Latest news with #NioCorp
Associated Press
11-07-2025
- Business
- Associated Press
NioCorp Provides Preliminary Unaudited Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
CENTENNIAL, CO / ACCESS Newswire / July 11, 2025 / NioCorp Developments Ltd. ('NioCorp' or the 'Company') (NASDAQ:NB) today provided its preliminary unaudited financial results for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025. Selected financial results expectations for the period includes: During the quarter ended June 30, 2025, the Company received approximately $31.1 million of gross proceeds from the sale of common shares and pre-funded warrants pursuant to a previously announced underwritten public offering, the sale of common shares under the Standby Equity Purchase Agreement, dated January 26, 2023, between the Company and YA II PN, Ltd., an investment fund managed by Yorkville Advisors Global, LP (the 'Yorkville Equity Facility Financing Agreement'), and the exercise of outstanding warrants. The Company ended the fiscal year with a cash balance of approximately $25.6 million and 58,491,196 common shares outstanding. NioCorp intends to file its audited consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025 in its Annual Report on Form 10-K on or about August 29, 2025. All figures reported above with respect to the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025 are preliminary and are unaudited and subject to change and adjustment as the Company prepares its consolidated financial statements for the years ended June 30, 2025 and 2024. Accordingly, investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on the foregoing information. The preliminary results provided in this news release constitute 'forward-looking information' and 'forward-looking statements' within the meaning of applicable Canadian and U.S. securities laws, are based on several assumptions and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially. See 'Forward-looking Statements.' # # # FOR MORE INFORMATION: Jim Sims, Corporate Communications Officer, NioCorp Developments Ltd., (720) 334-7066, [email protected] @NioCorp $NB #Niobium #Scandium #Titanium $rareearth #neodymium #dysprosium #terbium #ElkCreek ABOUT NIOCORP NioCorp is developing a critical minerals project in Southeast Nebraska (the 'Elk Creek Project') that is expected to produce niobium, scandium, and titanium. The Company also is evaluating the potential to produce several rare earths from the Elk Creek Project. Niobium is used to produce specialty alloys as well as High Strength, Low Alloy steel, which is a lighter, stronger steel used in automotive, structural, and pipeline applications. Scandium is a specialty metal that can be combined with Aluminum to make alloys with increased strength and improved corrosion resistance. Scandium is also a critical component of advanced solid oxide fuel cells. Titanium is used in various lightweight alloys and is a key component of pigments used in paper, paint and plastics and is also used for aerospace applications, armor, and medical implants. Magnetic rare earths, such as neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, and dysprosium are critical to the making of neodymium-iron-boron magnets, which are used across a wide variety of defense and civilian applications. FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities laws (collectively, 'forward-looking statements'). Forward-looking statements may include, but are not limited to, statements regarding our preliminary financial results, and the timing of the filing of the audited consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025; NioCorp's expectation of producing niobium, scandium, and titanium, and the potential of producing rare earths, at the Elk Creek Project; and NioCorp's ability to secure sufficient project financing to complete construction of the Elk Creek Project and move it to commercial operation. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words such as 'plan,' 'believe,' 'expect,' 'anticipate,' 'intend,' 'outlook,' 'estimate,' 'forecast,' 'project,' 'continue,' 'could,' 'may,' 'might,' 'possible,' 'potential,' 'predict,' 'should,' 'would' and other similar words and expressions, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. The forward-looking statements are based on the current expectations of the management of NioCorp and are inherently subject to uncertainties and changes in circumstances and their potential effects and speak only as of the date of such statement. There can be no assurance that future developments will be those that have been anticipated. Forward-looking statements reflect material expectations and assumptions, including, without limitation, expectations and assumptions relating to: NioCorp's ability to receive sufficient project financing for the construction and development of the Elk Creek Project on acceptable terms or at all; the future price of metals; the stability of the financial and capital markets; NioCorp's ability to service future debt, if any,and meet the payment obligations thereunder; and current estimates and assumptions regarding the benefits of NioCorp's business combination with GX Acquisition Corp. II (the 'Business Combination') and the Yorkville Equity Facility Financing Agreement (together with the Business Combination, the 'Transactions'), and their benefits. Such expectations and assumptions are inherently subject to uncertainties and contingencies regarding future events and, as such, are subject to change. Forward-looking statements involve a number of risks, uncertainties or other factors that may cause actual results or performance to be materially different from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, those discussed and identified in public filings made by NioCorp with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the applicable Canadian securities regulatory authorities and the following: NioCorp's ability to operate as a going concern; NioCorp's requirement of significant additional capital; NioCorp's