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Rise in Al Qaeda attacks revives spectre of West African caliphate
Rise in Al Qaeda attacks revives spectre of West African caliphate

Straits Times

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • Straits Times

Rise in Al Qaeda attacks revives spectre of West African caliphate

Find out what's new on ST website and app. FILE PHOTO: Iyad Ag Ghali (R), the leader of Ansar Dine, an al Qaeda-linked Islamist group in northern Mali, meets with Burkina Faso foreign minister Djibril Bassole in Kidal, northern Mali, August 7, 2012. Ag Ghaly has positioned himself as the leader of a new Islamist coalition in West Africa, JNIM, formed in 2017. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo DAKAR - At dawn on June 1, gunfire shattered the stillness of Mali's military base in Boulkessi. Waves of jihadist insurgents from an al-Qaeda-linked group stormed the camp, catching newly deployed soldiers off guard. Some troops, unfamiliar with the base, which lies near Mali's southern border with Burkina Faso, scrambled to find cover while others fled into the arid brush, according to one soldier, who spoke to survivors of the attack. The soldier, who had completed a tour at the camp a week before, requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to journalists. Hours after the attack, videos circulated online showing jubilant fighters from Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), stepping over the bodies of fallen soldiers. JNIM claimed it had killed more than 100 troops and showed around 20 soldiers who said they were captured at the base. Reuters was unable to verify the claims independently. The Boulkessi assault was one of more than a dozen deadly attacks by JNIM on military outposts and towns across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May and June. The insurgents claimed to have killed more than 400 soldiers in those attacks. Mali's military government has not commented on the toll. Reuters spoke to five analysts, a security expert and a community leader in the region who said the surge in violence reflects a strategic shift by JNIM - a group founded by a veteran Islamist who rose to prominence by briefly seizing northern Mali in 2012. Top stories Swipe. Select. Stay informed. Singapore Fatal abuse of Myanmar maid in Bishan: Traffic Police officer sentenced to 10 years' jail Singapore Man charged over manufacturing DIY Kpods at Yishun home; first such case in Singapore Singapore HSA launches anti-vaping checks near 5 institutes of higher learning Singapore $7,000 fine for eatery chain involved in ByteDance food poisoning case Singapore Bicycle wheel-inspired care model used to improve trauma outcomes in central S'pore Life 11 new entries on Singapore's Bib Gourmand list, including three re-entries at Old Airport Road Singapore NEA monitoring E. coli at Sentosa beaches after elevated bacteria levels delay World Aquatics events Singapore 15 under police probe for sharing Singpass credentials used in scams JNIM is moving from rural guerrilla tactics to a campaign aimed at controlling territory around urban centres and asserting political dominance in the Sahel, they said. "The recent attacks point a concrete effort to encircle Sahelian capitals, aiming for a parallel state stretching from western Mali to southern Niger and northern Benin," said Mucahid Durmaz, senior Africa analyst at risk intelligence group Verisk Maplecroft. Attacks by JNIM left more 850 people dead across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May, a rise from the average rate of killings of around 600 in previous months, according to data from U.S. crisis-monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). The surge in attacks in May and June marks one of the deadliest periods in the Sahel's recent history and underscores the threat posed by jihadist groups at a time when regional governments are estranged from former Western military allies, analysts say. More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel has caused mass displacement and economic collapse. The violence has steadily spread towards coastal West Africa, straining regional stability and fuelling migration toward Europe. On July 1, JNIM carried out simultaneous attacks on army camps and positions in seven towns in central and western Mali, according to an army statement and claims by the insurgents. The army said 80 militants were killed. Reuters was unable to reach JNIM for comment. The group releases its statements and videos on social media, and has no media spokesperson. Mali's army did not respond to Reuters requests for comments about the wave of JNIM attacks. It said in a statement after the Boulkessi assault that troops responded "vigorously" before retreating. "Many soldiers fought, some to their last breath," the statement said. STRATEGIC PIVOT JNIM's leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, has been instrumental in its transformation. A former rebel leader in Mali's Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s, Ag Ghaly led the