Latest news with #NursultanNazarbayev
Forbes
18-07-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Russia's Military Alliance Is Slowly Unraveling
ASTANA, KAZAKHSTAN - NOVEMBER 8: Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev (C), Russian President ... More Vladimir Putin (3rd R), Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov (3rd L), Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon (2nd R), Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (L) and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (2nd L) pose for a photo during a session of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) at the Independence Palace on November 8, 2018 in Astana, Kazakhstan. Leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgystan have gathered in Astana for a one-day summit. (Photo by Aliia Raimbekova/) Getty Images Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a press conference with media representatives this week to discuss Armenia's economic and social issues, as well as the country's relationship with Russia. During the session, he also hinted at Armenia's future in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Formed in 1992, the CSTO was created to serve as a military alliance for countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The organization, led by Russia, was seen as a successor to the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Armenia was one of the founding members of the CSTO. Since joining the organization, the Armenian military has conducted numerous training exercises and operations with the other CSTO members. The Armenians even chaired the organization in 2021. Since then, Armenia's relationship with the CSTO and Russia has faltered. Armenia accused the CSTO of failing to 'fulfill its obligations to Armenia.' The Armenians stated that the collective did not send protection during Azerbaijan's attacks in 2020 and 2023. As a result, Armenia froze its membership in the organization in February 2024. Since then, Armenia has not participated in CSTO training exercises. During the July 16 press conference, Pashinyan was asked about Armenia's future in the CSTO. The Armenian prime minister stated that it was 'more likely for Armenia to withdraw from [the CSTO] than to reactivate its membership.' Should Armenia withdraw from the CSTO, it would not be the first time a country has left the organization. For example, after joining in 1992, Azerbaijan and Georgia did not to renew their membership in 1999. Instead, these two countries chose to develop stronger relationships with other countries and organizations beyond the Russian-led CSTO. Then, in 2012, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO after it claimed the collective had failed to come to its defense during a skirmish with fellow CSTO member Kyrgyzstan. Other countries have had issues with the CSTO and Russia. For example, Kazakhstan has toyed with the future of its membership. When the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russians turned to the CSTO for assistance. In response, the Kazakh government rejected Russia's full-scale invasion by not supporting Russian territorial gains in Ukraine. Instead, the Kazakh government sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Kazakh officials have also distanced themselves from Russia. For example, in October 2022, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opted not to hold a bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a summit in Kazakhstan. The episode caused Putin to state that Russia demanded respect from Kazakhstan. Then, in June 2023, Tokayev did not attend a Russian-led economic forum in St. Petersburg. Since then, Kazakh officials have begun meeting more regularly with their counterparts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. CSTO members Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have not been as defiant toward Russia as Armenia and Kazakhstan. But they still have had their differences. In the case of Belarus, the Belarusian military has continued to hold training exercises and engagements with Russian forces. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has also met with Putin frequently to discuss the economic and energy relationship between Belarus and Russia. Despite this continued interaction, Lukashenko has repeatedly denied Putin's request to send Belarusian soldiers into Ukraine. In addition, a Newsweek report stated that most Belarusian citizens oppose their country's participation in Russia's war. Similarly, several Belarusian military officers do not want to participate in Russia's war. Meanwhile, the Kyrgyzstani government has been hesitant toward its relationship with the CSTO and Russia. In October 2022, Kyrgyzstani President Sadyr skipped an economic gathering organized by the Russian Federation. Kyrgyzstan then canceled a CSTO training exercise that it was supposed to host. Additionally, the Kyrgyzstani government has not deployed soldiers to assist Russia in its war. Finally, a report by The Diplomat stated that the Kyrgyzstani government has advised citizens not to travel to Russia. Finally, like the other CSTO members, Tajikistan has opted not to send soldiers to help Russia fight in its war against Ukraine. Additionally, a report by Eurasianet found that several dual Tajik-Russian citizens have considered relinquishing their Russian nationality as they do not want to be conscripted into the Russian army. Given these developments, a sense of uneasiness is growing across the CSTO. Some members have begun distancing themselves from the Russian Federation, and two countries have openly defied the military organization. The CSTO was formed as a successor to the Warsaw Pact, but the organization is now facing serious challenges. It remains to be seen how Russia will mend its relationship with the other members so that its security collective does not falter.
