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Web Release
17-07-2025
- Politics
- Web Release
AUB Holds Panel Discussion on the Reform of Governance in Saudi Arabia
The Good Governance and Citizenship Observatory (GGCO) at the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship at the American University of Beirut (AUB) hosted a panel discussion titled 'Hawkama and Vision 2030: The Reform of Governance in Saudi Arabia.' The event featured Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University Bernard Haykel, a leading expert on the Gulf and Middle East. The conversation explored how institutional reform and regulatory change are advancing transparency, accountability, and sustainable development as part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's broader transformation agenda. The panel drew a distinguished audience, including Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Dr. Waleed Al-Bukhari; Spanish Ambassador to Lebanon Jesús Santos Aguado; Mexican Ambassador to Lebanon Francisco Romero Bock; Dr. Fadi Makki, Lebanon's minister of state for administrative reform; and former ministers. Also in attendance were Dr. Fadlo Khuri, AUB president; Dr. Zaher Dawy, AUB provost; as well as university deans, senior administrators, and faculty members. Director of the Asfari Institute Lina Abou-Habib opened the event by welcoming the attendees and highlighting the significance and timeliness of the discussion, describing it as 'within the mandate of the institute, to discuss prospects, trends, and emerging initiatives that influence governance structures in the Arab region, particularly at this incredibly important moment of transition and instability.' Dr. Simon Kachar, GGCO founding and current director, and lecturer in political science at AUB, followed with opening remarks that placed the discussion in a broader regional and institutional context. 'In an era marked by rapid transformations and evolving global dynamics, understanding the nuances of governance reform becomes paramount,' he said. 'Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 represents an ambitious and far-reaching blueprint for economic diversification and social change, and at its very core lies the fundamental pillar of governance.' Kachar noted that the GGCO was established to foster critical thinking, encourage informed dialogue, and advance knowledge on good governance and active citizenship within Arab contexts. 'We believe that genuine progress and sustainable development are linked to transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance structures,' he added. He emphasized that the panel provided an opportunity to examine how Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 is being translated into practice and how governance reforms are reshaping institutions. 'Saudi Arabia is positioning itself as a forward-looking nation, globally integrated and domestically resilient,' he said. Dr. Fadlo Khuri, AUB president, then delivered his welcoming remarks, highlighting the panel's regional and global relevance. 'Questions like how Vision 2030 is shaping Saudi Arabia in the region are extremely germane to what's happening in Lebanon and the entire region,' he said. He added that understanding what is happening in Saudi Arabia is essential—not only for neighboring countries, but for the international community as a whole. 'Saudi Arabia is a global concern,' he noted. He went on to commend the event's keynote guest, Professor Haykel, for his academic depth and candid insight. 'I feel fortunate that today at AUB, we have arguably the most insightful expert—and also one of the most honest experts in the region. Not just academically qualified, but more than happy to share careful observations from a place of objectivity and great knowledge,' Khuri added. The panel discussion was moderated by Dr. Tania Haddad, associate professor of public administration and nonprofit management at AUB and member of the GGCO Steering Committee. She opened by framing the scope of the conversation: 'Over the past decade, the kingdom has undertaken one of the most ambitious state-led transformation agendas in the region. Anchored in Vision 2030, these reforms span economic diversification, bureaucratic modernization, social liberalization, and institutional restructuring. This panel aims to critically examine the governance dimensions of these reforms, including their origins, mechanisms, and implications.' Haddad then introduced Professor Haykel as a prominent scholar of the Arabian Peninsula, whose work focuses on the politics, economics, and history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Yemen, and 'has critically engaged with questions of state reform, institutional change, and governance in the kingdom.' The discussion unfolded as a moderated, in-depth exchange, structured around four key themes central to understanding Saudi Arabia's governance reform trajectory. It began by examining the driving forces behind the reform agenda. Haykel traced the impetus to a growing realization among Saudi leadership—and increasingly, among the public—that the previous system of governance had become unsustainable. 'The driver for reform in Saudi Arabia is a sense that exists among the leadership—but I think it's also prevalent in society—that the country, as it was functioning before the accession of King Salman in 2015… was unsustainable, and that the country needed to dramatically change,' Haykel said. He added that 'what's particularly distinctive about the kingdom, and you don't find it in other countries of the GCC, is the brutal honesty with which the leadership in the kingdom talked about this need.' The conversation then explored how reforms have reshaped the relationship between the state and its citizens, particularly through the strategic deployment of nationalism, identity, and new narratives of civic responsibility. It also addressed the institutionalization of accountability, transparency, and citizen participation, and concluded with a reflection on the broader regional implications of the Saudi reform experience. The event concluded with a question-and-answer session that invited reflections on the sustainability, implementation, and broader impact of the reforms.