ability to receive sufficient project financing for the construction of the Elk Creek Project on acceptable terms or at all; NioCorp's ability to receive a final commitment of financing from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense or a debt guarantee from UK Export Finance on acceptable timelines, on acceptable terms, or at all; NioCorp's ability to recognize the anticipated benefits of the Transactions, including NioCorp's ability to access the full amount of the expected net proceeds under the Yorkville Equity Facility Financing Agreement; NioCorp's ability to continue to meet Nasdaq listing standards; risks relating to NioCorp's common shares, including price volatility, lack of dividend payments and dilution or the perception of the likelihood of any of the foregoing; the extent to which NioCorp's level of indebtedness and/or the terms contained in agreements governing NioCorp's indebtedness, if any, or the Yorkville Equity Facility Financing Agreement may impair NioCorp's ability to obtain additional financing, on acceptable terms or at all; covenants contained in agreements with NioCorp's secured creditors that may affect its assets; NioCorp's limited operating history; NioCorp's history of losses; the material weaknesses in NioCorp's internal control over financial reporting, NioCorp's efforts to remediate such material weaknesses and the timing of remediation; the possibility that NioCorp may qualify as a passive foreign investment company under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the 'Code'); the potential that the Transactions could result in NioCorp becoming subject to materially adverse U.S. federal income tax consequences as a result of the application of Section 7874 and related sections of the Code; cost increases for NioCorp's exploration and, if warranted, development projects; a disruption in, or failure of, NioCorp's information technology systems, including those related to cybersecurity; equipment and supply shortages; variations in the market demand for, and prices of, niobium, scandium, titanium and rare earth products; current and future offtake agreements, joint ventures, and partnerships; NioCorp's ability to attract qualified management; estimates of mineral resources and reserves; mineral exploration and production activities; feasibility study results; the results of metallurgical testing; the results of technological research; changes in demand for and price of commodities (such as fuel and electricity) and currencies; competition in the mining industry; changes or disruptions in the securities markets; legislative, political or economic developments, including changes in federal and/or state laws that may significantly affect the mining industry; trade policies and tensions, including tariffs; inflationary pressures; the impacts of climate change, as well as actions taken or required by governments related to strengthening resilience in the face of potential impacts from climate change; the need to obtain permits and comply with laws and regulations and other regulatory requirements; the timing and reliability of sampling and assay data; the possibility that actual results of work may differ from projections/expectations or may not realize the perceived potential of NioCorp's projects; risks of accidents, equipment breakdowns, and labor disputes or other unanticipated difficulties or interruptions; the possibility of cost overruns or unanticipated expenses in development programs; operating or technical difficulties in connection with exploration, mining, or development activities; management of the water balance at the Elk Creek Project site; land reclamation requirements related to the Elk Creek Project; the speculative nature of mineral exploration and development, including the risks of diminishing quantities of grades of reserves and resources; claims on the title to NioCorp's properties; potential future litigation; and NioCorp's lack of insurance covering all of NioCorp's operations. Any financial results discussed in this press release are preliminary and represent the most current information available to the Company's management as of July 10, 2025, as financial closing procedures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025, are not yet complete. These estimates are not a comprehensive statement of the Company's financial results for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025, and actual results may differ materially from these estimates as a result of the completion of year-end accounting procedures and adjustments, including the execution of the Company's internal control over financial reporting, the completion of the preparation of the Company's audited consolidated financial statements and the subsequent occurrence or identification of events prior to the filing of the audited consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025 in its Annual Report on Form 10-K. In addition, any such statements regarding the Company's financial performance are not necessarily indicative of the Company's financial performance that may be expected to occur for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025, or for any future fiscal period. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize or should any of the assumptions made by the management of NioCorp prove incorrect, actual results may vary in material respects from those projected in these forward-looking statements. All subsequent written and oral forward-looking statements concerning the matters addressed herein and attributable to NioCorp or any person acting on its behalf are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to herein. Except to the extent required by applicable law or regulation, NioCorp undertakes no obligation to update these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events. SOURCE: NioCorp Developments Ltd. press release
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First Post
09-07-2025
- Business
- First Post
Has Trump already lost his tariff-trade war with China?
