Latest news with #Iranian-Israeli
Ammon
6 days ago
- Politics
- Ammon
Too Close to Ignore
The recent Iranian-Israeli war was not merely another chapter in a long-standing regional conflict. It marked a pivotal moment that compelled neighboring states—foremost among them Jordan—to seriously reassess their national security paradigms and core strategic interests. It has reignited debate within Jordanian political circles regarding the country's relationship with the West Bank, including the limits of its potential, legitimate, and necessary role— and at what point disengagement becomes not just a strategic decision, but an existential gamble. Within this debate, a prevailing school of thought in Jordan advocates for a "Jordan-first" approach, emphasizing domestic stability and steering clear of any direct or indirect involvement in the rapidly unfolding dynamics across the West Bank. This approach is driven by a growing conviction that the costs of regional entanglement—especially with Israel—have become prohibitively high, given the stark imbalance of power, waning Arab support, and the emergence of new regional alignments that do not necessarily favor Jordan's traditional stance on the Palestinian issue. Proponents of this position favor retreating into economic and social concerns, avoiding potentially volatile confrontations that could spiral out of control. While this posture may appear rational and cautious, it raises deeper questions about whether such a policy is even viable—or wise—within Jordan's specific historical, geographic, and political context. Can Jordan truly "isolate" itself from the West Bank? Is it possible to redefine national interests independent of a land that is intertwined with the Kingdom through history, geography, demography, security, and identity? In reality, the West Bank has never been merely an "external file" for Jordan. Even after the 1988 legal and administrative disengagement, the Palestinian issue has remained central to Jordan's national identity, and to both its domestic and foreign policy agendas. The West Bank—as a territory, a people, and a destiny—is embedded in Jordan's national security architecture. Its stability—or lack thereof—has a direct and tangible impact on Jordan's own internal stability. This strategic awareness is deeply embedded within the country's political and security institutions, particularly during moments of heightened tension, such as the Second Intifada, or during the recent Gaza war and subsequent escalation in the West Bank, where the rhetoric of a 'Jordanian option' re-emerged among certain extremist Israeli circles. More dangerously, Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank would not neutralize threats; it may, in fact, invite them. The political and security vacuum emerging from the erosion of political solutions, expansion of Israeli settlements, and weakening of the Palestinian Authority only enhances the influence of extremist forces—many of which do not recognize Jordan's existence, let alone its sovereignty or borders. In such a context, even symbolic Jordanian withdrawal from the West Bank could be seen as a premature sacrifice of a foundational pillar of Jordan's strategic stability. This is precisely where the urgency of redefining Jordan's regional role emerges—not as a passive bystander, but as an engaged and strategic actor possessing considerable influence over the Palestinian scene. Jordan, by virtue of its historical, geographic, and political connections, retains a unique ability to engage with Palestinian elites, the general public, and the social fabric—an influence unmatched by any other Arab state. To retreat from this role not only weakens Jordan's position vis-à-vis rising threats, but also erodes its strategic leverage. Jordan's national security cannot be preserved through isolation. Instead, it must be safeguarded through a smart regional strategy—one that balances political independence with effective engagement, diplomatic de-escalation with strategic firmness, and leverages Jordan's assets of soft power and strategic credibility: political legitimacy, regional trust, deep-rooted ties with the Palestinian public, diplomatic flexibility, and the religious custodianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites. Ultimately, the West Bank is not just a 'cause' for Jordan—it is an 'extension,' perhaps even a 'mirror,' of what could unfold in Amman should the situation there deteriorate. The real question, therefore, is not whether Jordan can isolate itself from the West Bank—but what the actual cost of such isolation might be. Can the state afford to gamble with its strategic security, political identity, and symbolic legitimacy in exchange for fragile, short-term stability that may not withstand the next tremor from the west?
