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Vox
17 hours ago
- Politics
- Vox
The hilarious implications of the Supreme Court's new porn decision
is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he focuses on the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the decline of liberal democracy in the United States. He received a JD from Duke University and is the author of two books on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld a Texas anti-pornography law on Friday that is nearly identical to a federal law it struck down more than two decades ago. Rather than overruling the previous case — Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004) — Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion spends at least a dozen pages making an unconvincing argument that Friday's decision in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton is consistent with the Court's previous decisions. Those pages are a garbled mess, and Thomas spends much of them starting from the assumption that his conclusions are true. All three Democratic justices dissented. SCOTUS, Explained Get the latest developments on the US Supreme Court from senior correspondent Ian Millhiser. Email (required) Sign Up By submitting your email, you agree to our Terms and Privacy Notice . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. That said, Free Speech Coalition makes two very significant changes to the Court's approach to free speech protections for pornography, and these changes are clearly stated in Thomas's opinion. In Ashcroft, the Court struck down a federal law that basically required pornographic websites to screen users to determine if they are over the age of 18. One reason for this decision is that it was far from clear that websites were actually capable of performing this task. As the Court had acknowledged in an earlier case, 'existing technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults.' This mattered because, long before the internet was widely available, the Court had established, in cases involving phone sex lines and televised pornography, that 'the objective of shielding children' from sexual material is not enough 'to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.' These decisions established that adults have a First Amendment right to view sexual material, and this right cannot be diminished in an effort to keep that material from children. Related The huge stakes in a new Supreme Court case about pornography Accordingly, in Ashcroft, the Court ruled that the federal age-gating law must survive the toughest test that courts can apply in constitutional cases, known as 'strict scrutiny.' Very few laws survive this test, and the law at issue in Ashcroft did not. The Court's ruling in Free Speech Coalition, however, changes the rules governing laws that seek to block minors' access to pornography, but which also may prevent adults from seeing that material. While much of Thomas's opinion is difficult to parse, one significant factor driving the Court's decision is the fact that technology has evolved. The internet, and internet pornography, is much more widely available than it was two decades ago. And it may now actually be possible to reliably age-gate pornographic websites. Now, laws like the one at issue in Free Speech Coalition are only subject to a test known as 'intermediate scrutiny' — a test which, as the name implies, is less strict. Under this somewhat less rigid framework, an anti-pornography law will be upheld 'if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.' According to Thomas, in Free Speech Coalition, the 'important governmental interest' at issue in this case is 'shielding children from sexual content.' Intermediate scrutiny, it should be noted, is not a paper tiger. Laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, for example, are typically subject to intermediate scrutiny. And most of these laws are struck down. But the new rule announced in Free Speech Coalition gives states broader leeway to restrict access to pornography. Additionally, Thomas's opinion also implies that adults have no legal right to keep their decision to view sexual material private. The plaintiffs in Free Speech Coalition argued that 'the unique stigma surrounding pornography will make age verification too chilling for adults.' Pornography users are likely to be reluctant to submit their ID to a site like Pornhub, for example, out of fear that the website will be hacked. This is likely to be especially true for people who are trying to keep their sexual orientation a secret, or people who could face serious career consequences if their private sexual behavior became public. But Thomas's opinion is exceedingly dismissive of the idea that privacy matters in this context. 'The use of pornography has always been the subject of social stigma,' he writes. But 'this social reality has never been a reason to exempt the pornography industry from otherwise valid regulation.' It's unclear just how far Thomas, or the rest of his colleagues, would take this conclusion. Could a state, for example, require everyone who wants to look at a pornographic video to submit their names to a government agency that will publish them on a public website? At the very least, however, Free Speech Coalition suggests that lawyers challenging anti-pornography laws may no longer raise privacy arguments as part of their challenge. The Court's decision is likely to make life miserable for judges Free Speech Coalition makes clear that the era when the courts struck down nearly all laws regulating sexual speech is over. The government will now play a larger role in regulating online content depicting sex. There is a very good reason, moreover, why pre-Free Speech Coalition courts