Latest news with #Mamluk
Shafaq News
20-07-2025
- General
- Shafaq News
Erased stones: War's toll on Gaza's cultural heritage
Shafaq News Beneath Gaza's modern streets and rubble lie fragments of civilizations that shaped the region for millennia. Yet the ongoing Israeli war since October 7, 2023, has shattered much of this heritage, threatening to erase irreplaceable cultural landmarks that reflect Gaza's complex history. Among the most significant sites affected is the Saint Hilarion Monastery near Deir al-Balah. This complex, dating back to the 4th century CE, once served as a major Christian monastic center in the Levant. Archaeologists have documented its basilica, cloister, baptistery, and burial crypts, all of which have sustained considerable structural damage amid the fighting. Previously placed on UNESCO's World Heritage Tentative List, the monastery was officially designated as endangered in early 2024. Northwest of Gaza City, the remnants of Anthedon Harbour—a vital ancient port spanning eras from the Iron Age to Hellenistic times—now bear the marks of bombardment. Multiple airstrikes between late 2023 and early 2024 left craters and scattered debris, as confirmed by satellite images analyzed by UNOSAT. These blows risk obliterating the layers of history embedded in the site's stones. Jabaliya, a town in northern Gaza, was home to a recently discovered Roman-era necropolis called Ard al-Moharbeen. Revealed in 2022 and 2023 during construction activities, the site contained more than 125 tombs, including rare lead sarcophagi—finds of considerable archaeological value. Reports indicate that the necropolis was nearly completely destroyed during a ground incursion in late 2023. The historic core of Gaza City has also suffered. The Pasha Palace, an Ottoman-era administrative building turned museum, lies in ruins after repeated strikes in early 2024. The palace's intricately tiled halls and arches, once admired for their craftsmanship, are buried beneath collapsed walls. Similarly, Hamam al-Sammara—the last functioning traditional bathhouse in Gaza and a structure with over 700 years of continuous use—was destroyed by an airstrike. Nearby, the Qissariya Market, with its vaulted stone corridors dating back to the Mamluk period, partially collapsed under bombardment. Among Gaza's religious landmarks, the Great Omari Mosque sustained heavy damage in December 2023. Built atop a Byzantine church and reconstructed during the Mamluk and Ottoman eras, the mosque's northern wall, dome, and main prayer hall were reduced to rubble, signaling a profound loss for both worshippers and heritage conservationists. The Greek Orthodox Church of Saint Porphyrius, located in the Zaytoun district, have also suffered a particularly tragic blow on October 19, 2023. While sheltering displaced families during the fighting, the adjacent monastery buildings were struck by a blast that killed at least 18 civilians, including women and children, and injured many others. Although the church's bell tower remained intact, much of the surrounding complex was severely damaged. Saving what's Left International law provides protections for cultural heritage sites regardless of their use, a point UNESCO has emphasized throughout the conflict. The agency cites the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, both of which prohibit targeting cultural property unless absolutely necessary for military operations. This widespread damage has drawn concern from global heritage organizations. ICOMOS, which advises UNESCO, has placed Gaza's historical fabric on its emergency watch list. Likewise, the World Monuments Fund included Gaza's Old City on its 2025 list of the world's most endangered cultural heritage sites, underlining the vulnerability of the enclave's historic urban environment. The financial toll is also substantial. In a report released in January 2024, the World Bank estimated losses to Gaza's cultural sector at over $319 million. This encompasses destruction of museums, archaeological sites, historic neighborhoods, and religious monuments. According to Gaza's Ministry of Culture, at least 247 cultural institutions, including libraries, theaters, and heritage centers, have been destroyed or damaged. Independent assessments by ALIPH and ICOMOS also suggest that over 1,000 historical artifacts may be irretrievably lost. Local officials further estimate that upwards of 60% of Gaza's cultural assets have been directly affected since hostilities began, while heritage-related livelihoods—craftspeople, tour guides, and preservation workers—have seen a 90% drop in activity and income. Amid this devastation, efforts to protect what remains have begun. The ALIPH Foundation has supported salvage operations aimed at recovering artifacts from collapsed buildings, including museum collections from the Pasha Palace. Archaeologists based in Gaza, led remotely by researcher Fadel al-Utol, are also employing mobile technology and digital tools to document damage and preserve records of threatened sites. Moreover, UNESCO has committed to backing comprehensive assessment and restoration once conditions permit safe access. However, experts caution that rebuilding Gaza's cultural heritage will be a long-term, costly endeavor, with estimates suggesting several hundred million dollars and years of dedicated work will be required to restore what has been lost.
