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EVN Report
03-07-2025
- Politics
- EVN Report
India-Pakistan Escalation, Nuclear Deterrence and Armenia's Defense Outlook
This article first briefly outlines the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory, providing context for understanding India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and their historical implementation. It then examines how nuclear deterrence functioned during the recent conflict, how this confrontation differed from previous escalations, and what broader lessons can be drawn, particularly in light of certain trends in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The second section addresses the regional dimension, analyzing the deepening cooperation among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan within the 'Three Brothers' alliance. The article then explores regional formats Armenia could engage with to counterbalance this emerging axis by examining specific options. Finally, it evaluates the performance of weapons systems used by both sides, focusing on Indian systems that Armenia has already acquired and other systems it may face in potential future conflicts. Introduction India and Pakistan, the two nuclear-armed powers of South Asia, engaged in a military escalation unprecedented in scale over the past half-century. The four-day conflict involved intense fighting, including artillery duels, drone warfare, and dogfights. The conflict was triggered by the killing of 26 civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, which India blamed on Pakistan. On May 7, under Operation Sindoor , India launched missile strikes deep into Pakistani territory—targeting sites in Punjab and Pakistani-administered Kashmir—and claimed to have hit nine 'terrorist infrastructure' locations. This was followed by a dogfight involving approximately 125 fighter jets. Pakistan reported shooting down five Indian jets, including three Rafales, a MiG-29, and a Su-30. In response, Pakistan launched a series of drone and missile strikes on May 7 and 8. India retaliated with its own drone attacks , targeting key Pakistani military assets, including a Chinese-made HQ-9 missile defense system. Cross-border shelling intensified and on May 9, both sides were engaged in sustained drone warfare and artillery duels. India also repositioned its Western Fleet, deploying an aircraft carrier. A U.S.-brokered ceasefire was reached on May 10, bringing the four-day confrontation to a halt. The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence Theory The advent of the atomic bomb by the U.S. under the Manhattan Project in July 1945 marked the beginning of the nuclear age and the Cold War arms race. The U.S. atomic monopoly was short-lived, undone by a Soviet espionage operation orchestrated by Lavrenti Beria, head of the USSR's NKVD. The threat of a looming Armageddon not only accelerated weapons development but also spurred new strategic thinking. The term 'conventional' came to describe warfare below the nuclear threshold. In ' Arms and Influence ', Thomas Schelling popularized concepts such as coercion, compellence, deterrence and preemptive strikes . Coercion uses threats to influence an adversary's behavior; deterrence threatens punishment to prevent action; compellence pressures an adversary to act under threat of harm; preemptive strikes involve attacking first in anticipation of an imminent, confirmed assault. The condition of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was central to nuclear confrontation , wherein neither the U.S. nor the USSR could defend its population, as both retained second-strike capability—even after a counterforce attack targeting nuclear arsenals. In this environment of mutual vulnerability, each side could retaliate with catastrophic force, including strikes on countervalue targets such as cities—a posture termed mutually assured retaliation . Some scholars argued that credible deterrence relied more on absolute capability than on relative force size. As long as both sides maintained second-strike capability , neither superiority nor first strikes could eliminate the threat of retaliation. This dynamic created crisis stability , where the fear of initiating a self-destructive war served as a stabilizing force. However, the growing sophistication of counterforce —driven by advances in precision strikes, delivery systems, command and control, and surveillance —began to erode the credibility of assured retaliation. States increasingly considered disarming adversaries through a first strike. Earlier doctrines focused on maintaining second-strike capability—such as the flexible response approach associated with the punitive retaliation school. However, a shift occurred toward doctrines emphasizing first-strike capability. The U.S., for example, adopted a 'countervailing strategy' grounded in the military denial school, which remains relevant today despite concerns that first-use counterforce increases the risk of preemptive action. This evolution led to both the expansion of nuclear arsenals and sustained efforts to maintain escalation dominance at every level of conflict. Nuclear Deterrence in Action: Regional Crisis and Broader Implications India and Pakistan—acquiring nuclear weapons in 1974 and 1998, respectively—are