Despite the initial bluster, there are signs that US President Donald Trump has already lost the trade war with China. On the back of its monopoly in global rare earth supplies, China has forced Trump to roll back export controls on semiconductors. read more In all likelihood, US President Donald Trump has already lost the trade war with China. Even as Trump tried to leverage the US market size and China's access to Western critical technology, China appears to have had the last laugh as it has forced him to rollback export controls on semiconductors technology and ethane products. China's trump card turned out to be rare earths that are used in nearly everything that is part of modern life, ranging from household electronics to cars and missiles and fighter planes. China controls around 70 per cent of rare earths mining and around 90 per cent of production of refined rare earths. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Trump rolls back export controls as China flexes muscles Trump last week revoked restrictions on the export of semiconductor technology, such as electronic design automation (EDA) software, to China, as part of an arrangement with China to secure China's rare earth supplies. After Trump declared his trade war, China halted the export of rare earths. The blockage has now forced Trump to buckle and roll back export controls. Trump also rolled back export controls on ethane products' supply to China. It was not unforeseen though. There were warnings from the beginning that Trump's tariff-led approach was bound to fail in the face of China's rare earths leverage. 'The answer cannot be for President Trump to issue a tariff. We need to be competitive with or without tariffs by increasing our technology, improving our processes, using more robotics. But we must have a legitimate business at the end of the day,' Mark Smith, the CEO of rare earths firm NioCorp, told Time. The road to counter China's rare earths dominance is long Considering China spent decades to master the processes to extract and refine rare earths, and spent considerable resources in acquiring rare earth reserves and refining rights abroad, it is natural that any effort to counter its monopoly is going to take years if not decades and substantial state support. Whether Trump has it in him to start a systematic process to regain the lead that the United States once had in rare earths is yet to be seen. In addition to dominance in refining, China is further helped by the fact that it has the largest rare earths reserves in the world. To be sure, there are plans in the United States to revive the Mountain Pass mine in California. Another mining operation is in the works in Wyoming. Australia and Malaysia have rare earths reserves too and various countries, including the United States, are exploring alternatives like them and figuring out ways to securing supplies from these new sources. However, it is expected to take years for these alternatives to scale up to be able to challenge China's dominance. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Developing rare earths' mining and processing capabilities requires a long-term effort, meaning the United States will be on the back foot for the foreseeable future, noted Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in an analysis carried by AFP. That means that China has a 'strong negotiation position' for the foreseeable future as China can hold foreign countries' industries hostage by stopping rare earths' supplies at will. 'Mineable concentrations are less common than for most other mineral commodities, making extraction more costly. It is this complex and costly extraction and processing that make rare earths strategically significant. This gives China a strong negotiating position,' noted Rico Luman and Ewa Manthey of ING in an analysis carried by AFP.
Business Insider
24-06-2025
- Business
- Business Insider
NioCorp to be added to Russell 3000 Index
NioCorp (NB) announced that it will be added as a member of the broad-market Russell 3000 Index, effective after the U.S. market opens on June 30 as part of the 2025 Russell indexes reconstitution. Confident Investing Starts Here:
Yahoo
17-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
China Just Cut Off These Rare Metals. The U.S. Has No Backup Plan--Yet.
