Latest news with #Israeli-Turkish
Al-Ahram Weekly
17-04-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Israeli incursions continue in Syria - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The UN Security Council met this week to discuss Israeli incursions into southern Syria against the backdrop of Israeli-Turkish talks on the country After over a week of Israeli bombings, incursions, and civilian bloodshed in Syria, Damascus turned to the UN Security Council to convene an emergency briefing session on the Israeli aggression this week in an appeal backed by Algeria and Somalia as non-Permanent Members. Syria's ambassador to the UN protested against Israel's repeated violations of Syrian sovereignty and called on the international community to compel it to withdraw from newly occupied territories in the Daraa and Quneitra governorates. He also demanded a halt to Israel's plundering of Syrian water resources. Israel has seized control of numerous strategic water sources in Syria, including the Mantara Dam, one of the largest water reserves in the south of the country. Turkey's representative at the Security Council warned that Israel's incursions and territorial expansion into Syria threaten not only civil peace in Syria but also regional peace and security. Algeria's representative added that Israel must withdraw its forces to behind the 1974 armistice line, stressing that the only permissible military presence on the Syrian side of the border is the UN force tasked with monitoring the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. The Russian ambassador to the UN denounced attempts to impose external solutions on Syria during the transitional period, noting that the Israeli assaults were fuelling separatist tendencies and threatening Syrian unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The US ambassador to the UN, siding with Israel, reiterated Israeli fears of Syria turning into a base for terrorists. She said that the US would be judging the new Syrian government by its actions and not its words and welcomed the start of Turkish-Israeli talks on how to avoid a clash between the two countries in Syria. During his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House in Washington on 8 April, US President Donald Trump said that the US would help the Israelis and the Turks resolve any disputes between them in Syria, provided that Israel's demands were reasonable. Netanyahu said he opposed the establishment of Turkish military bases in Syria, claiming that these would pose a threat to Israeli security. Trump, however, seemed to support Turkey's plans to secure the civil peace in Syria, which entails establishing Turkish military bases in central Syria to train the new Syrian Army, stabilise the new system of government, and counter threats to the new order and potential separatist ambitions. At least on the surface, the Israeli plan to partition Syria and perpetuate anarchy and strife there does not have Washington's approval, and this could signal an end to Israel's disruptive role in southern Syria. The green light Turkey received from the US for its post-Al-Assad involvement in Syria is largely attributable to the excellent relationship between Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has put restraints on Israeli military expansionism in Syria and forced Tel Aviv to enter into talks with Ankara on the Syrian issue. The first meeting was held on 10 April, after Netanyahu had returned home from an unusually disappointing visit to Washington. Turkish and Israeli military delegations met in Azerbaijan for technical talks aimed at creating a deconfliction mechanism, along the lines of the one that earlier existed between Russia and Israel to avert a potential clash between the two sides in Syrian airspace. Israel's entry into these talks constitutes a tacit acceptance of Turkish military expansion from Syria's northwestern governorates into the central region, which includes the vicinity of the Syrian capital and borders on southern Syria, where Israel has been wreaking havoc. The US support for Turkey's project in Syria is a key factor behind the renewed stabilisation of the country, and it was also instrumental in accelerating the understanding between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Damascus government over integrating the SDF into new and unified Syrian state structures, including the military and police. Since the official agreement was signed between the two sides on 11 March, a joint administrative body composed of representatives of the Damascus government and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has been formed to manage and protect the Tishrin Dam in Manbij in the Aleppo governorate, a strategic water and energy resource that had been controlled by the SDF. The Kurdish asayish (security) forces have also handed over responsibilities in Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in Aleppo, such as Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, to government security forces. Turkish-backed Syrian militias have also reduced their presence in the Kurdish-majority area of Afrin in favour of government forces. While the details of the understandings between Damascus and the AANES remain unclear, a spirit of rapprochement is gaining momentum. An indication is to be found in the buffer zone that Syrian government forces have established between SDF forces and Turkish-backed militias in the north of the country. Damascus appears to be keen to reframe the Kurdish presence in the north of Syria in a manner that Turkey cannot cite as a threat. The Kurdish political forces are also preparing for a conference where a list of demands will be drawn up to safeguard Kurdish rights. This will be presented to the Damascus government as a frame-of-reference for negotiations over the full integration of Kurdish entities into the unified Syrian state. In the south of the country, the Eighth Brigade, which is close to Moscow, has announced that it will disband, hand over its weapons and