The Diplomat
08-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Scripts and Power: How Russian Media Frame the Latinization of the Kazakh Language
The ongoing switch from Cyrillic to a Latin-based alphabet in Kazakhstan has been widely presented as a step toward modernization and global integration by Kazakh officials. However, in Russian media, the reform quickly became associated with shifting power, regional realignment, and the enduring legacies of the former Soviet empire. In Kazakhstan, the first discussions about switching the Kazakh language to the Latin script took place in the 1990s. In 2012, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev resurrected the idea of script reform in his 'Kazakhstan-2050' strategy. In 2017, Nazarbayev signed an official decree to adopt the Latin alphabet by the end of 2025. The official reasoning for Latinization includes strengthening national identity by getting rid of the externally imposed Cyrillic alphabet, streamlining access to global technologies and markets, and restoring the linguistic features of the Kazakh language. Since then, several versions of the alphabet have been presented but all have been heavily criticized. The latest version was introduced in 2021 and is considered to be the final version. The initial timeframe for the adoption of the Latin script has been adjusted to 2023-2031, with incumbent President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stressing the need for a cautious approach but nevertheless committing to carry on with the script reform. Script reforms are rarely purely technical, as they often reflect 'fundamentally ideological' systems as well as reveal deep-seated anxieties concerning identity, power, and shared cultural values. The Russian press often presents Latinization in Kazakhstan through a politicized lens. This analysis rests on the review of over 200 articles from Russian media outlets such as Regnum, Izvestiya, and Russia Today, done through the means of critical discourse analysis and corpus-assisted discourse. In this selection, only Russia Today is state-owned; however, all of the referenced media are either state-aligned or exhibit some Kremlin influence in their publishing policies. Although script-related terms such as 'language' and 'alphabet' dominate the word lists of the reviewed media, the existing discourse is broader and includes narratives about identity and geopolitics. References to Russia, Türkiye, and Eurasia suggest that Latinization is frequently framed as a geopolitical act, signaling that Kazakhstan is in the process of choosing between Moscow and a Turkic-Western orientation. Discursive Strategies Most noticeable are conspiratorial and nationalist tropes in the coverage. Aligning with the Kremlin's worldview, outlets frame Latinization as a foreign project aimed at undermining Kazakhstan's unity and its education system. For instance, Regnum reported in 2021 that foreign NGOs and Western 'fifth columns' were plotting to weaken Kazakhstan and warned that the country's education system will be made 'defenceless against the influence of foreign NGOs.' Here, authors invoked a popular conspiracist theme in order to present a mere technical alphabet change as an alien imposition created by external powers. The reviewed piece published by Regnum is titled 'Where Soros Goes, Trouble Follows,' echoing the notorious anti-Semitic conspiracy narratives associated with George Soros. Such narratives place Latinization well outside of ordinary policy discussions but within a concealed project to drive Kazakhstan away from Russia. Furthermore, such emotional article titles contribute to the tabloidization of the topic. Alongside conspiratorial framing, colonial nostalgia is evident. Such a discursive strategy is used to establish Cyrillic and the Russian language as a civilizational legacy. The Russian language and Cyrillic are presented as means which brought 'new knowledge' to Kazakhstan's people. A 2019 Regnum article stated that 'the Russian language was and is spoken by those who brought to these lands new knowledge that made Kazakhstan what we see today.' This narrative not only diminishes the role and achievements of the people of Kazakhstan, but also introduces an 'us vs. them' dichotomy to contrast the Soviet-era modernization ostensibly made possible thanks to Russian and Cyrillic with the allegedly misguided choice to switch to Latin. In a now-deleted Regnum article, Kazakhs were referred to as 'the people of the East,' suggesting a patronizing attitude toward them, who are seen as 'lamenting in their kitchens and yurts,' as stated in another article. This colonial discourse stresses the idea that Cyrillic and Russian are the reasons for Kazakhstan's development, and also signals that the country owes its achievements to the Soviet Union. Other related discursive patterns are ironical in framing and engaging in presupposition. Often, Russian commentators employ a mocking tone when referring to the script reform. Irony and sarcasm are used to present advocates of Latin, evidenced by such titles as 'The Kazakh pyramid of Cheops' and 'Nazarbayev has embarrassed everyone,' while pro-Russian views are framed as self-evident truths. Referring to Nazarbayev as the main supporter of Latinization, one author noted in a 2017 article about the then-Kazakh president's old age and said it is highly doubtful 'if the president lives [until Latiniziation is finalized] despite the achievements of modern