fundamentalist group Ansar Dine that was part of a coalition of groups that briefly occupied northern Mali in 2012. The militants imposed a harsh version of sharia law - banning music, imposing mutilations as punishment for crimes, and holding public executions and floggings. Thousands fled, and cultural sites were destroyed, leaving lasting trauma in the region before the rebels were driven out by a French military intervention the following year. Ag Ghaly is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, who seized power between 2020 and 2023 on the back of the prolonged insurgencies, promise to restore security before returning their countries to democratic rule. They've cut ties with Western nations and expelled their forces, blaming them for failing to end the insurgencies and turning instead to Russia for military support. After deploying mercenaries, the Russians have also suffered setbacks and been unable to contain the uprisings. In Burkina Faso — a country about half the size of France — militants exert influence or control over an estimated 60% of the territory, according to ACLED. Ag Ghaly, who has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, has positioned himself as the leader of a jihadist coalition that includes al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina after they merged into JNIM in 2017. A Western security source, who requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak publicly, told Reuters that JNIM has emerged as the region's strongest militant group, with an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters. Ag Ghaly's goal, the analysts said, is to impose Islamic rule across the Sahel and extend its influence to coastal West Africa, a region twice the size of Western Europe, with a population of around 430 million people, many of them Christian. In a rare video released in December 2023, he denounced the military governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and called on Muslims to mobilize against them and their Russian allies. Ag Ghaly could not be reached for comment. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger did not respond to requests for comment. SOPHISTICATED TACTICS, LOCAL OUTREACH JNIM's battlefield tactics have grown increasingly sophisticated, including the use of anti-aircraft weapons and drones for surveillance and precision strikes, Durmaz said. It has amassed substantial resources, meanwhile, through raids, cattle rustling, hijacking of goods, kidnappings and taxes on local communities, the five analysts said. While it has not appointed local administrators in areas under its control, JNIM has imposed a tax known as 'Zakat' for protection, according to two residents and a former militia fighter. They have quelled some inter-communal conflicts and imposed a form of Sharia law, requiring women to wear veils and men to grow beards. But they have refrained from severe punishments, such as amputating the hands of thieves. Heni Nsaibia, Senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, described its recent activity as a "step change". He said JNIM seizing Burkina Faso's northern provincial capital Djibo, a town of over 60,000 people, on May 11 and Diapaga, an eastern provincial capital of around 15,000, two days later was unprecedented. "In Djibo they stayed for 11 hours or plus. In Diapaga they remained for two-three days even. And that is very much something that we haven't seen before," Nsaibia said. According to Nsaibia, the group has captured an estimated $3 million worth of munitions in Djibo alone. The repeated attacks have left the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso unsettled, and idea of JNIM taking over Bamako or Ouagadougou, once considered far-fetched, is a plausible threat, according to Nsaibia. JNIM's outreach to marginalized communities, particularly the Fulani, a widely dispersed pastoralist group, has been central to recruitment, the analysts said. "JNIM is advancing its narrative as a defender of marginalised communities," Durmaz said. "They are not just fighting for territory — they're fighting for legitimacy." Fulani have increasingly found themselves targeted by authorities across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso under the banner of counter-terrorism, a Fulani community leader told Reuters, requesting anonymity for safety reasons. While not all Fulani are involved in armed groups, their presence is significant among insurgents in rural areas, driven more by frustration and lack of opportunity than ideology, the leader said. JNIM's ambitions now stretch beyond the Sahel. The group has expanded its operations into northern Benin and Togo, and are threatening Gulf of Guinea states which they use as a rear base, according to analysts. Both countries have deployed more security forces in the northern regions as insurgents ramp up attacks. "Togo and Benin are the most vulnerable due to their limited counterterrorism capabilities, existing local grievances in their northern regions, and porous borders with Burkina Faso," Durmaz said. REUTERS

