Latest news with #IndependentHighElectoralCommission
Shafaq News
6 days ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
IHEC's ink decision reopens wounds in Iraq's electoral trust
Shafaq News The Independent High Electoral Commission's (IHEC) decision to abolish the use of indelible ink in Iraq's upcoming November 2025 elections has ignited sharp criticism from key political forces, especially in Kirkuk. While the commission frames the move as a modernization step toward a fully biometric system, its political ramifications point to a deeper crisis of confidence in Iraq's fragile democratic institutions. A Symbol of Integrity Removed For years, indelible ink has served as a visible assurance that each voter casts only one ballot. Commonly used in many developing democracies—including India, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Nigeria—it offers a low-tech but highly symbolic method of deterring voter fraud. Iraq, like Egypt and other transitional democracies, has historically relied on the "ink step" to build credibility in elections marred by factional competition and institutional weakness. While advanced democracies often dispense with ink—relying on secure digital registries, ID systems, or mail-in voting—the Iraqi context differs starkly. In a system burdened by disputed voter rolls, weak oversight in peripheral regions, and contested ethnic territories, the ink is more than an anti-fraud measure; it is a public demonstration of electoral fairness. Biometric Promise Meets Political Skepticism IHEC justifies the ink's removal on technical grounds. According to commission officials, the biometric voter cards—complete with fingerprint and facial recognition—make manual safeguards redundant. These cards are meant to verify voters electronically, ensuring each person votes only once and only in their designated station. Yet this rationale has not convinced everyone, particularly in volatile areas. The Unified Iraqi Turkmen Front and the Arab Council in Kirkuk issued swift condemnations, arguing that the ink's elimination could pave the way for renewed manipulation, especially in provinces like Kirkuk, where past elections have been marred by allegations of demographic engineering and vote tampering. According to Mohammed al-Saadoon, a specialist in electoral affairs, the concerns voiced by Arab and Turkmen communities in Kirkuk stem from previous incidents in which individuals were reportedly able to vote at multiple stations or centers. This, he notes, has fueled widespread suspicion of fraud, particularly in the absence of rigorous and independent auditing of voter registries by a specialized committee. Kirkuk's Fragile Balance Kirkuk's history of ethnopolitical contention further complicates the issue. As a province disputed between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, every electoral mechanism is intensely scrutinized. The ink's removal has reignited long-standing fears among Turkmen and Arab communities of demographic manipulation—specifically, the claim that thousands of Kurdish voters were registered in the province after 2003 to tilt electoral balances. These fears have been exacerbated by what some describe as IHEC's reluctance to enforce Federal Court decisions mandating a comprehensive audit of voter lists in Kirkuk. Al-Saadoon emphasizes that such demands for audit and reform are not new but are persistently raised because Kirkuk represents a focal point of competition among its three main communities. Arabs and Turkmen, he says, view the verification of voter registries as a necessary step toward restoring faith in the electoral process. On the other side, Kurdish parties reject accusations of voter inflation, asserting that any increase in Kurdish voter numbers reflects the return of previously displaced families to Kirkuk under earlier government decisions—not an attempt to engineer the province's demographics. At stake is the perceived legitimacy of Iraq's electoral system in regions where politics remains zero-sum and where the loss of a seat could mean the erosion of community rights or federal funding. In such contexts, visible anti-fraud mechanisms carry enormous symbolic weight. Their removal, especially without extensive stakeholder consultation, may deepen already festering doubts in the democratic process.
