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Express Tribune
12-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
SJC disposes of 19 misconduct complaints
The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) on Saturday disposed of 19 complaints filed against various high and apex courts' justices under Article 209. It also decided to defer proceedings on five other complaints lodged by different individuals. The SJCthe constitutional forum that can hold superior court judges accountablemet at the Supreme Court in Islamabad under the chairmanship of the chief justice of Pakistan (CJP), Yahya Afridi. SC's Justice Munib Akhtar, Lahore High Court (LHC) Chief Justice Aalia Neelum and Sindh High Court (SHC) Chief Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar attended the meeting. SC's senior puisne judge Syed Mansoor Ali Shah also participated in the meeting through video link. According to sources, the council deliberated on the suggestion of CJP Afridi to announce names of the judges against whom complaints were disposed of. The SJC later decided to keep those names confidential. The Supreme Court's press release also did not specify which judges the five deferred complaints are against as well as the nature of the 19 resolved complaints. The council also approved the proposed draft of the Supreme Judicial Council Secretariat Service Rules 2025. However, it decided that the proposed amendments to the inquiry procedures and code of conduct required further consideration from legal and drafting perspectives. Article 209 of the Constitution deals with the composition and functions of the SJC.
Express Tribune
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
SJC meeting summoned after seven-month hiatus
After a break of almost seven months, Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Yahya Afridi has summoned a meeting of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) on July 12. The SJC is a constitutional body empowered to proceed against judges of the superior courts on charges of misconduct. Currently, CJP Afridi serves as its chairman. Other members include Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Justice Munib Akhtar, Lahore High Court Chief Justice Alia Neelum and Sindh High Court Chief Justice Junaid Ghaffar. The council is presently examining various complaints of misconduct against superior court judges. During its previous meeting in December last year, the Council discussed proposed amendments to the Code of Conduct for Judges under Article 209(8) of the Constitution, as well as revisions to the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Enquiry, 2005. A committee headed by Justice Munib Akhtar was constituted to prepare the proposed amendments to both the Code of Conduct and the enquiry procedure. It is expected that the committee will present its proposals at the upcoming meeting. Last year, six Islamabad High Court (IHC) judges had sought guidance from the SJC regarding interference by executive agencies in judicial functions. However, instead of taking up the matter within the SJC, then Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa initiated suo motu proceedings on the issue.
Business Recorder
07-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Amendments to orders for accuracy: Commissioner IR has powers under Sec 221(1) of IT law: SC
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commissioner Inland Revenue has jurisdiction under Section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. The 24-page judgment, authored by Justice Munib Akhtar, set aside the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court (LHC) and the Islamabad High Court (IHC). It held; 'the tax references out of which these matters arise shall be deemed pending in the respective High Courts and the questions of law raised therein decided in accordance with law and consistently with this judgment.' Section 122 (5A) ITO: Power granted to IR commissioners is not without boundaries: ATIR 'CPLA 431-L/2023 involves questions of law other than the one decided by this judgment. This leave petition is returned to the office to be fixed in the ordinary course before an appropriate Bench,' it also said. A three-judge bench, headed by Justice Munib Akhtar, and comprising Justice Ayesha A Malik and Justice Shahid Waheed heard the department (FBR) petitions against the LHC and IHC decisions. Babar Bilal appeared in CPLA Nos.4583 to 4585/2023. The judgment noted that the matters relating to the deemed assessment order (and indeed, the deemed amended assessment order) fall only and always within the first part (of Mehreen Zaibun Nisa), with all ensuing 'inevitable corollaries' applying accordingly. One of these is that the deemed orders of both kinds must be regarded as orders 'passed' by the Commissioner within the meaning, and for the purposes of, Section 221(1). 'The Commissioner therefore has the jurisdiction to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record'. The judgment decided the question; 'Whether the Commissioner has jurisdiction under subsection (1) of Section 221 of the 2001 Ordinance to amend, in exercise of the power thereby conferred and, in the manner, and to the extent therein stated, what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. 