CairoScene
12-07-2025
- General
- CairoScene
Concrete Statements: Brutalist Beauties in the Arab World
Concrete Statements: Brutalist Beauties in the Arab World Brutalism in the Middle East emerged with ambition and urgency offering concrete answers to postcolonial futures, urban growth, and national identity. Many of these buildings were conceived as architectural displays of power and autonomy. Today, their raw forms remain to remind us of a time when architecture dared to be bold and unapologetically modern. Jameel Centre – Cairo, Egypt Originally built in 1989 for AUC and now anchoring the GrEEK Campus, the Jameel Center is a bold Brutalist landmark defined by fair-faced concrete, deep arches, and exposed structural grids. Its mashrabiyyas and marble details nod to Cairo's Mamluk heritage without softening its raw, geometric form. The building's coffered concrete ceilings and circular façade indents - left behind by bolts in the structure - embrace the expressive imperfections of cast-in-place construction. Inside and out, the design celebrates clarity and function. National Assembly Building – Kuwait Utzon's 1989 design for Kuwait's parliament makes concrete feel like cloth, with a sweeping tent-like canopy that anchors the public plaza. Its weightless billow offers a poetic yet uneasy nod to Bedouin heritage. The grid-based interiors and precast concrete forms draw from Arabian bazaars and bureaucratic order. While it gestures toward regional identity, the result is an eclectic collision of imported modernism and selective tradition The Koujak-Jaber Building – Beirut, Lebanon Nicknamed the Gruyère for its perforated concrete façade, this apartment block turns Brutalism into visual play. Circular and elliptical voids pierce a flat concrete skin, revealing glimpses of the building's internal rhythm, windows, terraces, and structural slabs. From below, the shifting geometry distorts into a surreal optical effect, where circles become ellipses and the static appears in motion. Designed by Victor Bisharat, the building channels expressionism over function. Le Corbusier Gymnasium – Baghdad, Iraq A rare Le Corbusier Brutalist gem in the Middle East, the gymnasium is part of a visionary sports complex, its bold massing, sweeping ramp, and cable-suspended curved roof echo Le Corbusier's obsession with light, movement, and the architectural promenade. Originally it was imagined as a translucent "boîte à miracles" - a miraculous box of light and concrete. However, it evolved into a more grounded structure - still monumental, still modern. Hotel du Lac – Tunis Built in the 1960s on the banks of Lake Tunis, Hotel du Lac is a brutalist icon defined by its dramatic reverse-pyramid form - each floor cantilevering outward to make the top level twice as wide as the base. Its stacked concrete massing and unapologetically heavy profile symbolised Tunisia's post-independence leap into modernity. The building quickly became both a tourist landmark and pop culture reference, often cited as an inspiration for Star Wars' sandcrawler. Bloc des Salles de Classe IV – Algiers, Algeria Part of Niemeyer's visionary university complex in Algiers, the Bloc des Salles de Classe is a sculptural brutalist mass shaped by revolution - both political and architectural. Cast in raw concrete and arranged in monumental slabs and voids, it was built to embody post-independence Algeria's socialist ambitions. The severe geometry, rhythmic repetition, and sheer scale echo Niemeyer's signature language of expressive modernism. Once imagined as the nucleus of a utopian new capital, the complex now stands as a relic of an unfinished revolution - haunting, poetic, and present. Al-Burj – Amman, Jordan Completed in 1985, Al-Burj once stood as the tallest building in Amman, a 22-story brutalist monument that once defined the city's skyline and anchored one of the capital's busiest streets. It was designed as a self-contained commercial hub with a cinema, rooftop restaurant, and retail floors to embody Amman's urban optimism. Now semi-abandoned, its weathered shell remains an enduring imprint of Amman's modernist ambitions. General Post Office Headquarters – Doha, Qatar Completed in 1988, Doha's Central Post Office is a striking brutalist landmark that embodies the formal ambition of Qatar's state-building era. With its monolithic concrete massing, sculpted volumes, and rhythmic façade, the building conveys institutional authority and architectural clarity. Designed by the British firm Comconsult, its bold form has remained a fixture in the city's collective memory Center for Marine Research – Latakia, Syria Completed in the 1980s just north of Latakia, Syria's Center for Marine Research is a striking pyramidal form of raw concrete rising from the sea. Designed by Bourhan Tayara, the cruciform plan features trapezoidal walls, a central atrium, and cantilevered dormitories, echoing the rhythm of sails and the logic of modernist structure. Though now weathered and abandoned, its bold silhouette still anchors the shoreline bearing the visible scars of time. Al Ibrahimi Tower – Abu Dhabi, UAE The Ibrahimi Tower was constructed in the 1980s when Abu Dhabi saw its first skyscrapers, asserting itself on Abu Dhabi's Electra Street with a striking brutalist language as a reminder of the Emirati capital's modernity at the time. Designed by Egyptian architect Farouk El Gohary, the 16-storey concrete cylinder is wrapped in a dense mesh of interlocking panels refined from an earlier prototype by El Gohary in Cairo.