among the world's nuclear-armed states, along with the U.S., Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, North Korea, and Israel. Both are considered minor nuclear powers , each possessing a similar number of warheads: approximately 172 for India and 170 for Pakistan. They have improved their command and control systems, diversified delivery platforms, and continue to enhance the quality and survivability of their arsenals. However, their nuclear doctrines differ significantly. India's doctrine is based on mutual assured retaliation, underpinned by a No First Use policy and a credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan maintains a more ambiguous strategy, reserving the option of first use, including tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) against conventional attacks. This aligns with the theory of conventional inferiority , which holds that weaker conventional forces may rely on nuclear weapons to offset the imbalance. Facing conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India, Pakistan uses its nuclear arsenal to bridge the gap. In contrast, India—possessing sufficient conventional capabilities to deter both Pakistan and China—maintains its arsenal primarily for strategic deterrence. Pakistan has long leveraged its nuclear arsenal through salami-slicing tactics, signaling that any large-scale Indian conventional response to its limited attacks could trigger nuclear escalation. This has added a new dimension to the stability-instability paradox. A core feature of nuclear deterrence is that strategic instability can create tactical stability: the fear of nuclear confrontation restrains conventional conflict. However, in the India-Pakistan context, strategic instability has instead fueled tactical instability. Pakistan uses the threat of nuclear escalation to enable limited conventional attacks, while India remains deterred from launching a full-scale conventional response. As in past escalations, Pakistan's nuclear deterrence held, reaffirming the perceived benefits of nuclear weapons. What set this confrontation apart was India's deep conventional strikes into Pakistan's heartland —well beyond the Line of Control . These strikes not only sharply raised the risk of nuclear conflict but also signaled India's growing refusal to tolerate nuclear blackmail. Prime Minister Modi declared that India would 'retaliate on its own terms' and would not 'tolerate nuclear blackmailing' by Pakistan. This rhetoric reflects a shift in India's posture and a greater willingness to impose costs on future provocations. Notably, the limited nature of India's response —confined to missile strikes and drone warfare—suggests that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent remained effective. Once again, conventional inferiority was offset by nuclear capability. This reaffirms that nuclear weapons remain among the most effective deterrents, especially for states facing conventionally superior adversaries. In the context of shifting geopolitical dynamics—including growing doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence—this may encourage latent nuclear powers such as Japan and certain European states, including Germany , to reconsider acquiring their own arsenals. The confrontation once again underscored the complexity of nuclear decision-making, raising critical questions of where the threshold lies—what line, when crossed, would prompt a nuclear power to use its arsenal. This ambiguity highlights a central challenge in nuclear deterrence: the credibility of threats. These dilemmas are reflected in the ongoing war in Ukraine and carry serious implications for the stability of the global deterrence regime. The Kremlin has consistently leveraged its nuclear arsenal to pursue an aggressive foreign policy—from redrawing post-Soviet borders to deterring Western support for Ukraine. Russia's nuclear signaling aimed to block the transfer of advanced weapons systems, including ATACMS missiles, F-16 fighter jets, Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams tanks, as well as Patriot air defense systems. Yet over time, the West has delivered—or is delivering — all of these weapons, steadily raising the threshold for nuclear use. Ukraine's recent Operation Spider Web , targeting Russian strategic bombers deep inside Russian territory, further tested Moscow's red lines. The West's incremental escalation in arming Ukraine, Kyiv's deepening attacks into Russian territory, and even India's strikes against Pakistan all illustrate the extraordinary difficulty of crossing the nuclear threshold. Despite aggressive rhetoric, the actual decision to use nuclear weapons remains constrained by immense strategic, political, and psychological barriers. The Conflict's South Caucasus Dimension and Why It Matters for Armenia Notably, the escalation carries not only important implications for nuclear deterrence but also strategic relevance for the South Caucasus and Armenia. The conflict further consolidated the nexus between the so-called 'Three Brothers' alliance of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. Some Indian media described the conflict as a '100-hour war' not just against Pakistan, but against the broader 'Three Brothers' network: Pakistan as the face, Turkey as the weapons provider, and Azerbaijan as the source of a coordinated disinformation campaign. