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Time of India
14-06-2025
- Time of India
328 arms, 9,300 rounds of ammunition seized in strife-hit Manipur
Guwahati: In a major security breakthrough, Manipur Police along with Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), the Indian Army, and the Assam Rifles have recovered 328 arms and around 9,300 different types of ammunition in trouble torn Manipur. Additional Director General of Police (ADGP) Lhari Dorjee Lhatoo informed that the intelligence-based operations led to the recovery of 328 firearms, including 151 Self-Loading Rifles (SLR), 65 INSAS rifles, 73 other types of rifles, 5 carbine guns, and 2 MP-5 guns, along with other explosives and warlike stores. He said that in the wee hours of Saturday, on the basis of specific Intelligence reports regarding the presence of a large cache of arms and ammunition stashed in different areas of five Imphal valley districts, simultaneous search operations were launched at different locations. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Warum teure Lymphdrainagen überflüssig sind: 5-Minuten-Übung hilft Venen Kompass Weiterlesen He said that joint teams of Manipur Police, Army, Assam Rifles, Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) recovered the significant number of arms and a huge cache of ammunition and war-like stores from the outskirts of five valley districts of Imphal West, Imphal East, Thoubal, Bishnupur, and Kakching. The joint forces also recovered around 9,300 various types of ammunition in the most successful operations, the official said. Live Events A Manipur Police statement said that these Intelligence-based operations mark a major achievement for the Manipur Police, the security forces, in their continued efforts to restore normalcy, maintain public order, and ensure the safety and security of citizens and their property. The Manipur Police reiterates its commitment to a peaceful and secure Manipur, the statement said. It said that the public is urged to cooperate with the police and security forces and report any suspicious activities or information related to illegal weapons to the nearest police station or Central Control Room. 'Senior police officials are in close coordination with all security stakeholders to ensure that such operations continue in a sustained and focussed manner to restore normalcy, maintain public order, and ensure the safety and security of citizens and their properties,' the statement said. The recovery of 328 arms and 9,300 various types of ammunition is the first major success of the security forces in Manipur after the ethnic violence broke out in the state on May 3, 2023. Various official reports, political parties claimed that during the ethnic riots more than 6,020 varied types of sophisticated arms and different types of ammunition were looted from the police stations and police outposts by the mobs, attackers and militants. Till March 6, around 1,000 looted and illegally held weapons, including many sophisticated arms, and a huge cache of ammunition, have been returned to the security forces since Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla made the appeal for the first time on February 20.
Time of India
14-06-2025
- Time of India
Manipur: Security forces recover 328 weapons in major crackdown across valley districts
Imphal: Joint teams of Manipur Police, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), the Army, and Assam Rifles have recovered a massive cache of 328 firearms, including SLR and Insas rifles, along with explosives and warlike stores during coordinated searches across five valley districts, according to local police officials. ADGP Manipur Police, Lhari Dorjee Lhatoo, said that the intelligence-led raids, conducted on the intervening night of June 13-14, mark a major breakthrough in efforts to curb violence and restore stability in the strife-torn state. "In the intervening night of 13-14 June, search operations were launched in the outskirts of 5 valley districts by joint teams of Manipur Police, CAPF, Army and Assam Rifles. Explosives and other warlike stores were recovered by the joint teams. 151 SLR rifles, 65 Insas rifles, 73 rifles of other kinds, five carbine guns, 2 MP-5 guns and other warlike stores were recovered," Lhatoo said in a press conference here. "The total guns and rifles recovered are 328 in number. These intelligence-based operations mark a major achievement for the Manipur Police and the security forces in their continued efforts to restore normalcy, maintain public order, and ensure the safety and security of citizens and their properties," he added. Earlier this week, the Indian Army and Assam Rifles, under the aegis of Spear Corps, launched intelligence-based operations in the hill and valley districts, namely Kangpokpi, Thoubal, Kakching, Tengnoupal, Bishnupur, Jiribam, Imphal East and Imphal West between May 26 and June 5 in coordination with Manipur Police, CRPF, BSF, and ITBP, according to a press release. Live Events The operations resulted in apprehension of 23 cadres from the hill and valley-based groups and recovery of 40 weapons, nine Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), grenades, ammunition and war-like stores. Acting on specific intelligence inputs of movement of cadres and presence of IEDs in the general area of Chadong, Imphal East district, the Indian Army, using specialised resources like Explosive Detection Dog, launched an operation on 27 May and recovered 05 IEDs connected in tandem, with a total of 35 kg of explosives. Meanwhile, in another operation, a team of the Indian Army discovered a concealed hideout nearby, from where two 12-bore rifles, explosives, ammunition and war-like stores were recovered. Acting on specific intelligence regarding the presence of arms and warlike stores in the general area Khuangmun in Churachandpur District, a search operation was launched by the Indian Army and Manipur Police on June 1 and recovered two IEDs, seven weapons comprising leading to the recovery of a .303 rifle, four single-barrel rifles, three improvised mortars (Pompi), two IEDs, ammunition and other warlike stores.