Observer
11-07-2025
- Entertainment
- Observer
The epic rise of Baybars, the Panther Sultan
If you're a 90's high school graduate, you must remember the novel 'Wa Islamah' written by Yemeni author Ali Ahmed Ba'katheer and read in Arabic classes. You must also remember the super-long Egyptian movie by the same name produced in 1961 starring Ahmed Mazhar and Lubna Abdul Aziz (while researching this article I discovered that this movie was directed by two directors: Italian Enrico Bomba - who was also the writer and the producer - and Hungarian-American Andrew Marton. It had two names, La Spada del'Islam and Oh Islam. The movie follows the story of the Mamluk Sultan Saif Al Deen Qutuz from birth to his death in 1260. As for the novel, I wasn't a fan as I found the romance between Sultan Qutuz and princess Julnar tedious. However, the side character that always fascinated me was the Sultan's friend Baybars - another Mamluk from a humble background - who ruled after his sudden death. As I'm now in the phase of catching up with Arabic historical series on YouTube that I either missed or never heard of, I came across a Ramadhan series by the name Al Zahir Baybars that was broadcasted in Ramadhan of 2005 (unfortunately no English subtitles provided). The series talks about the rise of Baybars (1223/1228-1277 AD) from a Mamluk slave to becoming the Sultan of Egypt. Baybars was a Kipchak (a tribe form the north of the Black Sea) whose name meant great panther. As a young boy, his parents were massacred by the Mongols and he was sold into slavery. When reaching Egypt, he's bought by Alaa Al Deen al Bunuduqdari, a high rank official who when losing favour with the Ayyubid Sultan Al Saleh Ayub ends up fleeing, leaving behind all his possessions. Under the new Sultan, Baybars joins the Bahari Mamluks headed by Faris Al Deen Aktai and meets his new comrades: Izz Al Deen Aybak and Qutuz. After the death of the Sultan, his wife Shajar Al Durr decides to marry Aybak to maintain her status quo. The power-loving wife manipulates Aybak and orders him to assassinate Aktai when she senses his dissatisfaction with her decisions and fears a future military coup lead by him. Consequently, Baybars flees to Levant with his deputy Qalawun and a few loyal soldiers where he keeps travelling for years between different countries trying to convince rulers to help him invade Egypt. However, things change after Qutuz come to power and asks Baybars to return to Egypt and under his command, the Mongols are defeated in the battle of Ain Jalut in 1260. When Qutuz is assassinated, Baybars becomes the first Sultan of the Bahri Mamluk Dynasty and entitles himself Al Zahir (the discernible). During his 17 years of reign, he ends the presence of the Crusaders in Levant, develops Cairo's infrastructure, builds mosques, libraries, and funds scientific research. He also establishes the first waqf garden that provides food and shelter for stray cats. The series highlights the political and military side of Baybars life which made it interesting. Abid Fahad who plays Baybars was convincing but this can't be said about the rest of the cast who were struggling to speak in Classic Arabic, especially Aybak and Qutuz. Besides, director Mohammed Aziziya's signature battle scenes were too long at times (with close shots of smiling extras supposedly facing death) and some historical facts were tampered with like the death of Aybak and his wife Shajar Al Durr. The fun part was the opening song lyrics that sent viewers on heated discussions in different forums trying to decipher the lyrics and the language used. Rasha Al Raisi The writer is the author of 'The World According to Bahja'
Egypt Independent
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Egypt Independent
AUC professor Bahgat Korany continues discussion on Suez Canal, GERD concerns, and global politics (Part 2)
As the world undergoes rapid political and economic transformations with escalating conflicts shaking the Middle East, the region has witnessed over a full year of genocide in Gaza – and no clear prospect for an end. The conflict has expanded to southern Lebanon, reverberated in Yemen and Iraq, and reached Iran. The Future of the Middle East series seeks to explore these challenges through interviewing prominent politicians, theorists, intellectuals, and current and former diplomats, providing various regional and international perspectives. Through these discussions and insights, lessons from the past are shared in order to chart a path forward. From the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict to regional interventions and the rise of new non-state actors, this series engages in enlightened discussions regarding what can be learned from history and how it will impact the region's future. It aims to explore visions for the future and highlight the vital role that Arab nations can play if historical alliances are revived, pushing towards sustainable stability while safeguarding their interests. The structure of the series involves two parts – the first being a series of seven fixed questions based on requests from readers on the future of the region. The second part features questions tailored to the interviewees specific background, providing new insights into the overarching vision of the interview. Ultimately, this series aims to explore how the Arab region can craft its own unified independent project – one free of external influence. In the previous interview of our 'Middle East Dialogues' series, conducted with Professor of International Relations and Political Economy at the American University in Cairo and Professor Emeritus at the University of Montreal, Canada, and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Bahgat Korany, asserted that the term 'Middle East' is an imported expression lacking in scientific basis. He argued that 'the Arab Region' is a more appropriate designation, as 'Middle East' is based on a relative, fluid, and constantly changing division and perspective. Korany noted that Israel operates in the region as a military superpower, now seemingly able to act as it pleases, presenting itself to Washington as America's aircraft carrier in the region. In this second interview, Korany stated that there should have been clearer signs of objection from Arab regional states, especially Gulf nations, to curb the excessive practices of the ruling class in Tel Aviv. He expressed his concern about further expansion of the occupation outside Palestinian territories, particularly in the absence of a unified Arab response. Interview: ■As a political science professor, do you believe that history is repeating itself? During the medieval period, there were attempts by the kings of Abyssinia and their European allies to divert the course of the Nile, aiming to undermine the Mamluk state. Also during the Mamluk era, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope rerouted shipping away from Egyptian coasts. Do you see us facing a similar historical scenario today, as embodied by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the search for alternatives to the Suez Canal? Regarding the Cape of Good Hope, that's not the primary concern. The real threat now is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), for which a memorandum of understanding has been signed. This route connects Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, bypassing the Suez Canal by running from India through Eilat and the Middle East to Europe. We must coordinate with the UAE to prevent their participation in this project, as it would weaken the Suez Canal's position. As for the Nile and the GERD, we first need to understand just how Ethiopia is presenting this project. Addis Ababa claims that the current water distribution is based on colonial-era agreements and that Egypt's share under these agreements is excessive, while Ethiopia needs the water for development. So, on the