Shafaq News
12-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Iraq's 2025 Elections: Mass candidacy, minimal reform, and crisis of democracy
Shafaq News Iraq's upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 11, 2025, are shaping up to be a pivotal yet deeply problematic juncture for the country's democratic trajectory. With a record-breaking 7,900 candidates vying for 329 seats in the Council of Representatives, the surface impression is one of vigorous democratic engagement. Yet beneath the numbers lies a troubling portrait of structural dysfunction, eroded public trust, and the risk of intensifying political gridlock. A Numbers Game Without Vision The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) attributes the candidate surge to Iraq's proportional representation system and its application of the Sainte-Laguë method, designed to promote electoral fairness. However, political alliances have exploited this formula by fielding double or even triple the number of candidates per seat—a legally permissible strategy that has turned the election into what Analyst Abbas al-Jubouri calls 'political noise, not a contest of leadership.' This numerical inflation reflects a broader problem: the proliferation of parties and coalitions with little ideological coherence or policy clarity. Iraq now hosts over 400 registered political parties and around 140 electoral alliances, many lacking any substantive vision. Rather than signaling political diversity, the massive candidacy count appears driven by a scramble for influence, state resources, and parliamentary immunity. Legal Vacuum Behind Electoral Chaos A core structural weakness enabling this dysfunction is the absence of a comprehensive party regulation law. In the current vacuum, political parties are not legally required to disclose their sources of funding, membership structures, or internal governance. This opacity, according to political Commentator Abdullah al-Kanani, allows ruling elites to preserve their influence by constantly rebranding themselves under new banners. Campaign financing further compounds the problem. Al-Kanani warns that spending on this election may surpass 2 trillion Iraqi dinars (approximately $1.5 billion), a figure fueled in part by illicit funds and unregulated donor networks. The landscape was further destabilized by the announced boycott of Iraq's largest Shia political movement, led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. His group's withdrawal casts a shadow over the elections, likely depressing voter turnout and deepening sectarian fragmentation in an already fragile political order. Parliament's Record of Failure The credibility crisis extends beyond the electoral system to the performance of the outgoing parliament. Lawmakers failed to pass more than 150 draft bills and were frequently absent from key sessions. Political Researcher Ali al-Nasser bluntly summarizes the legislature's legacy, 'It collapsed in performance long before it dissolved.' Al-Nasser warns that this election risks becoming a cynical numbers game, where inflated candidacies serve to project the illusion of democratic engagement. He cites one electoral alliance that has fielded 470 candidates nationwide, interpreting this not as political inclusion but a deliberate attempt to 'game the system.' This perception is widely shared among Iraqi voters, many of whom see little hope that new faces will bring new results. The lack of accountability, coupled with the enduring dominance of elite-controlled blocs, continues to alienate citizens and depress faith in electoral institutions. The Return of a Flawed Framework After the 2019 protest movement, Iraq introduced localized voting districts to facilitate the emergence of independent candidates and curb bloc dominance. Those gains have now been partially reversed. According to IHEC spokesperson Jumana al-Ghalai, the 2025 elections will be conducted under the amended Law No. 12 of 2018—a system critics argue favors established powers. 'This framework was not designed for new voices,' says al-Jubouri. 'It's designed to protect old powers in new disguises.' The regression in electoral design, combined with the persistent absence of institutional reform, underscores the limits of Iraq's democratic evolution. Despite six rounds of electoral law changes since 2003, the political system remains captive to entrenched interests. Ritual Without Remedy Iraq's 2025 elections arrive at a moment of deep economic distress, regional instability, and domestic political fatigue. For many observers, they offer a costly repetition of entrenched failures. Al-Kanani encapsulates the prevailing sentiment, 'This is not democratic momentum—it's democratic exhaustion.' With just four months to go, the stakes are not limited to who wins or loses. The deeper question is whether Iraqis still believe that elections can meaningfully shape their country's future. In the absence of a structural overhaul, Iraq's elections may increasingly resemble a ritual—carefully choreographed but devoid of remedy.
