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Radio Free Asia
13-07-2025
- Politics
- Radio Free Asia
Analysis: Why Vietnam's To Lam moved so quickly to restructure the government
In less than a year as general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam has made moves likened to the drastic cuts that U.S. President Donald Trump and Elon Musk have implemented to U.S. federal agencies through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). To Lam has merged ministries and central government agencies, reduced the number of provinces and cities by half, and dismantled district-level administrative units. Why did To Lam move so fast with reforms, and what are the political, social, and economic impacts? Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University, or Radio Free Asia. Below is a transcript of an interview with Zach Abuza by Truong Son from the RFA Vietnamese service: RFA: What are your thoughts on the administrative reform in Vietnam that Secretary General To Lam just carried out? How significant is the government reshuffle in terms of its social, economic, and political impact, because we know that this is a massive change in Vietnam? Zach Abuza: The changes in the government are really significant and they shouldn't be underestimated. And we have to understand that they're happening at multiple levels. There was the reform of central government ministries. Five were folded in, and some hundred thousand civil servants were either fired or retired. At the provincial level, they went from 63 provinces or provincial-level cities down to 34. So that's almost a 50% reduction — a huge consolidation there. And then they eliminated an entire level of governance at the district level. So it used to go province, district, and then down to the commune level. And they got rid of that mid-level. So they're hoping for more efficiency. Now, all three of those reforms at each level of government have important economic, social, and political implications. Let's start with the government. Those reforms were done in part because the government is notoriously bureaucratic. It's slow. And I think the general secretary really feels that Vietnam has to just be much more responsive, much more accountable, to respond to a rapidly changing international environment, in order to grow the economy, to attract foreign investment. Just had to get rid of red tape. Some of the ministries that were eliminated really were legacy issues. They reflected much more of the government structure at the time of Doi Moi, not all these years into it. You know, the Vietnamese economy is fundamentally different than it was before. And that's why I think you really start to see some of the consolidation, especially in the economic ministries. I think now there are really three key ministries to pay attention to. The Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. These are kind of the three heavy hitters. At the provincial level, it's important to understand that this consolidation will have economic effects. And I think one thing that maybe we need to think about is, with the exception of the provinces in the northwest which is landlocked, you know, bordering Lao and the Chinese frontier, almost every other province now has a piece of coastline. And this is important because it was always the coastal provinces that were more advanced because they had access to ports, harbors and it was easier to get products to international markets. And so the reorganization at that level, certainly makes it easier. No province now, other than those northwestern landlocked ones, has an excuse that they cannot get goods to market anymore. Now, I think the provincial reforms have very significant political implications. And let me explain this at several levels. The first is the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the era of Doi Moi has basically had about one third of their members coming from, you know, the provinces. So provincial party chiefs, all of a sudden that is going to change. And we might see at the next Party Congress expected in January 2026 that we see a smaller central committee overall. And that's one thing that I am looking for. There are other political implications. And that is, you now have almost a 50% reduction in the number of governors in the number of party chiefs. And so the general secretary, through this consolidation actually got to choose winners and losers, right? Going into the next Party Congress, To Lam clearly has the support of those who have kept their jobs. They owe him, right? They could have lost everything. But, more importantly, the year before a party congress, normally nothing happens. And I mean, nothing happens. People are afraid to make decisions. People are afraid to make investments. Often, provinces or cities have funding allocated to them, but they're afraid to use it because they just don't know what's going to happen at the Party Congress. They don't know who's going to emerge on top. They're afraid of implementing policies that then get reversed. So there's traditionally a lot of caution. To Lam has completely thrown that off. He has pushed through the most radical reforms I can think of. And he did it right ahead of a Party Congress. So that to me, says he is very confident that he has the full backing of the Central Committee and that he is very confident that he will be reelected to a full term at the 14th Party Congress. Let me just make one quick point about eliminating the district level of administration. I think this is going to have an interesting impact down the line. I don't see it having a short term political impact, but for Communist Party cadres — they might have been in the cities working their way up, but, you know, all of a sudden you've eliminated a very important pathway to be selected and to be noticed, by the higher echelons of the party. And I think that there is going to be a lot of unhappiness that this real, important level, maybe not administratively, maybe it's not the most important for the functioning of government and efficiency, but for people looking for their career pathway to senior party membership. That is an important stepping stone that has been eliminated. RFA: You just said that Secretary General To Lam is certainly very confident politically. That's why he's carried out this unprecedented reform, I must say, the year before the party Congress, and as you said, which traditionally has been a very quiet year. And not just that he did this in the year prior to the Congress, but also, if we look into the manner in which he carried out this reform, which was really quick. The finish line was achieved within a few months. So, if we look at the scale of the project and the pace it was done this begs the question: Why did he do it in such a manner? Why do you think he has to achieve this reform within such a short period of time? Zach Abuza: The Vietnamese government and Communist Party are not known for quick decision making. They tend to be very slow, deliberative, and cautious. But these reforms happened at lightning speed. And I think that