one hand, Ethiopia promotes a populist idea appealing to many African nations, asserting that the current situation is a product of colonial agreements that should be rejected. On the other hand, they claim a need for water for development, which is also a populist notion. This overall argument is flawed for two reasons: First, some colonial agreements, such as border treaties, cannot be approached or altered currently. The entire world adheres to these agreements, and we cannot simply reject every colonial agreement, as this would open the door to unforeseen disasters. Second, Ethiopia can certainly achieve development, but with enough water for both parties—Cairo and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia must consider that there are lost water flows and another portion that evaporates. Therefore, the water must be sufficient for both sides. This issue is existential for Egypt and non-negotiable, as Egypt relies on Nile water for 94 percent of its resources. Consequently, there is no intention to relinquish its right. In my opinion, Egypt should have acted preemptively and engaged with international bodies and parties. This would have involved convincing donors, including the World Bank, to condition their funding to Ethiopia on not impacting Egypt's share of the Nile or the Egyptian presence, since the lives of Egyptians are tied to the Nile River. We don't oppose development or funding, but it must be done in a way that preserves everyone's rights. Here, I believe, there was a shortcoming in Egyptian diplomacy. ■About 10 years ago, most of the region's conflicts were civil wars, not international ones. I highlighted this issue in an article where I noted that the number of civil wars increased from 62 in 2016 to 82 in 2017. Do you believe the use of this pattern of warfare was merely a precursor to the wars Israel wages, aimed at exhausting rival military capabilities before engaging them directly, as it does now? In my view, external conspiracies are a given. Every nation, especially one that's coveted, faces external plots designed to maximize gains. However, the crucial aspect is strengthening the internal front to prevent any vulnerabilities that would allow outside penetration. I emphasize the necessity of rejecting any internal conflicts, be they ethnic, tribal, or even economic. Inequality within a society makes external temptations strong and weakens national belonging. Therefore, the strength of the internal front is the greatest defense against external forces. A significant portion of the war in Syria was orchestrated by Israel, which was preparing for the collapse of the Syrian state and army. With the army virtually non-existent, Bashar al-Assad imposed himself by force, transforming protests into a civil war that outside powers—Iran and Russia on one side, Turkey and Israel on the other—then exploited. ■The Huthi group recently targeted Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile. It's known that only a very limited number of countries, fewer than the fingers on one hand, possess this type of missile, and Iran is not among them. From your perspective, who supplied the Huthis with this kind of missile? And are we seeing a new backer for the Huthis, replacing Tehran, which has recently distanced itself from the Huthis for the sake of its negotiations with Washington? In international relations, there are Private Military Companies (PMCs). Americans sometimes rely on these companies instead of their military to limit casualties, just as the Russians relied on the Wagner Group in Africa. It's possible the Huthis have dealings with some of these companies, and they could be the ones who supplied them with this missile. ■In one of your articles published in 2012, you discussed Sadat's initiative to visit Tel Aviv and stated that we were facing a 'New Middle East' where Israel was an integral part of its cooperative and military interactions. Meanwhile, the conflict intensified between Morocco and Algeria. Given current events and Israel's forceful expansion in the region, how do you see the map of this 'New Middle East,' and how do you assess the relations of some Gulf states with Israel?' I wrote an article about two months ago that garnered significant reactions, both domestically and internationally, from prominent figures whom I won't name. The article was titled 'The Question from Foreign Friends I Couldn't Answer.' I was in a discussion with a number of foreigners, and we were talking about Israel's unprecedented genocide in Gaza, its brutality and war crimes. My foreign friends then posed a question that I couldn't answer: 'What are the stakeholders doing?' Here, I'm not referring to Egypt, but to the Gulf states and other Arab nations. Where is their role in this war? Within international relations, there's an option which involves recalling the ambassador for consultation, as a form of protest. This is a step before withdrawing the ambassador, which is then followed by severing diplomatic relations. We don't wish to reach the point of severing diplomatic relations, but at the very least, resorting to the simplest means of protest and suspending commercial deals. There are specific initiatives to demonstrate objection to a particular political behavior concerning the ruling class in Tel Aviv, especially after the International Criminal Court designated Netanyahu and his defense minister as war criminals, necessitating their arrest and extradition for trial. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council in Geneva condemned the unprecedented starvation of Gaza's population. Therefore, there should have been clearer signs of objection to curb the excesses of the ruling class in Tel Aviv, whose actions have even faced protests from within Israel itself. The reality is, I am very pessimistic about the group currently governing Israel. They are planning to annex the West Bank and Gaza, and I fear further expansion beyond the occupied Palestinian territories, especially given the absence of a unified response from Arab states. ■As a political science professor, you received a unique honor from the International Studies Association in the US, the first of its kind for a Middle Eastern political science scholar. The Director of the Governance Program presented your award as a welcome to 'the Other.' In your opinion, why does American hegemony extend even to intellectual and theoretical fields, causing international relations theories to revolve around the American perspective? First, let's start with a simple observation: despite some who oppose the US and speak of America's 'ugly side,' their main interests is often to send their children to American universities because of their excellence. However, I believe the Trump administration's handling of universities will harm the US. He began cutting funds for research teams conducting studies on cancer and other fields. This scientific dominance is one of America's greatest strengths, surpassing even Europe, China, and Russia. This educational and research aspect is one of the most prominent tools of American soft power, and what he's doing to Harvard and other universities will harm scientific research, including for cancer. The funds allocated by US administrations to scientific research and America's openness to the world in this regard have given the US a significant lead over other nations. From this perspective, I'd like to reference what Stanley Hoffmann, an Austrian-born professor at Harvard University, wrote in a 1977 article titled 'International Relations: An American Social Science.' This title reflects American intellectual dominance, which no one, not even England or France, can rival. From here, we as researchers from the Global South began to question: Does this serve the interest of international relations as a science and a practice? All sciences aim to be open and universal, especially international