gerontology and elite medicine.' Such claims associate the script reform with the will of an individual (Nazarbayev in this case) and create a perception that the Kazakh state would not be able to carry on the reform should the leader change. In a matter-of-fact tone, authors also stressed the message that education in the Russian language is of a higher quality: 'the higher quality of education in Russian is due to objective factors.' Thus, Russian media reinforce the notion that Russian education and language mean better opportunities, and by mocking the supporters of Latinization, it creates a narrative that the script reform is doomed or absurd. Unlike Regnum, which is often openly nationalistic and actively discredits Latinization, such outlets as or use a subtler approach, although with an evident bias. In a 2017 feature, noted that the script reform had been interpreted in many ways: as a breakaway from Russia's cultural sphere, a civilizational choice, or a simple desire for change. At the same time, the sarcastic tone of phrases like 'Play with Fonts' in the article is intended to delegitimize Latinization and create the notion of doubt among the audience. published an overview of Latinization in October 2019. There, the authors compared how Latinization was managed under Nazarbayev and his successor, Tokayev. It was underlined that, unlike his predecessor, Tokayev had not been actively advocating for Latinization but had decided to task specialized bodies to properly plan the transition. The report covered existing challenges associated with the reform, such as public criticism and difficulties in developing an optimal version of the alphabet, and framed Latinization as a bureaucratic challenge. Still, critical undertones are present. Thus, an expert quoted in the text questioned how Latin is supposed to play a civilizational role: 'Japan came close enough to Western civilization using hieroglyphics.' The state-run Russia Today (RT) in 2017 presented a diverse collection of viewpoints concerning Latinization to forecast what political, historical, and social implications the reform could have. Quoting official Kazakh discourse, the article mentioned that Latinization is a necessary step for modernization and the unification of all Kazakhs, including those living abroad. At the same time, it included critical points questioning the economic and cultural rationale behind the reform and doubting the streamlined integration with the Western and Turkic worlds. Transition to Latin is framed as a complex and potentially divisive policy, one which might create generational and cultural ruptures in Kazakh society. Regardless of reassurances from the Kazakh officials, RT expresses the concern that the reform can potentially limit the older generation's access to cultural heritage and raise questions about inclusivity and long-term consequences. More Than Just the Script As it became evident from the analysis, Russian media tends to frame Latinization in terms of regional realignment and loyalties rather than as a linguistic issue. The discourse is more about preserving existing cultural and political boundaries in which Kazakh-Russian relations function. In this context, Latinization becomes an alien imposition and a threat to Cyrillic and its role as a civilizational bridge to Russia and the Russian language. In the end, such discourse can signal Russia's concerns about its influence in Central Asia. Frequent references to Türkiye, China, and the West reinforce the narrative highlighting the geopolitical dimension of Latinization. In this politicized context, it is not a surprise that Russian authorities officially emphasize their intention to ensure Russian minorities' rights 'regardless of where they are located.' This vigilant oversight over Kazakhstan's policy changes is then reflected in the Russian media, in reports which serve as warnings that abandoning Cyrillic could lead to the marginalization of Russia's largest diaspora in Central Asia. What might potentially influence Russian rhetoric on the matter is the increased decolonization discourses in Kazakhstan, which have been reinforced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Conclusions The battle over Kazakhstan's alphabet reform is much more than a linguistic issue. It is a negotiation process aimed at defining who decides the Kazakh nation's future, writes its history into the language, and how the legacies of the former Soviet empire are presently reproduced. The Russian media echoes the Kremlin's position and frames Latinization not only as a local issue, a matter of Kazakhstan's internal business, but as a sign of shifting power in Central Asia. Media narratives illustrate that language policy discussions have become proxy battlegrounds in the post-Soviet space. While Kazakhstan continues its cautious approach to script reform, Russian media's discursive strategies are a crucial factor that influences regional perceptions. Since Latinization is still ongoing and the Kazakh elite seems determined to carry it out further, Russian media will continue covering it. What is important to remember is that Moscow's view of the script reform in Kazakhstan is as much about Russia's own self-perception as about the Kazakh alphabet. Note: This feature is based on the author's ongoing research of Kazakhstan's script reform. All data and analysis are from the author's original corpus and critical discourse analysis. Quotes are translated from Russian to English.