Shafaq News
05-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Elections stir ghosts of Iraq's sectarian past
Shafaq News Sectarian rhetoric is re-emerging in Iraq's political discourse ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for November 11, 2025. Once synonymous with civil strife and foreign interference, its renewed intensity has alarmed officials, lawmakers, and religious leaders. Many now warn that its return threatens Iraq's already fragile social cohesion, prompting urgent calls for swift legal reforms and firm institutional action before deeper divisions take hold. The resurgence is not viewed as coincidental. Analysts and observers draw a direct line between the rise in sectarian discourse and the looming elections, accusing certain political factions of deliberately weaponizing identity politics to galvanize fractured constituencies. Critics argue this approach revives the wounds of Iraq's darkest periods and threatens renewed fragmentation. As MP Thaer al-Jubouri told Shafaq News, 'Politicians without achievements resort to inflaming sectarian divisions to stay in power. They appeal to those who lack national and religious understanding—using sectarianism as a tool of power, not unity.' Al-Jubouri urged the Council of Representatives to pass legislation criminalizing sectarian incitement and pressed the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to disqualify candidates who engage in such rhetoric. 'Sectarianism is something we only overcame with great difficulty,' he remarked, 'and it remains a tool of occupation to divide the country.' Broader Electoral Context and Democratic Implications Iraq's post-2003 political structure has operated under an informal ethno-sectarian power-sharing system known as Muhasasa. This arrangement typically assigns the Prime Minister's post to a Shia, the Parliament Speaker to a Sunni, and the Presidency to a Kurd. Political parties are generally organized along sectarian and ethnic lines. Shia factions such as the Sadrist Movement (now the Patriotic Shiite Movement) and Fatah Alliance participated primarily within Shia constituencies. Sunni parties like Taqaddum and Azm competed in Sunni-majority areas. Kurdish representation was led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Demographic Tensions and Political Calculations Iraq's population, which now exceeds 46 million according to the Ministry of Planning, is ethnically and religiously diverse. Based on estimates from the US Department of State's 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom, the majority of Iraq's Muslim population is Shia, comprising 55 to 60%, while Sunnis represent about 40%—roughly 24 % Arab, 15 % Kurdish, and 1 % Turkmen. Minority communities include Christians—Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs, and Armenians—whose numbers have dropped to fewer than 150,000 from around 1.5 million before 2003, largely due to conflict and displacement. Other religious minorities include Yazidis and Sabean-Mandaeans. Ethnically, the population is primarily Arab, followed by Kurds in the north, with smaller communities such as Turkmen, Assyrians, Shabaks, and Armenians. Historical grievances and longstanding power imbalances between these groups have often been exploited by political actors. This divisive legacy continues to provide fertile ground for sectarian rhetoric, particularly during moments of electoral vulnerability. A Painful History Rekindled After the 2003 invasion, Iraq descended into years of bloodshed between Sunni and Shia communities, marked by bombings, assassinations, and ethnic cleansing. Baghdad and other mixed cities were flashpoints, while extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq—and later ISIS—exploited these fractures for recruitment and domination. The civil war of 2006–2007 represents a tragic peak, with tens of thousands killed and millions displaced. While estimates vary, it is believed that hundreds of thousands of civilians lost their lives during this period. UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) reported civilian casualty rates in the thousands per month at the time. This violence left deep scars and entrenched distrust, making today's revival of sectarian narratives especially dangerous. State Measures and Legal Ambiguity The Iraqi government has recently taken visible, though arguably overdue, steps to confront sectarian incitement. The Ministry of Interior 's Offensive Content Committee announced 'firm and decisive' action against instigators of division, and on June 30, launched proceedings against mosque preacher Uday al-Ghariri and poet Abdul Hussein Hayal al-Hatimi for promoting hateful content online. Earlier this year, journalist Salam Adel was also prosecuted for allegedly insulting the Sunni community. Momentum is also building for legislative reform. On June 28, MP Hamid al-Shiblawi initiated a signature campaign to draft a law explicitly criminalizing sectarianism. This echoes a March proposal by Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who advocated for legislation and called for the removal of online content promoting division. In a public statement, al-Mashhadani warned of the dangerous intersection between electoral campaigns and the mobilization of sectarian sentiment amid broader regional volatility. While legislative efforts are advancing, Iraq's existing legal framework already addresses sectarian incitement. Article 200 of the amended Penal Code criminalizes sectarian or ethnic hate speech as a threat to state security, with penalties of up to seven years in prison. Article 372 allows for imprisonment or fines for insulting religious beliefs or symbols. However, legal experts argue that implementation remains flawed. Mohammed Jumaa, a legal analyst speaking to Shafaq News, criticized the misuse of Article 372 for sectarian cases. 'These are not misdemeanors,' he contended. 'They should be prosecuted under Article 200 as felonies. Iraq needs deterrent action against anyone who incites sectarianism.' Inconsistent application, he warned, fuels impunity and undermines state efforts to contain the phenomenon. Religious Authorities Push Back Prominent religious leaders have added their voices to the campaign against sectarianism. Sheikh Muhammad Khalil Ibrahim, representing the religious establishment in Baghdad, emphasized to Shafaq News that sectarianism remains a tool of foreign domination. Stressing Islamic principles, he underscored the obligation to protect any person who proclaims the shahada (the Islamic declaration of faith) and urged unity across the Muslim world. Meanwhile, Sheikh Mustafa al-Bayati, head of the Association of Imams and Preachers of Al-Adhamiya, underlined that Islamic ethics demand respect—even for non-believers—and condemned sectarianism as both 'religiously forbidden and nationally harmful.' He implored the state and judiciary to take firm action against offenders, reaffirming the role of religious institutions in promoting unity.