India Today
11-05-2025
- Politics
- India Today
India-Pakistan, 2002: When it was close to war
(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated Dec 23, 2002)Last Christmas, fighter pilots of the Indian Air Force's No. 1 Tiger Squadron of Mirage-2000 H aircraft were not in celebratory mode. Moved a week earlier from home base Gwalior to the forward base Adampur near Jalandhar, the Tigers packed pistols, high-protein Swiss chocolates and a quarter-inch map of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). These would come in handy in case any of them was shot down behind enemy comrades in arms, the Indian Army's para-commandos, looked like the US marines with war paint, MP-5 sub-machine guns, infrared night-vision devices, Kevlar bulletproof jackets and hi-tech frequency-hopping radio sets. For the past week, the two elite forces had been secretly conducting mock raids in the hills of Jammu and Kashmir. This was not a routine exercise. It was preparation for war. Just how close India actually came to war, not once but twice, is emerging only now, and INDIA TODAY was able to piece together key all began on December 13, 2001, when Pakistan-based terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament, killing nine people. As the real intent of the strike sunk in and evidence of Pakistan's involvement mounted, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee made it clear that India's patience had worn At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the three service chiefs on December 15, Vajpayee asked the service chiefs, "Can we do something quickly?" All three responded in the affirmative. The CCS—comprising Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, finance minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Planning Commission Chairman K.C. Pant and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra—agreed on a strike against PoK-based 14, 2002: FIRST CHANCEOrders were immediately issued to mobilise troops—more than those in the run-up to the 1971 war. Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002. After much debate, the service chiefs opted for a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in would essentially entail air force strikes to pulverise zones with a high concentration of camps—that's where the Tiger Squadron came in. A limited ground offensive by special forces of the army would further neutralise the camps and help occupy dominant positions on the LoC. D-day was tentatively fixed for January Delhi's war calculus, limited action in PoK made sense as it would not only convey the Indian resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution to manageable levels. India, after all, was only taking a leaf out of the ongoing US action against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan. The daunting prospect of Pakistan launching an all-out offensive in response to the Indian action weighed heavily on the the intelligence assessment that the Pakistani Army was not well prepared loaded the dice in India's favour. This meant that the chances of Pakistan launching a full-scale war were minimal. The Indian plans were also backed by a sound economy that was bolstered by low inflation, high forex and petroleum reserves. Sinha went on record saying the economy was prepared for war even though it was the last option.A limited strike was a clever tactical option. The build-up indicated to the world, especially the US, that India was serious. If Pakistan wasn't reined in, India would have no option. Delhi also stepped up the diplomatic offensive, recalling its high commissioner and banning civilian flights from Pakistan. Picking up the war signals, Pakistan went into hypermode: it began mobilising forces and exchanged frantic calls with the US, getting President George W. Bush into the of State Colin Powell called India and Pakistan to cool down temperatures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair even flew to India in the first week of January to say that they were leaning on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. As proof, the US declared LeT and JeM as terrorist groups. Advani, meanwhile, flew to the US on January 8, where he was briefed on the contents of Musharraf 's impending landmark speech. The speech finally came on January 12, when Musharraf declared that terrorism in the name of Kashmir was unjustified. Practically giving in to Indian demands, he also announced plans to regulate madarsas and ban known terrorist groups operating out of Musharraf's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results. This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided 10, 2002: SECOND SHOTThe readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, "Hamein pratikar karna hoga (We will have to counter it)."On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations Lt-General S.S. Chahal and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the CCS favoured military action against terrorists in political leadership apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January. But after evaluating various military options, it was decided that action in PoK was not viable as Pakistan had