Yahoo
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
'The president is not a neocon': Trump tests his global approach in Iran
Donald Trump is putting his foreign policy instincts to the ultimate test in the Middle East — even as he, and his party, are still working to define something like a Trump Doctrine. The White House describes Trump's identity on the global stage with a callback to Ronald Reagan that's a cornerstone of GOP ideology: 'Peace through strength.' Yet reality is proving more complicated than that simple phrase this week, as the party's non-interventionists cheer Trump's post-bombing pivot to diplomacy and its hawks assess whether he's gone far enough for them. 'A ceasefire that leads to a sustainable peace, where Iran changes its policy of trying to destroy the State of Israel and would actually recognize the State of Israel, would be a great outcome,' Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., told Semafor. 'A ceasefire that doesn't lead to that and more, probably is a step backwards, because it gives them time to rearm and replenish.' Trump could have allowed Israel to prosecute its war without directly striking — or he could have tried to incite a regime change in Iran. Instead he chose a middle ground that's still scrambling alliances within his party; Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene argued Monday that Trump's bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities is 'a complete bait-and-switch to please the neocons' and ultra-hawkish pundit Mark Levin aired skepticism about a ceasefire. If anything is clear to many Republicans, it's that Trump's global doctrine has no firm definition beyond his own best sense of protecting US interests. Despite plenty of internal cries that he'd become a neoconservative, few people who've worked with him agree. 'The jury is still out' on Trump's foreign policy, David Schenker, who served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs during his first term, said in an interview. But, Schenker added: 'The president is not a neocon.' Marc Short, chief of staff to Vice President Mike Pence during Trump's first term, described Trump as 'more of a realist' who has, when it comes to Iran, 'been consistent.' After all, Trump ripped up former President Barack Obama's deal to contain Tehran's nuclear program and returned to sanctions, making clear he saw little room for compromise. Reagan's 'peace through strength,' as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, included groundbreaking denuclearization agreements, furiously criticized by the right at the time. One person close to Trump told Semafor that his foreign policy approach is driven by those 'who got burned by Reaganism,' arguing that some of his allies don't grasp the nuance. 'When your foreign policy is called America First, you're bound to find among you, 'America only' types. And Donald Trump has never been 'America only,' ever,' this person said. 'The idea that he would never stand for Iran having nuclear weapons has never changed. And the 'America only' types who are just now discovering it? Welcome to the party.' White House spokeswoman Liz Huston said that 'President Trump's proven 'peace through strength' approach is keeping Americans safe, deterring hostile threats around the world, and restoring stability to regions plagued by chaos.' The few non-interventionist Republicans who have not broadly supported Trump's moves this week seem to be adjusting to the new reality — even as the president keeps attacking Rep. Thomas Massie, the Kentucky congressman who will withdraw his push for a war powers vote if the ceasefire holds. Another in that group, Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, said Monday that 'all the neocons that have wanted us to be involved in every war in the Middle East are jumping up and down beside themselves' after Trump's strikes — but Tuesday, he was wishing Trump luck with diplomacy. Some Republicans 'don't have a sufficient degree of restraint in regard to war. And my hope is that the ceasefire will last,' Paul said. 'And that the president's natural instinct not to send troops into the Middle East will prevail.' Other, more Reaganite Republicans were taken aback by the frustrations with Israel that Trump expressed to cameras on Tuesday morning. Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., told Semafor he wasn't 'sure why he was more critical of Israel.' He advised Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to be prepared to go back into Iran if the intelligence shows its nuclear program is still humming. 'If they're not destroyed, between us and Israel, you can't allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. It's the number one most [likely reason] for nuclear war,' Bacon said. That's the toughest possibility for Trump to consider as he and Vice President JD Vance insist it's not a war on Iran but on its nuclear program: What if that program is easy to rebuild? What's more, the president now must put his peacemaker moniker in the hands of other countries — not just Iran and Israel. There's also the Ukraine-Russia war, something Trump made clear on the trail that he wants to solve and that continues to vex his administration. 'What's going to happen is that Donald Trump's success in creating peace in Russia-Ukraine depends in large part on his success in the Middle East right now,' the person close to Trump told Semafor. 