjshir and Nuristan is also underway. These roads serve to improve the security forces' access to restive parts of the country and increase the government's ability to establish additional mines in Badakhshan and elsewhere in the northeast. With the transportation network improving and Pashtuns now firmly entrenched in key positions in the province, the Taliban are gradually moving to bring governance in Badakhshan in line with Afghanistan's other provinces. Since Khalid's installation as governor, local officials have begun floggings for moral offenses, removing women from educational positions, seizing weapons, and regulating holiday celebrations, things that started long ago in other parts of the country. These moves have further exacerbated popular grievances. When Taliban forces showed up in Darayim and Argo districts in 2024 and in Argo, Jurm, and Khash districts in May and July this year to eradicate local poppy crops, violence was an extraordinarily likely outcome. The Taliban seem to be developing a playbook for such disturbances: withdraw the offending troops and reconstitute, flood the zone with reinforcements, cut off local access to internet, arrest any complicit local commanders, and employ senior Badakhshi Taliban leaders like Fitrat and others to mediate. Little has been done to address core grievances in Badakhshan, so additional violence next May, June, and July is likely as Taliban forces again eradicate poppy ahead of the harvest. Leaders of the anti-Taliban resistance, like General Jalaluddin Yaftali and Vice President Amrullah Saleh, were quick to encourage Badakhshan's population to expand the revolt. It was not to be. The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. Badakhshan will remain turbulent, though it might be possible for unrest to challenge the regime's ability to control the neighboring portions of Takhar and Panjshir provinces. Unless there is a substantial deterioration in conditions, it is likely the Taliban will do just enough to keep northeastern Afghanistan under control. However, Badakhshan should be watched closely for any further challenges to Taliban authority.
The Diplomat
07-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Taliban: Russia's ‘Objective Allies' in its Fight Against the Islamic State
On the sidelines of the third round of the U.N.-convened Doha Working Group (commonly known as Doha Process) meetings held in the Qatari capital on June 30 and July 1, Russia's Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Russia should arm the Taliban against the Islamic State. In this context, he further said that 'in this particular case, they are our objective allies, whom we must support to arm them in every sense of the word, so that they successfully suppress all these smallest hotbeds of international terrorism.' He said that Russia must support the Taliban with weapons in order to help them eliminate the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. Emphasizing the Taliban's role against the Islamic State, he said, 'The Taliban is fighting the Islamic State uncompromisingly and harshly.' Kabulov's remarks demonstrate the shift in Russia's policy toward the Taliban. This policy shift was further affirmed on July 3 when Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Moscow has accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan as part of a strategic shift in its Taliban policy to build friendly relations with Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which has been the de facto ruler of the country since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2021. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that 'We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields.' Such a bold move from Moscow has not come suddenly. Over the past few months, Russia has been gradually moving toward this end. In December 2024, Russia adopted a law to establish the possibility of delisting any organization from the list of terrorist organizations. In March, Russia's Prosecutor General submitted a petition to the Supreme Court to remove the Taliban from the terrorist designated list. That request was approved in mid-April. Russia's paradigm shift toward the Taliban must be seen from the security perspective, mainly vis-à-vis the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) — an affiliate of the Islamic State, which is active in South and Central Asia, primarily in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to a certain extent in Pakistan. In March 2024, the Crocus City Hall music venue near Moscow was attacked by four armed terrorists, resulting in over 150 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. The incident marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Russia in the past two decades. Russian President Vladimir Putin called it 'a barbaric terrorist act.' While the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, ISKP proclaimed it also without directly claiming responsibility. ISKP is widely believed to have orchestrated the attack, allegedly carried out by citizens of Tajikistan. Russia is a significant target for the Islamic State, and its affiliates, for several reasons, primarily due to the group's deep animosity toward the country. Many Islamic State jihadists harbor resentment against Russia for its involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent decade-long occupation. Additionally, Russia's two wars in Chechnya, which occurred in 1994 and 2000, plausibly further fueled anger among jihadists of the Islamic State. Currently, the heightened hostility toward Moscow is likely a result of Russia's active role against the Islamic State in support of the Syrian regime. With the assistance of Russian airpower, the Assad regime was able to recapture the city of Palmyra in 2017, which had been seized by Islamic State forces. Furthermore, Russia has been actively supporting groups in the Sahel to combat terrorist organizations, including Islamic State affiliates in the region. Despite these efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the Islamic State, Russia has not been able to eliminate the danger. Just days before the Crocus City Hall incident, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that it had killed Islamic State militants who were allegedly planning a terrorist attack on a synagogue in Moscow. However, the FSB failed to identify or forestall the Crocus City Hall attack, despite warnings from the United States. There is substantial evidence indicating that ISKP was