Hindustan Times
11-07-2025
- Business
- Hindustan Times
Putin's war in Ukraine may cost him control of the south Caucasus
FOR MOST people, geopolitics is an abstraction. For those living in the south Caucasus, which consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, it is a daily experience. The region between the Black and Caspian seas, Europe and Asia, sits at the crossroads of old empires: Ottoman, Persian and Russian. Situated alongside the belligerents of today's most dangerous wars—Russia's against Ukraine and the Iranian-Israeli conflict—it illustrates like few other regions the rise of middle powers and retreat of big ones. These two wars are redefining the region more consequentially than anything since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which showed its first cracks here in the late 1980s. Mr Putin's war against Ukraine inadvertently led to an end to the hitherto intractable conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is now struggling to break free of Russia's grip and make peace with Turkey. Meanwhile, the conflict between Israel and Iran has boosted the status of oil-rich Azerbaijan, the largest and militarily strongest of the three countries, as an ascending regional power, able to stand up to its bigger neighbours. Backed by Turkey and Israel, which sees it as a strategic ally in its conflict with Iran, Azerbaijan is contemplating joining the Abraham Accords. Only Georgia, once the darling of the West, is moving in the other direction as it slides into an ugly, anti-Western autocracy aligned with Russia. 'We live in a windy place,' says Elchin Amirbayov, a special representative of Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president, of the changes sweeping the region as he looks over the Caspian Sea from a swanky office in Baku, the capital. A whirlwind of high-level diplomacy reflects the change. On July 10th, as The Economist went to press, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan—which have been at war for over 30 years—were meeting for their first-ever direct talks without any mediators or intermediaries. That follows a historic visit last month by Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia's prime minister, to Istanbul, where he was ceremoniously received by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Influential recent visitors to the south Caucasus have included Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump's special representative; Masoud Pezeshkian, the president of Iran; and Kaja Kallas, the EU foreign-policy chief. What happens next will be felt far beyond the region. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would integrate Armenia into the so-called 'middle corridor' for trade and energy that links China and Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia. That is particularly vital for Europe's energy security because Georgia is becoming a less reliable partner. Russia is trying to stop this by putting pressure on the south Caucasian trio, which it still sees as being in its sphere of influence. Yet the speed of Russia's loss of clout is striking, considering the dominant position it had gained five years ago as the result of a 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and its surroundings—Azerbaijani territory that had been occupied by Armenia since the early 1990s (see map). Russia is trying to stop this by putting pressure on the south Caucasian trio, which it still sees as being in its sphere of influence The enclave's occupation, like many of the other 'frozen' conflicts in the former USSR, had been a key element in Russia's influence. Yet when Azerbaijan attacked to take it back in 2020, Russia refused to help defend Armenia, partly in retribution for a popular uprising two years earlier that had swept Mr Pashinyan, a democrat, to power, and partly as a chance to deploy Russian troops elsewhere in the region. Mr Putin allowed Azerbaijan to take some territory around Nagorno-Karabakh, before imposing a ceasefire that allowed Russia to put troops in Azerbaijan under the guise of peacekeepers, and which made Armenia more vulnerable and dependent on it. The armistice agreement also aimed to re-establish transport connections in the region by creating a road and rail link that would cross sovereign Armenian territory to connect the main part of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan's exclave bordering Iran and Turkey. Most importantly, however, Mr Putin imposed a condition that the FSB, Russia's security service, control the corridor. Peace without keepers Yet all these machinations unravelled after Mr Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2023, with Russia distracted by its own war, Azerbaijan recaptured all of Nagorno-Karabakh in less than 24 hours, while Russian peacekeepers stood impotently by. With no pretext for them to stay, Russia was compelled to withdraw them. Buoyed by its victory, Azerbaijan 'sought to deal with Moscow as an equal, not as a subordinate, thus challenging Russia's view of the south Caucasus as its playground', says Zaur Shiriyev, a Baku-based expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank. Azerbaijan has flexed its muscles more of late, making clear that it does not want the FSB to control the corridor between two parts of Azerbaijan. Instead it wants it to be administered by a neutral international body, possibly involving America. Russia's declining influence in the region is a worry for Mr Putin, who has intensified plans to build sanctions-proof transport links through it, such as a rail line to Iran, an important supplier of arms to Russia for its war against Ukraine and for any potential conflict against the West. Soon a new spat ensued involving Azerbaijan's roughly 2m-strong diaspora, when Russian police rounded up some 50 ethnic Azerbaijanis in the Urals, linking them to a 20-year-old unsolved case. Two Azerbaijani men