'What Donald Trump has created is a domino effect.' And if he's not successful, this person added, he 'has always got the option of walking away.' Vance built his own national name on a more non-interventionist stance and offered what amounted to his own definition of the Trump doctrine on Tuesday. '1) clearly define an American interest; 2) negotiate aggressively to achieve that interest; 3) use overwhelming force if necessary,' the vice president posted on X. And one former Trump administration national security official discounted the idea that Trump's Iran strikes amount to any major shift in his approach: 'Iran is very personal for him, because they directly threatened him and his family.' Schenker, another former Trump adviser, even likened his decision to strike Iranian nuclear sites to his first-term strike on Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani. The post-Trump Republican Party will have to sort out how it can neatly define a foreign policy doctrine that doesn't quite fit into one box — and is often based around support for him rather than a specific policy toolbox. How can his successor carry on that same legacy? You see Vance embracing Trump's brand as necessary. But there's no telling whether Trump will shift again, whether in the Middle East or Europe, and there's no guarantee that Vance can keep the whole party with him the way Trump has. For now, this is what matters most: There appears to be little limit to how far most Republicans will follow him — into Iran, or elsewhere. Democrats are sharpening their attacks against Trump's foreign policy after the US bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, NBC News reported. Congress's Iran briefings from Tuesday to Thursday to allow Secretaries Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth to attend. A preliminary US intelligence assessment determined that Trump's strikes likely set back Iranian nuclear capability by only months, CNN reported.
The Print
22-06-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Trump's seduction of Asim Munir won't get him cheap labour to uphold American Peace
The gushing reception President Donald Trump gave to Field Marshal Munir—making him the first Pakistan Army chief not holding political office to visit the White House—has caused no small anxiety in India. For the first time since 26/11, the United States seems to be tilting toward Islamabad, with Trump insisting on playing peacemaker on Kashmir. And yet, the effort can add up to little. Look at the old film of the imperial reception granted to Field Marshal Ayub Khan as he travelled through the United States in 1961. In the following decade, he lost a war and was rejected by his people and forced out of office by his brother officers. To seduce Pakistani generals is a perilous project. Field Marshal Asim Munir was content with goat cheese gateau and caramelised onions over his rack of lamb. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, one account assures us , was present at a party where 19-year-old showgirl Christine Keeler wasn't wearing any clothes. There is the story —take it for what it is worth—that General Yahya Khan snubbed his key ally, the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Raza Pehlavi, as he was busy in the bedroom. Trump's gargantuan vanity gives the impression that he's just after a Nobel Peace Prize. In fact, he seeks to resolve a fracture that has confronted American policy since the birth of India and Pakistan, one that defeated figures like General Dwight Eisenhower and Robert F Kennedy. The stakes are far higher than containing jihadists in Afghanistan: They go to the heart of America's projection of power in the Middle East. Endless wars, Trump is discovering, will continue to be fought whether or not America continues to maintain the imperial presence that has upheld the global order across the Middle East. Iran is just one of many conflicts that might erupt across the region. To fight these wars of the future, Trump needs allies and partners—the cheaper, the better. The eastern guard Following the lessons of the war in Korea, the US persuaded itself it needed partners to secure its access to oil—to the great fields in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. In February 1951, a meeting of US ambassadors in the Middle East marked out Pakistan as one possible source of troops. Later that month, historian Robert McMahon has written, State Department officials based in South Asia concluded that Pakistan would be willing to commit forces to the Middle East, 'provided the Kashmir question is settled'. Through 1951, gushing commentary on Pakistan's military size, its martial traditions, and its pro-Western leanings spread rapidly through the US establishment. Later that year, newly appointed as Pakistan's military chief, Ayub reached out to Washington, asking for discussions on his country's role in the Middle East. America's strategic establishment was keen to take the bait. 'With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended,' George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, told a meeting at the Pentagon that summer. 