Latest news with #NationalSecurity
The Guardian
7 hours ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
US attacks on Iran redraw calculus of use of force for allies and rivals around globe
For US allies and rivals around the world, Donald Trump's strikes on Iran have redrawn the calculus of the White House's readiness to use force in the kind of direct interventions that the president said he would make a thing of the past under his isolationist 'America First' foreign policy. From Russia and China to Europe and across the global south, the president's decision to launch the largest strategic bombing strike in US history indicates a White House that is ready to employ force abroad – but reluctantly and under the extremely temperamental and unpredictable leadership of the president. 'Trump being able to act and being willing to act when he saw an opportunity will definitely give [Vladimir] Putin pause,' said Fiona Hill, a former Trump national security adviser and one of the principal authors of the UK's strategic defence review. While Trump has pulled back from his earlier warnings about potential regime change in Iran, going from tweeting 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' to 'NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!' within 72 hours, he has nonetheless reinforced Russian perceptions of the United States as an unpredictable and aggressive rival that will not unilaterally abandon its ability to use force abroad. 'It has some pretty dire warnings for Putin himself about what could happen at a time of weakness,' Hill said. 'It will just convince Putin even more that no matter what the intent of a US president, the capability to destroy is something that has to be taken seriously.' It also shows a shift in the calculus in Washington DC, where hawks – along with Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu – were able to convince Trump that launching a strike on Iran was preferable to pursuing negotiations that had not yet failed. That could have knock-on effects for the war in Ukraine, where Republicans and foreign policy hardliners have grown more vocal about Putin's attacks on cities and the need for a tougher sanctions strategy. Although he hasn't changed his policy on resuming military support to Ukraine, Trump is publicly more exasperated with Putin. When Putin offered Trump to mediate between Israel and Iran, Trump said he responded: 'No, I don't need help with Iran. I need help with you.' In the immediate term, however, the strikes on Iran are unlikely to have an impact on Russia's war in Ukraine. 'I don't see it as having a big impact on the Ukraine war, because although Iran was very helpful at the beginning stages in providing Russia with [Shahed] drones, Russia has now started manufacturing their own version and have actually souped them up,' said Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, during a roundtable discussion. More broadly, Trump's attacks could undermine a growing 'axis of resistance' including Russia and China, given the pair's reluctance to come to Iran's aid beyond issuing strong condemnations of the attacks during security discussions under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) being held in China this week. 'It also shows that Russia is not a very valuable friend, because they're not really lifting a finger to help their allies in Iran and returning all the help that they've received,' Boot added. The strike could also have implications for China, which has escalated military pressure around Taiwan in recent months and has been holding 'dress rehearsals' for a forced reunification despite US support for the island, according to testimony from Adm Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. Trump had promised a tough line on China, and many of his top advisers are either China hawks or believe that the US military should reposition its forces and focus from Europe and the Middle East to Asia in order to manage China as a 'pacing threat'. Sign up to This Week in Trumpland A deep dive into the policies, controversies and oddities surrounding the Trump administration after newsletter promotion Yet his previous hesitancy to use US force abroad could have emboldened Beijing to believe that the US would not come to the direct aid of Taiwan if a military conflict would break out – the one wild card in what would otherwise probably be a lopsided conflict between China and Taiwan. Experts cautioned that the stakes were far different, and the conflicts too far removed, to draw direct conclusions about Trump's readiness to intervene if a conflict broke out between China and Taiwan. Trump's administration appears further embroiled in Middle East diplomacy than it wanted and its pivot to focus on China has been delayed as well. And while some close to the military say the strikes have regained credibility lost after some recent setbacks, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, others have said that it won't send the same message for military planners in Moscow or Beijing. 'We shouldn't conflate willingness to use force in a very low risk situation with deterring other types of conflicts or using force when it's going to be incredibly costly – which is what it would be if we were to come to the defence of Taiwan,' said Dr Stacie Pettyjohn of the Center for a New American Security during an episode of the Defense & Aerospace Air Power podcast. Around the world, US rivals may use the strikes to reinforce the image of the US as an aggressive power that prefers to use force rather than negotiate – a message that may break through with countries already exhausted with a temperamental White House. 'The fact that it all happened so fast, there wasn't much multilateral involvement or chance for diplomacy, I think, is something Russians can point to as an indication of, you know, imperialism to the global south,' said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings during a conference call. 'But also in their talking points to United States and western allies, they will definitely make a point of highlighting this as something great powers do, and in a way that normalizes Russia's language on its own [conflicts].