How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups
How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups

Yahoo

time07-07-2025

  • Politics
  • Yahoo

How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the main group behind a surge in militant jihadist attacks sweeping across several West African nations, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. On 1 July, the group said it had carried out a major coordinated attack on seven military locations in western Mali, including near the borders with Senegal and Mauritania. There is growing concern about the impact JNIM could have on the stability of the region. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have struggled to contain the violence – and this is one of the factors that contributed to several military coups in the three Sahel countries over the last five years. But like the civilian governments they replaced, the juntas are seemingly unable to stem the growing jihadist threat, especially from JNIM. JNIM has become one of Africa's deadliest jihadist groups within the space of just a few years. It was formed in Mali in 2017, as a coalition of five jihadist militant groups: Ansar Dine Katibat Macina Al-Mourabitoun Ansar al-Islam The Sahara branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb These groups started collaborating after the French military pushed back several jihadist and separatist organisations that were operating in northern Mali in 2012. Eventually, the leaders of the groups came together to create JNIM. In recent years, they have expanded geographically, establishing new areas of operation. JNIM is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Malian diplomat who belongs to the Tuareg ethnic group. He was at the helm of the Tuareg uprising against the Malian government in 2012 which sought to establish an independent state for the Tuareg people called Azawad. Deputy leader Amadou Koufa is from the Fulani community. Analysts believe the central leadership helps guide local branches which operate across the Sahel region of West Africa. While it is difficult to know exactly how many fighters there are in JNIM's ranks, or how many have recently been recruited, experts suggest it could be several thousand - mostly young men and boys who lack other economic opportunities in one of the poorest regions in the world. The group rejects the authority of the Sahel governments, seeking to impose its strict interpretation of Islam and Sharia in the areas where it operates. Analysts say that in some areas, JNIM has been known to impose strict dress codes, implement bans against music and smoking, order men to grow beards and prevent women from being in public spaces alone. This version of Islam can be at odds with the religion as practised by local communities, says Yvan Guichaoua, a senior researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies. "These practices are clearly breaking from established practices and certainly not very popular," he says. "But whether it's attractive or not, also depends on what the state is able to deliver, and there has been a lot of disappointment in what the state has been doing for the past years." Disillusionment with the secular justice system can make the introduction of Sharia courts appealing to some. After its beginnings in central and northern Mali, JNIM rapidly expanded its reach. While its strongholds are in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, JNIM has also carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and at one point Ivory Coast. It is now operational throughout Mali and 11 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions, according to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc), a civil society organisation. In the last year, Burkina Faso has become the epicentre of the group's activities – predominately the northern and eastern border regions. This is, in part, because of divisions and defections in the country's military as well as how deeply embedded the militants are in the local communities, according to Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst for security consultancy firm Control Risk. "JNIM have an ability to embed in local communities or to be able to use local grievances as a means of recruiting or winning sympathy towards their cause," she told the BBC. In recent months violent incidents have spiked in Burkina Faso to previously unseen levels, according to analysis from BBC Monitoring's jihadist media team. Major attacks have also recently been carried out in Mali, Niger and Benin. In the first half of 2025, JNIM said it carried out over 280 attacks in Burkina Faso – double the number for the same period in 2024, according to data verified by the BBC. The group has claimed to have killed almost 1,000 people across the Sahel since April, most of them members of the security force or militias fighting alongside government forces, according to BBC Monitoring data. Almost 800 of these have been in Burkina Faso alone. Casualties in Mali were the next highest (117) and Benin (74). "The frequency of attacks in June is just unheard of so far," says Mr Guichaoua. "They have really stepped up their activities in the past weeks." The militants use a variety of tactics designed to cause maximum