relations. I cannot establish a science of international relations with a perspective confined solely to American society. This, of course, is not in the best interest of the US itself, as the perspectives of its researchers are often limited to an American internal view, and most are not familiar with other regions outside the US borders, such as the Far East and Middle East. Therefore, we agreed on the necessity of collaborating with others from those regions to produce a universal science. However, there are some obstacles preventing this, such limited resources in third-world countries. American universities, for instance, provide opportunities for international travel to attend conferences and so forth, while local universities lack the financial means to offer such opportunities. These resources are also necessary to produce strong research that promotes the thinking of the Global South. This is why the International Studies Association resorted to organizing grants for researchers to overcome this obstacle. There's also the language barrier, which the association has tried to overcome so that research from the region can be published. ■What hinders the Global South from reaching this same level of development? Years ago, I was selected as a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, the first non-Canadian to be granted this membership. After that, I worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which publishes the Arab Human Development Report. This report is incredibly important for anyone interested in development issues. It's an outstanding report, and the team responsible for it began its publication in 2002. The head of that team was Nader Fergany, an Egyptian statistics professor, who always produced an exceptional version of the report that I frequently refer to. In 2009, the UNDP assigned me the task of preparing a new edition of the report. I tackled the issue of political empowerment and titled the report 'The Importance of Empowerment'. Through it, I highlighted the idea that while economic development is crucial, the political aspect is even more important. Resources matter, but it's the politician or policymaker who decides how those resources are used. For example, Japan has limited economic resources but is highly developed, whereas Congo has abundant minerals and pearls yet remains embroiled in continuous wars, leading to the absence of state authority. This underscores the importance of the political apparatus. I recall now the tragedy of Syria, which wasn't caused by the Arab Spring as much as by the incompetence in confronting political challenges. The difference between Mubarak's Egypt and Bashar's Syria is that the latter imposed himself on his people for about 11 years, during which Israel funded and fueled the civil war, while Mubarak chose to relinquish power. This demonstrates the critical importance of political decisions and how a state is directed. In reality, economic reform is important, but political reform is paramount and takes precedence, even if it takes time. I focus on three main pillars: transparency and data availability, openness to others (especially experts who provide modern scientific insights), and tolerance, which is also a crucial foundation. ■The American President, during his election campaign, claimed he could end wars with a single phone call, yet these wars have not ceased. Do you believe what he said was mere election propaganda, or has Israel become so influential that Washington can no longer affect it, or is the matter ultimately a calculation of profit and loss? Politics, in general, is a calculation of profit and loss. However, Trump arranges his political affairs in a crude, direct, and immediate manner, without considering the long-term nature of relationships. He is fundamentally a liar, whether this stems from ignorance, malice, or even limited thinking. When he participated in the debate with former President Joe Biden, American journalists found that 67 percent of his statements were falsehoods, and some journalists recorded nearly 17,000 lies during his first term. His pronouncements are sometimes pure propaganda, and sometimes they are the result of insufficient information. This, of course, poses a danger to the international community: for the president of the world's most powerful nation to have such a shortsighted perspective. When he cuts the Department of Education, curtails scientific research, and approaches matters based on immediate results without foresight, this naturally raises concerns. ■For a period, before the era of Richard Nixon, the US treated Taiwan as if it were China. While Biden has supported the island's independence, Trump, true to form, has used it as a bargaining chip, promising protection in exchange for specific demands, such as reclaiming the electronic chip industry currently dominated by Taiwan. How do you foresee the future of the China-Taiwan crisis, given China's insistence on annexing the island? Taiwan is one of the most prominent global issues right now. It could trigger a war far more difficult than the one in Ukraine, fundamentally because China views Taiwan as an integral part of its territory, just as we view Hala'ib and Shalateen as inseparable parts of Egyptian land. The relationship between US and China used to baffle us as political science researchers. How could the world's largest country not be represented in the United Nations? When communism triumphed in China, America took a stance, declaring that the true representative of China was not the mainland as we know it today, but rather the small island of Taiwan. This continued until 1972, with Taiwan holding a seat and veto power in the Security Council, a small island that separated from China after its defeat in the civil war, until Nixon visited China in 1972. What's striking is that throughout this period of non-recognition by Washington, China remained consistent with its 'One China' policy, which Washington eventually accepted. To this day, China considers Taiwan part of its territory, and if it decides to invade it at any point, it will. Thus, the reality confirms that the Taiwan crisis is not like the Russia-Ukraine situation; the latter are two independent states. Taiwan, however, is not represented in the United Nations, and therefore, the world does not view it as a state. I believe Trump will not intervene in this crisis, nor will he fight China for Taiwan. He might resort to sanctions, and perhaps some European countries might exert pressure to prevent an invasion, but the matter will not escalate to the point of armed conflict with China over Taiwan. Trump, as an individual, is unpredictable, save for one indicator that helps us discern his stances: he acts like a real estate magnate, adopting a transactional approach. His entire mindset is focused on deals, just as he did with Ukraine, when he demanded minerals in exchange for defense, even though Kyiv was his biggest ally in Europe and, along with the US, formed what was known as the Atlantic Front. Trump operates in a crude and direct quid pro quo manner. ■Setting aside Trump's unpredictability, does the Jewish lobby also influence American decision-making regarding Israel? The lobby indeed has significant influence, but I believe its impact is often exaggerated. External actors, in many instances, indirectly contribute to inflating the lobby's perceived power. Some mistakenly believe that reaching the US administration is solely achievable through the Jewish lobby, and they approach it as a means of gaining proximity to Washington. This, ironically, grants the lobby even greater power, even within the administration itself. The US Congress sometimes intimidates non-Jewish members or those not loyal to Israel, which ensures the lobby maintains a loyal bloc within Congress. Therefore, I believe it's crucial to focus studies on Congress as well, not just the White House.