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan were among the first to condemn Indian counterterrorism strikes. Hours after the attack in Pahalgam, during a press conference in Ankara, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked President Erdogan for his 'unwavering' support on Kashmir. Soon after, reports surfaced alleging Turkish military assistance to Pakistan —claims Ankara denied, explaining that a Turkish cargo plane had landed in Pakistan only for refueling. This was followed by the arrival of the Turkish naval warship TCG Büyükada (F-512) at Pakistan's Karachi port. Erdogan reiterated his solidarity shortly after India's 'Operation Sindoor,' referring to the events as the 'martyrdom of numerous civilians.' Notably, the 300–400 drones deployed by Pakistan during the conflict were of Turkish origin. Along with providing diplomatic support, Azerbaijan — unlike Turkey's more visible military assistance —engaged actively in disinformation warfare . Baku condemned the Indian airstrikes and expressed solidarity with Pakistan. State-affiliated media outlets, such as Caliber, disseminated false information about the Kashmir conflict, accused India of 'water terrorism,' labeled its government as a 'fascist-leaning regime,' and amplified Pakistan's narrative. Azerbaijani sources sought to portray India's deterrence posture as ineffective by characterizing its weapon systems as underperforming. The trilateral summit held in Lachin on May 28 further cemented the strategic partnership among the three countries. It signaled a shared determination to expand their regional influence—from Western to South and Central Asia—and elevate their partnership to a broader geopolitical level. Coordination across diplomatic, military, and informational fronts suggests that the parties have developed procedures for collective action and are gaining practical experience. This is illustrated by the substantial support Pakistan and Turkey provided to Azerbaijan during the 44-day war, where each country contributed according to its comparative strengths. This external balancing effort reflects a pragmatic response to a shifting geopolitical order, as the three states seek to enhance their collective security by pooling and aggregating their respective resources. The growing alliance between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan presents an increasing challenge for Armenia, necessitating renewed balancing efforts. During the Lachin Summit, Turkish President Erdogan emphasized that the three countries together have a population of approximately 350 million and a combined economic output of $1.5 trillion—underscoring the scale and potential of the partnership. This regional development, along with broader shifts in the international system, suggests that Armenia must not only deepen its ties with Washington and Brussels but also explore new alliances in trilateral and quadrilateral formats. In a recent piece , Professor Nerses Kopalyan outlined the potential of a quadrilateral alliance between Armenia, France, India and Poland within the framework of secularized multilateralism. Taking into account the already robust bilateral cooperation among these countries—as well as their respective interests in the South Caucasus—he argues that Armenia's main objective should be 'situating the matrix of bilateral relations into a minilateral configuration, with the congruent and mutual interests of all four actors aligning.' The emerging India–Armenia–Greece–Cyprus front could serve as a counterbalance to the Pakistan–Azerbaijan–Turkey alliance . Armenia, Greece and Cyprus, beyond their historical and cultural ties, have been deepening cooperation in the defense sector. In December of last year, the three countries signed defense cooperation plans for 2025, following a visit by Greek Defense Minister Nikolaos Dendias to Armenia on March 4. Armenia's strategic partnership with India in the defense sector has grown steadily since 2022, with Armenia emerging as India's largest customer for finished weapon systems, with purchases totaling $2 billion . India's relations with Greece and Cyprus have also evolved, with New Delhi receiving an invitation to join the Eastern Mediterranean's '3+1' format—originally composed of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, with the U.S. participating informally—intended to counterbalance Turkey's posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, India signed military c ooperation agreements with Cyprus and Greece in December 2022 and April 2023, respectively. Notably, this 'quad' could potentially expand to include France, which maintains positive and growing relations with all four countries. The Battlefield As a Testing Ground for Weapons Systems Given that Armenia is one of the top purchasers of Indian armaments—and considering Turkey and Pakistan's close military ties with Azerbaijan—it is important to examine how the weapon systems used by both sides performed during the recent conflict. Since 2022, Armenia has procured a range of military equipment from India. The table below outlines key equipment Armenia has purchased or agreed to purchase from India in recent years, some of which were deployed by India during the escalation.