disruption, Ms Ochieng explains. "They plant IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on key roads, and have long-range capabilities. "They [also] target security forces in military bases, so a lot of their weapons come from that. They have also attacked civilians - in instances where communities are perceived to be cooperating with the government." Starlink - a company owned by Elon Musk which provides internet via satellites - has also been exploited by groups like JNIM to enhance their capabilities, according to a recent report by Gi-Toc. The company provides high-speed internet where regular mobile networks are unavailable or unreliable. Militant groups smuggle Starlink devices into the country along well-established contraband routes, G-toch says. "Starlink has made it much easier for [militant groups] to plan and execute attacks, share intelligence, recruit members, carry out financial transactions and maintain contacts with their commanders even during active conflict," an analyst from Gi-Toc told the BBC's Focus on Africa podcast. The BBC has contacted Starlink for comment. The group has multiple sources of income. At one time in Mali, funds were raised through kidnapping foreigners for ransom but few remain in the country because of the deteriorating security situation. Cattle-rustling has now become a major source of income, according to an analyst from Gi-Toc. They did not want to be named as it could risk their safety in Mali. "Mali is a big exporter of cattle so it's easy for them to steal animals and sell them," the analyst said. Research by Gi-Toc shows that in one year in just one district of Mali, JNIM made $770,000 (£570,000) from livestock. Based on this figure, JNIM could be earning millions of dollars from cattle theft. JNIM also imposes various taxes, according to experts. "They tax the gold, but basically tax anything that goes through their territory, whether that's listed goods or illicit goods," Gi-Toc says. "There can be an extortion type of tax, where JNIM tell citizens they need to pay in return for protection." The militants have also been known to set up blockades, at which people must pay to leave and enter the area, according to Ms Ochieng. France's armed forces were on the ground supporting the government in Mali for almost a decade - with over 4,000 troops stationed across the Sahel region fighting groups that went on to form JNIM, as well as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. While they had some initial success in 2013 and 2014, reclaiming territory from the militants and killing several senior commanders, this did not stop JNIM's growth after it was formed. "Counterinsurgency efforts have failed so far because of this idea that JNIM can be beaten militarily, but it is only through negotiation that the group will end," Gi-Toc's analyst suggested. In 2014, Sahelian countries banded together to form the G5 Sahel Task Force, a 5,000-strong group of international troops. However, over the past couple of years, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn, undermining the task force's ability to tackle the insurgency. Minusma, the UN peacekeeping force – while not a counter-insurgency effort – was also in Mali for a decade to support efforts, however it left the country at the end of 2024. Military coups took place in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. Poor governance under the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger subsequently has allowed militant groups like JNIM to flourish, according to analysts. These juntas were swift to tell French troops to leave, replacing them with Russian support and a joint force formed by the three Sahelian countries. Though Russian paramilitary group Wagner has withdrawn its troops from Mali entirely, Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in place. In Burkina Faso, a so-called "volunteer" army, launched in 2020 before the military takeover, is one strategy being used to fight militants. Junta leader Ibrahim Traoré has said he wants to recruit 50,000 fighters. But experts say many of these volunteers are conscripted by force. Inadequate training means they often suffer heavy casualties. They are also often a target for JNIM attacks. The military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali have also been accused by human rights organisations of committing atrocities against civilians, particularly ethnic Fulanis. Human rights group say the government often conflates the Fulani community with Islamist armed groups, which has furthered hampered peace efforts. Between January 2024 and March 2025, the military government and their Russian allies were responsible for 1,486 civilian casualties in Mali, according to Gi-Toc. This extreme violence against civilians has generated anger towards the government, fuelling further recruitment for JNIM. How 'blood gold' is fuelling conflict in West Africa 'I thought I would die' - freed captive tells BBC of life in jihadist base Why Burkina Faso's junta leader has captured hearts and minds The region with more 'terror deaths' than rest of world combined Go to for more news from the African continent. Follow us on Twitter @BBCAfrica, on Facebook at BBC Africa or on Instagram at bbcafrica Focus on Africa This Is Africa