pace took everyone by surprise. Part of the answer is it took everyone by surprise. He made the announcement. And for the government ministries, for example, they had less than three months to implement these major restructuring, government reshuffle, 100,000 civil servants, either being retired or found redundant. Part of the reason he moved quickly is before there could be real resistance to it. He wanted to make sure that no one had time to kind of dig in their heels and resist these reforms, because people, these reforms, create winners and losers, and that was clearly a concern of his. I think that To Lam — and while I certainly find the way he came to power, as the minister of Public Security who completely weaponized the anti-corruption campaign, eliminated all of his rivals on the Politburo in just absolute Machiavellian fashion — I actually think that he is maybe the right man for the job right now. I think he really does understand that Vietnam has this very narrow window of opportunity to push through major economic restructuring and reforms. Vietnam's demographics have peaked. The country will start to see its population decline and fairly rapidly, especially with the rapid urbanization, the increased number of women in the workforce, higher education levels. All those three factors always lead to sharp declines in demographics. So Vietnam has the challenge of soon it's going to start getting old before it gets rich. You know, it's one thing for Japan to get old because it's already rich. Thailand has had a little harder time, and I think Vietnamese policymakers do look to Thailand as a country that has gotten old before it got rich. The second thing is that To Lam is very fearful of being caught in the middle income trap, where Vietnam simply assembles. It does not produce; it doesn't have those ecosystems there. In the current trade negotiations with the United States, the Americans always pointed to the fact that Vietnam's trade deficit with China was very close to its trade surplus with the United States. Now, the United States' thinking was that Vietnam was simply being used as a transshipment point for Chinese goods. To a degree, yes, but that doesn't explain all of it. What explains it is the fact that things that are produced in Vietnam, whether it's Samsung, mobile phones or VinFast cars, are made with components imported from China. So Vietnam hasn't developed that ecosystem. To Lam is very interested in getting the higher value added foreign investment. We hear a lot about semiconductors and other high-end manufacturing. He needs a much more efficient government structure to attract foreign investment. One of the reasons we know foreign investors — there's often a delta between pledged investment and actual shovel in the ground building something is because of bureaucratic red tape. I think To Lam is really concerned that foreign investors are going to get frustrated and move on to the next place because Vietnam's labor costs are going up. It has shortages of electricity. You know, it's been a darling of foreign investors, but that is not a given. That foreign investors can be very fickle. We have watched them leave Vietnam in the past. And let me just make one last point about why he did it so fast. I think this is To Lam really asserting himself politically. He has done what many of us probably would have said, 'Impossible.' No way is he going to get through such momentous restructuring in a quick period of time. There will be too much, you know, resistance to it. He really showed that he has full control over the Central Committee. Now, he still has his former deputy minister, now the Minister of Public Security. He's got another former deputy minister of Public Security in charge of the Central Inspection Commission. He has many levers of power that he can wield against people who are opposed to him. He can still investigate corruption and destroy careers, but I think he really has won over this Central Committee with his vision. One last point we should probably make about these reforms. There is going to be a major shift in power to the South. You have created a huge megacity now. Ho Chi Minh City, all the way out to Vũng Tàu around Bien Hoa. This is now a massive place. Under the former General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng there was a real attempt to crush any southern autonomy. I think we understand that the South is the driver of the economy. To Lam knows that he has to empower the South. He knows that legitimacy is coming from economic development. RFA: I guess he got what he wanted. He restructured the entire governance system not just at the central level, but also the local level as well. So the entire country now is basically governed under a new system that looks very different from when he took power in August 2024. But I'm curious because we understand that this kind of project has massive implications and consequences. And usually people do it with great caution because they need to study. They need to experiment to find the best model. But the way To Lam carried it out was that it was just too quick, too rapid. There was no opportunity for experimentation, for research at all. He just said, 'This is what we are going to do,' and he achieved that within a few months. So what do you think would be the consequences and the challenges that he has to face, given that he has done this too quickly and gave no room for deliberation, for experiment, for research, for debate. Zach Abuza: No doubt there will be growing pains. And a lot of this was rushed. And I imagine in many cases, you are not going to only see some resistance to this and kind of pushback. But just complications and everything from accounting and getting bank accounts and tax collection and all these things are going to be very different. Now, from the central government's position, this is hopefully easier. There are now almost 50% fewer provinces to basically negotiate with. And should make some coordination a little bit easier. But without a doubt this was pretty rushed. Now, I would go back to a point I made earlier, and that is the party chiefs that are in power today after the restructuring owe To Lam — they owe him their jobs and I imagine they will be very responsive, because they're all interested in climbing up the ladder and those who do not perform well and have problems are going to find their political careers might not last much longer than January. So I think he's using the clock very effectively, you know, like a good football coach uses the clock in a game. I think he is doing that. But yeah, there will be problems, and we just haven't seen them yet. There are going to be issues with spending and infrastructure development. You now have these party chiefs that are going to think about which part of the province, these larger provinces to invest in. You know, there are going to be rural communes that are going to feel they're being left behind because the emphasis will be on more development to the coast and where industry is. And so, yeah, without a doubt, we will see how this plays out.