were tortured and beaten to death during the arrests. Azerbaijan retaliated, storming the office of Sputnik, Russia's state propaganda outlet, and detaining two employees it accused of being FSB agents. (Russia denies this.) Its security forces also arrested and beat up eight Russians who had moved to Baku after Russia invaded Ukraine. The leader in Baku cares about human rights as little as Mr Putin does, but the row put a nail into the idea of Russia's military presence in the transport corridor between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The dispute between the two autocrats may subside. But the inherent tensions between an emerging regional power and a former imperial master will not. Azerbaijan, which is armed by both Turkey and Israel, is too powerful for Russia to fight openly. So Mr Putin's best hope to regain influence may be through Armenia, which depends on Russia's energy and food imports, and where Russia still has a military base. What Russia lacks in Armenia, however, is popular support. Having been so overtly betrayed, few Armenians see Mr Putin as an ally. Yet, paradoxically, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the exodus of 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the disputed territory—painful as it was—has also liberated Armenia from a conflict that had shut its border with Turkey, had forced it to outsource its security to Russia and also made its politics hostage to the Nagorno-Karabakh clans that had close ties with Moscow. 'Armenia was de facto a half-colony of Moscow, which treated it as an asset in its relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan,' says Mikayel Zolyan, a historian and analyst in Yerevan, Armenia's capital. Since losing the war with Azerbaijan, Armenia has been trying to break free of Russia's influence and draw closer to the EU. More important, it has intensified attempts to normalise its relationship with Turkey, which had been poisoned by the memory of the genocide of Armenians inflicted by Ottoman forces in 1915-16. Mr Pashinyan has tried to move Armenia beyond its trauma and lament for the loss of its historical homeland, symbolised by mount Ararat (now in Turkey). He has emphasised 'reconciliation over resentment'. Areg Kochinyan, the head of a security think-tank in Yerevan, says Russia was long viewed in Armenia as its only protection against Turkey. Now it is Russia that is viewed as a threat. Reopening the border between Turkey and Armenia, which has been closed since 1993, would cement Turkey's role as the 'rising star in the south Caucasus' and the guarantor of the region's security, says Mr Kochinyan. Turkey, however, seems reluctant to reopen the border without the consent of Azerbaijan, which has also invested heavilyin Turkey. Azerbaijan is stalling and imposing new demands. It wants Armenia to hold a referendum to remove a residual claim to Nagorno-Karabakh from its constitution. And it wants unimpeded access through southern Armenia to Nakhchivan. These demands reveal not only Azerbaijan's deep-rooted mistrust of its former foe, but also its economic insecurity. Despite all its oil riches, Azerbaijan's GDP per person is below that of Armenia, which has none of its natural resources. No time to lose Yet these demands risk scuppering the deal. Armenians would be more likely to agree to a constitutional change after they have seen the benefits of trade and open borders, than before. Armenia wants to synchronise the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border with the agreement that would establish a corridor across its territory, even if this comes before a formal peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Privately Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan since 2003, knows that Mr Pashinyan is the best Armenian partner he could have in trying to strike a peace deal, yet publicly he has not shown him any support. Azerbaijan risks destabilising Armenia, a country a third of its size, by putting unnecessary pressure on it even as it is being menaced by Russia. Mr Putin's government has spared no effort to get rid of Mr Pashinyan, who faces elections next year, one way or another. It is hoping for the repeat of the Georgian scenario, in which Bidzina Ivanishvili, a Moscow-friendly oligarch, and the church, halted the country's Westward trajectory and delivered it into Russia's orbit. In June Mr Pashinyan said his government had foiled an attempted coup planned for September. It arrested Samvel Karapetian, a Russian-Armenian billionaire, on charges of making public calls to seize power in the country illegally, which he denies. Margarita Simonyan, the boss of RT, another Russian propaganda channel, called Mr Pashinyan an 'Antichrist' and traitor to ethnic Armenians such as herself. Russia's malign activity both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia adds urgency to the peace process, says Mr Shiriyev. The window of opportunity is narrow. Missing it could throw the region once again into dangerous geopolitical uncertainty. Correction (July 10th 2025): This article has been amended to clarify that direct talks between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan were the first without any mediators or intermediaries.
Economist
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Economist
Putin's war in Ukraine may cost him control of the south Caucasus
FOR MOST people, geopolitics is an abstraction. For those living in the south Caucasus, which consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, it is a daily experience. The region between the Black and Caspian seas, Europe and Asia, sits at the crossroads of old empires: Ottoman, Persian and Russian. Situated alongside the belligerents of today's most dangerous wars—Russia's against Ukraine and the Iranian-Israeli conflict—it illustrates like few other regions the rise of middle powers and retreat of big ones.