JNIM in Mali: How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups
JNIM in Mali: How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups

BBC News

time07-07-2025

  • Politics
  • BBC News

JNIM in Mali: How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa's deadliest militant groups

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the main group behind a surge in militant jihadist attacks sweeping across several West African nations, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and 1 July, the group said it had carried out a major coordinated attack on seven military locations in western Mali, including near the borders with Senegal and is growing concern about the impact JNIM could have on the stability of the Faso, Mali and Niger have struggled to contain the violence – and this is one of the factors that contributed to several military coups in the three Sahel countries over the last five like the civilian governments they replaced, the juntas are seemingly unable to stem the growing jihadist threat, especially from JNIM. What is JNIM? JNIM has become one of Africa's deadliest jihadist groups within the space of just a few was formed in Mali in 2017, as a coalition of five jihadist militant groups:Ansar DineKatibat MacinaAl-MourabitounAnsar al-IslamThe Sahara branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic MaghrebThese groups started collaborating after the French military pushed back several jihadist and separatist organisations that were operating in northern Mali in 2012. Eventually, the leaders of the groups came together to create JNIM. In recent years, they have expanded geographically, establishing new areas of is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Malian diplomat who belongs to the Tuareg ethnic group. He was at the helm of the Tuareg uprising against the Malian government in 2012 which sought to establish an independent state for the Tuareg people called Azawad. Deputy leader Amadou Koufa is from the Fulani believe the central leadership helps guide local branches which operate across the Sahel region of West it is difficult to know exactly how many fighters there are in JNIM's ranks, or how many have recently been recruited, experts suggest it could be several thousand - mostly young men and boys who lack other economic opportunities in one of the poorest regions in the world. What does JNIM want? The group rejects the authority of the Sahel governments, seeking to impose its strict interpretation of Islam and Sharia in the areas where it say that in some areas, JNIM has been known to impose strict dress codes, implement bans against music and smoking, order men to grow beards and prevent women from being in public spaces version of Islam can be at odds with the religion as practised by local communities, says Yvan Guichaoua, a senior researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies."These practices are clearly breaking from established practices and certainly not very popular," he says."But whether it's attractive or not, also depends on what the state is able to deliver, and there has been a lot of disappointment in what the state has been doing for the past years."Disillusionment with the secular justice system can make the introduction of Sharia courts appealing to some. Where does JNIM operate? After its beginnings in central and northern Mali, JNIM rapidly expanded its reach. While its strongholds are in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, JNIM has also carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and at one point Ivory is now operational throughout Mali and 11 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions, according to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc), a civil society the last year, Burkina Faso has become the epicentre of the group's activities – predominately the northern and eastern border regions. This is, in part, because of divisions and defections in the country's military as well as how deeply embedded the militants are in the local communities, according to Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst for security consultancy firm Control Risk."JNIM have an ability to embed in local communities or to be able to use local grievances as a means of recruiting or winning sympathy towards their cause," she told the BBC. Are JNIM attacks increasing in scale? In recent months violent incidents have spiked in Burkina Faso to previously unseen levels, according to analysis from BBC Monitoring's jihadist media team. Major attacks have also recently been carried out in Mali, Niger and the first half of 2025, JNIM said it carried out over 280 attacks in Burkina Faso – double the number for the same period in 2024, according to data verified by the group has claimed to have killed almost 1,000 people across the Sahel since April, most of them members of the security force or militias fighting alongside government forces, according to BBC Monitoring 800 of these have been in Burkina Faso alone. Casualties in Mali were the next highest (117) and Benin (74)."The frequency of attacks in June is just unheard of so far," says Mr Guichaoua. "They have really stepped up their