equipment to the Syrian Defence Ministry, and place its members under the command of the Syrian Army. The Brigade, led by Ahmed Al-Awda and active in the Daraa region, is the last of the southern militias to do so. Its decision is likely informed by the public outrage caused by the recent murder of a young local resident committed by some of its members who were subsequently surrendered to the government authorities. The Eighth Brigade was one of the paramilitary formations created by Russia in southern Syria following the de-escalation agreements brokered between the former Al-Assad regime and the opposition militias in 2018. It was also one of the Southern Operations Room militias that marched on the capital in tandem with the forces led by Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham, which advanced from the north, culminating in the overthrow of the Al-Assad regime in December last year. Afterwards, it held out against pressures to dissolve itself and integrate its members into the military and security forces under the command of the Syrian Ministry of Defence. The government has now turned its attention to the area of Suweida, in the hope of persuading the local militias there to follow the lead of the SDF and Eighth Brigade. It will then be able to assert its sovereignty over large parts of the country that have long remained outside of the control of the central government in Damascus. For the moment, however, an agreement remains out of reach due to intermittent tensions. Amid the Israeli escalation and the local de-escalation in the south, Syrian Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa took part in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey. The most high-profile event he has attended since the emergency Arab Summit in Cairo earlier this year, this marked another major step towards the international recognition of the new Syrian regime. On the sidelines of the proceedings, Al-Sharaa met with the presidents of Turkey, Kosovo, and Azerbaijan, as well as the Qatari foreign minister and Libyan prime minister. Afterwards, he flew to the UAE to meet with President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who expressed his intention of supporting Damascus in contending with the challenges of reconstruction and transition. The UAE had been among the Arab capitals that has remained sceptical about the nature of the change in Damascus under the country's new leadership. While in the UAE, the Syrian president also met with Syrian businesspeople, urging them to help promote Emirati participation in Syrian reconstruction and economic recovery efforts. However, the ongoing US sanctions, and especially the continued exclusion of the Syrian Central Bank from the SWIFT international payment system, remain a formidable obstacle to such efforts. A high-level Syrian delegation led by the foreign and finance ministers and the Central Bank governor will travel to Washington to attend the forthcoming meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to explore the prospects for securing emergency aid packages to spur Syria's economic recovery. It will be the first time Syria has participated in an international financial event at this level in over 20 years. At the same time, a group of prominent Syrian-American figures are planning to meet with US Congressional leaders to push for the lifting of the US sanctions. Among the most devastating are the sanctions packaged as the Caesar Act, passed by Congress in January 2019 with broad bipartisan support. Repealing this would require a similar majority. What has made these sanctions especially harmful has been their secondary nature, meaning that they also target third parties engaging directly with Syrian government financial and other institutions. For this reason, they severely hampered earthquake relief efforts in 2023, despite their partial lifting at that time. As long as they remain in place, they will continue to hinder investment and the influx of goods and services needed for reconstruction and economic recovery in Syria. * A version of this article appears in print in the 17 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Gulf Insider
14-04-2025
- Politics
- Gulf Insider
Can Israel & Turkiye Manage Their Escalating Rivalry In Syria?
The 'deconfliction mechanism' that they're reportedly discussing would likely be insufficient for resolving their security dilemma and might thus only delay what could be an inevitable clash. Israel and Turkiye held talks in Azerbaijan last week on the creation of a so-called 'deconfliction mechanism' for preventing an accidental conflict between them in Syria. No details were disclosed but it might resemble the one that Israel and Russia agreed upon in September 2015 and which is still in use. Unlike its precedent, however, this new one that's reportedly in the works has much higher stakes given the escalating Israeli-Turkish rivalry in Syria since the fall of the Assad Government last December. Israel never regarded post-Soviet Russia as a threat, and in fact, relations between them are closer than ever under Putin due to his lifelong passionate philo-Semitism. Their 'deconfliction mechanism' therefore wasn't all that difficult to negotiate and maintain since Russia had no ideological or strategic reason to interfere with Israel's regular bombing of the IRGC and Hezbollah in Syria. Israeli-Russian relations sharply contrast with Israeli-Turkish ones, however, in the ways that'll now be explained. Israel and Turkiye's mutual threat perceptions worsened after October 7th. Turkiye believes that Israel's military operation in Gaza is a genocide that could one day be replicated against Muslims everywhere and can only be averted by restoring a regional balance of power. Israel suspects that Turkiye might try to achieve the aforesaid by ordering its Syrian clients to host ideologically aligned Hamas militants who'd be defended from Israeli airstrikes by Turkish air defense systems (even if they're only Syrian-manned). Turkiye abuts Syria so it can