'Without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East.' General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred, suggesting that the US should find means to arm both Pakistan and Turkey. From America's point of view, Pakistani troops were desperately needed to stabilise a volatile region. 'Currently, the danger in this area to the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism,' read a paper from the National Security Council, approved by President Harry Truman in April 1952. These concerns were adroitly manipulated by Pakistan. In a meeting that July, Ayub's Special Advisor on Defence, Mir Laik, requested $200 million worth of supplies for Pakistan's air force and army, as well as a substantial line of credit. The weapons, he told American Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, were needed for use not against India, but against communist aggression. Even though diplomats responsible for engaging India were less than enthusiastic, the proposal to arm Pakistan soon had overwhelming political momentum. Following a visit to Karachi, Vice President Richard Nixon told the National Security Council that Pakistan was 'a country [he] would like to do everything for'. 'The people have less complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through,' he added. For its part, Pakistan had no interest in getting drawn into wars in the Middle East. It had manipulated American anxieties to secure its position against its principal regional rival. Also read: To be or not to be? Trump's next call on Iran-Israel conflict will reshape West Asia Fallout in Kashmir The government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru responded by hardening its position on Kashmir in response to these pressures, historian Paul McGarr observes. Talks between Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in 1953, as well as with Ayub Khan in 1959, led nowhere. Later, six desultory rounds of dialogue took place between 27 December 1962 and 16 May 1963. India declined concessions beyond minor adjustments on the ceasefire line. For its part, Pakistan demanded that only the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu stay with India. Frustration mounted in Islamabad over the Kashmir deadlock, with dramatic consequences. From the mid-1950s, American aid to Pakistan had played a dramatic role in modernising its infrastructure and enabling industrialisation. The country's annual GDP growth, between 4 per cent and 6 per cent, had earned Ayub extravagant praise from economists like Samuel Huntington. To pressure the US, Ayub Khan reached out to China, organising an eight-day red-carpet visit for Premier Zhou Enlai in February 1964. From the colonial colonnades of Karachi's Frere Hall Garden, Zhou spoke of China's ancient trading relationship with the Indus plains and condemned the influence of colonialism. Newly elected US President Lyndon Johnson cancelled an invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the country after the Field Marshal publicly criticised the war in Vietnam. From 1964, tensions began to build up over Kashmir, too. The disappearance of the Hazratbal relic in December 1963 led to anti-Hindu riots in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Kolkata's Hindus responded with an anti-Muslim pogrom, which led to hundreds of deaths. The Hazratbal crisis also led Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to extend provisions of the Indian Constitution, which allowed New Delhi to exercise direct rule in Kashmir. Led by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Field Marshal Ayub Khan allowed himself to be persuaded that a limited war in Kashmir would compel the US and the United Kingdom to intervene again. The Indian Army, weakened by the war against China, would be in no position to widen the war, the argument went. National Security Council staff member Robert Komer warned his bosses of what was coming. In a 22 October 1963 memorandum, he noted that the Pakistanis appeared to be deliberately building up tensions over Kashmir. 'I wonder if we aren't doing ourselves a disservice by our continued pressure on Kashmir,' Komer wrote. Also read: Pakistan's coldness to Iran shows idea of Ummah is poetic illusion Partners in crime Islamabad's defeat in the 1965 war marked the coming of a long period of disengagement between the two allies. Though President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, facilitated arms supplies from third countries like Iran in the 1971 war, the United States proved unwilling to directly intervene, documents show. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan proved critical in facilitating flows of jihadists and weapons to fight the Soviet Union. Aid diminished again after 1989, though, with the Soviet withdrawal. Like the Afghan war had been for General Zia, 9/11 would prove a gift for another military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf. In 2011, though, President Barack Obama's government sharply reduced aid after the killing of Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden. Trump further slashed funds after 2017, compelling Pakistan to turn ever-closer to China for support. Islamabad emerged as a gun-for-hire to fight American regional conflicts, but not the partner for peacekeeping that the US had imagined it would become in 1951. This is the relationship Trump hopes he will be able to resuscitate. America is today the largest oil producer in the world, and no longer needs the enormous system of Middle East bases it set up after 1947 to secure its energy. 'Keeping the region's shipping lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz, open to tanker traffic costs the Pentagon, on average, $50 billion a year—a service that earns us the undying enmity of populations in that region,' wrote scholar Arthur Herman in a superb 2014 analysis. Like his predecessors, Trump is holding out the prospect of a deal on Kashmir, with some lashings of aid, to persuade Field Marshal Munir to take on the job. Will Trump succeed where his predecessors failed? Free lunches—especially third-rate racks of lamb, lacking the least hint of garam masala, ginger, garlic, and exotic women—are likely to get you only so far. (Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