Yahoo
28-05-2025
- Entertainment
- Yahoo
‘Two Prosecutors' Review: Sergei Loznitsa's Chilling Soviet Drama Is A Bleak Warning From History
Sergei Loznitsa's forensically objective, intellectually nuanced documentaries tend to stand in stark contrast to his fictional output; in films like My Joy, In the Fog and Donbass, the Ukrainian director is inclined to put his cards on the table, usually addressing his signature subject: the abject failure of the Russian state. Two Prosecutors follows in that tradition, being a very slow and very talky chamber piece that could be the most terrifying comedy that Aki Kaurismäki never made, or a Chaplin-esque horror film about the evils of bureaucracy in a world ruled by morons. This time, Loznitsa doesn't just have the Kremlin in his sights; Two Prosecutors is one of his most accessible films to date, with relevance to every country wrestling with authoritarian political parties right now. Based on a novella by Soviet and political activist Georgy Demidov (1908-1987), Two Prosecutors begins with a screen credit noting the year as 1937 ('The height of Stalin's terror'). A prison door opens, and a procession of broken men file out into the yard. 'This is your work gang,' a warden tells his colleague. 'What a fine bunch,' is the sarcastic reply. One especially old, dishevelled man is singled out for special duties; his job is to sit by a stove in an empty cell, incinerating a huge pile of folded papers. It transpires that they are letters, written to the dear leader by men being held illegally, having been forced to confess to imaginary crimes by NKVD, the USSR's secret service. He will never read them. More from Deadline Scarlett Johansson On Why The Script For Her Directorial Debut 'Eleanor The Great' Made Her Cry: 'It's About Forgiveness' – Cannes Cover Story Cannes Film Festival 2025 in Photos: Tom Cruise, Robert De Niro, 'Sound Of Falling' & 'Mission: Impossible – The Final Reckoning' Premieres 'The Little Sister' Review: Nadia Melliti Makes A Striking Debut In Hafsia Herzi's Seductive Coming-Out Story - Cannes Film Festival The old man is warned of dire consequences should he give any of the letters a reprieve. Nevertheless, he tucks one away, a missive written in blood and addressed to the Bryansk Prosecutor's Office. Somehow, it gets to its intended destination, and sometime after that, the first of the two prosecutors — a recent graduate called Kornyev (Aleksandr Kuznetsov) — arrives at the prison asking to see the governor. Instead, he gets his deputy, who tries to fob him off with the Russian equivalent of 'he's in a meeting.' But Kornyev insists, demanding access to a prisoner named Stepniak. RELATED: The deputy goes to see the governor, who is lounging in his office on a leather sofa. 'Some student has turned up,' he says, and the two make plans to leave him hanging around in the deputy's office, hoping he'll just get bored and go. But Kornyev does not go, so the governor tells him that Stepniak has a contagious disease, reeling off a list of terrible diseases that are doing the rounds, like typhoid, diphtheria and much, much worse. Kornyev is undeterred, so the governor allows his request, albeit with a sinister warning. 'Washing your hands with soap won't save you from certain infections,' he says, an innocent enough line just dripping with barely concealed violence. Stepniak (Aleksandr Filippenko) is in solitary confinement, and reveals to Kornyev what's going on in the prison. Lifting up his clothing, he reveals weeping red welts and purple lesions all over his body ('That's how things are, laddy… My urine is red.'). Stepniak explains that the Soviet secret service, the NKVD, has infiltrated local government and are busily installing a kakistocracy, targeting older party members and taking them out with especially harsh punishments. Kornyev, a fine, upstanding Communist, is shocked at this contempt for the law of his land, and gets a train back to the city, where he demands an urgent meeting with the Prosecutor General. The pace is painfully methodical, as Kornyev faces obstruction and obfuscation at every level, enduring Kafka-esque levels of red tape before the Prosecutor General will even agree to see him. What separates this from, say, a Roy Andersson movie is the creeping sense of Parallax View-style menace that sets in; there's a sense that Kornyev is getting in over his head, never quite reading the room and making enemies that are each cumulatively more dangerous than the last. The set design is terrific in this regard; statues of Lenin and Stalin watch over airless, wood-paneled rooms bathed in a passive-aggressive Soviet glaze of green. In previous years, this might have seemed like more of a very local, and, culturally, very specific story, more of a cautionary tale about what might happen to us in the West if our democracies are not protected. It used to be a case of there but for the grace of God…, but in 2025, life is coming at all of us hard and fast. Two Prosecutors is a bleak warning from history, one that will only seem more and more prophetic with the passing of time — and that time starts now. Title: Two ProsecutorsFestival: Cannes (Competition)Director: Sergei LoznitsaScreenwriter: Sergei Loznitsa, based on the novella Two Prosecutors by Georgy DemidovCast: Aleksandr Kuznetsov, Aleksandr Filippenko, Anatoliy BeliySales company: SBS InternationalRunning time: 1 hr 53 mins Best of Deadline Broadway's 2024-2025 Season: All Of Deadline's Reviews Sundance Film Festival U.S. Dramatic Grand Jury Prize Winners Through The Years Deadline Studio At Sundance Film Festival Photo Gallery: Dylan O'Brien, Ayo Edebiri, Jennifer Lopez, Lily Gladstone, Benedict Cumberbatch & More