Radio Free Asia
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Radio Free Asia
PERSPECTIVE: Why Vietnam's To Lam moved so quickly to restructure the government
In less than a year as general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam has made moves likened to the drastic cuts that U.S. President Donald Trump and Elon Musk have implemented to U.S. federal agencies through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). To Lam has merged ministries and central government agencies, reduced the number of provinces and cities by half, and dismantled district-level administrative units. Why did To Lam move so fast with reforms, and what are the political, social, and economic impacts? Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University, or Radio Free Asia. Below is a transcript of an interview with Zach Abuza by Truong Son from the RFA Vietnamese service: RFA: What are your thoughts on the administrative reform in Vietnam that Secretary General To Lam just carried out? How significant is the government reshuffle in terms of its social, economic, and political impact, because we know that this is a massive change in Vietnam? Zach Abuza: The changes in the government are really significant and they shouldn't be underestimated. And we have to understand that they're happening at multiple levels. There was the reform of central government ministries. Five were folded in, and some hundred thousand civil servants were either fired or retired. At the provincial level, they went from 63 provinces or provincial-level cities down to 34. So that's almost a 50% reduction — a huge consolidation there. And then they eliminated an entire level of governance at the district level. So it used to go province, district, and then down to the commune level. And they got rid of that mid-level. So they're hoping for more efficiency. Now, all three of those reforms at each level of government have important economic, social, and political implications. Let's start with the government. Those reforms were done in part because the government is notoriously bureaucratic. It's slow. And I think the general secretary really feels that Vietnam has to just be much more responsive, much more accountable, to respond to a rapidly changing international environment, in order to grow the economy, to attract foreign investment. Just had to get rid of red tape. Some of the ministries that were eliminated really were legacy issues. They reflected much more of the government structure at the time of Doi Moi, not all these years into it. You know, the Vietnamese economy is fundamentally different than it was before. And that's why I think you really start to see some of the consolidation, especially in the economic ministries. I think now there are really three key ministries to pay attention to. The Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. These are kind of the three heavy hitters. At the provincial level, it's important to understand that this consolidation will have economic effects. And I think one thing that maybe we need to think about is, with the exception of the provinces in the northwest which is landlocked, you know, bordering Lao and the Chinese frontier, almost every other province now has a piece of coastline. And this is important because it was always the coastal provinces that were more advanced because they had access to ports, harbors and it was easier to get products to international markets. And so the reorganization at that level, certainly makes it easier. No province now, other than those northwestern landlocked ones, has an excuse that they cannot get goods to market anymore. Now, I think the provincial reforms have very significant political implications. And let me explain this at several levels. The first is the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the era of Doi Moi has basically had about one third of their members coming from, you know, the provinces. So provincial party chiefs, all of a sudden that is going to change. And we might see at the next Party Congress expected in January 2026 that we see a smaller central committee overall. And that's one thing that I am looking for. There are other political implications. And that is, you now have almost a 50% reduction in the number of governors in the number of party chiefs. And so the general secretary, through this consolidation actually got to choose winners and losers, right? Going into the next Party Congress, To Lam clearly has the support of those who have kept their jobs. They owe him, right? They could have lost everything. But, more importantly, the year before a party congress, normally nothing happens. And I mean, nothing happens. People are afraid to make decisions. People are afraid to make investments. Often, provinces or cities have funding allocated to them, but they're afraid to use it because they just don't know what's going to happen at the Party Congress. They don't know who's going to emerge on top. They're afraid of implementing policies that then get reversed. So there's traditionally a lot of caution. To Lam has completely thrown that off. He has pushed through the most radical reforms I can think of. And he did it right ahead of a Party Congress. So that to me, says he is very confident that he has the full backing of the Central Committee and that he is very confident that he will be reelected to a full term at the 14th Party Congress. Let me just make one quick point about eliminating the district level of administration. I think this is going to have an interesting impact down the line. I don't see it having a short term political impact, but for Communist Party cadres — they might have been in the cities working their way up, but, you know, all of a sudden you've eliminated a very important pathway to be selected and to be noticed, by the higher echelons of the party. And I think that there is going to be a lot of unhappiness that this real, important level, maybe not administratively, maybe