took a libertarian approach to sexual speech. Although the First Amendment has been part of the Constitution since the late 1700s, it was largely meaningless for most of American history. And the government routinely prosecuted people for saying things, or for producing art, that regulators or law enforcement found objectionable. Under the 1873 Comstock Act and similar state laws, for example, people were routinely jailed for selling erotic literature or nude art, even works that are now widely considered masterpieces. This regime began to change in the middle of the twentieth century, when the Court started protecting speech of all kinds, including both sexual and political speech. In Roth v. United States (1957), for example, the Court established that sexual speech and art could only be banned if the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards' would determine that 'the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.' Later Supreme Court decisions tweaked this rule, and they also focused on whether the challenged speech or art has 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' Speech that does have such value is protected. All of these legal tests, however, are quite vague. And the question of whether a particular film or photo has serious artistic value is rather obviously in the eye of the beholder. Hence Justice Potter Stewart's infamous statement that he may not be able to come up with a coherent legal framework to determine what sort of material should be banned, 'but I know it when I see it.' The result was that, for much of the 1970s, the justices literally had to meet in the basement of the Supreme Court to watch pornographic movies that were the subject of prosecutions, in order to make subjective calls about which movies should be protected by the First Amendment. Those movie days, as described by Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong in The Brethren, were thoroughly humiliating experiences. Justice John Marshall Harlan, for example, was nearly blind during many of these screenings, so one of his law clerks had to describe what was happening on the screen to him — often prompting Harlan to explain 'By Jove!' or 'extraordinary!' Meanwhile, filmmakers would often try to work within the Court's 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value' framework by including political discussions or similar matters in a movie that was otherwise about sex. According to Woodward and Armstrong, for example, one such film ended with a speech 'on the comparative merits of Communist and Western societies.' The point is that, once the Court decided that some sexual speech is protected by the Constitution, it was extremely difficult to come up with a principled way to distinguish art that is too sexy to be protected by the First Amendment from art that is not. And the Court's attempts to do so only made a mockery of the justices. Eventually, the combination of Supreme Court decisions that read the First Amendment broadly, and technologies like the internet that made it very difficult to suppress sexual speech, ushered in an era where pornography is widely available and mostly unregulated. In upholding the Texas law at issue in Free Speech Coalition, the Court could end this era. But the justices are likely to make their own lives miserable as a result. Texas's law incorporates many of the Supreme Court's past pornography decisions, only restricting speech, for example, that 'lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.' Thus, if Texas wants to apply this law to Pornhub, some poor judge will have to watch much of the content on that website to determine if it has literary, artistic, political, or scientific value — and whatever that judge decides, their decision will be appealed to other judges who will have to engage in the same exercise. Justice Thomas and his colleagues, in other words, should probably install a popcorn machine in the Supreme Court building, because they've just signed themselves up to recreate the humiliating movie days of the Court's past.
Daily Record
21 hours ago
- Daily Record
Gangland cops arrest teen over "firebombing" at home of Mark Richardson's pal
An 18-year-old man has been arrested and charged in connection with incident as well as two other wilful fire-raisings in Edinburgh on April 17. A teenager has been arrested after the plush family home of Mark Richardson's pal was allegedly firebombed while children slept inside. Police launched a probe into the incident after the home of David McMillan on Pitcairn Grove caught fire on Thursday, April 17. The blaze took place on the six year anniversary of the assassination of Trainspotting T2 star Bradley Welsh who was best pals with McMillan. Police have confirmed that a 18-year-old Yusef Duale, from Liverpool, has now been arrested in connection the incident, as well as with two other wilful fire-raisings that took place on the same night at Prestonfield Crescent and Niddrie Marischal Crescent in the capital. He is faced three charges of attempted murder and willful fire-raising with danger to life on appearance at Edinburgh Sheriff Court where he made no plea. It's the 50th arrest in connection with Police Scotland's Operation Portaledge - the investigation into violent incidents in the East and West of the country. Join the Daily Record WhatsApp community! Get the latest news sent straight to your messages by joining our WhatsApp community today. You'll receive daily updates on breaking news as well as the top headlines across Scotland. No one will be able to see who is signed up and no one can send messages except the Daily Record team. All you have to do is click here if you're on mobile, select 'Join Community' and you're in! If you're on a desktop, simply