China just played its rare earth card againand this time, the West may not have a safety net. In April, Beijing ramped up export restrictions on seven rare earth metals, tightening its hold over elements essential for advanced magnets, electric vehicles, and defense systems. It's a familiar playbook. But according to Mark Smith, former Molycorp CEO and now head of NioCorp (NASDAQ:NB), this round feels different. Buyers were unprepared, and Washington is now scrambling to responddusting off Cold War-era tools to back strategic mineral projects. It's a wake-up call, Smith said, one the U.S. arguably should've answered years ago. His point: America has resourcesbut almost no infrastructure to process them. Warning! GuruFocus has detected 2 Warning Sign with NB. Smith is betting that can change. NioCorp's Nebraska project aims to extract terbium, dysprosium, and scandiummetals now under China's control. With all key environmental permits secured, the company is seeking funding from the U.S. Department of Defense and export banks in the U.S., UK, and Germany. If support comes through, construction could start later this year. Still, even under ideal conditions, production won't begin until 2029 at the earliest. Smith says that's the reality for nearly every new mine: years of waiting, litigation, and delays. We have all of our permits in hand to start construction today, he noted, underscoring how rare that is in today's U.S. permitting landscape. There are glimmers of hope. Australia's Lynas and U.S.-based MP Materials (NYSE:MP) have made dents in China's dominance, with Lynas now supplying around 30% of Japan's rare earth needs. But Beijing still commands nearly all global refining capacity and dominates supply of high-temperature metals like samarium and terbium. Smith believes that's why neodymium and praseodymiumelements MP and Lynas can produceweren't restricted. But for the rest? No one outside China can yet produce them in volume, he said. Unless the U.S. and its allies step up fast, the supply chain could remain one crisis away from collapse. This article first appeared on GuruFocus. Sign in to access your portfolio
Time Magazine
17-06-2025
- Automotive
- Time Magazine
Trump Wants Rare Earths. But Challenging China's Dominance Will Take More Than Tariffs
When, in December 1953, Dragnet became the first American television show to broadcast in color, few fans knew they had a dusty nook on the California-Nevada border to thank for bringing it to polychromatic life. But every early cathode-ray tube color television owed its screen's red hue to europium, a rare earth element excavated and processed exclusively at the Mountain Pass Mine in San Bernardino County. From the 1950s to the 1980s, Mountain Pass produced practically all known quantities of europium, as well as over 90% across the spectrum of rare earth minerals worldwide. Back then, of course, uses were limited: apart from europium adding vibrancy to L.A. cop procedurals, cerium was used as a glass polishing agent, while lanthanum was—and still is—crucial for oil cracking, or turning crude into gasoline and other lighter fuels. Today, however, the picture is very different. Rare earth materials are vital for myriad industries, from advanced weaponry to wind turbines and robotics. But far from the U.S. having a monopoly on production, now some 96% of rare earth minerals are sourced from China, propelling these arcane materials into center stage in the escalating trade war between the world's top two economies. In response to President Donald Trump imposing tariffs of 145% on Chinese goods, as well as curbing the sale of strategic U.S. technology including semiconductor chips, China hit back by restricting the export of rare earth elements. Auto manufacturers across the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Germany and India have warned the shortages may force factories to halt production. The spat prompted Trump to hit out at China for reneging on a nascent trade deal between the superpowers. Then, last week, Trump revealed a 'framework' struck in London that supposedly will ease U.S. access to China's rare earth minerals and magnets in exchange for setting tariffs on Chinese exports at 55% and a relaxing of curbs on Chinese students' access to U.S. colleges. 'Full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, will be supplied, up front, by China,' Trump posted on Truth Social. But reports from Washington suggest that the deal will expire in just six months, and with U.S.-China relations continuing to spiral, how America and its allies can break itself free of its Chinese rare earth dependency is a geopolitical priority. While it's a question with sweeping economic ramifications, it's also one with no easy answer. 'Everybody wants to just snap their fingers and start producing heavy rare earth elements,' says Mark Smith, CEO of rare earths firm NioCorp, who has worked in the industry for almost four decades. 