News18
10 hours ago
- Business
- News18
Canada Orders Chinese Firm Hikvision To Cease Operations Citing National Security Concerns
Last Updated: Canada's Industry Minister Melanie Joly said the government has decided that Hikvision's continued operations in Canada would be detrimental to Canada's national security. In a significant development, the Canadian government has ordered Chinese video surveillance camera-making company Hikvision to halt all operations in the country and close its Canadian business over national security concerns. Canada's Industry Minister, Melanie Joly, said the government has determined that Hikvision Canada's continued operations would be detrimental to Canada's national security. 'Following a National Security Review under the Investment Canada Act, the Government of Canada has ordered Hikvision Canada Inc. to cease all operations in Canada and close its Canadian business," she said in a statement. Joly said this determination was a result of a multi-step review that assessed information and evidence provided by Canada's security and intelligence community. She also said Canada was prohibiting the purchase or use of Hikvision products in government departments, agencies and crown corporations. My statement on Hikvision Canada Inc. following a national security review under the Investment Canada Act: — Mélanie Joly (@melaniejoly) June 28, 2025 'The scope of this National Security Review under the Investment Canada Act does not extend to Hikvision's affiliate operations outside of Canada," she said, while encouraging Canadians to take note of this decision and make their own decisions accordingly. 'The Government of Canada is further conducting a review of existing properties to ensure that legacy Hikvision products are not used going forward. The Government of Canada welcomes foreign investment – but will never compromise on Canada's national security," she added. Hikvision's Canadian and US operations, the parent company and China's foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The company, which calls itself the world's biggest maker of video surveillance equipment, said last year it had exited contracts in Xinjiang through five subsidiaries that were added to a US trade black list in 2023. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that Canada was reviewing an application to impose sanctions on four Chinese surveillance-gear companies, including Hikvision, over their alleged role in human-rights violations in Xinjiang. (with agency inputs) First Published: June 28, 2025, 09:01 IST
The Guardian
20 hours ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
US attacks on Iran redraw calculus of use of force for allies and rivals around globe
For US allies and rivals around the world, Donald Trump's strikes on Iran have redrawn the calculus of the White House's readiness to use force in the kind of direct interventions that the president said he would make a thing of the past under his isolationist 'America First' foreign policy. From Russia and China to Europe and across the global south, the president's decision to launch the largest strategic bombing strike in US history indicates a White House that is ready to employ force abroad – but reluctantly and under the extremely temperamental and unpredictable leadership of the president. 'Trump being able to act and being willing to act when he saw an opportunity will definitely give [Vladimir] Putin pause,' said Fiona Hill, a former Trump national security adviser and one of the principal authors of the UK's strategic defence review. While Trump has pulled back from his earlier warnings about potential regime in Iran, going from tweeting 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' to 'NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!' within 72 hours, he has nonetheless reinforced Russian perceptions of the United States as an unpredictable and aggressive rival that will not unilaterally abandon its ability to use force abroad. 'It has some pretty dire warnings for Putin himself about what could happen at a time of weakness,' Hill said. 'It will just convince Putin even more that no matter what the intent of a US president, the capability to destroy is something that has to be taken seriously.' It also shows a shift in the calculus in Washington DC, where hawks – along with Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu – were able to convince Trump that launching a strike on Iran was preferable to pursuing negotiations that had not yet failed. That could have knock-on effects for the war in Ukraine, where Republicans and foreign policy hardliners have grown more vocal about Putin's attacks on cities and the need for a tougher sanctions strategy. Although he hasn't changed his policy on resuming military support to Ukraine, Trump has is publicly more exasperated with Putin. When Putin offered Trump to mediate between Israel and Iran, Trump said he responded: 'No, I don't need help with Iran. I need help with you.' In the immediate term, however, the strikes on Iran are unlikely to have an impact on Russia's war in Ukraine. 'I don't see it as having a big impact on the Ukraine war, because although Iran was very helpful at the beginning stages in providing Russia with [Shahed] drones, Russia has now started manufacturing their own version and have actually souped them up,' said Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, during a roundtable discussion. More broadly, Trump's attacks could undermine a growing 'axis of resistance' including Russia and China, given the pair's reluctance to come to Iran's aid beyond issuing strong condemnations of the attacks during security discussions under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) being held in China this week. 