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The Hindu
27-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
What is next for Iran's nuclear programme?
After its recent airstrikes against Iran's facilities in Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan, the U.S. has been claiming it has set back the Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons ambitions by decades and nullified the country's ability to make a nuclear weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The question of whether Iran actually has nuclear weapons is important because of the U.S.'s history of attempts to force regime changes in foreign countries on the pretext of threats they pose, including with WMDs. Iran currently doesn't have a nuclear weapon — but that may not be the only important question. Doubts remain in the global arms control community over whether US bombs — including the 'bunker buster' massive ordinance penetrators (MOPs) designed to destroy subsurface structures — were able to damage subterranean enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordo and Iran's stockpile of 60% enriched uranium. The latter is of particular interest. Its existence, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated amounted to 400 kg in May, allows Iran to enrich it further to weapons-grade uranium in a matter of days, reducing the 'breakout' time within which it can be ready with a nuclear warhead. Using high-resolution satellite data provided by private operators like Maxar, experts have spotted trucks moving in and out of the Fordo facility in the days leading up to the bombing. They have interpreted this to mean Tehran may have anticipated the bombs, including the use of MOPs, and moved fissile material and equipment away to safer locales. Indeed, Financial Times reported on June 26 that 'preliminary intelligence assessments' shared with European governments suggest Iran's 60% enriched stockpile survived the US strikes 'largely intact' and that it wasn't 'concentrated' in Fordo when the bombs fell. In posts on Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California, among others also discussed satellite images showing signs of special tunnels where Iran may have moved its enriched stockpile for safekeeping. Thus, questions linger about the extent to which the American and Israeli bombing set Iran's nuclear weapons programme back. While estimates of the damage wrought by American bombs vary, that the Iranian nuclear programme was set back at all isn't in dispute. But as Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program co-director James Acton has contended, this is separate from the question of whether Iran can build a nuclear weapon now. It can if it has access to the 60% enriched stockpile, other enrichment facilities the world doesn't know about (the IAEA has deemed this likely), and/or the ability to operationalise new enrichment centres. If the 60% enriched stockpile persists, the nuclear option also persists. In fact Israel's actions and statements in the last month and US involvement in its war are expected to galvanise local support for the nuclear weapons programme and strengthen Tehran's resolve. With regards to the risk of proliferation as well as what former Indian Ambassador Mahesh Sachdev has called the 'geopolitical entropy' slowly unfolding in West Asia, an equal question is whether Iran has the intention to develop nuclear weapons. As things stand, Iran has amassed both the technical knowhow and the materials required to make a nuclear weapon. Second, the Israelis and the Americans have failed to deprive Iran of these resources in their latest salvo. In fact the airstrikes against Iran from June 13 cast Tehran as the victim of foreign aggression and increased the premium on its option to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) without significant international censure. Iran's parliament has also passed a resolution to suspend its cooperation with the IAEA after having accused the agency of leaking sensitive information to facilitate Israel's targeted strikes. The international community is already wary of the possibility of a proliferation cascade in the region. It is an openly acknowledged fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. It isn't party to the NPT either. Saudi Arabia has said it will pursue a weapon of its own if Iran has one, as might Turkey. Former US State Department members Mark Goodman and Mark Fitzpatrick have written that this situation is reminiscent of that in the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 forced South Korea and Japan to reconsider their own options. In the right conditions, highly enriched uranium (HEU) can retain its quality for several decades. Modern equipment stores uranium in inert cladding and sealed containers devoid of any moisture, with periodic surveillance and maintenance to keep the cores within their original specifications. Even the decay heat of HEU is only around 1 mW/kg, entailing virtually no thermal or radiation damage to the surrounding components. While Tehran's refusal to cooperate with the IAEA is suggestive, it hasn't explicitly articulated that it will pursue nuclear weapons. In fact, since the 1960s until the US unilaterally pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, Tehran has maintained its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy alone. But the presence of large quantities of HEU in the stockpile is intriguing. From a purely technical standpoint, the HEU can still be diverted for non-military applications. For example it can be used in a pilot enrichment cascade to study and develop nuclear reactors for naval use. At 60% enrichment, the same fissile inventory will also fit in a third of the total mass, requiring fewer cylinders to store and transport. But these are niche use-cases. Energy- and cost-wise, enriching uranium to 60% and then down-blending it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) required to run nuclear power plants is irrational. A 60% stockpile can be blended on demand to 19.75%, 5% or 3% uranium without spinning centrifuges — but it can also be achieved by blending 20% uranium with natural or depleted feed, so there is no real advantage. Likewise, down-conversion and routine safeguards can handle large volumes easily, precluding a need to reduce the number of containers. If anything, the HEU stockpile, the technical knowhow in the country, the absence of a nuclear warhead per se, and the sympathy created by the bombing allow Tehran a perfect bargaining chip: to simultaneously be in a state of pre-breakout readiness while being able to claim in earnest that it is interested in nuclear energy for peace. What this Schrodinger's cat will look like when the box is opened is perhaps the next question.