scan the QR code above with your phone and click 'Join Community'. We also treat our community members to special offers, promotions, and adverts from us and our partners. If you don't like our community, you can check out any time you like. To leave our community click on the name at the top of your screen and choose 'exit group'. If you're curious, you can read our Privacy Notice. David McMillan has been targeted multiple times in the recent gangland turf wars midst a feud between kingpin Richardson, who is serving a jail sentence, and Dubai-based Mr Big Ross McGill. McGill, who was ripped off by the hood in a £500k drug deal, has since gone after a number of his associates. On May 8, a white SUV was torched McMillan's driveway after his family returned home from a shopping trip. Hooded yobs were shown throwing accelerant over the vehicle before it went up in flames. Harrowing images in the aftermath showed a charred baby seat in the back of the burnt out vehicle. Just days later, on May 22, McMillan, 54, was allegedly attacked with machetes outside his house. Arran Reid, 26, and Joshua Stewart, 20, were charged with attempted murder in connection with the incident when they appeared at Edinburgh Sheriff Court on Tuesday, June 17. Reid was charged with assault to severe injury, permanent disfigurement, attempted murder, reset, possession of blade, attempt to defeat ends of justice, possession of firearm and ammunition. Stewart was charged with assault to severe injury, permanent disfigurement, attempted murder, reset and attempt to defeat the ends of justice. The two other firebombings that took place on April 17 also targeted Richardson's associates. Images from the time also showed a property at Prestonfield Crescent was also torched. Cops were alerted to fire damage at a property in Niddrie Marischal Crescent in the city. It was the second time the property had been targeted after being shot at on March 20. The property is linked to Richardson associate Paddy Beatson. A transit van was also blown up outside the same home in the early hours of June 9. It came after Beatson taunted henchmen working for Ross McGill. The 38-year-old mocked McGill's enforcers - a faceless gang called Tamo Junto (TMJ) - in an online post as he urged them to "come and get him". Images taken in the aftermath showed the burnt out shell of the vehicle.
Vox
2 days ago
- Health
- Vox
The Supreme Court's disastrous new abortion decision, explained
is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he focuses on the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the decline of liberal democracy in the United States. He received a JD from Duke University and is the author of two books on the Supreme Court. Justice Neil Gorsuch, the author of the Court's new attack on Medicaid, shakes hands with Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images Federal law says that 'any individual eligible for medical assistance' from a state Medicaid program may obtain that care 'from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required.' In other words, all Medicaid patients have a right to choose their doctor, as long as they choose a health provider competent enough to provide the care they seek. On Thursday, however, the Republican justices ruled, in Medina v. Planned Parenthood, that Medicaid patients may not choose their health provider. And then they went much further. Thursday's decision radically reorders all of federal Medicaid law, rendering much of it unenforceable. Medina could prove to be one of the most consequential health care decisions of the last several years, and one of the deadliest, as it raises a cloud of doubt over countless laws requiring that certain people receive health coverage, as well as laws ensuring that they will receive a certain quality of care. SCOTUS, Explained Get the latest developments on the US Supreme Court from senior correspondent Ian Millhiser. Email (required) Sign Up By submitting your email, you agree to our Terms and Privacy Notice . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. All three of the Court's Democrats dissented. Justice Neil Gorsuch's opinion in Medina is a trainwreck of legal reasoning. It's hard to think of a principled reason why, two years after the Court took a much more expansive approach to Medicaid law in Health and Hospital Corporation v. Talevski (2023), the Republican justices abruptly decided to reverse course. It is easy, however, to see a political reason for the Medina decision. The plaintiff in Medina, after all, is Planned Parenthood, an abortion provider Republicans love to hate. Medina involved South Carolina's attempt to forbid Medicaid patients from choosing Planned Parenthood as their health provider, a policy that violates federal law. In an apparent attempt to spite Planned Parenthood, the Republican justices have now effectively repealed that law. This is not aberrant behavior from this Court's Republican majority. Four years ago, before the Court overruled Roe v. Wade and eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the justices considered a Texas law which permitted private bounty hunters to sue abortion providers and collect bounties of at least $10,000 from them. The Texas law was an obvious attempt to cut off abortion rights in violation of Roe, but five of the Republican justices joined an opinion by Gorsuch, which held that this sort of law could not be challenged in federal court because, Gorsuch claimed, abortion providers must wait until after they are hauled into court by a bounty hunter to assert their rights. Medina fits within the same legal tradition. When a case involves abortion providers, the Court's Republican majority is frequently willing to twist the law into any shape necessary to