'It also shows that Russia is not a very valuable friend, because they're not really lifting a finger to help their allies in Iran and returning all the help that they've received,' Boot added. The strike could also have implications for China, which has escalated military pressure around Taiwan in recent months and has been holding 'dress rehearsals' for a forced reunification despite US support for the island, according to testimony from Adm Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. Trump had promised a tough line on China, and many of his top advisers are either China hawks or believe that the US military should reposition its forces and focus from Europe and the Middle East to Asia in order to manage China as a 'pacing threat'. Sign up to This Week in Trumpland A deep dive into the policies, controversies and oddities surrounding the Trump administration after newsletter promotion Yet his previous hesitance to use US force abroad could have emboldened Beijing to believe that the US would not come to the direct aid of Taiwan if a military conflict would break out – the one wild card in what would otherwise likely be a lopsided conflict between China and Taiwan. Experts cautioned that the stakes are far different, and the conflicts too far removed, in order to draw direct conclusions about Trump's readiness to intervene if a conflict broke out between China and Taiwan. Trump's administration appears further embroiled in Middle East diplomacy than it wanted and its pivot to focus on China has been delayed as well. And while some close to the military say the strikes have regained credibility lost after some recent setbacks, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, others have said that it won't send the same message for military planners in Moscow or Beijing. 'We shouldn't conflate willingness to use force in a very low risk situation with deterring other types of conflicts or using force when it's going to be incredibly costly – which is what it would be if we were to come to the defence of Taiwan,' said Dr Stacie Pettyjohn of the Center for a New American Security during an episode of the Defense & Aerospace Air Power podcast. Around the world, US rivals may use the strikes to reinforce the image of the US as an aggressive power that prefers to use force rather than negotiate – a message that may break through with countries already exhausted with a temperamental White House. 'The fact that it all happened so fast, there wasn't much multilateral involvement or chance for diplomacy, I think, is something Russians can point to as an indication of, you know, imperialism to the global south,' said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings during a conference call. 'But also in their talking points to United States and western allies, they will definitely make a point of highlighting this as something great powers do, and in a way that normalizes Russia's language on its own [conflicts].
Russia Today
a day ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Forget the Middle East: This region could be next to see a major crisis
The war in the Middle East poses a growing threat to Central Asia. If Iran undergoes a radical change in its political system or descends into internal turmoil, its territory could become a conduit for foreign infiltration into a region long seen as within Russia's strategic orbit. Anyone with a grasp of international affairs understands that Russia's most defining geopolitical feature is the absence of natural borders. Even where physical barriers exist, such as in the Caucasus, historical experience has taught Russians to treat them as illusory. In this context, central Asia has always been viewed as part of Russia's extended strategic space. Threats to the region's stability are thus perceived in Moscow not as distant disruptions, but as direct national security concerns. One of the central foreign policy challenges for Russia in the coming years will be determining how far it must go to prevent such threats from materializing. For the first time since gaining independence in the 1990s, Central Asia may now be seriously vulnerable to destabilizing forces. Geographically removed from the conflict-prone neighborhoods of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Israel, the region has enjoyed a period of relative calm. Only Mongolia, bordered by friendly Russia and China, is arguably more fortunate. Central Asia, until now, has been largely insulated. But this insulation is now under threat. Since the late 19th century, Afghanistan has been the primary concern. But the danger has rarely come from Afghan state actors. Instead, the country has served as a base for extremists targeting neighboring post-Soviet republics. Both Russia and China have long had a vested interest in shielding the region from such spillover, largely for their own domestic reasons. Both powers have large Muslim populations and strong incentives to keep Islamist radicalism at bay. It is precisely this self-interest that has formed the basis of effective cooperation and restraint in international relations. However, this relatively stable picture is beginning to change. Israel's current posture – driven by an elite seeking to maintain power through perpetual military confrontation – is creating ripple effects far beyond its borders. The escalation since October 2023 has triggered a direct conflict between Israel and Iran. There is even talk in some Israeli circles of targeting Turkey next, due to its regional ambitions. While many of Israel's Arab neighbors may prefer to stay out of such a spiral, the intensification of conflict makes neutrality increasingly untenable. This trajectory has implications not only for the Middle East, but for the wider Eurasian space. The possibility that Iran could be destabilized – either through external pressure or internal collapse – should concern all those who value regional stability. Iran is a key player in the Eurasian balance, and a descent into chaos could turn it into a launch pad for foreign interference aimed at Russia and China via Central Asia. Russia must therefore prepare for all scenarios. So far, Iran has shown resilience. The leadership is maintaining control, and the population remains broadly patriotic. But dramatic changes cannot be ruled out. Should Iran fracture, the security vacuum created could expose Central Asia to manipulation from actors who view the region not as a priority in itself, but as a lever against Moscow and Beijing. It bears emphasizing: Central Asia is not significant to the West in the way it is to Russia or China. The region's population of under 90 million is dwarfed by the likes of Iran or Pakistan. Its global economic footprint pales in comparison to Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam or Indonesia. The West views it not as a partner, but as a resource base – useful insofar as it