Ammon
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Ammon
Remembrance Day of the Victims of the Genocide against the Crimean Tatars
Myroslava Shcherbatiuk- Ambassador of Ukraine to Jordan May 18 is designated by the Ukrainian parliament as the Remembrance Day of the victims of the genocide of the indigenous Muslim people of Crimea – Crimean Tatars. On this day in 1944 the Soviet totalitarian regime committed one of the gravest crimes in its history — the forced mass deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar people from their historical homeland - Crimea. Acting on Joseph Stalin's personal order, the Soviet authorities decided to «completely cleanse» the peninsula of Crimean Tatars. This was an act of ethnic cleansing aimed at destroying the Crimean Tatars as an Indigenous people and national community, thereby enabling the full-scale colonization of the region. This crime was particularly devious, as the majority of the victims were women, children, and the elderly, while thousands of Crimean Tatar men were serving on the front lines of the World War II as part of the Red Army. At dawn of May 18 a large-scale operation by the NKVD (KGB) began simultaneously across Crimea. Armed officers stormed into homes, giving families only 10-20 minutes to gather their belongings before being forcibly expelled. By May 20, the Soviet authorities deported to remote regions of the Soviet Union by freight trains in total over 190 thousand Crimean Tatars, including more than 92,000 children under the age of 16. Deportees were transported in overcrowded cattle cars, without access to food, clean water or medical care. The journey to these remote settlements typically lasted two to three weeks. During the transportation alone from 7,000 to 8,000 people died from thirst, disease, exhaustion and the inhumane conditions. Upon arrival in exile Crimean Tatars faced forced labor, starvation, unsanitary conditions, widespread disease and total social isolation. They were resettled in specially designated, segregated areas known as «special settlements», which were operating as Soviet reservations. These settlements were subject to strict surveillance: mandatory registration at commandants' offices, prohibition from leaving the area and constant oversight by repressive authorities. Being a Crimean Tatar was a sentence, as these people were given the status of «special settlers» which entailed lifelong discrimination, restriction of basic rights such as freedom of movement, access to education, healthcare and employment in qualified professions. In Uzbekistan alone, according to official Soviet records, approximately 30,000 Crimean Tatars died within the first 18 months. In some areas, mortality rates reached 60–70%. According to the Crimean Tatar national movement, the actual death toll was likely even higher. Any attempt to leave the settlements could result in arrest, and repeated violations were punishable by up to 20 years of hard labor. In addition, nearly 6,000 individuals were sent directly to GULAG labor camps. Following the mass expulsion, the Soviet regime began erasing every trace of the Crimean Tatar presence in Crimea. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was turned into a regular administrative region. Crimean Tatar toponyms were russified, mosques were destroyed or converted into utility buildings, and settlers from other Soviet republics were relocated to the homes of the deportees. The Crimean Tatar language, literature, historical documents and cultural artifacts were systematically destroyed or replaced with Russian ones. Even mentioning the deportation — known as Sürgünlik — was prohibited, and the term «Crimean Tatar» itself was nearly eliminated from the public use. Following the death of Joseph Stalin and the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars were still denied the right to return to their homeland — Crimea. In effect, their forced exile became indefinite. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a national movement emerged, advocating for the restoration of Crimean Tatars' rights and their return to their homeland. The movement employed peaceful methods: public appeals, large-scale petition campaigns, non-violent protests and unauthorized returns to Crimea despite the official ban. It became one of the most extensive and longest-running human rights movements in the Soviet Union. In July 1987 hundreds of Crimean Tatars staged demonstrations on the Red Square in Moscow, publicly demanding the right to return. Under sustained public pressure in 1989 the Soviet authorities finally lifted the formal ban on Crimean Tatars residing in Crimea. After this decision a mass return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland began. By the late 1980s and especially in 1990–1991, thousands of families began their journey to homeland. The return was spontaneous and extremely difficult: the state provided no housing or support. Many families had to live in tents, dugouts or temporary shelters, building homes and infrastructure on their own. In response to bureaucratic resistance, particularly regarding land allocation, the community organized itself and founded around 300 new settlements in Crimea. In 1991 the institutional representation of the Crimean Tatar people was restored. On 26 June 1991 the historic Second Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People was held in Simferopol, reviving the tradition of the national self-governance which began in 1917. The Qurultay proclaimed the restoration of the people's right to self-governance in