it's not the most important for the functioning of government and efficiency, but for people looking for their career pathway to senior party membership. That is an important stepping stone that has been eliminated. RFA: You just said that Secretary General To Lam is certainly very confident politically. That's why he's carried out this unprecedented reform, I must say, the year before the party Congress, and as you said, which traditionally has been a very quiet year. And not just that he did this in the year prior to the Congress, but also, if we look into the manner in which he carried out this reform, which was really quick. The finish line was achieved within a few months. So, if we look at the scale of the project and the pace it was done this begs the question: Why did he do it in such a manner? Why do you think he has to achieve this reform within such a short period of time? Zach Abuza: The Vietnamese government and Communist Party are not known for quick decision making. They tend to be very slow, deliberative, and cautious. But these reforms happened at lightning speed. And I think that pace took everyone by surprise. Part of the answer is it took everyone by surprise. He made the announcement. And for the government ministries, for example, they had less than three months to implement these major restructuring, government reshuffle, 100,000 civil servants, either being retired or found redundant. Part of the reason he moved quickly is before there could be real resistance to it. He wanted to make sure that no one had time to kind of dig in their heels and resist these reforms, because people, these reforms, create winners and losers, and that was clearly a concern of his. I think that To Lam — and while I certainly find the way he came to power, as the minister of Public Security who completely weaponized the anti-corruption campaign, eliminated all of his rivals on the Politburo in just absolute Machiavellian fashion — I actually think that he is maybe the right man for the job right now. I think he really does understand that Vietnam has this very narrow window of opportunity to push through major economic restructuring and reforms. Vietnam's demographics have peaked. The country will start to see its population decline and fairly rapidly, especially with the rapid urbanization, the increased number of women in the workforce, higher education levels. All those three factors always lead to sharp declines in demographics. So Vietnam has the challenge of soon it's going to start getting old before it gets rich. You know, it's one thing for Japan to get old because it's already rich. Thailand has had a little harder time, and I think Vietnamese policymakers do look to Thailand as a country that has gotten old before it got rich. The second thing is that To Lam is very fearful of being caught in the middle income trap, where Vietnam simply assembles. It does not produce; it doesn't have those ecosystems there. In the current trade negotiations with the United States, the Americans always pointed to the fact that Vietnam's trade deficit with China was very close to its trade surplus with the United States. Now, the United States' thinking was that Vietnam was simply being used as a transshipment point for Chinese goods. To a degree, yes, but that doesn't explain all of it. What explains it is the fact that things that are produced in Vietnam, whether it's Samsung, mobile phones or VinFast cars, are made with components imported from China. So Vietnam hasn't developed that ecosystem. To Lam is very interested in getting the higher value added foreign investment. We hear a lot about semiconductors and other high-end manufacturing. He needs a much more efficient government structure to attract foreign investment. One of the reasons we know foreign investors — there's often a delta between pledged investment and actual shovel in the ground building something is because of bureaucratic red tape. I think To Lam is really concerned that foreign investors are going to get frustrated and move on to the next place because Vietnam's labor costs are going up. It has shortages of electricity. You know, it's been a darling of foreign investors, but that is not a given. That foreign investors can be very fickle. We have watched them leave Vietnam in the past. And let me just make one last point about why he did it so fast. I think this is To Lam really asserting himself politically. He has done what many of us probably would have said, 'Impossible.' No way is he going to get through such momentous restructuring in a quick period of time. There will be too much, you know, resistance to it. He really showed that he has full control over the Central Committee. Now, he still has his former deputy minister, now the Minister of Public Security. He's got another former deputy minister of Public Security in charge of the Central Inspection Commission. He has many levers of power that he can wield against people who are opposed to him. He can still investigate corruption and destroy careers, but I think he really has won over this Central Committee with his vision. One last point we should probably make about these reforms. There is going to be a major shift in power to the South. You have created a huge megacity now. Ho Chi Minh City, all the way out to Vũng Tàu around Bien Hoa. This is now a massive place. Under the former General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng there was a real attempt to crush any southern autonomy. I think we understand that the South is the driver of the economy. To Lam knows that he has to empower the South. He knows that legitimacy is coming from economic development. RFA: I guess he got what he wanted. He restructured the entire governance system not just at the central level, but also the local level as well. So the entire country now is basically governed under a new system that looks very different from when he took power in August 2024. But I'm curious because