'But it's a very long, hard process. And the longer we wait, the further China gets ahead.' China has bet on rare earths for a long time. Back in 1992, reformist leader Deng Xiaoping declared: 'The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.' China accompanied this strategic focus with billions of dollars of investment in mines and processing facilities to monopolize the market. Just like countless strategic industries, China wielded huge state subsidies, and little concern for environmental or safety standards, to produce rare earths at a fraction of the cost of Western competitors. As a result, in 1998, Mountain Pass' separation plant ceased producing refined rare earth compounds. Four years later, a toxic waste spill led the mine to close altogether, and intense Chinese competition impelled the decision not to reopen. At the same time, uses of rare earths were just ramping up. Today, yttrium is used in lighting and flat screens; ytterbium in cancer treatments and earthquake monitoring; erbium in lasers and fiberoptic cables. But particularly important are permanent rare earth magnets, which account for a quarter of total rare earths consumption and are a vital component in actuators, or devices that turn a control signal into mechanical motion. These could be robot arms on assembly lines, the fins of a ballistic missile or stealth bomber, or any of the multiple motors of an electric vehicle. But it's not just EVs that rely on actuators and, by extension, permanent rare earth magnets. Conventional internal combustion engine vehicles are also heavily reliant on these materials. That is how, in 2010, China managed to bring Japan's auto industry to the brink of collapse by halting exports of rare earth materials amid a territorial spat in the East China Sea. In the following year, prices of rare earths soared by 10 times and the incident served as a wake-up call that was only partly heeded. Japan invested in alternative sources, particularly in Australia, though remains heavily dependent on Chinese supplies. That September, the U.S. House passed the Rare Earths and Critical Materials Revitalization Act to subsidize the revival of the American rare earths industry, including reopening Mountain Pass, which resumed production in 2012 only to fall into bankruptcy three years later. Today, under the new ownership of MP Materials, it remains the only functioning American rare earth mine. Crucially, however, not all rare earths are created equal. What are termed rare earths are in fact a 'basket' of 17 elements with overlapping but ultimately unique properties. Regarding permanent rare earth magnets for actuators, the most common element is neodymium, which can be sourced from Mountain Pass. The problem is that for actuators to work at high temperatures—like those found under a car's hood—the neodymium needs to be mixed with either dysprosium or terbium, distinct rare earth minerals which are not significantly present in the Mountain Pass ore body. In fact, China controls practically 100% of global supply of dysprosium and terbium and added both to export controls on April 4. Tellingly, Beijing didn't bother restricting sales of neodymium, cognizant of alternative sources—and the fact they are largely useless without their heat-resistant siblings. So where can American firms source dysprosium and terbium—and fast? At the Lynas rare earth mine in Mount Weld, Western Australia, yellow diggers scoop the tawny earth and dump it into soot-stained trucks. Following on-site concentration, the semi-refined ore is then taken on a four-hour drive to processing facilities in nearby Kalgoorlie, or loaded on ships to Malaysia, where in the seaside town of Kuantan Lynas operates the world's largest rare earth processing plant. Crucially, in May the Kuantan plant produced its first batch of dysprosium and is expecting its first terbium this month. 'This is an exciting achievement for Lynas and for manufacturers keen to secure a resilient supply of separated rare earths products,' Amanda Lacaze, CEO and managing director of Lynas Rare Earths, tells TIME. 'We have stated our intention to meet the needs of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base on a priority basis.' It's a great start, but given the insatiable global appetite for rare earths, many more sources will ultimately be needed. And other options are years from fruition. It was with great fanfare that Trump signed a deal with Ukraine in March that ostensibly handed half the war-torn nation's future oil, gas, and mineral wealth—including rare earths—to the U.S. The only problem is that Ukraine may have abundant reserves of lithium and titanium, but it doesn't actually have rare earths in any sizable deposits worthy of exploitation. What about Greenland? Trump has repeatedly touted buying or even invading the semi-autonomous Danish province, citing its mineral wealth. In March, Vice President J.D. Vance led a U.S. delegation including National Security Adviser Michael Waltz and Energy Secretary Chris Wright to Greenland. But while Greenland does boast 18% of the world's total rare earth reserves, accessing them is extremely problematic, owing to freezing temperatures and a thick layer of silica. Chinese, American, and European prospectors have spent decades trying to figure out how to extract these resources without any success. Today, Greenland has no functioning rare earth mines. Other options are more feasible. Brazil has the world's third largest reserves of rare earths and is aggressively exploring this space, while Saudi Arabia also boasts significant deposits and signed a cooperation agreement with the U.S. on critical minerals during Trump's visit in May. MP Materials and Saudi Arabia's national mining company, Maaden, also signed a MoU to collaborate on establishing a rare earth supply chain in the Gulf state. Meanwhile, Japan's state-owned energy firm JOGMEC and gas firm Iwatani have unveiled plans to invest up to $120 million in a French rare earths refining project. And with Africa boasting four of the top 10 nations for rare earth exploration last year—namely South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, and Malawi—the continent stands to play a huge role in future supply chains. But there are also options closer to home. Other than Mountain Pass, Lynas has secured $258 million from the U.S. Department of Defense to build a heavy rare earth refinement facility in Seadrift, Texas. 