120 to rectify a mistake apparent from the record?', in favour of the Commissioner and against the taxpayers. The High Courts had answered the question in the negative. The Department urged that both the courts erred materially in this regard. The taxpayers pray that the impugned judgments be upheld as having reached the correct conclusion in law. The judgment confirmed that the error made by the High Courts was to conflate the two deeming provisions into one. It was on account of this mistake that both judgments, whose reasoning run in parallel, concluded that there was no application of mind by the Commissioner and that the mistake always lay where, and by whom, in fact made, i.e., the taxpayer. However, once this unfortunate fusing is unpacked, and what the subsection actually does and require is realized, the mistake becomes apparent. Had the subsection only contained the deeming required by clause (b), then there could be merit to what the learned High Courts concluded. In such a situation, the only 'state of affairs' required to be imagined would be the deemed issuance of an assessment order. It could perhaps then be said that the deeming did not reach or touch any mistake to be found as a matter of fact in the return, and hence the deemed assessment order did not deal with any such thing. In this situation the attribution of the mistake, being outside the scope (or beyond the limit) of the legal fiction could be said to lie where, and by whom, actually made as a matter of fact. But that of course is not the case. There is also the (precedent) deeming required by clause (a). Once that is kept in mind then the inevitable conclusion is that there was, as a matter of law, a (deemed) application of mind by the Commissioner. Since it operated (as it could only) on the return, an inevitable corollary is that it is the whole of it, mistakes and all, that is the assessment (deemed) to have been made. And it is the (deemed) assessment so made that then results in the (deemed) issuance of the assessment order. In our view, it is only in terms of this bifurcation that subsection (1) can be properly understood and applied. A rolling up of the two clauses into one, with respect, led to the error into which both the learned High Courts fell. Thus, in the principal LHC judgment much emphasis was placed on s. 221(1) requiring that the order be 'passed' by the Commissioner. The matters before the Supreme Court arose under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in relation to the jurisdiction, under subsection (1) of Section 221, of the Commissioner to rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record and thereby amend what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. Most of these matters come from the Lahore High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 27.04.2022. That decision disposed of eight tax references that had been filed by the Commissioner and was followed in all the other matters in the said High Court by various orders of different dates. Islamabad High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 20.09.2023 which disposed of tax references filed by the Department. Both High Courts reached the same conclusion on the question now before the Court and therefore, all these matters were heard together and are being decided by this judgment. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Business Recorder
03-06-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
Sec 179(4) Customs Act: Power of FBR to grant extension ‘narrower': SC
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court noted that the power of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969 to grant extension of time is much narrower and circumscribed. A three-judge bench, headed by Justice Munib Akhtar, ruled that while hearing an appeal of Director, Directorate General, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) against the decision of the Sindh High Court (SHC), and dismissed it. Dr Farhat Zafar, representing the petitioner (DG Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) submitted that in this case an extension of time was granted by the FBR and therefore, the impugned decision of the SHC is not sustainable. She relied on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment of larger bench of the Supreme Court, which upheld the principles laid down in the case of Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others 2017 SCMR 1427 (Super Asia). SHC judgment: SC reserves verdict on DG Customs Valuation's pleas The court noted that these paras dealt with Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and considered the possibility of the grant of an extension of time in terms thereof. Section 74 was held to apply in terms as stated in para 12 of the judgment in Super Asia. The judgment said this matter (extension of time) has arisen under the Customs Act, 1969, which Section 179 (4) says; 'The Board shall have the powers to regulate the system of adjudication including transfer of cases and extension of time-limit in exceptional circumstances.' The court noted that the power to grant an extension by the Board under Section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969, is circumscribed, and is to be exercised only in 'exceptional circumstances'. On the other hand, Section 74 of the 1990 Act provides that the Board is empowered to grant an extension to the extent found 'appropriate'. The court said that there is an obvious and clear difference between the two provisions; the power under Section 179(4) is much narrower and circumscribed. Therefore, the paragraphs of Super Asia sought to be relied upon by counsel for the petitioner have no relevance. It stated that the Larger Bench has also made some observations with regard to Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The judgment also said that, on a query from the Court, the