bolster its new authorities' military capabilities and those of their shared Hamas allies much easier and quicker than Iran was able to bolster the Assad Government's and their shared 'Resistance Axis' allies'. This represents a much greater national security threat than the one that Israel earlier mitigated via its 'deconfliction' mechanism with Russia, not least because Turkish systems might be used to defend Hamas, while Russian ones were never used to defend the 'Resistance Axis'. The potential downing of an Israeli jet by Turkish air defense systems (even if they're only Syrian-manned) during an anti-Hamas bombing mission in the Arab Republic could spark a regional crisis that they want to avoid for now. Neither can be sure whether the US would take their side against the other, both over that hypothetical incident and whatever they choose to do afterwards, and the worst-case scenario of a direct Israeli-Turkish clash – let alone a conventional war – is fraught with uncertainties. At the same time, such a scenario could become more likely if the newly exacerbated Israeli-Turkish security dilemma in Syria isn't responsibly managed, but the root cause is arguably more connected to regional leadership aspirations than it is to Hamas. Israel and Turkiye are vying to fill the void left by the unexpected expulsion of Iran's on-the-ground influence in Syria, which both envisage achieving via a hybrid approach, but their methods differ. Israel wants to retain its freedom to bomb whoever it wants there together with strengthening the Druze and Kurds in order to facilitate the creation of a decentralized Syria that could be more easily divided-and-ruled for thwarting latent threats. Turkiye wants military bases and Hamas militants in a centralized Syria, which are tangible returns on its 14-year-long investment into regime change there, and to symbolically lead the Ummah by positioning its forces to strike Israel from Syria (even if it never does). Each is convinced that their national security interests can only be ensured by filling the void left by Iran in Syria through their respective abovementioned methods, which they consider to be a zero-sum competition, but one that doesn't have to lead to an accidental war if it's responsibly managed. To that end, they might agree to a compromise whereby Turkiye entrenches itself in the north while Israel maintains freedom of action in the south, but such an arrangement would likely prove unsustainable. Israel would feel uncomfortable with Hamas possibly operating training camps in Turkish-defended northern Syria while Turkiye would feel uncomfortable with Israel holding the Damocles' sword of airstrikes above the head of Syria's new authorities in Damascus. Turkish air defense systems could also secretly be deployed in proximity to the Golan Heights for defending Hamas militants that might launch missiles against Israel from there. A regional crisis might therefore only be delayed instead of averted. As such, whatever imperfect 'deconfliction mechanism' might be agreed to between Israel and Turkiye would be insufficient for responsibly managing their escalating rivalry, thus perpetuating regional instability as they continue vying for leadership in Syria. These dynamics raise the risk of a direct Israeli-Turkish clash that could quickly spiral into a conventional war unless creative diplomacy succeeds in reshaping them. It's here where Syria, Russia, and the US could possibly play positive roles. To explain, Syria wants to replace some of its military equipment that Israel destroyed right after Assad's fall, which Russia could help it do in exchange for privileged economic (reconstruction, resource, etc.) contracts and so long as this is within Israeli-approved limits. Israel doesn't regard post-Soviet Russia as a threat and has a decade-long history of successfully interacting with it in the context of their 'deconfliction mechanism' so Israel would accordingly prefer for Russia to rearm Syria than for Turkiye. This accounts for why Israel is reportedly lobbying the US to keep Russia's bases in Syria as a way for Moscow to help West Jerusalem balance Turkish influence there through these means. Damascus would have to agree, however, but it would do well to go along with the abovementioned arrangement since this is the only realistic pathway for partially rearming, liberating itself from Turkish tutelage, and eliminating the pretext for more Israeli bombings. It's unclear how interested it is in this though. The new authorities came to power due to the leading role that their Turkish patron played in the 14-year-long rolling regime operation in Syria so they're indebted to Ankara and trust it a lot too. These factors reduce the likelihood that they'd agree to rely on Russia instead of Turkiye for (at least partially) rearming, not to mention within Israeli-approved limits that would amount to tacitly subordinating themselves to its interests, though the US could offer phased sanctions removal as an incentive. The problem though is that Turkiye wants tangible returns on its lengthy investment in overthrowing Assad, so it probably won't accept not being able to at least set up a few bases in Syria and secure the right to use its airspace for military purposes, both of which Israel doesn't want Damascus to provide. Just like the US could offer incentives to Syria for agreeing to this, so too could it offer some to Turkiye after Trump volunteered to mediate between it and Israel, though it's unclear what he might propose. All in all, the insight that was shared in this analysis suggests that more than a 'deconfliction' mechanism is required for responsibly managing the escalating Israeli-Turkish rivalry in Syria, with the most effective solution being the proposal that was just forth with regard to Russia. Damascus might not agree, however, while Turkiye could unilaterally establish more bases in Syria even if it does. Trump might therefore try to broker a deal, but if he fails, then an Israeli-Turkish clash might be inevitable.