responsible for the attack. The group maintains an active presence in Afghanistan, and since the Taliban's takeover of Kabul four years ago, its operations have significantly increased. Due to a lack of international cooperation in combating this terrorist organization, the responsibility for fighting ISKP has largely fallen on the Taliban, which views the group as a direct threat to its regime. ISKP has directed much of its hostility toward the Taliban, in turn, prompting the latter to adopt a forceful strategy against it. The Taliban has reportedly succeeded in infiltrating ISKP by targeting its operatives within the country. However, despite these efforts, the Taliban has been unable to prevent the group from attacking other countries, primarily due to its limited counterterrorism capabilities and the various political and economic crises facing Afghanistan since the regime's takeover. Therefore, Russia's support for the Taliban in their fight against ISKP could enhance their capabilities in combating the group. The growing engagement between the Taliban and Russia can be viewed as a practical partnership. Russia seeks allies to aid in its fight against the Islamic State, with Putin labeling the Taliban as 'allies in the fight against terrorism' in July 2024. On the other hand, the Taliban requires support to sustain their regime in Afghanistan while combating their most significant internal threat, ISKP. In addition to collaborating against a common enemy, Russia's recognition of the Taliban government, which could plausibly lead to other countries following suit, serves as a significant diplomatic boost for the regime. Russia was once an adversary of the Taliban, backing the Northern Alliance, which opposed the Taliban from 1996 to 2001. However, the Taliban are notorious for not acting against terrorist groups using Afghan soil to attack other countries. Nonetheless, the threat posed by ISKP to their regime provides the Taliban with a compelling reason to combat this particular terrorist group. Russian support could enhance the Taliban's counterterrorism capabilities. It remains to be seen how and when Russia will begin providing support, including weapons, to the Taliban in their fight against the Islamic State, particularly its affiliate, ISKP.
The Diplomat
07-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Hassan Abbas on the Resurgent Support for Pakistan Army's Rise, Post-Operation Sindoor
'The sense of external threat and national unity has led many Pakistanis to rally around the armed forces, although this resurgence in support may prove to be transient.' The Pakistan military's image has improved in the eyes of the Pakistani people following the four-day India-Pakistan military strikes in May. A recent survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan found that 93 percent of those polled felt their view of the military had improved following the clashes with India. There has been an outpouring of nationalist pride in the military, and the stature of Army Chief Gen Asim Munir, who was promoted to the post of field marshal and hailed as a 'savior' following the clashes, has grown further in the wake of his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Only a few months ago, the Pakistani military was deeply unpopular in the country, despised for its role in the ouster and incarceration of Prime Minister Imran Khan, Pakistan's most popular politician, and its brutal crackdown on his supporters. That has changed since May. The military's newfound popularity has raised concerns over its possible assumption of a role in governance. Sharing his insights into the changed public mood in Pakistan vis-à-vis the military, Pakistani-American scholar, Hassan Abbas, a distinguished professor of International Relations at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C., said that while the current popularity of the military 'may seem to favor an enhanced military role [in politics],' 'support for the military tends to erode once political mismanagement or authoritarian overreach becomes apparent.' Pakistan's history suggests that the people will eventually push back against 'prolonged military interference in politics,' he told The Diplomat's South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran. In a recent interview, you suggested that the terror attack at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir may have been perpetrated by groups like the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP). What could have motivated such an attack, and do you believe India responded in a way that may have served the attackers' interests? In the absence of verifiable evidence, the mutual recriminations between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam attack are not only unproductive but also risk obscuring the possibility of third-party involvement. It is imperative to consider the strategic calculus of transnational extremist groups, particularly the ISKP, which has demonstrated both intent and capability to launch high-profile attacks in the region. ISKP thrives on instability and confrontation between regional powers, especially India and Pakistan. An escalation in bilateral tensions serves its objectives in several ways: it diverts security resources away from counterterrorism, deepens sectarian and nationalist divides, and creates fertile ground for recruitment by heightening a sense of crisis. If indeed ISKP or similar entities orchestrated the attack, one could argue that India's immediate attribution of blame to Pakistan, without conclusive evidence, may have inadvertently validated the group's strategy—playing regional rivals against each other to carve out operational space. The group's motive would thus be to provoke military responses, undermine dialogue, and benefit from the distraction of two nuclear-armed states consumed by mutual hostility. There has been much speculation about the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir. What are your insights into this high-level interaction? The Trump-Munir meeting was indeed unexpected and, according to informed observers, was arranged through discreet channels — most likely between the White House and Pakistan's military or intelligence leadership. While exact details remain unknown, publicly available information and informed speculation suggest that Iran was a major point of discussion. Gen Munir's recent visit to Tehran alongside Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif gave him firsthand insight into the evolving regional dynamics, especially in the context of the Israel-Iran confrontation. Trump's reported remarks about Gen Munir's deep understanding of Iran underscore that the meeting likely focused on strategic stability in the Gulf, avoiding a full-scale conflict, and exploring Pakistan's role in regional de-escalation. It is also plausible that Pakistan reiterated its interest in renewing U.S.