ensure that the abortion providers lose. What was the specific legal issue in Medina? A federal law known as 'Section 1983' lets state officials be sued if they deprive someone of 'any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' This is arguably the most important civil rights law ever enacted by Congress. Without it, many federal laws and constitutional provisions would be unenforceable. Medina turns on Section 1983's reference to 'rights' protected by federal law. Past Supreme Court decisions establish that not all federal laws create a right that can be enforced under Section 1983 and so the Court has developed a set of rules to determine which laws do. Before Thursday's decision in Medina, the key case laying out this framework was Talevski. Talevski held that a federal law creates enforceable rights when it is ''phrased in terms of the persons benefited' and contains 'rights-creating,' individual-centric language with an 'unmistakable focus on the benefited class.'' Thus, before Thursday, the key question was whether a law's text focuses on the individuals who benefit. A hypothetical federal law which provides that 'no state may prevent a hungry person from eating at Taco Bell' would be enforceable, under Talevski, because this hypothetical law centers the people who benefit from it (people who are hungry). A similar statute stating that 'states shall not impede access to cheap burritos' would likely not be enforceable under Talevski, because it does not mention who is supposed to benefit from these burritos. Under Talevski, Medina is an easy case, and it should have ended in a 9-0 victory for Planned Parenthood. Here is the relevant statutory language from the Medina case: A State plan for medical assistance must … provide that … any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required (including an organization which provides such services, or arranges for their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes to provide him such services. This law is full of the kind of 'individual-centric language' demanded by Talevski. It provides a right to 'any individual.' It provides that these individuals 'may obtain' care from their chosen provider. And it concludes with a pronoun ('him') which refers back to the individuals who benefit from this law. There is simply no way to reconcile Gorsuch's Medina opinion with Talevski. So how does Gorsuch try to get around Talevski? The Republican justices largely try to get around Talevski by ignoring it, or by misrepresenting what it said. Notably, the key words laying out Talevski's legal rule — that federal laws are enforceable through private lawsuits if they are 'phrased in terms of the persons benefited' — appear nowhere in Gorsuch's opinion. Instead, Gorsuch introduces some new principles into federal Medicaid law that are likely to confuse judges who must apply his decision to other provisions of the Medicaid statute. In its brief, for example, South Carolina suggested that a federal law must use the magic word 'right,' or it is unenforceable under Section 1983. Gorsuch's opinion doesn't go quite this far, but it does repeatedly point out that the provision of Medicaid law at issue in Talevski, which the Court held to be enforceable, uses this magic word in its text. Unlike Talevski, however, Medina does not articulate a clear legal rule which lower court judges can apply to other provisions of Medicaid law. It does not even explicitly overrule Talevski. Instead, Gorsuch mostly just points to some random features of the law at issue in Medina, and then leaves readers to guess how to determine which Medicaid laws are still enforceable. Gorsuch, for example, finds it quite significant that a different provision of federal Medicaid law allows states to exclude some providers who are convicted of a felony from their Medicaid program — a fact that is completely irrelevant under Talevski. He also notes that the provision at issue in Medina 'appears in a subsection titled 'Contents.'' It's hard to understand how this title is relevant. Moreover, this segment of Gorsuch's opinion appears to conflict with the explicit text of a federal law, which states that a provision of Medicaid law 'is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section…specifying the required contents of a State plan.' Gorsuch also includes an ominous line suggesting that, in the future, his Court will read Medicaid laws very narrowly: 'Though it is rare enough for any statute to confer an enforceable right,' Gorsuch claims, 'spending-power statutes like Medicaid are especially unlikely to do so.' Thursday's decision, in other words, is likely to have sweeping implications for low-income Americans' health care, even if it was handed down solely to wound Planned Parenthood. Federal Medicaid law is riddled with provisions governing how states must operate their Medicaid programs, including requirements governing who must be covered, and rules governing patient safety. The Talevski case, for example, concerned a law which prohibits nursing homes from using psychotropic drugs 'for purposes of discipline or convenience' when they are 'not required to treat the resident's medical symptoms.' Under Medina, many of these laws may now be rendered unenforceable. It should be noted that, even under Gorsuch's decision, there is still one possible way to enforce the law permitting Medicaid patients to choose their health providers — the federal government could cut off some or all Medicaid funding to South Carolina. Realistically, however, this remedy would only make matters worse. It does not help Medicaid patients to take away their funding, and so the federal government has historically been exceedingly reluctant to use this blunderbuss of an enforcement mechanism.