See - Sada Elbalad
09-07-2025
- Business
- See - Sada Elbalad
Gold ETFs See $38 Billion in Inflows in H1 2025 — Best Half-Year Performance Since 2020, Says World Gold Council
Waleed Farouk Gold exchange-traded funds (ETFs) witnessed strong positive inflows totaling $38 billion during the first half of 2025, marking their best half-year performance since H1 2020, according to a report released Tuesday by the World Gold Council. The report noted that the sharp rise in gold prices, coupled with robust inflows, contributed to a 41% increase in total assets under management (AUM) for gold ETFs, reaching a record high of $383 billion by the end of June. Total gold holdings by these funds grew by 397 tonnes during the first half of the year, bringing the total to 3,616 tonnes—the highest month-end level since August 2022. The average daily liquidity of the global gold market reached $329 billion during this period, the highest since 2018. All regions recorded positive inflows in June, with North American and European investors leading the way. North American funds saw their strongest half-year performance in five years, attracting $4.8 billion in June alone—the largest monthly inflow since March—bringing the region's H1 total to $21 billion. The surge in demand was largely driven by escalating geopolitical tensions, particularly the ongoing Iranian-Israeli conflict, prompting investors to seek safe-haven assets, with gold at the forefront. Although the Federal Reserve kept interest rates unchanged in June, persistent concerns over slowing growth and elevated inflation further supported investor appetite for gold. Market forecasts suggest the possibility of three rate cuts by the end of 2025, with two additional cuts expected in 2026. In Asia, despite a slowdown in momentum during May and June, investors recorded record purchases of gold ETFs, accounting for 28% of global net inflows and 9% of global AUM. Meanwhile, in Europe, inflows turned positive in the first half of 2025 for the first time since H2 2022, following a series of consecutive half-year losses, according to the World Gold Council. read more CBE: Deposits in Local Currency Hit EGP 5.25 Trillion Morocco Plans to Spend $1 Billion to Mitigate Drought Effect Gov't Approves Final Version of State Ownership Policy Document Egypt's Economy Expected to Grow 5% by the end of 2022/23- Minister Qatar Agrees to Supply Germany with LNG for 15 Years Business Oil Prices Descend amid Anticipation of Additional US Strategic Petroleum Reserves Business Suez Canal Records $704 Million, Historically Highest Monthly Revenue Business Egypt's Stock Exchange Earns EGP 4.9 Billion on Tuesday Business Wheat delivery season commences on April 15 News Israeli-Linked Hadassah Clinic in Moscow Treats Wounded Iranian IRGC Fighters News China Launches Largest Ever Aircraft Carrier Sports Former Al Zamalek Player Ibrahim Shika Passes away after Long Battle with Cancer Videos & Features Tragedy Overshadows MC Alger Championship Celebration: One Fan Dead, 11 Injured After Stadium Fall Lifestyle Get to Know 2025 Eid Al Adha Prayer Times in Egypt Business Fear & Greed Index Plummets to Lowest Level Ever Recorded amid Global Trade War News "Tensions Escalate: Iran Probes Allegations of Indian Tech Collaboration with Israeli Intelligence" News Flights suspended at Port Sudan Airport after Drone Attacks Videos & Features Video: Trending Lifestyle TikToker Valeria Márquez Shot Dead during Live Stream Technology 50-Year Soviet Spacecraft 'Kosmos 482' Crashes into Indian Ocean
Saba Yemen
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Yemen's Military Support for Gaza, Comprehensive Deterrence Strategy to Exhaust the Enemy
Gaza – SABA: A Palestinian expert praised Yemen's military support for the Gaza Strip, which has moved beyond symbolic solidarity to direct and organized military action in clear support of Gaza's battle against the Israeli enemy, making Yemen an integral part of the struggle alongside Palestine. The Palestinian news agency Shehab quoted Palestinian expert Rami Abu Zubaida as saying that Yemen's sustained military backing for Gaza reflects a fundamental shift in the role of the Yemeni Armed Forces, which no longer limit themselves to political stances or media rhetoric but have instead taken on an impactful operational role. Abu Zubaida stated, "The continuation of Yemen's military support for Gaza through ballistic missile and drone launches—despite the regional preoccupation with the repercussions of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation—demonstrates that the Yemeni Armed Forces have become an active player with independent decision-making and significant offensive capabilities." He pointed out that "Yemeni forces escalated their operations even after the U.S. strike on Iran, showing no retreat in the face of direct Israeli threats." He emphasized that the strikes targeting Ben Gurion Airport (Lod) and other strategic sites deep inside Israeli territory "are not merely emotional gestures of solidarity with Gaza, but part of a comprehensive deterrence strategy aimed at exhausting the enemy and creating an active southern front.' Abu Zubaida argued that the Yemeni Armed Forces have redefined Israel's security from a new geographical perspective, revealing qualitative shifts in offensive positioning across the region—especially given the lack of decisive responses from major powers and their preoccupation with diplomatic calculations. Coinciding with these analyses, the Yemeni Armed Forces announced last night the execution of four military operations, including a missile strike on Ben Gurion Airport (Lod) and three drone attacks targeting Jaffa, Ashkelon, and Umm al-Rashrash (Eilat). Despite direct threats and airstrikes, the Yemeni Armed Forces continue to target Israeli depth with missiles and drones, providing tangible support to Gaza, which has faced a genocidal war by the occupation army since October 7, 2023. The Yemeni Armed Forces had previously declared an aerial blockade on the Israeli occupation entity by targeting Israeli airports, particularly Ben Gurion (Lod)—marking a qualitative shift in the tools of regional resistance against Israeli aggression. It is evident that Yemen has reshaped the priorities of the conflict. Once perceived as a marginal player, it has now become a central actor in the deterrence equation, as observers note. While international decision-making capitals are preoccupied with de-escalation efforts, the Yemeni people choose to continue military and political confrontation, sending a clear message: "Gaza is not alone, and the missiles coming from Yemen are not merely symbolic—they are an essential part of the battle." Whatsapp Telegram Email Print more of (Local)
