Latest news with #MarounNassif
LBCI
03-07-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
Expat seats in limbo as Lebanon heads toward 2026 elections
Report by Maroun Nassif, English adaptation by Laetithia Harb In 2017, ahead of the 2018 parliamentary elections, Lebanon's parliament passed a new electoral law—Law No. 44/2017. Among its provisions was the creation of a new electoral district, District 16, allocating six parliamentary seats to Lebanese citizens residing abroad. These seats were to be divided evenly among Christian and Muslim sects: one each for Maronites, Orthodox, and Catholics, and one each for Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze. To delay the implementation of the measure, parliament explicitly stated that the expat seats would not apply to the 2018 elections but would instead come into effect in 2022—a five-year delay that many critics now describe as a calculated stalling tactic. Then, in 2021, just months before the 2022 elections, parliament convened once again to amend the law. This time, lawmakers suspended the application of key articles—particularly Articles 112 and 122—effectively shelving the expat seats for another round of elections. Instead, Lebanese citizens abroad were allowed to vote for candidates in their original home districts. As Lebanon approaches the 2026 elections, the same scenario is unfolding again. Critics argue that the so-called six expat seats have become an empty promise, repeatedly used to placate diaspora demands while avoiding actual implementation. Eight years after the law's passage, successive governments—formed by the same political blocs that dominate parliament—have yet to issue the necessary executive decrees to operationalize the overseas seats. These include critical details such as candidacy conditions, voting procedures, and how expatriate MPs would physically attend committee meetings and legislative sessions. According to Lebanon's constitution, MPs cannot delegate attendance or voting duties. Eight years after the law's passage, successive governments—formed by the same political blocs that dominate parliament—have yet to issue the executive decrees needed to activate the six overseas seats. These decrees would define candidacy requirements, voting mechanisms, and how expatriate MPs would attend committee meetings and legislative sessions. According to Lebanon's constitution, lawmakers are not allowed to delegate their attendance or voting rights. What hasn't been done in eight years is unlikely to be accomplished just months before the 2026 elections. And even beyond the expat seats, other key electoral reforms—such as biometric voting cards and the creation of 'megacenters' that would allow people to vote outside their home districts—remain unaddressed.
LBCI
18-04-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
Power balance at risk: Could sectarian parity collapse in Beirut's municipal elections?
Report by Maroun Nassif, English adaptation by Yasmine Jaroudi Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri's decision to withdraw the Future Movement from Lebanon's upcoming municipal and mukhtar elections has sparked fears over the delicate sectarian balance in the Beirut municipality. Hariri, who announced Wednesday that his party would not participate, cited his conviction that municipal elections should remain developmental and non-political. However, his decision has intensified anxieties about the preservation of parity between Muslims and Christians in the capital's municipal body. The primary concern stems from demographic realities: Muslim—particularly Sunni—voters significantly outnumber Christian voters in Beirut. Without a unified political list or consensus among major political forces, Christian candidates could lose all 12 council seats allocated to them under the majoritarian voting system. Second, during the leadership of the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the Future Movement historically played a key role in maintaining sectarian balance in the capital, leveraging its large Sunni voting base to support Christian candidates. Under Saad Hariri, the party is no longer in the race, and no single Sunni-led political force appears capable of replicating that influence. Currently, Beirut's Sunni vote is fractured across at least three emerging electoral lists. One reportedly brings MP Fouad Makhzoumi, the Lebanese Forces, Al-Ahbash, and the Amal Movement together. Another is being formed by Change MPs Ibrahim Mneimneh, Paula Yacoubian, and Melhem Khalaf, in partnership with Beirut Madinati and other civil society groups. A third list is reportedly being shaped by MP Nabil Badr. Based on the 2022 parliamentary elections, around 138,000 voters participated in Beirut II—predominantly Sunni and Shia—compared to roughly 42,000 in the predominantly Christian Beirut I. These figures underline the imbalance and the potential impact of vote fragmentation, raising fears of the inability to secure a complete 24-seat list equally divided between Christians and Muslims without a broad political consensus. The growing concerns have led to speculation that the elections might be postponed altogether, possibly at the last minute, to avoid the collapse of Beirut's sectarian parity for the first time.
LBCI
01-04-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
Aid oversight: Why are the US, Saudi Arabia, and IMF focused on Lebanon's Reconstruction Council leadership?