-Pakistan defense ties and conveyed its position regarding the recent military exchange with India. Furthermore, Trump likely advised restraint vis-à-vis India, while urging Pakistan to intensify counterterrorism operations against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISK, and Kashmir-focused extremist factions. The meeting signaled that Washington seeks to retain functional ties with Islamabad—not only to avoid pushing Pakistan entirely into China's orbit but also due to Pakistan's nuclear status and its pivotal location in an increasingly volatile region. How has this meeting between Trump and Munir been perceived across different segments of Pakistani society, including political parties, the public, and the military establishment? The reaction within Pakistan has been largely positive, particularly among the general public and segments of the military establishment. There was a sense of national pride that Pakistan's military leadership was received with such importance by the U.S. president, signaling international recognition of Pakistan's strategic relevance. This favorable perception is also shaped by a broader decline in anti-American sentiment in recent years—a notable shift from earlier periods marked by deep skepticism of U.S. intentions. However, critical voices have emerged, especially among civil society actors, independent analysts, and some political commentators. Their concerns center on the timing of the meeting — immediately preceding U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure — which some view as problematic. A few critiques, often conveyed through social media or in measured opinion pieces, have warned against Pakistan being perceived as a complicit actor in potential regional escalation. There is also strong speculation that Trump may have raised the Abraham Accords in an effort to coax Pakistan into normalizing relations with Israel—contingent, perhaps, on tangible progress in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and renewed hope for a two-state solution. Pakistan can potentially move in this direction if Saudi Arabia takes the lead. Some critics argue that strong military-to-military ties between the U.S. and Pakistan have historically undermined democratic institutions in the country. Why then is the renewed momentum in U.S.-Pakistan relations being celebrated so broadly? This criticism, while not unfounded, often overlooks the broader historical context. U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has indeed shaped the country's strategic orientation since the 1950s, starting with alliances like SEATO and CENTO and later deepening during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. These alliances yielded significant economic and military benefits for Pakistan, albeit often at the cost of civilian oversight and democratic consolidation. It is true that much of this cooperation unfolded under military regimes, sidelining elected governments. However, there have also been notable exceptions. The U.S. played a quiet but constructive role in facilitating democratic transitions — such as the rise of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in 1988 — and major aid packages like the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act were delivered during civilian governments. Today, many Pakistanis view renewed engagement with the U.S. not through an ideological lens but as a pragmatic necessity — especially given the country's economic distress and security challenges. The celebration of renewed ties thus reflects both strategic calculations and public desire for international legitimacy and stability, rather than a rejection of democratic values. This revival or warming of U.S.–Pakistan relations also suggests that Pakistan is seeking to strike a balance in its ties between China and the U.S. Recent developments — including India-Pakistan clashes, the Munir-Trump meeting, and the Iran-Israel conflict — have improved the Pakistani military's public image. How do you interpret this shift? The Pakistani military's image had taken a significant hit in recent years, particularly due to its controversial role in the ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and its heavy-handed treatment of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) senior and mid-level leadership. Widespread public disillusionment followed, with unprecedented levels of criticism directed at the military, both online and in street protests, leading to severe backlash from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. However, the recent military skirmishes with India, especially what is perceived domestically as a tactical victory — including the downing of several Indian aircraft — have sparked a surge in nationalist sentiment. Pakistan's Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos (translated as 'unbreakable wall' in response to India's Operation Sindoor), which showcased Pakistan's defensive capabilities and strategic preparedness, has helped rehabilitate the military's image. The sense of external threat and national unity has led many Pakistanis to rally around the armed forces, although this resurgence in support may prove to be transient. Public sentiment shifted dramatically after Operation Sindoor, with growing support for the military's role. Are Pakistanis now more accepting of a larger military footprint in political affairs? At present, public tolerance for an expanded military role in governance has indeed increased, largely due to national security concerns and the perception that the military is a stabilizing force amid regional turmoil. However, such support tends to be cyclical and situational. Pakistan's historical experience demonstrates that prolonged military interference in politics eventually triggers public pushback. Every military ruler — from Ayub Khan to Musharraf — ultimately exited under pressure and public discontent. While the current climate may seem to favor an enhanced military role, it would be premature to interpret this as a permanent shift in public attitudes. Pakistanis generally aspire to democratic governance, and