Dublin Live
2 days ago
- Dublin Live
LIVE: Garda attacked by knifeman in west Dublin
A garda has been hospitalised after a thug attacked him with a knife when officers responded to a burglary in west Dublin. The officer is understood to have been injured when attempting to apprehend the suspect amidst the break in at a premises in Blanchardstown in the early hours of this morning. The Garda was rushed to hospital where he is being treated for non life threatening injuries. It is believed he sustained slash wounds to his hand. The incident comes as a Garda representative told this paper this week that officers are being attacked 'on a daily basis.' We'll bring you live updates on this story below. Join our Dublin Live breaking news service on WhatsApp. Click this link to receive your daily dose of Dublin Live content. We also treat our community members to special offers, promotions, and adverts from us and our partners. If you don't like our community, you can check out any time you like. If you're curious, you can read our Privacy Notice . For all the latest news from Dublin and surrounding areas visit our homepage.
Time Business News
2 days ago
- Business
- Time Business News
Why It Is Important to Consult Interpol Lawyers
In international law, the Blue Notice issued by Interpol is often misunderstood. Unlike a Red Notice, which is a formal arrest request, a Blue Notice is used to collect information on an individual's location, movements, or identification. However, these notices can sometimes act as covert tools of pressure, especially in politically sensitive cases. This blog explains why it's crucial to consult with Interpol lawyers if you suspect a Blue Notice has been issued against you or your business. A Blue Notice is an official request from Interpol asking member states to assist in locating, identifying, or tracking an individual. While not a request for arrest, a Blue Notice can be a step in a broader investigation, potentially leading to an extradition process. The key difference between an Interpol Blue Notice and a Red Notice is that the latter involves a formal arrest request, while the former is typically used to gather information. Although Blue Notices are not as serious as Red Notices, they can still have significant implications, especially if the person or entity subject to the notice is unaware of it. Blue Notices can be used to track the movements of individuals without their knowledge, which can lead to unnecessary scrutiny or even the initiation of legal proceedings. The primary risk of a Blue Notice is the impact it can have on your freedom of movement. These notices often lead to increased scrutiny at border crossings, lengthy customs checks, and sometimes detentions for questioning. Even if the individual is not arrested, their travel may be delayed or interrupted. For businesses, the risks are equally severe. A Blue Notice could lead to the freezing of assets, disruptions in business operations, or difficulties in international contracts. If your company or employees are under a Blue Notice, partners and clients may become concerned about the legitimacy of your operations, potentially damaging your reputation. Moreover, while a Blue Notice itself does not directly lead to arrest, it can initiate an extradition process if further legal action is taken. The uncertainty surrounding the potential for legal escalation makes it essential to address these issues promptly. Experienced Interpol lawyers play a crucial role in identifying and challenging a Blue Notice. They can assist in verifying whether the notice has been issued and, if so, help understand the legal implications for the individual or business involved. Lawyers can also help you navigate the complexities of international law, ensuring that your rights are protected. If necessary, lawyers can file requests with Interpol to investigate the validity of the Blue Notice or request its removal if it is unwarranted. Legal representation is essential for ensuring that the notice does not evolve into more serious legal consequences, such as extradition. If you suspect that a Blue Notice has been issued against you or your business, it is vital to seek legal help as soon as possible. Even though Blue Notices are not as immediately dangerous as Red Notices, their implications for personal freedom and business operations can be severe. It is crucial to start your legal defense early. Interpol lawyers can help you assess the risks, take the necessary steps to protect your rights, and minimize potential damage to your reputation. The sooner you address a suspected Blue Notice, the more effectively you can prevent further complications. TIME BUSINESS NEWS