Yahoo
26-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
We asked three experts on Iran's nuclear program what Trump achieved with his strikes. Their answers were concerning
Donald Trump was looking for a simple, if explosive, solution to stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions when he ordered strikes on nuclear sites across the country. But as the smoke cleared over the three underground facilities hit by stealth bombers and cruise missiles over the weekend, experts say the result may actually bring an Iranian nuclear bomb closer to reality and raise the risk of greater U.S. involvement in the conflict. 'Technically, it's probably slightly further away, but politically it's much more imminent,' said Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute and a former member of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which advises the Secretary of State. 'Iran has been a few months away from a nuclear weapon since about 2007. It's clear that the thing that keeps them a few months away is not their technical capacity; it's their political will. And I think whatever loss in technical capacity they have suffered, it is more than compensated for by an increase in political will,' Lewis told The Independent. Trump described the U.S. strikes against Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan as a 'spectacular military success' in brief remarks from the White House on Saturday night, adding that the sites had been 'completely and totally obliterated.' But Lewis said the showpiece of Trump's attack — the attack on the Fordow nuclear facility, built deep underground, which required the use of 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs — was limited in its effectiveness because Iran had time to evacuate and remove equipment before the strikes. 'I understand that Fordow has a symbolic importance to people, but it is by no means the only underground facility associated with Iran's nuclear program. And given how long it took the U.S. to strike, it's not clear to me that by the time it was hit, it was even the most important, because the Iranians had had time to power off centrifuges and possibly remove them,' he added. One of the primary motivations for launching the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities was to destroy Iran's ability to enrich uranium. But the country has amassed a stockpile over the years of an estimated 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — enough to make around 10 nuclear weapons if it were further enriched from 60 percent where it is now, to the 90 percent required to construct a device. Following the strikes, Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said on Monday that his agency was seeking access to 'account for' Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpiles. Vice President JD Vance conceded on Sunday that the stockpile is still in Iranian hands and its whereabouts are unknown. "We are going to work in the coming weeks to ensure that we do something with that fuel and that's one of the things that we're going to have conversations with the Iranians about," he said. But Vance's desire to open negotiations with the Iranians about that missing uranium will be much more difficult since the attacks, according to Kelsey Davenport, the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran. She told The Independent that this weekend's attack will make Iran 'much more likely politically to pursue nuclear weapons, and the factions arguing that nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence are only strengthened now.' 'The U.S. decision to strike Iran before diplomacy was exhausted in the midst of a negotiation process has destroyed U.S. credibility, and is going to raise serious questions about whether the U.S. could be trusted to negotiate again in good faith,' she said. It's not the first time Iran has been burned by Trump for seeking a negotiated settlement over its nuclear program, either. In 2018, Trump in his first term pulled out of a nuclear deal negotiated by his predecessor, Barack Obama, that had successfully and dramatically reduced Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium. In response to Trump's withdrawal and the reintroduction of sanctions, Tehran started to increase uranium enrichment and build up its stockpile once more, and removed monitoring equipment from nuclear facilities. That led to it building a stockpile of highly enriched uranium that prompted the Israeli attack earlier this month. 'The United States faces a real quandary here,' Davemport said. 'If the U.S. objective is to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, diplomacy is going to be more challenging politically because of the U.S. credibility deficit, but also technically, because we may never know if all of Iran's enriched uranium is accounted for. 'We may never know if all of Iran's centrifuges are accounted for,' he said. 'Any diplomatic agreement is going to need to look entirely different from what the U.S. has attempted to negotiate in the past — that is if the opportunity arises to negotiate an agreement,' she added. There are also concerns that Iran's nuclear program, or what is left of it, will move underground. That would begin with the stockpile of enriched uranium that is currently unaccounted for. 'If it is intact and Iran is able to keep it that way, they could potentially use it in a new covert enrichment facility to produce material for several nuclear weapons in a matter of months,' said Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an expert on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy. 'If they think they can pull it off, Iran's leaders may calculate developing nuclear weapons is the best insurance policy against externally-backed regime change,' he added. Miller believes the strikes have made it 'more likely that the U.S. gets drawn deeply into the conflict.' 'Depending on the scope and manner of Iranian retaliation against U.S. interests, Trump may feel compelled to respond. Israel may also convince the Trump administration to aid in an effort to destroy the remnants of Iran's nuclear program,' he said. Davenport, too, said there is a risk that the matter remains unsolved, and that might mean a longer-term commitment than Trump might have hoped for. 'There's a risk that if the United States wants to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran in the future, it's going to need to strike Iran again and again. Because Iran is going to retain that knowledge, the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be eliminated,' she said. 'If the United States broadens its objectives and attempts to overthrow the regime, that could be severely destabilizing for the region, so not an approach for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran in the long term. Regime change is not a Non-Proliferation strategy,' she added.