Crimea and established the representative body — the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. The Mejlis became the legitimate voice of Crimean Tatars and worked with Ukrainian state authorities and the international community on issues of repatriation, restitution of property rights, education, language, and cultural development. Upon returning home, the Crimean Tatar people actively engaged in reviving their culture, language, and religious life, despite significant initial challenges. In the early years of repatriation, the Crimean Tatar Drama Theatre resumed its work, the folk ensemble Qırım was founded, and institutions such as the Ismail Hasprinskyi Library and the Museum of History and Culture of the Crimean Tatar People were established. The media began broadcasting and publishing in the Crimean Tatar language. Communities reopened mosques and reclaimed religious buildings that had been used as museums or warehouses under the Soviet rule. Schools were established with the tuition in Crimean Tatar language. After the Russian Federation occupied the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014, the genocidal practices initiated during the Soviet period were revived. The Russian occupation administration launched the systematic campaign of pressure, persecution, and displacement targeting the Crimean Tatar community — one of the most prominent centers of the non-violent resistance to the occupation. From the very beginning, the actions of the Russian occupation regime were aimed at destroying the identity, culture, political rights of this indigenous people of Ukraine in Crimea. In the first years of the Russian occupation the activities of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People — the legitimate representative body recognized by the international community — were banned. In 2016 a Russian court designated the Mejlis as an «extremist organization» depriving Crimean Tatars of the right to collective representation. Peaceful assemblies - including commemorative events marking the anniversary of the 1944 deportation on 18 May – as well as the use of the Crimean Tatar symbols, and public remembrance of genocide victims were either banned or severely restricted. Prominent leaders, activists and human rights advocates were forced to leave Crimea, while others became targets of criminal prosecution, political pressure and smear campaigns in the media. Russian security forces in occupied Crimea carry out systematic searches of Crimean Tatar homes, arrests on fabricated charges, torture, abuse, and enforced disappearances. One of the key tools of the repression is prosecution of Crimean Tatars based on accusations of involvement in extremist organizations. Dozens of Crimean Tatars received lengthy sentences (up to 17–20 years) for alleged terrorism without any proof. Among the victims of such cases are journalists, human rights advocates, members of the Crimean Solidarity movement, and other pro-Ukrainian activists. At the same time, the occupation administration pursues the deliberate policy of cultural erasure and forced assimilation. All independent Crimean Tatar media outlets, including the ATR channel were shut down. Opportunities to receive education in the Crimean Tatar language were severely reduced, and history programs in schools were altered in order to reflect the Russian imperial interpretations. Traditional cultural events were banned and the public use of the Crimean Tatar language, symbols and religious practices are increasingly restricted. All these repressive actions occur against the backdrop of demographic shifts: thousands of Crimean Tatars are once again being forced to leave their homeland due to the atmosphere of fear, continuous searches, political persecution, and compulsory military conscription. In parallel, the Russian Federation is actively resettling its own citizens to the occupied Ukrainian territory of Crimea. This involves hundreds of thousands of people, which constitutes a direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and an act that qualifies as a war crime. This policy of «hybrid» deportation serves the same purpose as previous repressive campaigns of the Soviet time: to erase the Crimean Tatar presence in Crimea and create a false image of the «Russian» Crimea. On November 12, 2015 the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine officially recognized the deportation of the Crimean Tatars as an act of genocide and condemned the policy of the Soviet totalitarian regime in accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Parliaments of Latvia and Lithuania (2019), Canada (2022), as well as Poland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic (2024) adopted resolutions recognizing the Soviet regime's actions against the Crimean Tatar people as genocide. These resolutions also explicitly condemn the Russian Federation's ongoing repressive policies against Crimean Tatars in the context of the ongoing Russian occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Ukraine continues to actively engage with governments and international organizations calling for a comprehensive legal and moral assessment of the events of 1944 and classification of the Crimean Tatar tragedy as genocide. One of the priorities of the foreign policy of Ukraine is the de-occupation of Crimea and protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars. Only the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea - and the guarantee of the rights of its indigenous people - can ensure that Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and other citizens of Ukraine can live freely.