we understand that this kind of project has massive implications and consequences. And usually people do it with great caution because they need to study. They need to experiment to find the best model. But the way To Lam carried it out was that it was just too quick, too rapid. There was no opportunity for experimentation, for research at all. He just said, 'This is what we are going to do,' and he achieved that within a few months. So what do you think would be the consequences and the challenges that he has to face, given that he has done this too quickly and gave no room for deliberation, for experiment, for research, for debate. Zach Abuza: No doubt there will be growing pains. And a lot of this was rushed. And I imagine in many cases, you are not going to only see some resistance to this and kind of pushback. But just complications and everything from accounting and getting bank accounts and tax collection and all these things are going to be very different. Now, from the central government's position, this is hopefully easier. There are now almost 50% fewer provinces to basically negotiate with. And should make some coordination a little bit easier. But without a doubt this was pretty rushed. Now, I would go back to a point I made earlier, and that is the party chiefs that are in power today after the restructuring owe To Lam — they owe him their jobs and I imagine they will be very responsive, because they're all interested in climbing up the ladder and those who do not perform well and have problems are going to find their political careers might not last much longer than January. So I think he's using the clock very effectively, you know, like a good football coach uses the clock in a game. I think he is doing that. But yeah, there will be problems, and we just haven't seen them yet. There are going to be issues with spending and infrastructure development. You now have these party chiefs that are going to think about which part of the province, these larger provinces to invest in. You know, there are going to be rural communes that are going to feel they're being left behind because the emphasis will be on more development to the coast and where industry is. And so, yeah, without a doubt, we will see how this plays out.
DW
11-06-2025
- Politics
- DW
EU, Southeast Asia aim to boost security for undersea cables – DW – 06/09/2025
Both telecommunications and international trade rely on cables connecting continents across the ocean floor. In a changing world, Asian and European powers are looking for ways to protect these vital links from sabotage. The world's undersea cable network spans roughly 1.4 million kilometers (870,000 miles) and carries over 95% of intercontinental internet traffic, yet it remains vulnerable to accidental damage, such as ship anchors, and deliberate disruption. Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and Red Sea have underscored the cables' fragility. Policymakers are now staging international initiatives to safeguard the system. "We need to work together to defend the entire network," Singaporean Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing said at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier security forum, earlier this month. "There's no point trying to defend the integrity and security of a submarine cable by looking at a point. We need both ends to be secure," he added. NATO nations patrol Baltic Sea as cables fail In February 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea were severed when anchors from a cargo vessel sunk by Houthi militants dragged along the seabed. The damage caused a sharp reduction in internet capacity between Europe and Asia, disrupting everything from financial transactions to video conferencing. Meanwhile, Europe has struggled with a series of similar faults in the Baltic Sea, with many Western officials hinting those cables were intentionally damaged by ships linked to Russia. Experts have warned, however, that there has been no proof of deliberate damage. Estonia steps up patrols after undersea cable attack To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Since January, some NATO members have expanded the deployment of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones to conduct regular cable-surveillance missions across vital waterways. Beijing using cable projects as leverage in naval disputes In Southeast Asia, subsea infrastructure also faces similar geopolitical friction. In February, Taiwanese officials detained a Chinese-crewed ship after an undersea communications cable was damaged near the self-ruled island, which China sees as a breakaway province. China has also increasingly pressured cable consortia laying new links from Japan through the South China Sea to seek Beijing's "permission," effectively doubling down on its claims in internationally disputed waters. Telecommunication cables are also a linchpin of global trade Image: "This is just another way that China is trying to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea," Zachary Abuza, professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW. China is also reportedly developing "advanced cable-cutting devices capable of targeting armored cables at unprecedented depths," according to a commentary published by Tokyo-based magazine Nikkei Asia this week. Southeast Asian nations are also worried about the cables being threatened by natural disasters and possibly costing them access to new and expanded renewable energy projects, such as offshore wind farms. According to Nikkei Asia, investment in the submarine power cable sector is projected to reach $1.95 billion (€1.70) by 2030. Hanoi 'cautious not to anger China' Vietnam, a nation of 90 million people served by just five undersea cables, lost up to 75% of its data capacity in February 2023 when all five suffered partial or total damage. In June last year, three of the five submarine internet cables failed again. Europe's undersea cables under attack? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video The cause for those disruptions is still unclear, at least officially. Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, told DW that Hanoi is "cautious not to anger China and tends to dismiss the suspicion that the cables were intentionally damaged." "They argue that the cables are located in one of the world's busiest shipping routes, hence the chance that fishing vessels unintentionally damage them is high," Vuving added. "However, this argument leaves unanswered the question of why the rate of incidents rose sharply in recent years." EU as a way out of US-China clinch Vietnam wants to add up to four new cables in the coming years to significantly boost connectivity speeds and the power supply, as the country looks to progress into higher-end, tech manufacturing. Hanoi has encouraged Vietnamese telecom companies to spearhead this move. However, laying cables across the ocean floor is costly, and Vietnamese firms are looking for outside investment, mainly from China and the US. "Many in Vietnam see this as a no-win situation as they do not want to be dependent on either China or the US and certainly do not want to get entangled in the US-China competition," said Vuving. "European companies can help Vietnam escape this catch-22 situation. The same can be said regarding other countries in Southeast Asia." Brussels working on 'cable diplomacy' France's Alcatel Submarine Networks is often regarded as the global leader in subsea cable installation, and several European firms operate sizable fleets of cable repair ships. In February, the EU published its Cable Security Action plan, which called on Brussels to "develop and deploy an advanced cable diplomacy." "When it comes to addressing incidents," the plan reads, "the [EU] should enhance the exchange of information with, for instance, Indo Pacific partners who are facing similar incidents in relation to critical submarine infrastructures." Undersea cable damage leads to internet blackouts in Africa To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Soon thereafter, Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission's executive vice president in charge of tech sovereignty and security, announced that almost €1 billion would be redirected in the EU's budget to boost surveillance of undersea cables and establish a fleet of emergency repair vessels. Does US want Europeans in Asia? Whether Europe is actually capable of supporting Asia is another matter. "While Europeans could help build more undersea cable architecture for Southeast Asia, China already dominates the undersea cable network in the region," Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, told DW. "It would take a massive and very costly effort by Europe to come anywhere near supplanting China's cable network, and I don't think Europe can afford that," he added. German frigate completes passage through South China Sea To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Moreover, there could be pushback from the US, which appears to increasingly believe that Europeans should disengage from the Indo-Pacific region. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that European states should limit their engagement and investments in regions like Southeast Asia to focus entirely on safeguarding Europe. Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, pushed back a day later, arguing that "it's an illusion that these security theaters of Indo-Pacific and Europe are not interlinked." She called for Europe and Asia to collaborate against covert "shadow fleets" and review maritime security laws to protect submarine cable networks. Edited by: Darko Janjevic
DW
09-06-2025
- Politics
- DW
EU, Southeast Asia look for ways to protect undersea cables – DW – 06/09/2025
Both telecommunications and international trade largely rely on cables connecting continents across the ocean floor. In a changing world, Asian and European powers are looking for ways to protect them from sabotage. The world's undersea cable network spans roughly 1.4 million kilometers (870,000 miles) and carries over 95% of intercontinental internet traffic, yet it remains vulnerable to accidental damage, such as ship anchors, and deliberate disruption. Recent incidents in the Baltic and Red Seas have underscored the cables' fragility as policymakers staged international initiatives to safeguard the system. "We need to work together to defend the entire network," Singaporean Minister of Defense Chan Chun Sing said at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier security forum, earlier this month. "There's no point trying to defend the integrity and security of a submarine cable by looking at a point. We need both ends to be secure," he added. NATO nations patrol Baltic Sea as cables fail In February 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea were severed when anchors from a cargo vessel sunk by Houthi militants dragged along the seabed. The damage caused a sharp reduction in internet capacity between Europe and Asia, disrupting everything from financial transactions to video conferencing. Meanwhile, Europe has struggled with a series of similar faults in the Baltic Sea, with many Western officials hinting those cables were intentionally damaged by Russia-linked ships. Experts warn, however, that there is no proof of deliberate damage. Estonia steps up patrols after undersea cable attack To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Since January, some NATO members have expanded deployments of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones to conduct regular cable-surveillance missions across vital waterways. Beijing using cable projects as leverage in naval disputes In Southeast Asia, subsea infrastructure also faces similar geopolitical friction. In February, Taiwanese officials detained a Chinese-crewed ship after an undersea communications cable was damaged near the self-ruled island, which China sees as a breakaway