The Independent
24-06-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
We asked three experts on Iran's nuclear program what Trump achieved with his strikes. Their answers were concerning
Donald Trump was looking for a simple, if explosive, solution to stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions when he ordered strikes on nuclear facilities across the country. But as the smoke cleared over the three underground facilities hit by stealth bombers and cruise missiles over the weekend, experts say the result may actually bring an Iranian nuclear bomb closer to reality and raise the risk of greater U.S. involvement in the conflict. 'Technically, it's probably slightly further away, but politically it's much more imminent,' said Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute and a former member of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which advises the Secretary of State. 'Iran has been a few months away from a nuclear weapon since about 2007. It's clear that the thing that keeps them a few months away is not their technical capacity; it's their political will. And I think whatever loss in technical capacity they have suffered, it is more than compensated for by an increase in political will,' Lewis told The Independent. Trump described the U.S. strikes against Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan as a 'spectacular military success' in brief remarks from the White House on Saturday night, adding that the sites had been 'completely and totally obliterated.' But Lewis said the showpiece of Trump's attack — the attack on the Fordow nuclear facility, built deep underground, which required the use of 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs — was limited in its effectiveness because Iran had time to evacuate and remove equipment before the strikes. 'I understand that Fordow has a symbolic importance to people, but it is by no means the only underground facility associated with Iran's nuclear program. And given how long it took the U.S. to strike, it's not clear to me that by the time it was hit, it was even the most important, because the Iranians had had time to power off centrifuges and possibly remove them,' he added. One of the primary motivations for launching the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities was to destroy Iran's ability to enrich uranium. But the country has amassed a stockpile over the years of an estimated 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — enough to make around 10 nuclear weapons if it were further enriched from 60 percent where it is now, to the 90 percent required to construct a device. Following the strikes, Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said on Monday that his agency was seeking access to 'account for' Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpiles. Vice President JD Vance conceded on Sunday that the stockpile is still in Iranian hands and its whereabouts are unknown. "We are going to work in the coming weeks to ensure that we do something with that fuel and that's one of the things that we're going to have conversations with the Iranians about," he said. But Vance's desire to open negotiations with the Iranians about that missing uranium will be much more difficult since the attacks, according to Kelsey Davenport, the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran. She told The Independent that this weekend's attack will make Iran 'much more likely politically to pursue nuclear weapons, and the factions arguing that nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence are only strengthened now.' 'The U.S. decision to strike Iran before diplomacy was exhausted in the midst of a negotiation process has destroyed U.S. credibility, and is going to raise serious questions about whether the U.S. could be trusted to negotiate again in good faith,' she said. It's not the first time Iran has been burned by Trump for seeking a negotiated settlement over its nuclear program, either. In 2018, Trump in his first term pulled out of a nuclear deal negotiated by his predecessor, Barack Obama, that had successfully and dramatically reduced Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium. In response to Trump's withdrawal and the reintroduction of sanctions, Tehran started to increase uranium enrichment and build up its stockpile once more, and removed monitoring equipment from nuclear facilities. That led to it building a stockpile of highly enriched uranium that prompted the Israeli attack earlier this month. 'The United States faces a real quandary here,' Davemport said. 'If the U.S. objective is to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, diplomacy is going to be more challenging politically because of the U.S. credibility deficit, but also technically, because we may never know if all of Iran's enriched uranium is accounted for. 'We may never know if all of Iran's centrifuges are accounted for,' he said. 'Any diplomatic agreement is going to need to look entirely different from what the U.S. has attempted to negotiate in the past — that is if the opportunity arises to negotiate an agreement,' she added. There are also concerns that Iran's nuclear program, or what is left of it, will move underground. That would begin with the stockpile of enriched uranium that is currently unaccounted for. 