activities in the past weeks."The militants use a variety of tactics designed to cause maximum disruption, Ms Ochieng explains."They plant IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on key roads, and have long-range capabilities."They [also] target security forces in military bases, so a lot of their weapons come from that. They have also attacked civilians - in instances where communities are perceived to be cooperating with the government."Starlink - a company owned by Elon Musk which provides internet via satellites - has also been exploited by groups like JNIM to enhance their capabilities, according to a recent report by Gi-Toc. The company provides high-speed internet where regular mobile networks are unavailable or unreliable. Militant groups smuggle Starlink devices into the country along well-established contraband routes, G-toch says."Starlink has made it much easier for [militant groups] to plan and execute attacks, share intelligence, recruit members, carry out financial transactions and maintain contacts with their commanders even during active conflict," an analyst from Gi-Toc told the BBC's Focus on Africa BBC has contacted Starlink for comment. How is JNIM funded? The group has multiple sources of one time in Mali, funds were raised through kidnapping foreigners for ransom but few remain in the country because of the deteriorating security has now become a major source of income, according to an analyst from Gi-Toc. They did not want to be named as it could risk their safety in Mali."Mali is a big exporter of cattle so it's easy for them to steal animals and sell them," the analyst by Gi-Toc shows that in one year in just one district of Mali, JNIM made $770,000 (£570,000) from livestock. Based on this figure, JNIM could be earning millions of dollars from cattle also imposes various taxes, according to experts. "They tax the gold, but basically tax anything that goes through their territory, whether that's listed goods or illicit goods," Gi-Toc says. "There can be an extortion type of tax, where JNIM tell citizens they need to pay in return for protection."The militants have also been known to set up blockades, at which people must pay to leave and enter the area, according to Ms Ochieng. What about efforts to fight them? France's armed forces were on the ground supporting the government in Mali for almost a decade - with over 4,000 troops stationed across the Sahel region fighting groups that went on to form JNIM, as well as Islamic State in the Greater they had some initial success in 2013 and 2014, reclaiming territory from the militants and killing several senior commanders, this did not stop JNIM's growth after it was formed."Counterinsurgency efforts have failed so far because of this idea that JNIM can be beaten militarily, but it is only through negotiation that the group will end," Gi-Toc's analyst 2014, Sahelian countries banded together to form the G5 Sahel Task Force, a 5,000-strong group of international troops. However, over the past couple of years, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn, undermining the task force's ability to tackle the the UN peacekeeping force – while not a counter-insurgency effort – was also in Mali for a decade to support efforts, however it left the country at the end of 2024. What impact have military coups had on JNIM? Military coups took place in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in governance under the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger subsequently has allowed militant groups like JNIM to flourish, according to juntas were swift to tell French troops to leave, replacing them with Russian support and a joint force formed by the three Sahelian Russian paramilitary group Wagner has withdrawn its troops from Mali entirely, Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in Burkina Faso, a so-called "volunteer" army, launched in 2020 before the military takeover, is one strategy being used to fight militants. Junta leader Ibrahim Traoré has said he wants to recruit 50,000 experts say many of these volunteers are conscripted by force. Inadequate training means they often suffer heavy casualties. They are also often a target for JNIM military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali have also been accused by human rights organisations of committing atrocities against civilians, particularly ethnic Fulanis. Human rights group say the government often conflates the Fulani community with Islamist armed groups, which has furthered hampered peace January 2024 and March 2025, the military government and their Russian allies were responsible for 1,486 civilian casualties in Mali, according to extreme violence against civilians has generated anger towards the government, fuelling further recruitment for JNIM. You may also be interested in: How 'blood gold' is fuelling conflict in West Africa'I thought I would die' - freed captive tells BBC of life in jihadist baseWhy Burkina Faso's junta leader has captured hearts and minds The region with more 'terror deaths' than rest of world combined Go to for more news from the African us on Twitter @BBCAfrica, on Facebook at BBC Africa or on Instagram at bbcafrica

