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AllAfrica
02-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission. The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis. Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers. Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail. US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated 'integrated deterrence,' pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies. Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools. Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces. The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning. Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world's second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario. If Seoul is serious about being a 'Global Pivotal State,' it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific. South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments. It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners. Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI's analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line. Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid. South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace. Category Likely Request Policy Considerations Diplomatic Support Public statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or others Calibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risks Intelligence and Surveillance Cooperation Enhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisis Requires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocols Cyber and Space Operations Joint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperation Institutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops center Humanitarian and Non-Combat Support Disaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military supplies High public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creep Air and Maritime Protection Securing key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missions Emphasize a posture of protection and deterrence Base Access Forward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deployment Establish conditional use principles MRO Support MRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharing pre-negotiated civilian cooperation Logistics Support Ammunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance support Develop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/Australia Redeployment of USFK Assets Redeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forces Assess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraints Forward Deployment of Strike Assets Hosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radar Risk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetime Participation in Multinational Operations Naval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operation Reduces political risk; requires legal authorization Deployment of Combat Forces Overseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systems High political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements Washington's most plausible request will be access to South Korea's bases. Osan and Gunsan offer hardened runways and fuel; Busan and Jeju can move war stocks and aid at scale, signaling allied resolve and reinforcing integrated deterrence without ROK boots on the ground. Folding this demand into Seoul's phased-response playbook and flexible red lines lets Korea meet US needs while retaining political control. Hosting such operations, however, brings real risks – North Korean opportunism or Chinese retaliation – so Seoul should adopt a 'conditional access' principle, for example, barring strikes on the Chinese mainland. Clear boundaries would deter Beijing, reassure allies and keep escalation with Pyongyang in check, allowing South Korea to contribute decisively without strategic overextension. In the climactic scene of the movie 'Battleship,' the world comes together to confront an alien threat. It presents a neat narrative: one enemy, one front, one unified response. Reality, however, is far messier. Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity. South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple 'intervene or abstain' choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive. What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability. Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is. Hanbyeol Sohn PhD ( serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.
The Mainichi
21-06-2025
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Opinion: 80 years on, could Okinawa again become a battlefield?
It has been over three years since our daily routine has come to include being shown the ominous flashes of light from missiles and their violent flames on the morning and evening TV news. The abnormal reality of civilians in urban areas suddenly being killed by the latest weapons has extended from Ukraine and Palestine to Iran and Israel. Television and newspapers often avoid showing viewers and readers what they don't want to see, but under the light and flames lie crushed faces, torn limbs and bodies with exposed organs. On May 3, during a meeting hosted by the Shinto Seiji Renmei (Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership) and the right-wing group Nippon Kaigi in the Okinawa Prefecture capital of Naha, ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) House of Councillors legislator Shoji Nishida made a misguided statement about the Himeyuri Cenotaph, built in memory of female student corps members who were mobilized and died in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The comment caused a stir when it became widely known, but there was a serious omission in the media's coverage of the issue: Nishida's motivation. Nishida prefaced his remarks with the following words: "Before an extraordinary emergency situation actually arises in the future, we must establish laws that are able to protect the people. To do so, LDP lawmakers must tackle the incorrect postwar education and nonsense that has been perpetuated." In essence, he was suggesting that the day when Japanese citizens could die in war was not far off, and the first battleground would likely be Okinawa. In the July issue of the opinion magazine Gekkan Nippon, former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki, a heavyweight among the party's lawmakers with influence over defense policies and budgets, harshly criticized hawkish statements by Japanese and U.S. politicians who claimed that a Taiwan contingency would be a Japan contingency. "If that were the case, although everyone hesitates to say it, there is even a possibility that the whole of Okinawa could be destroyed," he said. It was a warning that such a situation must never be allowed to happen, and that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) could not legally be deployed in the first place. Despite the concerns of senior figures, however, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida repeatedly stated, "Ukraine could be East Asia tomorrow," and increased Japan's defense budget by more than 1.5 times, explicitly including the capability to strike enemy bases in the country's National Defense Strategy. I have previously written about issues relating to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines Japan's war dead. The SDF is steadily "preparing for death." According to the May 16 digital edition of the Japanese Communist Party's Shimbun Akahata newspaper, the Ground Self-Defense Force has concluded an agreement, details of which are unknown, with the largest domestic funeral service business group to "prepare for any eventuality." This is no different from the prewar period. Military personnel are only concerned about their own prestige and their compensation, with no time to think about the fate of civilians. Yasukuni Shrine represents a state-sponsored scheme to divide the war dead between the public and private sectors, between the famous and the obscure, between honorable and futile deaths. It appears dormant now, but it wouldn't be surprising for it to start up again at any moment. We have become numb to missile footage, and some of us have started to passively accept the idea that we might die that way, too, sooner or later. June 23 marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa.