'If it is intact and Iran is able to keep it that way, they could potentially use it in a new covert enrichment facility to produce material for several nuclear weapons in a matter of months,' said Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an expert on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy. 'If they think they can pull it off, Iran's leaders may calculate developing nuclear weapons is the best insurance policy against externally-backed regime change,' he added. Miller believes the strikes have made it 'more likely that the U.S. gets drawn deeply into the conflict.' 'Depending on the scope and manner of Iranian retaliation against U.S. interests, Trump may feel compelled to respond. Israel may also convince the Trump administration to aid in an effort to destroy the remnants of Iran's nuclear program,' he said. Davenport, too, said there is a risk that the matter remains unsolved, and that might mean a longer-term commitment than Trump might have hoped for. 'There's a risk that if the United States wants to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran in the future, it's going to need to strike Iran again and again. Because Iran is going to retain that knowledge, the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be eliminated,' she said. 'If the United States broadens its objectives and attempts to overthrow the regime, that could be severely destabilizing for the region, so not an approach for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran in the long term. Regime change is not a Non-Proliferation strategy,' she added.
NDTV
24-06-2025
- Business
- NDTV
Iran May Have More Underground Nuclear Sites For Uranium Enrichment: Report
Despite a series of strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, experts warn that the Islamic Republic likely has more underground sites that could be rapidly converted into uranium enrichment facilities. "I bet they dug a lot of facilities and didn't put anything in them," Jeffrey Lewis, professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told The NY Post. "Then they have opportunities to move different things around [like the materials from Fordow] and to bring different facilities into operation." The warning comes amid questions about the fate of Iran's nuclear stockpile. While President Donald Trump declared that Iran's key sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan were "completely and totally obliterated," US and Israeli intelligence now believe Tehran moved a substantial amount of enriched uranium and equipment out before the attacks. "We don't know what was taken away but, obviously, it was something important," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "They had stocks [of enriched uranium] and they had centrifuges. So, those are things they could have removed." Mr Albright has previously identified a new underground complex south of Natanz, which he says could be converted into a fully operational enrichment facility. "Could be [where the uranium went]," he said. "But I think Israel would know that, they certainly are capable of following those trucks." He said Iran is unlikely to resume enrichment immediately, as the regime is too destabilised and risk-averse in the short term. Still, Mr Albright warned the pause may not last. Within "six months", Tehran could regroup and begin operating centrifuges to enrich uranium to 60 per cent. Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence and National Security and Technology Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Iran's nuclear strategy is defined by redundancy and long-term planning. "One thing that Iran has continued to do is dig deeper and prepare. They love keeping their options open." On June 12, a day before Israel struck Iran, Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced that the country had completed construction of a new enrichment site. "The new site is fully constructed and located in a secure, invulnerable location," Mr Eslami said. "As soon as centrifuge installation and setup are complete, enrichment will begin." Iran's efforts to expand military infrastructure underground have also been widely publicised. In 2023, Ali Reza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, announced that Iran had constructed 2,200 km of "underground cities" to house advanced weapon systems. These fortified networks reportedly contain missile launchers, drone platforms, oceangoing helicopter carriers, and warships, many of which are linked to Iran's southern waterways and offshore islands. Despite Iran's military buildup, the central concern remains its nuclear material. US Vice President JD Vance admitted Sunday that enriched uranium, enough to construct up to ten nuclear bombs, remains unaccounted for.
Bloomberg
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Bloomberg
Trump Sees Path to De-Escalate After Iran Barrage
"Balance of Power: Late Edition" focuses on the intersection of politics and global business. On today's show, Former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, shares his thoughts on Iran firing missiles at a US base in Qatar and the US intercepting the attack. Jeffrey Lewis, Professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, discusses roughly 900 pounds of highly enriched uranium being stashed somewhere in Iran and what Iran could possibly do with that amount. Rep. Becca Balint (D) Vermont shares her thoughts on whether or not members of Congress should still push through with a vote on a war powers resolution even if President Trump states he no longer intends any additional military attack against Iran. (Source: Bloomberg)