counsel for the petitioner has candidly stated that the permission/ letter of extension that was granted by the Board was not placed on the record before the Appellate Tribunal. The judgment said that indeed, this was specifically noted by the Tribunal in its order; i.e., 'However, the plea taken by the respondents is that they have taken approval from FBR as mentioned in Section 179(4) but no such approval was placed before the Tribunal'. The court noted that the matter came before it from a tax reference and it is well established that beyond the stage of the Appellate Tribunal, it is only questions of law that can be taken to the High Court. It is also well settled that the record on the basis of which the questions of law can be decided is in terms of the record as it stood before the Appellate Tribunal. The judgment said that record cannot be added to and certainly not on a point that requires factual determination. Since the position is that the FBR letter by which it is claimed extension of time was granted by the Board was never placed on the record before the Appellate Tribunal, it is impermissible for any reliance to be placed on the same in this Court. The Court; therefore, declined to entertain this point, saying; 'Any departure from the well settled position would allow a party to a tax reference to alter the record either before the High Court or this Court which is not permissible.' Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Business Recorder
30-04-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
In tax cases substantive changes affecting vested rights apply prospectively: SC
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court upholding the decision of the Lahore High Court (LHC) declared that in tax cases substantive changes affecting vested rights apply prospectively unless retrospective effect is expressly or necessarily intended. A three-judge bench, headed by Justice Munib Akhtar and comprising Justice Ayesha A Malik and Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi heard income tax reference of Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad. The basic contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that Section 2(36) read with Section 100C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2002 (Ordinance) read with SRO No754 (I)/ 2016 dated 15.08.2016 (SRO) was misconstrued by the High Court. The taxpayer is a welfare society and the relevant tax year is 2019. The taxpayer filed their return on 26.12.2019 after which a show-cause notice was issued on 12.02.2021 under Section 122(9) read with Section 122(5A) of the Ordinance stating therein that the taxpayer was not entitled to tax credit as they had not obtained the relevant approval required under Section 2(36) of the Ordinance given that the validity of their existing approval dated 05.06.2007 expired in the year 2010 in terms of the SRO. The assessment order dated 01.03.2021 and the appeal before the Commissioner decided the matter against the taxpayer maintaining the contention that they did not have a valid approval under Section 2(36) of the Ordinance. The Tribunal; however, agreed with the contention of the taxpayer that it had a valid approval issued by the Commissioner for which the condition of three years as stipulated by the SRO would commence from 2016 and not retrospectively from 2007. The LHC has maintained the decision of the Tribunal for the same reasons. The judgment authored by Justice Ayesha noted that the matter in issue simply relates to the retrospective applicability of the SRO. The said SRO was issued on 15.08.2016 under Section 237(1) of the Ordinance which essentially made amendments to the Income Tax Rules, 2002. The relevant rule in this case is Rule 214 of the Rules which originally provided that the approval granted under Rule 212 of the Rules will remain in force unless withdrawn under Rule 217 of the Rules. The approval under Rule 212 of the Rules is essentially with reference to the approval sought by the non-profit organization for the purposes of Section 2(36) of the Ordinance. The amendment brought to Rule 214 of the Rules by way of the SRO is that the approval given under Rule 212 of the Rules shall remain in force for the subsequent three years unless withdrawn under Rule 217 of the Rules whichever is earlier. Hence, the question before us is simply whether Rule 214 of the Rules as amended by the SRO will apply retrospectively. A bare reading of Rule 214 clarifies that it will apply for the subsequent three years meaning that it will apply prospectively as the words subsequent three years do not suggest that this amendment will apply retrospectively. The judgment noted that the SRO does not contain any provision which suggests that the said SRO will apply retrospectively. Under the circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the approval obtained by the taxpayer in the year 2007 is no longer valid, as it expired in 2010, on account of the SRO, is misconceived as the argument suggests a retrospective application of the SRO. This goes against the settled law that retrospective application of the law cannot be made unless specifically provided for, particularly in tax cases. 'Therefore, we find that the SRO was issued on 15.08.2016, the period of three years will be counted subsequent thereof which means that the approval granted in 2007 expired in August 2019.' 'Consequently, the taxpayer did have the relevant approval necessary for claiming tax credit for the tax year 2019 and was entitled to it.' Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