'The U.S. facility has been designed with the capability to process feedstock from other sources as and when they become available and are qualified,' says Lacaze. Meanwhile, NioCorp has the permits to build a rare earth processing facility at its Elk Creek Mine in Nebraska and is currently waiting on a $780 million financing agreement with the U.S. Export–Import Bank for the $1.2 billion project, which will take around three years to get online. Smith, the NioCorp CEO, says he is currently 2.5 steps through a four-step approval process, which if greenlighted will provide up to 1,500 jobs during construction followed by a 450-strong full-time crew. Although Smith predicts Elk Creek could service all Department of Defense dysprosium and terbium needs, he's under no illusions about the scale of the challenge. 'One thing absolutely for sure is that NioCorp, by itself, is not the whole answer to the problem,' he says. 'So we're rooting for anybody to be an additional part of the solution. We need to put all the parts together to really be formidable against China.' Unfortunately, simply seeding projects in friendly countries doesn't solve the problem. For one, China controls the separation and refining equipment market and placed export controls on those technologies in December 2023. Today, the rare earth refining industry is scrambling to reverse engineer Chinese technologies or innovate entirely new ones. There is also the matter of expertise. Refining rare earths is 'a whole new art unto itself,' says Smith. Heavy rare earth elements are extremely close to each other in terms of their atomic weights, making the process to separate each from the other at sufficient purity levels for commercial or military applications extremely taxing. 'There's chemical engineering involved, there's physics, there's kinetics,' says Smith. 'It takes a whole bunch of knowhow, practice, and art to get heavy rare earths into their final purified oxide form. As well as a big investment.' The cash injections needed keep on growing. Lynas's Texas project, for one, is currently stalled as the firm seeks more government funding on top of the nine figures already pledged. 'Following design changes to accommodate local permitting, additional CAPEX will be required, and Lynas is in discussion with the U.S. government with respect to this funding,' says Lacaze. But even if all these new rare earth projects are realized across the globe, challenging Chinese dominance must still overcome its toughest obstacle: price. China has spent decades building out massive capacity for rare earth minerals, so all other competitors operate at a huge disadvantage. 'The inside China price is used by outside China customers as a benchmark,' says Lacaze. 'We have not observed any intent from the majority of non-Chinese consumers to pay a significant premium to the inside China price.' Moreover, China's massive processing capacity means it just opens the spigot whenever a potential competitor emerges to price them out of the market. The Chinese state has no problem eating any short-term losses to maintain key strategic levers over the global economy. It's a similar dynamic for many different minerals, including cobalt, nickel, and titanium. Today, neodymium oxide costs less than $60 per kilogram—around half its 2023 cost—and is forecast to get even cheaper. 'One of the biggest challenges we face is that rare earth prices are very low,' says Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 'And a lot of that has been achieved through market manipulation by China increasing and increasing production.' The cost issue looks frankly impossible to solve. Other than technical challenges, refining rare earth minerals uses a huge amount of water. Back when China was first ramping up its rare earth industry, wastewater was just discharged into the nearest river, although environmental standards have tightened considerably in recent years. In the U.S. or other developed economies, wastewater must be evaporated in huge kilns to isolate and dispose of pollutants—though this is a very energy intensive and thus costly process. 'And it's not something that China has to do,' shrugs Smith. So, the big question is how American—or Saudi or African—rare earths can survive in such a cost-competitive marketplace. Various mechanisms have been considered: One is a Contract for Difference model, which is common in agriculture and says that if prices fall below a certain point the government will pay the difference. Another option is having the government serve as an Offtaker of Last Resort, agreeing to buy minerals at a certain price if nobody wants them on the open market. However, 'in the U.S., at least in an era of DOGE, putting in an indefinite OPEX subsidy is quite politically unpalatable,' says Baskaran. 'But it is what China will do, so how do we compete against a country that's willing to inject fiscal support at any part of the supply chain to retain their dominance?' Another potential solution is one very close to Trump's heart: tariffs. By hiking levies on Chinese rare earths, the U.S. could strongarm firms to source from preferred friendly nations. But this essentially shifts the cost burden from government to businesses, undermining their global competitiveness with unknown ramifications down the line. For Smith, tariffs are merely a stop-gap solution. 'The answer cannot be for President Trump to issue a tariff,' he says. 'We need to be competitive with or without tariffs by increasing our technology, improving our processes, using more robotics. But we must have a legitimate business at the end of the day.'