weakens Russia and China. Should Iran descend into disorder, foreign actors could use it as a staging ground to project influence or destabilize Central Asia, without facing any real consequences themselves. For Washington, Brussels, or London, events in the region are an abstraction – something to exploit diplomatically, not something to defend materially. Beyond the external threats, there are internal risks as well. Israel's aggressive foreign policy, when broadcast globally, generates resentment among Muslim populations. In Central Asia, where ties to Russian culture and the Soviet past are strong, many citizens have a finely tuned sense of justice. They are not passive observers. Perceived injustice in the Middle East could radicalize sections of the population, making them susceptible to extremist messaging. The governments of Central Asia have done much to avoid becoming pawns in global geopolitics. The creation of the 'Central Asian Five' – a regional platform for dialogue and coordination – has been a major step. Russia supports this initiative, recognizing the importance of local agency and regional cooperation. These states are wisely building stronger relations with key neighbors, including China and Russia, while maintaining a cautious stance towards Turkey's neo-Ottoman ambitions. Ankara's push for a 'Great Turan' is treated with polite skepticism. Its economic and military capacities remain limited, and Central Asian leaders understand that. Overall, the region's foreign policy is marked by pragmatism. It seeks flexibility without compromising core obligations to strategic partners such as Russia. Moscow has no reason to take offence. And yet, even the best foreign policy cannot insulate these states from chaos beyond their borders. Russia must be realistic. It cannot – and should not – assume total responsibility for defending Central Asia. History teaches caution. The First World War stands as a cautionary tale of Russia committing to allies at great cost, only to reap instability and collapse. Moscow should now make clear that the preservation of sovereignty in Central Asia is a matter for the region's governments themselves. Russia remains a friend, a neighbor, and a responsible partner. But it will not mortgage its future for vague promises or ill-defined obligations. In the age of collapsing norms and rising brute force, this sober, balanced approach is the only one that can ensure both regional peace and Russia's own long-term article was first published by Vzglyad newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team.
Daily Mail
a day ago
- Politics
- Daily Mail
Spy chief Tulsi Gabbard faces new crushing blow after Trump sidelined her over Iran nuclear strikes
Tulsi Gabbard is facing another blow after President Donald Trump sidelined her during the Iran nuclear strikes. Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas, the Republican chairman of the Intelligence Committee, has proposed legislation to slash the size of her agency in half. 'ODNI was intended to be a lean organization to align America's intelligence resources and authorities, not the overstaffed and bureaucratic behemoth that it is today,' he said in a statement announcing his proposal. Cotton's bill - if passed - would provide a sweeping overhaul of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), including cutting its staff from 1,600 to 650. It would also shutter the National Intelligence University, a federally chartered research university dedicated to national security. There are indications Trump would sign it into law. He's privately mulled scrapping the ODNI because of his frustrations with Gabbard, The Atlantic reported. And that would hamper Gabbard's political ambitions. Her allies told the magazine that Gabbard sees the director of national intelligence role as a stepping stone to a second run for the presidency after her failed attempt as a Democrat in 2020. Trump has had an uneasy relationship with Gabbard, particularly after she posted a video to social media earlier this month describing her visit to Hiroshima, Japan, and warning of the dangerous threat of a nuclear war. The president berated her for the video, reported The New York Times, saying that a discussion of nuclear annihilation would scare people and she shouldn't discuss it. That meant Gabbard was already on thin ice when Trump began to look at striking Iran's nuclear sites. She had privately expressed concern about the fears of a wider war. And Trump flat out said 'she's wrong' when he was asked about Gabbard's testimony in March that Iran had not decided to build a nuclear weapon. While Gabbard was in the Situation Room during the strike, she became sidelined in the aftermath of the attack. And Gabbard didn't join the classified intelligence briefing for senators on Thursday nor did she join the one for House members on Friday. Her defenders say she is still doing important work for the administration. She has publicly supported the airstrike and she has defended Trump's declaration that Iran's nuclear capabilities were destroyed. 'New intelligence confirms what @POTUS has stated numerous times: Iran's nuclear facilities have been destroyed,' she wrote on X. But that doesn't mean the two are close. And Gabbard's position is not helped by Trump's inherent distrust of the intelligence community, which goes back to his first presidential campaign and allegations Russia interfered to help him win the White House. A Trump ally told The Atlantic the president appreciates Gabbard's political appeal to disaffected Democrats but doesn't seek her advice on foreign policy or national security. 'She's a nonplayer,' the person said. 'When I want to call someone to influence Trump, I don't even think of her.' Her position in Trump's world was precarious from the start, given her position. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a smaller agency with a short-lived history. It was created to improve coordination among U.S. spy agencies after the September 11 attacks. It oversees all of the country's 18 intelligence services, including the CIA. But CIA director John Ratcliffe served in Trump's first term and has his own strong relationship with the president. Gabbard has already cut the agency by 25% in line with Trump's efforts at slashing the size of the federal government.