Egypt Independent
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Egypt Independent
Second interview with AUC professor Bahgat Korany discusses Suez Canal, GERD concerns, and global politics
As the world undergoes rapid political and economic transformations with escalating conflicts shaking the Middle East, the region has witnessed over a full year of genocide in Gaza – and no clear prospect for an end. The conflict has expanded to southern Lebanon, reverberated in Yemen and Iraq, and reached Iran. The Future of the Middle East series seeks to explore these challenges through interviewing prominent politicians, theorists, intellectuals, and current and former diplomats, providing various regional and international perspectives. Through these discussions and insights, lessons from the past are shared in order to chart a path forward. From the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict to regional interventions and the rise of new non-state actors, this series engages in enlightened discussions regarding what can be learned from history and how it will impact the region's future. It aims to explore visions for the future and highlight the vital role that Arab nations can play if historical alliances are revived, pushing towards sustainable stability while safeguarding their interests. The structure of the series involves two parts – the first being a series of seven fixed questions based on requests from readers on the future of the region. The second part features questions tailored to the interviewees specific background, providing new insights into the overarching vision of the interview. Ultimately, this series aims to explore how the Arab region can craft its own unified independent project – one free of external influence. In the previous interview of our 'Middle East Dialogues' series, conducted with Professor of International Relations and Political Economy at the American University in Cairo and Professor Emeritus at the University of Montreal, Canada, and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Bahgat Korany, asserted that the term 'Middle East' is an imported expression lacking in scientific basis. He argued that 'the Arab Region' is a more appropriate designation, as 'Middle East' is based on a relative, fluid, and constantly changing division and perspective. Korany noted that Israel operates in the region as a military superpower, now seemingly able to act as it pleases, presenting itself to Washington as America's aircraft carrier in the region. In this second interview, Korany stated that there should have been clearer signs of objection from Arab regional states, especially Gulf nations, to curb the excessive practices of the ruling class in Tel Aviv. He expressed his concern about further expansion of the occupation outside Palestinian territories, particularly in the absence of a unified Arab response. Interview: ■As a political science professor, do you believe that history is repeating itself? During the medieval period, there were attempts by the kings of Abyssinia and their European allies to divert the course of the Nile, aiming to undermine the Mamluk state. Also during the Mamluk era, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope rerouted shipping away from Egyptian coasts. Do you see us facing a similar historical scenario today, as embodied by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the search for alternatives to the Suez Canal? Regarding the Cape of Good Hope, that's not the primary concern. The real threat now is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), for which a memorandum of understanding has been signed. This route connects Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, bypassing the Suez Canal by running from India through Eilat and the Middle East to Europe. We must coordinate with the UAE to prevent their participation in this project, as it would weaken the Suez Canal's position. As for the Nile and the GERD, we first need to understand just how Ethiopia is presenting this project. Addis Ababa claims that the current water distribution is based on colonial-era agreements and that Egypt's share under these agreements is excessive, while Ethiopia needs the water for development. So, on the one hand, Ethiopia promotes a populist idea appealing to many African nations, asserting that the current situation is a product of colonial agreements that should be rejected. On the other hand, they claim a need for water for development, which is also a populist notion. This overall argument is flawed for two reasons: First, some colonial agreements, such as border treaties, cannot be approached or altered currently. The entire world adheres to these agreements, and we cannot simply reject every colonial agreement, as this would open the door to unforeseen disasters. Second, Ethiopia can certainly achieve development, but with enough water for both parties—Cairo and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia must consider that there are lost water flows and another portion that evaporates. Therefore, the water must be sufficient for both sides. This issue is existential for Egypt and non-negotiable, as Egypt relies on Nile water for 94 percent of its resources. Consequently, there is no intention to relinquish its right. In my opinion, Egypt should have acted preemptively and engaged with international bodies and parties. This would have involved convincing donors, including the World Bank, to condition their funding to Ethiopia on not impacting Egypt's share of the Nile or the Egyptian presence, since the lives of Egyptians are tied to the Nile River. We don't oppose development or funding, but it must be done in a way that preserves everyone's rights. Here, I believe, there was a shortcoming in Egyptian diplomacy. ■About 10 years ago, most of the region's conflicts were civil wars, not international ones. I highlighted this issue in an article where I noted that the number of civil wars increased from 62 in 2016 to 82 in 2017. Do you believe the use of this pattern of warfare was merely a precursor to the wars Israel wages, aimed at exhausting rival military capabilities before engaging them directly, as it does now? In my view, external conspiracies are a given. Every nation, especially one that's coveted, faces external plots designed to maximize gains. However, the crucial aspect is strengthening the internal front to prevent any vulnerabilities that would allow outside penetration. I emphasize the necessity of rejecting any internal conflicts, be they ethnic, tribal, or even economic. Inequality within a society makes external temptations strong and weakens national belonging. Therefore, the strength