province. China has also increasingly pressured cable consortia laying new links from Japan through the South China Sea to seek Beijing's "permission," effectively doubling down on its claims in internationally disputed waters. Telecommunication cables are also a linchpin of global trade Image: "This is just another way that China is trying to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea," Zachary Abuza, professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW. China is also reportedly developing "advanced cable-cutting devices capable of targeting armored cables at unprecedented depths," according to a commentary published by Tokyo-based magazine Nikkei Asia this week. Southeast Asian nations are also worried about the cables being threatened by natural disasters, and possibly costing them access to new and expanded renewable energy projects, such as offshore wind farms. According to Nikkei Asia, investment in the submarine power cable sector is projected to reach $1.95 billion (€1.70) by 2030. Hanoi 'cautious not to anger China' Vietnam, a nation of 90 million people served by just five undersea cables, lost up to 75% of its data capacity in February 2023 when all five suffered partial or total damage. In June last year, three of the five submarine internet cables failed again. Europe's undersea cables under attack? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video The cause for those disruptions is still unclear, at least officially. Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, told DW that Hanoi is "cautious not to anger China and tend to dismiss the suspicion that the cables were intentionally damaged." "They argue that the cables are located in one of the world's busiest shipping routes, hence the chance that fishing vessels unintentionally damage them is high," Vuving added. "However, this argument leaves unanswered the question of why the rate of incidents rose sharply in recent years." EU as a way out of US-China clinch Vietnam wants to add up to four new cables in the coming years to significantly boost connectivity speeds and the power supply as the country looks to progress into higher-end, tech manufacturing. Hanoi has encouraged Vietnamese telecom companies to spearhead this move. However, laying cables across the ocean floor is costly, and Vietnamese firms are looking for outside investment, mainly from China and the US. "Many in Vietnam see this as a no-win situation as they do not want to be dependent on either China or the US and certainly do not want to get entangled in the US-China competition," Vuving told DW. "European companies can help Vietnam escape this Catch-22 situation. The same can be said regarding other countries in Southeast Asia." Brussels working on 'cable diplomacy' France's Alcatel Submarine Networks is often regarded as the global leader in subsea cable installation, and several European firms operate sizeable fleets of cable repair ships. In February, the EU published its Action Plan on Cable Security, which called on Brussels to "develop and deploy an advanced cable diplomacy." "When it comes to addressing incidents," the plan reads, "the [EU] should enhance the exchange of information with, for instance, Indo Pacific partners who are facing similar incidents in relation to critical submarine infrastructures." Undersea cable damage leads to internet blackouts in Africa To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Soon thereafter, Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission's executive vice president in charge of security, announced that almost €1 billion is being redirected in the EU's budget to boost surveillance of undersea cables and establish a fleet of emergency repair vessels. Does US want Europeans in Asia? Whether Europe is actually capable of supporting Asia is another matter. "While Europeans could help build more undersea cable architecture for Southeast Asia, China already dominates the undersea cable network in the region," Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, told DW. "It would take a massive and very costly effort by Europe to come anywhere near supplanting China's cable network, and I don't think Europe can afford that," he added. German frigate completes passage through South China Sea To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Moreover, there could be pushback from the US, which appears to increasingly believe that Europeans should disengage from the Indo-Pacific region. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit earlier this month, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth argued that European states should limit their engagement and investments in regions like Southeast Asia to focus entirely on safeguarding Europe. Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, pushed back a day later, arguing that "it's an illusion that these security theaters of Indo-Pacific and Europe are not interlinked." She called for Europe and Asia to collaborate against covert "shadow fleets" and review maritime security laws to protect submarine cable networks. Edited by: Darko Janjevic
DW
28-05-2025
- Business
- DW
Is Vietnam courting Trump family with luxury golf course? – DW – 05/28/2025