TimesLIVE
14-05-2025
- Entertainment
- TimesLIVE
From London, a Russian film maker explores the pain of exile
When Russia was convulsed by revolution and civil war more than a century ago, an estimated two million people fled abroad, including artists, musicians and poets. Some, like Vladimir Nabokov, author of Lolita, became famous in the West, while others lived in near-obscurity, haunted by the desire to return home but able to do so only in their imaginations. Liberov is equally fascinated by those who made the opposite choice and remained in Russia despite the danger of persecution, such as the poet Anna Akhmatova. Akhmatova wrote dozens of poems reproaching her former lover Boris Anrep for leaving her, and Russia, behind, foreshadowing what Liberov calls the 'terrible conversation' taking place today between those who stayed behind and those who left. She endured surveillance by the NKVD secret police, expulsion from the Writers' Union and her son's arrest, while other writers and artists, including her friend Osip Mandelstam, perished in Josef Stalin's camps. Several Akhmatova poems are included in Keys to Home, an album compiled by Liberov in what he calls his farewell to Russia. It features music by artists inside the country, though Liberov said seeking partners there was a tough process during which he discovered 'things I'd prefer not to know'. 'People were selfish, scared. People lied, people were false. People avoided (me), people did not respond,' he said. However, he declined to engage in personal recriminations. 'If we're going to blame those who stayed and they're going to blame those who left, it leads to nowhere, only to further separation.' From exile, Liberov, 44, has tracked the repression of fellow artists with horror. In a high-profile 2024 case, a playwright and a director, Svetlana Petriychuk and Zhenya Berkovich, were sentenced to six years each in prison for 'justifying terrorism' in a play about Russian women who married Islamic State fighters. Inspired by a defiant speech Berkovich delivered to the court in verse, Liberov created a widely viewed YouTube video in which her words were turned into rap-style lyrics, accompanied by drawings made inside the courtroom. Last July Russian pianist Pavel Kushnir, 39, died in a Siberian prison where he had launched a hunger strike while awaiting trial on charges of inciting terrorism after posting anti-war material online. Thanks to Liberov's efforts, a recording of Kushnir playing Sergei Rachmaninov's preludes has been restored and released on Spotify and Apple Music, and a scholarship was established to support young pianists from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus who want to study in Europe. Concerts dedicated to Kushnir are taking place this month in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Tel Aviv and Berlin. Liberov is pessimistic about what lies ahead. Russia squandered the opportunity to reinvent itself as a free country after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, he said. 'So the question is: will we ever have this chance again? I pray for that, but I doubt it. If we have this chance I would love so very much to go back home and work there.'