of the internal front is the greatest defense against external forces. A significant portion of the war in Syria was orchestrated by Israel, which was preparing for the collapse of the Syrian state and army. With the army virtually non-existent, Bashar al-Assad imposed himself by force, transforming protests into a civil war that outside powers—Iran and Russia on one side, Turkey and Israel on the other—then exploited. ■The Huthi group recently targeted Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile. It's known that only a very limited number of countries, fewer than the fingers on one hand, possess this type of missile, and Iran is not among them. From your perspective, who supplied the Huthis with this kind of missile? And are we seeing a new backer for the Huthis, replacing Tehran, which has recently distanced itself from the Huthis for the sake of its negotiations with Washington? In international relations, there are Private Military Companies (PMCs). Americans sometimes rely on these companies instead of their military to limit casualties, just as the Russians relied on the Wagner Group in Africa. It's possible the Huthis have dealings with some of these companies, and they could be the ones who supplied them with this missile. ■In one of your articles published in 2012, you discussed Sadat's initiative to visit Tel Aviv and stated that we were facing a 'New Middle East' where Israel was an integral part of its cooperative and military interactions. Meanwhile, the conflict intensified between Morocco and Algeria. Given current events and Israel's forceful expansion in the region, how do you see the map of this 'New Middle East,' and how do you assess the relations of some Gulf states with Israel?' I wrote an article about two months ago that garnered significant reactions, both domestically and internationally, from prominent figures whom I won't name. The article was titled 'The Question from Foreign Friends I Couldn't Answer.' I was in a discussion with a number of foreigners, and we were talking about Israel's unprecedented genocide in Gaza, its brutality and war crimes. My foreign friends then posed a question that I couldn't answer: 'What are the stakeholders doing?' Here, I'm not referring to Egypt, but to the Gulf states and other Arab nations. Where is their role in this war? Within international relations, there's an option which involves recalling the ambassador for consultation, as a form of protest. This is a step before withdrawing the ambassador, which is then followed by severing diplomatic relations. We don't wish to reach the point of severing diplomatic relations, but at the very least, resorting to the simplest means of protest and suspending commercial deals. There are specific initiatives to demonstrate objection to a particular political behavior concerning the ruling class in Tel Aviv, especially after the International Criminal Court designated Netanyahu and his defense minister as war criminals, necessitating their arrest and extradition for trial. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council in Geneva condemned the unprecedented starvation of Gaza's population. Therefore, there should have been clearer signs of objection to curb the excesses of the ruling class in Tel Aviv, whose actions have even faced protests from within Israel itself. The reality is, I am very pessimistic about the group currently governing Israel. They are planning to annex the West Bank and Gaza, and I fear further expansion beyond the occupied Palestinian territories, especially given the absence of a unified response from Arab states. ■As a political science professor, you received a unique honor from the International Studies Association in the US, the first of its kind for a Middle Eastern political science scholar. The Director of the Governance Program presented your award as a welcome to 'the Other.' In your opinion, why does American hegemony extend even to intellectual and theoretical fields, causing international relations theories to revolve around the American perspective? First, let's start with a simple observation: despite some who oppose the US and speak of America's 'ugly side,' their main interests is often to send their children to American universities because of their excellence. However, I believe the Trump administration's handling of universities will harm the US. He began cutting funds for research teams conducting studies on cancer and other fields. This scientific dominance is one of America's greatest strengths, surpassing even Europe, China, and Russia. This educational and research aspect is one of the most prominent tools of American soft power, and what he's doing to Harvard and other universities will harm scientific research, including for cancer. The funds allocated by US administrations to scientific research and America's openness to the world in this regard have given the US a significant lead over other nations. From this perspective, I'd like to reference what Stanley Hoffmann, an Austrian-born professor at Harvard University, wrote in a 1977 article titled 'International Relations: An American Social Science.' This title reflects American intellectual dominance, which no one, not even England or France, can rival. From here, we as researchers from the Global South began to question: Does this serve the interest of international relations as a science and a practice? All sciences aim to be open and universal, especially international relations. I cannot establish a science of international relations with a perspective confined solely to American society. This, of course, is not in the best interest of the US itself, as the perspectives of its researchers are often limited to an American internal view, and most are not familiar with other regions outside the US borders, such as the Far East and Middle East. Therefore, we agreed on the necessity of collaborating with others from those regions to produce a universal science. However, there are some obstacles preventing this, such limited resources in third-world countries. American universities, for instance, provide opportunities for international travel to attend conferences and so forth, while local universities lack the financial means to offer such opportunities. These resources are also necessary to produce strong research that promotes the thinking of the Global South. This is why the International Studies Association resorted to organizing grants for researchers to overcome this obstacle. There's also the language barrier, which the association has tried to overcome so that research from the region can be published. ■What hinders the Global South from reaching this same level of development? Years