Japan Today
31-05-2025
- Politics
- Japan Today
Japan, U.S. to boost cybersecurity cooperation amid rising threats
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Japan's Defence Minister Gen Nakatani pose for a photograph at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore on Saturday. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth agreed Saturday to boost cybersecurity cooperation, following Japan's enactment of a law allowing the government to monitor online communications amid rising cyber threats. After their talks in Singapore, meanwhile, Nakatani did not clarify whether Hegseth had requested Japan pay more for defense during their meeting. U.S. President Donald Trump views the long-standing security treaty with Japan as unfair and one-sided. Nakatani and Hegseth met on the sidelines of the annual Asia Security Summit, better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, being held for three days from Friday. It was their first in-person meeting since March in Tokyo. In May, Japan enacted a law introducing "active cyberdefense" measures aimed at preempting cyberattacks, enabling police and the Self-Defense Forces to counter threats by accessing and neutralizing the source servers. Nakatani told reporters that he and Hegseth also affirmed their governments will closely collaborate to align their top strategic priorities, as the Pentagon plans to release the latest version of its policy document, the National Defense Strategy. The Trump administration has voiced eagerness to compile a final draft of the document by the end of August. Japan issued its National Defense Strategy in 2022, pledging to acquire "counterstrike capabilities" to directly target enemy territory in an emergency, as China continues to build up its forces and North Korea seeks to expand its nuclear and missile arsenal. According to government sources, Japan is eyeing "two-plus-two" security talks with the United States in Washington this summer, which would bring together their foreign and defense ministers for the first time under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and during Trump's second term. Afterward, Nakatani and Hegseth attended a quadrilateral gathering with their Australian and Philippine counterparts, Richard Marles and Gilberto Teodoro. In a joint statement released after the meeting, they expressed "continued serious concern about China's destabilizing actions" in the East and South China seas. The four countries confirmed that they will explore planning joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the two seas, and coinvest in cybersecurity of the Philippines, the statement said. Separately, Nakatani, Hegseth and Marles held a trilateral gathering. Earlier on Saturday, Nakatani delivered a speech at the security summit, calling for global efforts to restore a "rules-based international order," with Japan "at its center." He also aired concerns over a "rapid military buildup, including nuclear forces, without transparency" and an "increase in provocative military activities," in an apparent reference to Chinese forces. © KYODO
31-05-2025
- Business
Japan, U.S. Agree to Deepen Cyber Cooperation
News from Japan Politics May 31, 2025 20:08 (JST) Singapore, May 31 (Jiji Press)--Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Saturday agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the cyber field. Meeting in Singapore, Nakatani and Hegseth confirmed that they will work together in aligning the strategic priorities of Japan and the United States, as the administration of U.S. Donald Trump prepares the 2025 National Defense Strategy, the first of its kind since the one compiled in 2022 by the administration of former President Joe Biden. Hegseth has ordered the new strategy to be submitted by the end of August. According to the Japanese Defense Ministry, the two countries are expected to share their recognitions of regional situations as well as priorities in the development of Japan's defense capabilities. In their meeting, Nakatani explained to Hegseth that Japan's parliament recently passed a law to introduce active cyberdefense designed to prevent serious cyberattacks. [Copyright The Jiji Press, Ltd.] Jiji Press
The Mainichi
31-05-2025
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Japan, US vow to spur cybersecurity cooperation amid rising threats
SINGAPORE (Kyodo) -- Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth agreed Saturday to boost cybersecurity cooperation, following Japan's enactment of a law allowing the government to monitor online communications amid rising cyber threats. After their talks in Singapore, meanwhile, Nakatani did not clarify whether Hegseth had requested Japan pay more for defense during their meeting. U.S. President Donald Trump views the long-standing security treaty with Japan as unfair and one-sided. Nakatani and Hegseth met on the sidelines of the annual Asia Security Summit, better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, being held for three days from Friday. It was their first in-person meeting since March in Tokyo. In May, Japan enacted a law introducing "active cyberdefense" measures aimed at preempting cyberattacks, enabling police and the Self-Defense Forces to counter threats by accessing and neutralizing the source servers. Nakatani told reporters that he and Hegseth also affirmed their governments will closely collaborate to align their top strategic priorities, as the Pentagon plans to release the latest version of its policy document, the National Defense Strategy. The Trump administration has expressed eagerness to compile a final draft of the document by the end of August. Japan issued its National Defense Strategy in 2022, pledging to acquire "counterstrike capabilities" to directly target enemy territory in an emergency, as China continues to build up its forces and North Korea seeks to expand its nuclear and missile arsenal. According to government sources, Japan eyes "two-plus-two" security talks with the United States, involving their foreign and defense ministers in Washington this summer -- the first under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and during Trump's second term in office. Earlier on Saturday, Nakatani delivered a speech at the security summit, calling for global efforts to restore a "rules-based international order," with Japan "at its center." He also aired concerns over a "rapid military buildup, including nuclear forces, without transparency" and an "increase in provocative military activities," in an apparent reference to Chinese forces.