Al Jazeera
23-02-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
The wounds of the 1944 deportation still fester in Chechnya and beyond
A day before Ukraine marks three years since the full-scale Russian invasion, the Chechen and Ingush peoples are commemorating the 81st anniversary of their forced expulsion by the communist regime in Moscow. The impact of this genocidal operation, which began on February 23, 1944 on the orders of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, continues to reverberate today throughout the North Caucasus and beyond. The decades-long efforts to suppress the memory of this violent expulsion and the refusal of Moscow to acknowledge and apologise for it have ensured that it remains an open wound for the Chechen and Ingush people. I distinctly recall being six or seven years old when I first heard the term 'deportation'. It slipped from the lips of one of my parents, only to be swiftly followed by silence. Soviet authorities in the early 1980s still had a strong grip over the country and resolutely suppressed discussions of this topic, particularly within the Chechen and Ingush autonomous republics. Adults lived in an atmosphere of fear and mistrust and were very cautious about discussing the topic even in front of their children. A child repeating the word in front of strangers or at school could attract the attention of the Soviet secret police, the KGB, and lead to some kind of punishment. The era of Perestroika, marked by increased openness and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union, lifted the veil of silence surrounding taboo subjects, including the various crimes the Soviets had committed. The younger generations of Chechen and Ingush peoples began to learn about what had happened to their parents and grandparents. They finally heard the stories of how, during World War II, elite divisions of the NKVD, the predecessor of the KGB, and the military were deployed to deport the entire Chechen and Ingush populations from their ancestral lands. Even more chilling was the revelation that Soviet soldiers did not hesitate to kill the elderly and sick to meet the deportation schedule. Their bodies were callously disposed of in mountain lakes. Entire communities were burned down. In the case of the village of Khaibakh, the NKVD burned alive 700 of its residents, including pregnant women, children and the elderly, who could not be transported to train stations in time for deportation due to heavy snowfall. The gruelling three-week journey in rail cars meant for livestock, where people faced starvation and unsanitary conditions, further contributed to the staggeringly high death toll. Dropped off in the Central Asian steppe with no food or shelter, the deportees had little chance of survival. Due to the deportation, the Chechens and Ingush lost almost 25 percent of their populations, according to the official estimate, before they were allowed to go back to their homes in 1957, four years after Stalin's death. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first democratic elections in the Russian Federation, the state started paying monetary compensation to those who were born or lived in exile. But the amount paid out was meagre and insulting. Still, the Chechen people hoped they would receive a formal apology from newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In 1993, during a visit to Poland, he honoured the more than 20,000 Polish officers executed by the Soviets in Katyn at a monument commemorating the massacre. However, neither he nor any of his successors issued a formal apology for the more than 100,000 Chechen and Ingush deaths during the deportation. In 2004, during the raging war in Chechnya, the European Parliament raised a question about recognising this tragedy as genocide. The initiative was not successful and the genocide was not formally recognised. The violent and traumatic experience of deportation was a driving force behind the declaration of Chechnya's independence in 1991. The Chechens did not want to have a repetition of this experience and therefore sought the protection of their statehood through international law. However, Russia's aggression in 1994 against Chechnya shattered these hopes. Even after achieving victory against Russia in 1996, the Chechens found themselves abandoned by the world, meaning it was for Moscow to decide what came next. Three years later, the second Russian aggression against Chechnya followed. During the war, which lasted until 2009, Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, installed an authoritarian regime led by the Kadyrov family. To demonstrate his loyalty to the Kremlin, in 2011, Ramzan Kadyrov, who inherited the presidency of Chechnya from his father Akhmat after his assassination in 2004, forbade the commemoration of the deportation on February 23. Instead, he forced people to celebrate the Russian holiday, the Day of the Motherland Defender. It was only five years ago, in 2020, that some commemoration events were permitted in the republic on February 23. Yet, these ceremonies primarily served to legitimise Kadyrov's power in Chechnya and propagate the cult of personality surrounding his father, Akhmat. In 2023, Kadyrov took a step further and compelled the authors of a newly issued Russian history textbook to revise the section that had justified Stalinist deportations. Of course, this move does not signal a shift in Kadyrov's relationship with the Kremlin. He will remain loyal to Putin as long as he maintains power. But the fact that the Chechen leader who wields absolute power in Chechnya feels compelled to revise his own policies of erasure means he understands that the memory of the deportation will continue to serve as a rallying cry for the Chechens for years to come. The memory of the deportation continues to inspire support for Chechen independence, despite the brutality and devastation of the two Chechen wars. It also motivated hundreds of Chechens to go to Ukraine and fight the invading Russian army in 2022. It is important to remember what happened to the Chechen people today, as Ukrainians also face the danger of suppression and erasure. Ukraine risks being abandoned by the world just as Chechnya was in the 1990s. The consequences can be devastating, just as they have been for the Chechen people who continue to suffer under brutal authoritarianism.