New Straits Times
19-05-2025
- Politics
- New Straits Times
Trump's Gulf tour reshapes Middle East diplomatic map
NOTHING captured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's isolation more starkly last week than the image of United States President Donald Trump shaking hands with Syria's leader Ahmed al-Sharaa — a man Israel has branded "an al-Qaeda terrorist in a suit". "He's got the potential. He's a real leader," said Trump after talks with Ahmed on Wednesday in Riyadh — a meeting brokered by his Saudi hosts, with whom the US president agreed a slew of arms, business and technology deals. Trump's four-day tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates was more than just a diplomatic spectacle marked by lucrative investments. It sealed the emergence of a new Sunni-led Middle East order and leaves Israel sidelined, according to three regional and two Western sources. Amid growing irritation in Washington with Israel's failure to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, Trump's tour was a snub to Netanyahu, a close US ally who was the first foreign leader to visit Washington after the president returned to office in January, said the sources. The message was clear: in Trump's less ideological, more results-driven vision of Middle East diplomacy, Netanyahu could no longer count on unconditional US support for his right-wing agenda, said the sources. "This administration is very frustrated with Netanyahu and that frustration is showing," said David Schenker, a former US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs under former president George W. Bush. "They're very, very transactional, and Netanyahu isn't giving them anything right now." The Trump administration wanted to deliver the message to Netanyahu that the US had its own interests in the Middle East, and it does not like him standing in its way, the sources added. US patience has been strained not just by the Israeli prime minister's refusal to countenance a Gaza ceasefire but also his objection to US talks with Iran over its nuclear programme. While publicly insisting US-Israeli relations remain strong, Trump administration officials have privately expressed irritation with Netanyahu's refusal to fall into line with Washington's positions on Gaza and Iran. Six regional and Western sources said friction between the US and Israel was building before Trump's regional trip. The tension began when Netanyahu flew to Washington on a second visit last month seeking Trump's backing for military strikes on Iran's nuclear sites — only to discover, to his shock, that Trump was opting for diplomacy. An unbending advocate for a hardline stance against Teheran, Netanyahu was caught off guard, learning just hours before his meeting that negotiations were about to start. In the following weeks, Trump's declaration of a ceasefire with the Houthis in Yemen, rapprochement with Syria's new leadership and bypassing of Israel on his Gulf visit showed how the traditionally close relations had become strained, said the sources. During his election campaign, Trump made clear he wanted a ceasefire in Gaza and the hostages there released before he returned to the White House. Months into Trump's presidency, Netanyahu has continued to defy ceasefire calls, expanded the offensive and offered no endgame or a post-war plan after 19 months of conflict. The death toll in Gaza has passed 52,900 in recent days, according to local health officials. Any hope that Trump could use his regional visit to cement his image as a peacemaker and announce a deal to end the bitterly divisive war were dashed. Instead, Netanyahu — who is charged with war crimes in Gaza by the International Criminal Court — has doubled-down on his aim of crushing Hamas. Netanyahu is also on trial in Israel over corruption charges, which he denies. As Trump wrapped up his visit, Israel launched a new offensive last Friday in Gaza. Israeli strikes have killed hundreds of Palestinians in recent days. Trump's other key priority — expanding the Abraham Accords establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and Arab states to include Saudi Arabia — has also been blocked by Netanyahu's intransigence. Publicly, Trump himself has dismissed any talk of a rift. But Trump is forging ahead without Netanyahu. With unapologetic self-interest, the US president is driving a realignment of US diplomacy towards wealthy Sunni states. Although Netanyahu led the fight against Iran, the new regional order is being shaped in Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi.