Shafaq News
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Nineveh Council member: residents reject sectarianism, demographics
Shafaq News – Nineveh On Wednesday, Mohammed Ahris, a member of the Nineveh Provincial Council, warned against the use of sectarian, ethnic, or provocative political discourse. Stressing the importance of peaceful coexistence and rejecting demographic changes affecting parts of the region, Ahris told Shafaq News that 'any attempt to destabilize Nineveh by fueling political discord must not be allowed.' He also addressed allegations of demographic engineering, clarifying that residents from various ethnic and religious backgrounds have long held land in areas such as Qazafakhra, Ajliokhan, and Khazir. 'These citizens have owned land there for decades, yet they are still denied permission to build homes under the pretext of demographic concerns. This is unacceptable,' he stated. According to Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission, 36 electoral lists representing 12 parties, 9 political alliances, and 15 minority quota lists will compete in Nineveh's parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11. The quota system includes 8 lists representing the Yazidi community, 4 for the Shabak, and 3 for the Christian community, along with two independent candidates running under quota allocations. In total, 1,400 candidates are registered in Nineveh province. Nineveh is one of Iraq's most ethnically and religiously diverse provinces, home to Sunni Arabs, Assyrian Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Turkmen, and Kurds. Areas like the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar are disputed between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These territorial claims fuel ongoing political friction and deepen ethnic and sectarian divisions. Communities often align with either Baghdad or Erbil, adding complexity to local governance.
Shafaq News
01-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Iraq November elections: Push for postponement gains momentum
Shafaq News – Baghdad Influential political factions in Iraq, some reportedly backed by international and regional actors, are exerting growing pressure to postpone the country's parliamentary elections, citing regional instability and political deadlock as justifications. Multiple political sources confirmed to Shafaq News that momentum is building behind a quiet but coordinated push to delay the elections, with the effort expected to become public in the coming weeks. According to one source familiar with the discussions, several parties are preparing to demand a delay 'under the pretext of instability,' while in reality aiming to reposition themselves politically in response to broader shifts—including the announced boycott by influential Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his movement. 'These demands are likely to escalate into open calls from prominent blocs seeking to reorganize their alliances,' the source said, noting that the delay would also give time for electoral law amendments to be debated—an effort some factions view as critical for shaping the upcoming vote. Another political source told Shafaq News that the first parliamentary session after the Ashura commemorations is expected to focus on politically divisive laws that are unlikely to see progress. 'There will be proposals for technical changes to the election law and other legislation, but they are not expected to yield concrete outcomes,' the source said. Discussions about postponement are increasingly framed in terms of legal, logistical, or security concerns. But behind the scenes, political recalculations and a lack of consensus on electoral reforms are driving the push. Despite the mounting pressure, sources confirmed that the work of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) remains unaffected for now. On Monday, IHEC spokesperson Jumana al-Ghalai told Shafaq News that the Commission has formed central and provincial-level media monitoring committees to oversee election campaigning, signaling its continued preparations for the November vote. Iraq's Cabinet previously set November 11, 2025, as the date for the country's next legislative elections, with campaigning expected to begin shortly beforehand. However, since the date was announced, the path to elections has become increasingly uncertain. The electoral process faces a number of significant challenges, including growing public disengagement and widespread skepticism about the legitimacy of the political system. Calls for a boycott have expanded in recent months, not only from the Sadrists but also from al-Nasr (Victory) Coalition and several civil and independent movements, deepening concerns about voter turnout and political inclusivity.