Report by Maroun Nassif, English adaptation by Yasmine Jaroudi The United States, Saudi Arabia, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have placed significant emphasis on appointing a new president and board for Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). According to experts monitoring the issue, this push serves two main purposes: ensuring a unified Lebanese body oversees reconstruction efforts following Israel's recent military campaign and preventing a repeat of the 2006 war's fragmented aid distribution. In the aftermath of the 2006 war, reconstruction responsibilities were divided among multiple entities. Hezbollah's Waad Foundation led rebuilding efforts in Beirut's southern suburbs, relying on funding from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the Lebanese government. In South Lebanon and western Bekaa, aid distribution was managed by the Higher Relief Commission, the South Lebanon Council, and municipalities largely controlled by Hezbollah and Amal Movement. Meanwhile, CDR handled infrastructure projects such as bridges, roads, water and electricity networks, hospitals, schools, and agricultural land restoration. Its role included commissioning infrastructure rehabilitation with funding from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and supervising in-kind grants from Lebanese businesses and entrepreneurs, including projects like the Casino Bridge and the Mudeirej Bridge. The decentralized and overlapping responsibilities for reconstruction aid in 2006 led to significant mismanagement and corruption, raising concerns in Washington that Hezbollah had used relief funds to rebuild its military infrastructure in South Lebanon. This concern has fueled the current international push to restructure CDR's leadership. However, international stakeholders, including the IMF, must recognize that CDR—established in 1977 under President Elias Sarkis—gained unchecked authority with the rise of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The council plans projects, drafts terms of reference, conducts tenders, and oversees implementation, all while being subject only to post-completion audits by Lebanon's Court of Audit, rather than preemptive oversight. These extensive powers, combined with the lack of regulatory checks, have led to legal action on charges of repeated allegations of corruption, financial mismanagement, and favoritism in awarding contracts. Addressing corruption within CDR requires more than just leadership changes. Experts argue that meaningful reform must involve either reinstating the Ministry of Planning, which was abolished when CDR was created or amending the council's governing decree to curb its authority and enforce stricter oversight mechanisms.
LBCI
04-03-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
Municipal elections set for May, despite challenges in southern Lebanon
Report by Maroun Nassif, English adaptation by Karine Keuchkerian Minister of Interior and Municipalities Ahmad Al-Hajjar confirmed to the Parliamentary Defense Committee, chaired by MP Jihad al-Samad, that municipal and mukhtars' elections will be held as scheduled in four stages: May 4, 11, 18, and 25. Funding is secured: $11 million. According to information provided to LBCI, the Interior Minister heard from the Hezbollah-Amal Movement political duo their insistence on holding the municipal elections on time in the southern region, even if villages and towns are destroyed. The plan is to place ballot boxes at the entrances of towns where roads are blocked and in homes that are ready. Thus, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement want the municipal elections in the south, meaning the use of megacenters—one of the reforms required internationally—is now unlikely. The hope remains that it will not be ruled out and could be used in the 2026 parliamentary elections.
LBCI
18-02-2025
- Politics
- LBCI
Unanswered questions: Why is Israel still positioned in five hills in South Lebanon?
Report by Maroun Nassif, English adaptation by Yasmine Jaroudi Why did the Israeli army remain stationed in the five hills in South Lebanon, and how long does it intend to stay? Lebanon's government has yet to receive an official explanation for these matters. According to LBCI sources, President Joseph Aoun directly posed these questions to the Quintet Committee ambassadors and UNIFIL commander General Aroldo Lázaro but received no clear response. On the day Israel was supposed to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territories, President Aoun convened a high-level meeting with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. The discussions focused on ways to pressure Israel into fully implementing the ceasefire agreement. Following the meeting, the Lebanese government reaffirmed its readiness to deploy its army along the internationally recognized borders to safeguard national sovereignty and ensure the security and stability of southern Lebanese residents. The issue of Hezbollah prisoners also resurfaced. The Baabda meeting reiterated the commitments outlined in the joint statement issued by the United States and French presidents on the eve of the ceasefire agreement. The statement emphasized both nations' commitment to working with Israel and Lebanon to ensure full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel's complete withdrawal from the south within 60 days. Lebanese officials believe Israel's continued occupation of the five hills is not driven by military or strategic needs but rather by political obstinacy and a desire to reassure its northern settlers, as these elevated positions overlook five Israeli settlements.