Rudaw Net
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Trump-Sharaa meeting, a 'turning point' in US-Syria ties: Former US official
Also in Interview Plant believed to eliminate 95 percent of cervical cancer cells Iraq is successfully distanced from regional conflicts: UNAMI chief Kurdish parties must 'work quickly' to form government: US official President Trump can get deal with Iran done: US Deputy State Department Spox A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Senior US diplomat and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf described the landmark meeting between US President Donald Trump and Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh as a 'historic' moment and a pivotal 'turning point' in US-Syria relations. Speaking to Rudaw, Leaf also hailed the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)'s decision to disarm as a significant step toward broader regional stability. During the high-profile meeting - hosted by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and attended remotely by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan - President Trump urged Sharaa to normalize relations with Israel and to assume responsibility for detention centers currently housing Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates in northeast Syria (Rojava), now controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A day earlier, Trump announced his intention to lift US sanctions on Syria as part of a broader strategy to normalize relations with Damascus. Speaking to Rudaw on Wednesday, Leaf said the move to lift 'all US sanctions' would 'have a tremendous effect on regeneration of the Syrian economy. She also pointed to the symbolic weight of the Syrian interim presidet's appearance alongside President Trump and MbS, calling it 'a very dramatic and strong signal of support for this transition' that Sharaa is leading in Syria. However, Leaf stressed that expectations of Sharaa are now substantial, particularly 'from the Syrian people, regional partners, and now very explicit expectations proffered by the US president.' 'Many of those expectations on the American part have to do with terrorism - that is to say, getting rid of all the foreign terrorist fighters who are still in Syria,' she noted. The senior US diplomat additionally ruled out an eventual normalization of ties between Syria and Israel. 'I think that's a very distant prospect,' she said, 'but on the other hand, I think there is room to hope that there will be a calming of tensions between Israel and Syria over the coming months.' Sharaa, then the commander of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led a coalition of opposition forces that ousted Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad on December 8. He was appointed interim president in late January. While HTS remains designated as a terrorist organization by the US, Washington previously offered a $10 million reward for Sharaa's capture, but the bounty was dropped in late December. Leaf acknowledged Sharaa's controversial past but emphasized the vision he presented during their meeting. 'He laid out a clear sense of his hopes - his ambitions - for what he said was a new Syria,' she explained, 'a new Syria that would have good relations with all of its neighbors and with the broader region, a Syria that would no longer present threats to its neighbors and would not allow other parties or actors to present threats, whether it was to Israel, to Turkey, to Jordan or anyone else.' On the topic of the PKK, Leaf underscored the importance of the group's decision to disarm and dissolve, calling it 'the most significant recent event' that could pave the way for securing the rights of Syria's Kurds within a unified state. Founded in 1978, the PKK originally sought to establish an independent Kurdish state but later shifted its demands toward securing broader cultural and political rights for Kurds in Turkey. On Monday, the group announced that it would end its decades-long armed campaign against the Turkish state, describing the decision as a step toward a peaceful resolution. According to Lead, the PKK's decision further aligns with President Trump's push for the 'calming of tensions and conflict in this area through and across Syria." The following is the full text of the interview with Leaf. Rudaw: Hello Ms. Barbara. Thank you for this opportunity. Today, we witnessed a historic event. Donald Trump met Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh. Will the new Syria commit to normalizing ties with Israel, as the White House said and as Donald Trump requested? Barbara Leaf: Well, look, I think this was, as you say, a historic meeting. First of all, he preceded this by an announcement yesterday [Tuesday] that he was going to lift all US sanctions [imposed on Syria]. That is going to have a tremendous effect on the regeneration of the Syrian economy. And then to see him standing there near the president with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia [Mohammed bin Salman] is a very dramatic and strong signal of support for this transition. You were the first US official to visit Ahmed al-Sharaa in the previous months. Did you expect that five months after your visit, the US President would meet him? I want you to talk about the process over the past four to five months. Well, I think there are a lot of expectations that have been heaped on him, expectations by the Syrian people, expectations by regional partners, and now very explicit expectations proffered by the US president. Many of those expectations on the American part have to do with terrorism, that is to say, getting rid of all the foreign terrorist fighters who are still in Syria. But also the president raised expectations or hopes that eventually there would be a cooling or warming of relations, rather, with Israel and potentially normalization of relations. I think that's a very distant prospect. But on the other hand, I think there is room to hope that there will be a calming of tensions between Israel and Syria over the coming months. An interesting point