How JNIM wey get link wit al-Qaeda take turn one of di most deadly terror groups for Africa
How JNIM wey get link wit al-Qaeda take turn one of di most deadly terror groups for Africa

BBC News

time14-06-2025

  • Politics
  • BBC News

How JNIM wey get link wit al-Qaeda take turn one of di most deadly terror groups for Africa

Surging jihadist violence wey dey sweep across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger dey make pipo worry say di Sahel region for West Africa fit dey destabilised. One umbrella group wey get link wit al-Qaeda dey claim say na dem do most of di attacks but who dem be and wetin dem want? Who be JNIM? Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) don turn one of di most deadly jihadist groups for Africa just within small time. Dem form am for Mali, and now JNIM dey operate across di Sahel, one big desert region wey cover 10 kontris from di west coast of Africa go reach di east side. Pipo believe say na dem cause more dan half of all di political violence wey bin happun for Central Sahel from March 2017 reach September 2023. For 2024, about 19% of all terrorist attacks for di whole world and more dan half of all deaths wey relate to terrorism happun for di Sahel, according to di 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), wey di Institute for Economics and Peace publish. E dey hard to know how many fighters dey for JNIM or how many dem just recruit, experts dey tok say e fit reach thousands – mostly young, local men. How dem form JNIM and wetin dem want? Dem create JNIM for 2017 – na wen four Islamist militant groups wey dey operate for North Africa and Sahel join body: Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina, al-Mourabitoun and di Sahara branch of Al-Qaeda in di Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Na Iyad Ag Ghali, one former Malian diplomat wey come from di mostly Muslim Tuareg ethnic group, dey lead di group. E later lead Tuareg uprisings against Malian goment for 2012, wey wan create independent state for northern Mali. Dem still get one deputy leader, Amadou Koufa, wey come from di Fulani community. Analysts believe say dis central leadership dey help guide local branches of JNIM wey extend across di Sahel - network wey dey known as di 'katibat'. JNIM dey post text and video for dia social media accounts for ChirpWire and Telegram through one media arm wey dem dey call al-Zallaqa. Di group tok say dem wan replace goment wit conservative Islamic law and governance. Dem don also tok bifor say make foreign troops comot from Mali. Wia dem dey operate? JNIM start for central Mali but dem don expand fast, dey claim say na dem do attacks for Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Niger and Ivory Coast. Di group dey active now for all di regions of Mali and 11 out of 13 regions for Burkina Faso, na wetin Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) tok. Burkina Faso don turn di main place wia di group dey operate – mostly for di northern and eastern border areas. From January-May 2025, JNIM claim say dem do over 240 attacks – double wetin dem do for same time for 2024, according to data wey BBC verify. JNIM dey show say dem dey for big parts of Mali and Burkina Faso. Members of di group dey collect 'tax' from villages – dem dey call am zakat – dem dey force pipo to wear certain clothes and dem dey create roadblocks wey pipo go pay bifor dem fit enta or comot, na wetin Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst for Control Risk, one global consultancy firm tok. Dis kain Islam fit no match di one wey local pipo dey practice, na wetin Yvan Guichaoua, senior researcher for Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, tok. "Dis kain practice no follow wetin pipo don dey do bifor and e no too popular," im tok. "But whether pipo like am or not, e still depend on wetin goment fit provide, and many pipo don dey disappointed wit wetin goment don dey do for years." JNIM attacks dey increase? Di group do more dan 3000 attacks for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger last year, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) tok. Ochieng explain say di group dey use different tactics to cause wahala. "Dem dey plant IEDs (improved explosive devices) for important roads, and dem get long-range power." "Dem (still) dey attack security forces for military bases, so many of di weapons wey dem get na from dia. Dem don also attack civilians – especially wen dem tink say di community dey work wit goment," she add. Attacks don turn more violent and dey happun more often for di past few months. Di group tok say na dem do one big attack for June for one Malian town wey dem dey call Boulikessi, wia 30 soldiers die, Reuters sources tok. Reuters report say more dan 400 soldiers don die from insurgents since di start of May for military bases and towns across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, wey don shake di already unstable region wey dey see coups. "Di number of attacks for last week na somtin we never see bifor," Guichaoua tok. "Dem don really increase wetin dem dey do recently." Even though press freedom don reduce and many media houses – newspapers and TV stations – don close afta di coups for Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, e mean say di number of attacks wey dem fit trace to militant groups fit even pass wetin we know. Military coups happun for Niger for 2023, Burkina Faso for 2022 and Mali for 2020. How JNIM dey get money? JNIM dey get money from different ways. Bifor, dem dey kidnap foreign pipo and ask for ransom and dem dey collect money from pipo wey dey pass through routes for minerals and animals. "Cattle-rustling na one big way wey JNIM dey get money," one GI-TOC analyst wey tok to BBC yarn. Di analyst no gree make dem call im name becos e fit put am for danger. "Mali dey export plenty cattle so e easy for dem to thief animals and sell." GI-TOC research show say for just one year and one district, JNIM make about FCFA 440 million ($768,000 USD). If we use dis figure, JNIM fit dey make millions from cattle theft. "Gold mines na anoda big source of money, dem dey collect tax from pipo wey dey enta and comot from dia area." U.S Africa Command oga Gen. Michael Langley tell US reporters last week say e believe say one of JNIM main goals na to control di coastline, so dat "dem fit fund dia operations through smuggling, human-trafficking and arms trade." Wetin dey happun wit counter-insurgency? France army bin dey help Mali goment for almost 10 years wit ova 4,000 soldiers wey dey fight groups like JNIM for di Sahel. Even though dem get some success for 2013 and 2014, recova land from jihadist groups and kill some big commanders, e be like say dem no fit stop JNIM growth. "Counter-insurgency neva work becos pipo dey tink say dem fit beat JNIM wit force, but na only negotiation fit end di group," GI-TOC analyst tok. Few years ago, Sahel kontris join bodi form G5 Sahel Task Force, one 5000-man international troop. But for di past few years, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger don comot, wey don make di task force weak to fight di insurgency. MINUSMA, di United Nations peacekeeping force – even though no be anti-terrorism force – bin dey Mali for 10 years to help, but dem comot for di kontri end of 2024. Wetin military coups cause for JNIM? Reports show say deaths for Sahel don triple since 2020, wen di first military coup happun for Mali. Bad governance under di military rulers for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger don make militant groups like JNIM grow, na wetin analysts tok. Di juntas quick tell French soldiers make dem comot, and dem replace dem wit Russian support and one joint force wey di three Sahel kontris form. But now, Russian paramilitary group wey dem dey call Wagner don dey pull all dia soldiers comot from Mali. For Burkina Faso, one army wey dem dey call 'volunteer' na one way wey dem dey use fight militants. Di president, Ibrahim Traore, don tok say e wan recruit 50,000 fighters. But experts dey tok say many of dis volunteers na by force dem take carry dem, and becos dem no train well, dem dey suffer plenty casualties. Di military juntas demsefs don still get accusation from human rights groups say dem dey do bad tins to civilians, especially pipo from Fulani community, say dem dey work wit militia groups, wey dey prevent peace efforts. From January 2024 reach March 2025, na state forces and dia Russian partners bin cause 1486 civilian deaths for Mali, almost five times wetin JNIM do, GI-TOC tok. Dis kain serious violence against civilians don make pipo vex for goment, and e dey make more pipo join JNIM. As di kontris dey struggle to stop di insurgency, pipo dey fear say JNIM go continue to spread across all di Sahel.