ago, I was selected as a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, the first non-Canadian to be granted this membership. After that, I worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which publishes the Arab Human Development Report. This report is incredibly important for anyone interested in development issues. It's an outstanding report, and the team responsible for it began its publication in 2002. The head of that team was Nader Fergany, an Egyptian statistics professor, who always produced an exceptional version of the report that I frequently refer to. In 2009, the UNDP assigned me the task of preparing a new edition of the report. I tackled the issue of political empowerment and titled the report 'The Importance of Empowerment'. Through it, I highlighted the idea that while economic development is crucial, the political aspect is even more important. Resources matter, but it's the politician or policymaker who decides how those resources are used. For example, Japan has limited economic resources but is highly developed, whereas Congo has abundant minerals and pearls yet remains embroiled in continuous wars, leading to the absence of state authority. This underscores the importance of the political apparatus. I recall now the tragedy of Syria, which wasn't caused by the Arab Spring as much as by the incompetence in confronting political challenges. The difference between Mubarak's Egypt and Bashar's Syria is that the latter imposed himself on his people for about 11 years, during which Israel funded and fueled the civil war, while Mubarak chose to relinquish power. This demonstrates the critical importance of political decisions and how a state is directed. In reality, economic reform is important, but political reform is paramount and takes precedence, even if it takes time. I focus on three main pillars: transparency and data availability, openness to others (especially experts who provide modern scientific insights), and tolerance, which is also a crucial foundation. ■The American President, during his election campaign, claimed he could end wars with a single phone call, yet these wars have not ceased. Do you believe what he said was mere election propaganda, or has Israel become so influential that Washington can no longer affect it, or is the matter ultimately a calculation of profit and loss? Politics, in general, is a calculation of profit and loss. However, Trump arranges his political affairs in a crude, direct, and immediate manner, without considering the long-term nature of relationships. He is fundamentally a liar, whether this stems from ignorance, malice, or even limited thinking. When he participated in the debate with former President Joe Biden, American journalists found that 67 percent of his statements were falsehoods, and some journalists recorded nearly 17,000 lies during his first term. His pronouncements are sometimes pure propaganda, and sometimes they are the result of insufficient information. This, of course, poses a danger to the international community: for the president of the world's most powerful nation to have such a shortsighted perspective. When he cuts the Department of Education, curtails scientific research, and approaches matters based on immediate results without foresight, this naturally raises concerns. ■For a period, before the era of Richard Nixon, the US treated Taiwan as if it were China. While Biden has supported the island's independence, Trump, true to form, has used it as a bargaining chip, promising protection in exchange for specific demands, such as reclaiming the electronic chip industry currently dominated by Taiwan. How do you foresee the future of the China-Taiwan crisis, given China's insistence on annexing the island? Taiwan is one of the most prominent global issues right now. It could trigger a war far more difficult than the one in Ukraine, fundamentally because China views Taiwan as an integral part of its territory, just as we view Hala'ib and Shalateen as inseparable parts of Egyptian land. The relationship between US and China used to baffle us as political science researchers. How could the world's largest country not be represented in the United Nations? When communism triumphed in China, America took a stance, declaring that the true representative of China was not the mainland as we know it today, but rather the small island of Taiwan. This continued until 1972, with Taiwan holding a seat and veto power in the Security Council, a small island that separated from China after its defeat in the civil war, until Nixon visited China in 1972. What's striking is that throughout this period of non-recognition by Washington, China remained consistent with its 'One China' policy, which Washington eventually accepted. To this day, China considers Taiwan part of its territory, and if it decides to invade it at any point, it will. Thus, the reality confirms that the Taiwan crisis is not like the Russia-Ukraine situation; the latter are two independent states. Taiwan, however, is not represented in the United Nations, and therefore, the world does not view it as a state. I believe Trump will not intervene in this crisis, nor will he fight China for Taiwan. He might resort to sanctions, and perhaps some European countries might exert pressure to prevent an invasion, but the matter will not escalate to the point of armed conflict with China over Taiwan. Trump, as an individual, is unpredictable, save for one indicator that helps us discern his stances: he acts like a real estate magnate, adopting a transactional approach. His entire mindset is focused on deals, just as he did with Ukraine, when he demanded minerals in exchange for defense, even though Kyiv was his biggest ally in Europe and, along with the US, formed what was known as the Atlantic Front. Trump operates in a crude and direct quid pro quo manner. ■Setting aside Trump's unpredictability, does the Jewish lobby also influence American decision-making regarding Israel? The lobby indeed has significant influence, but I believe its impact is often exaggerated. External actors, in many instances, indirectly contribute to inflating the lobby's perceived power. Some mistakenly believe that reaching the US administration is solely achievable through the Jewish lobby, and they approach it as a means of gaining proximity to Washington. This, ironically, grants the lobby even greater power, even within the administration itself. The US Congress sometimes intimidates non-Jewish members or those not loyal to Israel, which ensures the lobby maintains a loyal bloc within Congress. Therefore, I believe it's crucial to focus studies on Congress as well, not just the White House.