that I want to ask you is that during your visit to meet Ahmed al-Sharaa a few months back, there was a reward for Ahmed al-Sharaa's arrest, but after your visit, the bounty was scrapped. How did this happen? Yes, there was a $10 million bounty on his head for some years put by the US government, because he was originally, he still is under US law. He is designated as a terrorist and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is designated as a terrorist organization. But given the decision by the Trump administration that we should meet with him and begin engagement, diplomatic engagement, it was just logical that we would remove the bounty. And so I was asked to let him know that, and we had, there was a bit of joking about it on the part of the foreign minister who suggested that he could, that President Sharaa could offer himself up and get the $10 million bounty himself. But in any case, it was an important gesture at the time. Did he speak about this topic when you met him during your visit? Well, look, he laid out a clear sense of his hopes, his ambitions for what he said was a new Syria, a new Syria that would have good relations with all of its neighbors and with the broader region, a new Syria that would no longer present threats to its neighbors and would not allow other parties or actors to present threats, whether it was to Israel, to Turkey, to Jordan or anyone else. So he laid out a very ambitious agenda and he was at pains to reassure this first American official that he had met, that he intended to turn the page on a very dark history that the Assad family had made; a history of violence towards its own people and insecurity towards all of its neighbors. At today's meeting, were the rights of Kurds in Syria on the table between Trump and Sharaa? Did they speak about the Kurds and Rojava? I have not gotten all the details. They are just coming out now. It was a meeting [that lasted] for about a half an hour. We know that President [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan of Turkey called in during the meeting. I think that is a significant piece [of information] right there. I also think, of course, that the most significant recent event was the decision by the [Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK to disarm and demobilize and to dissolve as an organization. So I think all of these events come together and offer some real promise for Syrian Kurdish rights within a unified Syria. This is something that Ahmed al-Sharaa, again, was emphasizing in my meeting with him, that he regarded and he would take the approach that Syria's Kurds had exactly the same rights as any other Syrian citizen, and that he would look to protect them. You made an important point regarding the PKK. On Syria, will the principle of self-administration or federalism as a Kurdish right in Syria be implemented in the Syrian constitution? So I think all of those details are issues that have to be worked out in a political set of compromises among Syrians, with Damascus, with the transitional and interim government. I think there is a lot of room for compromise to allow the kind of self-government or decentralized government, I might say, across the country. But these are issues that Syrians themselves really need to discuss around the [discussions] table. There is another topic. The David Corridor is a project that is frequently mentioned. Is it just social media rumors, or is there actually a project to expand Israel's hegemony in northeast Syria and until the Rojava-Kurdistan Region border? If you mean a project of Israel towards Syria, I think Israel's approach to Syria is premised, I think, still on the notion that there are many threats in this new Syria, that there are foreign terrorist fighters there, may be extremist Palestinian groups that are still active in Syria. So I think, frankly, that events this week, the move by President Trump, will have its impact in Israel as well. And my hope and expectation would be that there would be channels opened up eventually between Israel and Syria to manage their… even if they don't have diplomatic relations, even if they don't have formal relations, they can have an arrangement where they can manage their security concerns directly or with the assistance of a friendly government, be it the US or someone else. About the PKK, you said that the meeting discussed the process of the PKK laying down arms. Can you give us the details? Look, I think it's very clear what the PKK leader has laid out in terms of the future of this group, that it has met its goals and that it is time to disarm, demobilize, and no longer carry out militant actions. So I think this also adds to the positive nature of the conversation that President Trump and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and President Erdogan had today [Wednesday]. In the end, I think the US wants to see what a lot of regional neighbors want to see, which is a calming of tensions and conflict in this area through and across Syria. The Syrian people, be they Syrian Kurds or Syria's many other communities; they have suffered enormously because of the conflicts that have raged through the country. Will the US participate in the practical process of the PKK's disarmament? If it participates, will it participate as an observer or a guarantor? Well, if you mean oversee the PKK, I don't think the US has a direct role. Of course, the PKK has been listed as a foreign terrorist organization under US law for many years. So I don't think the US will have a direct role, but of course the US will monitor it closely. Is the US looking to have a role in deploying Iraqi border guards and Peshmerga forces in the places that the PKK will evacuate? Well, if the government of Iraq or the Iraqi security forces ask for some sort of technical support, advice, consultations, of course, I would imagine that we will be willing to offer that. Again, I don't see us having a direct role unless we're asked by the parties, unless we're asked by one of the governments or several of the governments to do so. Thank you so much.