Who are the militants using the Sahel as a hunting ground?
Who are the militants using the Sahel as a hunting ground?

Arab News

time26-02-2025

  • Politics
  • Arab News

Who are the militants using the Sahel as a hunting ground?

ABIDJAN: For well over a decade, terrorist violence has plagued the Sahel, a semi-arid belt stretching along the Sahara desert's southern rim from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Tens of thousands of people have been killed in violence that began in Mali in 2012, spread to Burkina Faso and Niger, and now threatens coastal west African states. Two militant organizations dominate the central Sahelian region that includes Mali, Niger and Burkina: the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and the Islamic State — Sahel Province or ISSP. Affiliated to Al-Qaeda, the JNIM was founded in 2017 after militant groups merged under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg chief from the northern Malian town of Kidal. The rival ISSP is linked to the Daesh group and was created two years earlier by Moroccan terrorist Adnan Abou Walid Al-Sahraoui, who was killed in Mali in 2021 by a French military force. Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad — in the Lake Chad Basin — are battling two other jihadist groups: Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State in West Africa or ISWAP. The groups mainly roam rural areas. 'Controlling the towns is very difficult for them,' International Crisis Group researcher Ibrahim Yahaya said. From their camps in the bush, they use intimidation tactics such as abduction and killings to menace villagers and organize attacks on towns, Yahaya said. The JNIM has a wide presence in Mali, Niger and Burkina and is increasingly extending its influence toward the northern parts of the Gulf of Guinea countries. 'The group plans to make new areas of instability on the borders of Burkina Faso with Benin and Togo,' Seidik Abba, head of the International Center of Reflection and Studies on the Sahel, said. The ISSP is concentrated in the border area encompassing Mali, Burkina and Niger. The group 'struggles to expand' because of the JNIM which is 'militarily stronger' and has more local support, Liam Karr, analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, said. Their ambitions differ. The ISSP follows the hard line of the Daesh group, using indiscriminate violence against civilians and soldiers with the aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Sahel under Shariah law. The JNIM also carries out deadly attacks but seeks local footholds by presenting itself as the defender of marginalized communities. 'In the JNIM narrative, there is the reference to the Islamic ideology, but linked to forms of local demands,' said Bakary Sambe, director of the Timbuktu Institute in Dakar. 'While Daesh has remained in a form of global jihad that is failing to take root in local communities,' he added. Daesh frequently broadcasts videos showing violence committed by security forces and their allies in order to legitimize its discourse, a UN Security Council report said this month. There is often violent rivalry between the groups. The militant groups exploit social and ethnic tensions to enlist fighters. The JNIM, initially composed of Fulani, a community of mainly semi-nomadic herders, and of ethnic Tuaregs, has widened its base to include other communities, in particular ethnic Bambaras. Exact figures are difficult to estimate, but according to a UN report in July last year, the JNIM has 5,000-6,000 fighters and the ISSP 2,000-3,000. Their weaponry comes largely from the armies of the region and was pillaged during attacks, or from arms trafficking from Libya. Financing ranges from kidnappings, especially of Westerners, to the theft and resale of cattle and forcing locals to pay the 'zakat,' an annual tax in charity. The militant groups use ambush, abduction, long-range shelling, improvised explosive devices and recently started using drones to drop explosives. Civilians suspected of collaboration with the army are kidnapped or killed. Militants also impose embargoes, burn harvests and abduct community leaders to force villagers into submission. The response of the region's armies has proven limited as the groups are constantly on the move and feed on local grievances. Mali, Burkina and Niger have formed the Alliance of Sahel States confederation and said they will soon set up a 5,000-strong anti-militant force. 'At a time when the Sahelian armies are killing 3,000 militants, 12,000 others are being recruited,' Abba, head of the International Center of Reflection and Studies on the Sahel, said. 'So, if we do not solve the problem of youth unemployment in these countries, they will remain at the mercy of militant groups,' he added.

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