beefed up its forces across the LoC. Any action limited to forays across the LoC would translate into minimum military gains and would risk attrition in the Indian forces. The military, however, favoured an all-out offensive that would stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give India an opening in the armed forces came up with a daring plan: destroy Pakistan's war-waging potential and pulverise the terror factories in PoK. The June canvas was bigger than the January one, since Pakistan had packed areas north of Chenab with forces and military logic dictated the battle should not be confined to the LoC. But there were serious limitations to the plans that worried the political bosses. With the monsoons imminent, the armed forces warned that the window for attack was extremely narrow. Any miscalculation could see the offensive bogged down with disastrous as the debate raged, the military made its plans. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J. Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war. The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in the Shakargarh bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK by strike formations moved in from the east and tasked to capture strategic points used by Pakistan to push in period considered for limited strikes was between May 23 and June 10. On May 22, at Kupwara brigade headquarters near the LoC Vajpayee declared that "it was time for a decisive battle". A day later, the CCS met to assess the readiness of the country's key sectors in the event of a war. An economic review was also undertaken: Sinha said India's economy was a hundred times stronger than Pakistan's to bear hostilities, and RBI Governor Bimal Jalan pointed to a low inflation rate of 1.56 per cent and all-time high forex reserves of $55 billion (Rs 2,64,000 crore) to tide over the crisis. The crude oil and petroleum stock reserves, which should sustain the country for more than a month in a war, were also the CCS endorsing a strike, Vajpayee wrote to Bush, Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Jacques Chirac, saying Musharraf had failed to deliver on his January 12 speech and that India's patience was running out. Hectic diplomacy followed as Bush, Putin, Blair and even Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called and pleaded with Vajpayee not to take the extreme step. The global community conveyed to Delhi that it would impress on Musharraf to clarify his promise on stopping cross-border June was an option considered seriously by the Vajpayee Government is borne out by the Defence Ministry's SOS for defence supplies to Israel during the month. But the global community urged restraint as it was worried Pakistan would use the nuclear card to address its conventional asymmetry against the Indian armed forces. Musharraf had already played the nuclear brinkmanship—hinting he would use nukes against India—in an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel in April. Pakistan had even tested three missiles—Ghauri (N-capable), Ghaznavi and Abdali—between May 25 and 28 as a deterrent to India's belligerence forced India to review its N-capability to strike back—Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Defence Research and Development Organisation Secretary V.K. Aatre reportedly participated in a CCS meeting in late May. In the absence of any formalised strategic force command, the nuclear strategy was handled on a need-to-know basis by Mishra, who reportedly attended an AEC meeting on May 24 in Chennai and later flew to Manali to brief nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him. Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan on June 5. He apparently asked Musharraf three times whether he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He conveyed Musharraf's commitment to Powell while flying to Delhi on June 6, and to India, on June 10, Powell disclosed Musharraf's promise to the world, by which time India had already called off its strike plans. The political logic was understandable as a full-frontal attack would translate into war. It was better to give Musharraf another chance. Or perhaps, the build-up was a shrewd ploy by India, not only in June but also in January, to force Pakistan as well as the world community into week, Fernandes denied (to INDIA TODAY) that India had been on the brink of war, claiming that at no point had the CCS given directions to the armed forces to take action against Pakistan. He, however, did not put it beyond the army generals to prepare for contingency plans. Mishra, on the other hand, reiterated that India had indeed been "close to war" in January and May. While refusing to disclose dates, he pointed out that on June 23, Vajpayee had said in an interview to the Washington Post that it was a "touch and go affair".The Tiger Squadron, on its part, did have its share of action. On August 2, four Mirage fighters evicted Pakistani intruders 800 m across the LoC in Machhil sector of Kashmir. In Washington, it was dubbed Kargil II. The Tigers know that given the murky Indo-Pak relations, all it will take is another carnage for them to be back in air, in to India Today Magazine