Daily News Egypt
07-04-2025
- Politics
- Daily News Egypt
Israel expands ground offensive in Gaza in move to divide strip
The Israeli occupation army announced on Saturday the expansion of its ground offensive in the Gaza Strip, launching a new advance along the so-called 'Morag Axis' in the southern part of the enclave. The operation aims to further isolate the cities of Rafah and Khan Younis, a move Palestinian officials have condemned as an attempt to 'sustain occupation and divide Gaza.' This latest escalation comes amid mounting international concern over the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which has endured months of relentless Israeli bombardment and ground operations. The Gaza Health Ministry reported that 26 Palestinians were killed and 113 injured in the past 24 hours alone. Since 18 March, 1,335 people have been killed and 3,297 wounded, bringing the overall death toll since the start of the war to 50,695, with more than 115,338 injured. In a related development, the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, released a video on Saturday showing two Israeli hostages who claimed they were bombed by Israeli forces during a rare nighttime outing. The footage, interpreted as a warning to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, emphasized that 'time is running out' for a hostage deal. Meanwhile, The New York Times published a video retrieved from the phone of a Palestinian paramedic killed by Israeli fire alongside 14 colleagues in Rafah on 23 March. The footage, reportedly shared by a senior UN diplomat, appears to contradict Israeli accounts of the incident. Some of the victims were reportedly shot at close range, with at least one found handcuffed. Prime Minister Netanyahu's office confirmed that he will travel to Washington on Sunday, following an invitation from US President Donald Trump. The two leaders are expected to discuss customs tariffs, hostage negotiations, Israeli-Turkish relations, the threat posed by Iran, and legal issues surrounding Netanyahu's war crimes charges at the International Criminal Court. In a major development on the ground, approximately 300,000 Palestinians have been forced to flee Rafah under intense aerial and ground bombardment. According to Rafah's Mayor Ahmed Al-Soufi, 90% of the city has been destroyed since Israel's initial incursion in early May 2024, including residential areas, infrastructure, public facilities, and medical services.
Gulf Insider
03-03-2025
- Politics
- Gulf Insider
Why's Israel Reportedly Lobbying The US To Keep Russia's Bases In Syria?
Reuters cited unnamed sources to report that Israel is lobbying the US to keep Russia's bases in Syria as part of a plan to counterbalance Turkish influence there. According to them, Israel fears that Hamas might relocate to Syria and then operate from there under Turkish protection, which could drastically worsen Israeli-Turkish tensions. They didn't explain how Russia's continued military presence in Syria could avert that scenario, however, nor how the US could convince Syria not to kick them out either. Nevertheless, the little that was revealed sheds light on what Israel might have in mind, namely an informal trilateral arrangement centered on their shared interests in preventing Turkiye from dominating post-Assad Syria. Should they fail, then Russia fears that Turkiye could hold its bases there hostage as part of some geopolitical blackmail scheme; Israel fears Hamas establishing itself there with Turkish protection; and the US fears the preceding scenario leading to a serious crisis within its allied network. The first step towards protecting their corresponding interests is to ensure that Syria can rely on Russia as an economic and military counterbalance to Turkiye, which necessitates the US agreeing to let Russia maintain its military presence there. The prerequisite is getting the US to understand Russia's crucial role in this respect, ergo the reported Israeli lobbying, after which the US would then have to convey this to Syria. That could take the form of assuring it that sanctions relief isn't conditional on kicking Russia out. An unnamed high-ranking EU official told reporters in late January that 'We have already informed the new authorities in Syria that the normalization process hinges on removing all manner of foreign presence, be it military or some other tentacles. Three countries are present there, and Russia is one of them. So yes, we keep pressing them on this matter.' In spite of that, the EU just lifted some sanctions on energy, transport, and banking, thus suggesting that its position has unofficially changed since then. This volte-face is either due to Israeli lobbying and/or US pressure, the first of which would show that the EU is still doing regional favors for Israel even after harshly criticizing its conduct in Gaza while the second would show that the transatlantic rift over Ukraine isn't as serious as many thought. After all, it's a major concession on the EU's part to lift some sanctions on Syria even though Russia still retains its two bases there that the bloc demanded be removed as a condition for this, hence the aforesaid speculation. Click here to read more Also read: Israel Threatens Military Intervention In Damascus As Internal Fighting Engulfs Suburb