support for the military tends to erode once political mismanagement or authoritarian overreach becomes apparent. Given his current popularity and institutional control, do you see Gen Munir being tempted to stage a formal coup? Or does he already wield sufficient power without one? Gen Munir is arguably in a more commanding position than many past military rulers, yet he has not needed to formally seize power. Through strategic alliances with the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the military has maintained de facto control without overtly undermining the constitutional order. This civilian-military alignment — where two of the country's three major political parties appear aligned with the armed forces — is highly unusual by Pakistani standards. While this arrangement has provided short-term stability, it raises questions about sustainability. Political volatility in Pakistan has historically defied expectations, and such alignments, if perceived as undemocratic, could fuel public backlash or fragmentation within the ruling coalition over time. While nationalism is surging in Pakistan, how have ethnic minorities — particularly in Balochistan — responded to this wave of military pride and assertiveness? Balochistan remains a complex and restive region, with its own political dynamics and historical grievances. While urban centers in the province have witnessed participation in nationalist fervor, this trend has not fully penetrated rural or insurgency-affected areas, where skepticism towards the central government and military remains high. The current regional instability — particularly the Iran-Israel confrontation — has created both risks and opportunities for Islamabad. On the one hand, it enables renewed focus on border control and counter-smuggling operations, which may curtail militant mobility. On the other, it offers the federal government a strategic opportunity to reset its approach toward Balochistan by pursuing reconciliation with disaffected groups and investing in meaningful political inclusion and development. Without such outreach, the underlying causes of unrest will persist. Does the recent shift in power dynamics mark the end of the road for Imran Khan and the PTI? Despite the sustained crackdown on the PTI leadership and Imran Khan's ongoing legal challenges, the party retains popular support and remains a formidable political force. In any free and fair electoral contest, the PTI is likely to perform strongly. However, the political environment is currently shaped by security concerns stemming from India-Pakistan tensions and regional instability involving Iran and Israel. The IMF has also helped bring in some financial stability lately. The apparent consensus among key power brokers to allow the current government — effectively a PML(N)-PPP coalition — to serve its full term until 2029 reflects a calibrated political arrangement. At the same time, both parties maintain significant national constituencies, and Bilawal Bhutto, in particular, appears to have a promising political future ahead. That said, Pakistan's political history is replete with sudden shifts, realignments, and popular upheavals. Imran Khan's political future cannot be written off, and the PTI's resilience — coupled with public discontent over economic and security conditions — may well redefine the political landscape in the future.
United News of India
05-07-2025
- Politics
- United News of India
UK acknowledges partial success by Afghan Taliban in curbing ISKP terrorists
London/Kabul, July 5 (UNI) The United Kingdom acknowledged that Afghanistan's Taliban-led interim government has made partial gains in curbing the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), though the Islamic terror group continues to pose a serious threat both within the country and beyond its borders. Speaking at a security conference in Islamabad, British High Commissioner to Pakistan Matt Cannell noted that while Taliban efforts have disrupted ISKP operations since 2022, the group has not been dismantled, reports Tolo News. 'What we've seen is a dispersal rather than eradication of ISKP,' he said. 'They have obviously regrouped and are now promoting attacks in neighbouring countries and across the border as well.' ISKP, the regional affiliate of the Islamic State, has remained active despite ongoing crackdowns by the Taliban, which so far has successfully curbed the terrorist group's numbers in the country. The group has been responsible for a series of deadly attacks targeting civilians, minorities, government authorities, infrastructure, and even foreign officials across Afghanistan and the wider region. While the Taliban has claimed that the group has been defeated, Western officials and analysts continue to express concern about its shifting tactics and potential for resurgence. Cannell emphasised the need for sustained regional cooperation to counter the evolving threat. 'We understand how Taliban pressure has continued to affect ISKP,' he said. 'Sharing insights with our partners is essential to continue disrupting future activity.' In a separate meeting, the British chargé d'affaires to Afghanistan told Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, the Taliban's acting Minister for Refugees and Repatriation, that the United Nations has drafted a plan for Afghanistan focused on strengthening engagement with the interim government and supporting national stability in the country. UNI ANV GNK 1839
News18
02-07-2025
- Politics
- News18
Kerala to Kunar: CNN-News18 Exposes ISIS-K Recruitment Trail Targeting Dalit Youth
CNN-News18 exclusive investigation uncovers a chilling jihadi network operating out of Kerala, silently recruiting vulnerable Indian youth—particularly Dalit minors—into the deadly ranks of ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP) in Afghanistan. Top intelligence sources reveal how radicalisation begins in Gulf-funded institutions like Peace International School and is followed by indoctrination in covert safehouses run by banned outfits like PFI and are smuggled via Kochi and Trivandrum airports using forged documents, often travelling through Dubai, Istanbul, Sri Lanka or Iran before reaching ISKP strongholds in Nangarhar and Kunar expert Maj Gen (R) Rajan Kochar and activist Rahul Easwar weigh in on this dangerous development. Why are Indian youth being targeted? Who is funding this pipeline of terror? Don't miss this deep dive into one of India's most critical national security threats. News18 Mobile App -