A luxury golf resort owned by US President Donald Trump's family has swiftly received preferential treatment from Hanoi. The move comes as Vietnam faces high tariffs from the Trump administration. Ground was broken on May 21 for a $1.5 billion luxury golf resort in northern Vietnam owned by US President Donald Trump's family business. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Eric Trump, executive vice president of the Trump Organization, presided over the ceremony. Days later, Eric Trump traveled to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam's economic powerhouse, to finalize an agreement for a luxury hotel development in an upscale district of the rapidly expanding city. Reports indicate that the Vietnamese government expedited approvals and potentially violated domestic regulations to favor the Trump Organization. The deals come as Vietnam faces a 46% tariff threatened by the Trump administration on April 2. Although these punitive "reciprocal tariffs" have been postponed until July, Vietnam remains under pressure, especially considering its substantial $123 billion trade surplus with the United States. Vietnam ranks among the most trade-dependent countries globally, with exports to the US alone accounting for approximately 30% of its GDP, according to official data. "Hanoi understands that for the Trump Administration, what is public is private, and the best way to curry favor is to do deals with the Trump family," Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, told DW. Relations with Vietnam were positive in the early years of Trump's first term. Former Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc was one of the first world leaders to meet Trump at the White House in 2017, and Hanoi was later chosen to host the high-profile but unsuccessful summit between Trump and North Korea's Kim Jong Un. However, Trump's stance shifted drastically in 2019 when he accused Vietnam of being the "worst abuser" in trade relations with the US, launching investigations into alleged unfair practices. These measures were only reversed after President Joe Biden took office. Eric Trump and Vietnamese officials attend the groundbreaking ceremony for the Trump International Hung Yen Image: dpa/picture alliance Vietnam fast-tracks Trump's luxury golf resort Although officially a private venture, the Vietnamese government significantly facilitated the Trump Organization's golf resort plans. In mid-March, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh met Charles James Boyd Bowman, head of the Trump Organization's projects in Vietnam, and promised to "conduct a thorough review to fast-track the project." He called on the Trump Organisation to "position Vietnam as a business base and expand its investment footprint in the country," according to Vietnamese media reports. Vietnam has indeed delivered on its promise, achieving record-breaking speed for regulatory approval, Abuza noted. Typically, projects of this scale take years; this one reached groundbreaking within three months of initial filings. In March, Hanoi also gave permission for SpaceX, owned by Elon Musk, Trump's efficiency tsar, to launch its Starlink satellite internet service on a trial basis. Earlier this week, the New York Times newspaper revealed a letter from Vietnamese officials that explicitly stated that the project required support from senior members of the Vietnamese government because it was "receiving special attention from the Trump administration and President Donald Trump personally." According to the New York Times' report, the Vietnamese government has "ignored its own laws" by granting concessions to the Trump Organization that are "more generous than what even the most connected locals receive." Moreover, the entire project runs counter to the housing master plan of Hung Yen province, where it is located, and potentially the state's environmental and safety regulations. According to the aforementioned letter by Vietnamese government officials, the groundbreaking event was also brought forward to avoid "missing the window to capitalize on the support of the Donald Trump administration." Vietnam's strategic hedging The initial agreement for the golf course was signed last September, two months before Trump won the US presidential elections. "Although the specifics leading up to the deal are not known, one plausible theory is that a real estate project of this scale could not have proceeded without the backing of the Vietnamese government," Hoang Thi Ha, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, wrote last month in an article for the institute's Fulcrum analysis website . She added that state backing "could have been a way for Vietnam to hedge its interests with Trump even before the US presidential election outcome was known." Moreover, the golf resort's location is significant. Hung Yen is just outside Hanoi and is the home province of To Lam, the communist party's general secretary. In early 2024, the incumbent and powerful general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, passed away. In his place, To Lam, previously the public security minister and Trong's enforcer, quickly consolidated power. Lam became state president and then party chief, breaking the separation of powers norm of Vietnamese politics and leading some commentators to wonder whether he had dictatorial plans. He later relinquished the presidency. Since last year, To Lam has purged various ministries and appointed officials or personal friends from Hung Yen province in their place. Business and politics "There's little doubt that Hanoi has rolled out the red carpet for Trump-affiliated businesses in recent months," Khac Giang Nguyen, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, told DW. "It's a calculated, transactional move, with hopes that favourable treatment for Trump's business interests might buy some goodwill in Washington amid the ongoing trade negotiations," he added. The White House maintains that President Trump's trade discussions are entirely separate from his family's business dealings. Vietnam has actively sought to mitigate tariff threats, pledging earlier to reduce all duties on US imports and increase purchases of American goods. Khac Giang Nguyen said Hanoi's dealings with the Trump Organization reflect a strategic balancing act designed to navigate complex political and economic pressures. However, the analyst said this is not a "sustainable strategy," and that in the long run, "Vietnam's real test will be finding a stable way to balance the competing demands of Washington and Beijing, rather than relying on quick fixes." US-China tensions test ties between ASEAN members To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Edited by: Wesley Rahn