Korea Herald
25-04-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
Kazakhstan vows stronger interethnic harmony
Kazakh leader calls for stronger interethnic unity amid global uncertainty Korea Herald correspondent ASTANA, Kazakhstan — Kazakhstan vowed stronger interethnic harmony to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan on Thursday. Taking place at the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in Kazakhstan's capital Astana, the assembly discussed the nation's statehood and societal cohesion. The APK was established on March 1, 1995, by the first President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and has evolved from an advisory body into a constitutionally recognized institution of the Kazakh government in 2007. Chaired by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the assembly brought together more than 2,000 members from diverse ethnic, social and professional backgrounds. 'Only where there is unity, there is life,' remarked the president at the assembly's 34th session, pointing to the value of unity amid global uncertainty. 'Some ethnocultural associations have gathered unique private collections of art and ethnography that should also become part of the national cultural heritage,' Tokayev suggested. 'Kazakhstan is home to nine Russian drama theaters and four unique ethnic theaters — Uighur, Korean, Uzbek and German,' said Tokayev. According to the president, Kazakhstan ensures equal opportunities regardless of ethnicity, language, or religion, calling the commitment to fairness the foundation of a just state. Kazakhstan's multicultural identity is reflected in its rich cultural infrastructure, including nine Russian drama theaters and four ethnic theaters — Uighur, Korean, Uzbek, and German, he said, applauding ethnocultural associations. Organizers say that the assembly unites people who value social harmony with over 1,000 ethnocultural associations, APK institutions, and community initiatives such as councils of mothers and elders, a youth wing and volunteer-driven centers. 'We are different, but equal,' Tokayev said, underscoring that all ethnic groups living on Kazakh soil have the opportunity to fully develop their language, culture and traditions. But he also warned against provocations targeting ethnic harmony. 'Any provocative actions aimed at inciting discord in our society or destabilizing the situation will be stopped and punished by law,' he said, reinforcing that 'ideological strife is absolutely alien to our (Kazakh) worldview.' Citing Kazakhstan's historical tradition of hospitality, Tokayev recalled how the nation received millions who resettled during the Soviet era. Kazakhstan has a long history of people moving there from other regions. In the 20th century, many Russians, Slavs and other Soviet ethnic groups arrived in several waves. In the 1930s, many came to work in factories, while others were forced to move due to Stalin's purges. In the 1950s and 60s, more people arrived as part of the Virgin Lands campaign. During World War II, Kazakhstan became a safe place for over a million people escaping the Nazis, and was also a destination for groups, such as Crimean Tatars, Germans, Koreans, and North Caucasus Chechens and Ingush who were deported from Russia. 'Kazakhs accepted them as brothers. Millions of their descendants are now full-fledged, responsible citizens of Kazakhstan,' he said. 'I have instructed the Akims to regularly hold meetings on interethnic and interethnic relations,' said Tokayev. An Akim is the head of a local government in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan who looks after administrative duties to implement policies within their region. 'All ethnic groups living on Kazakh soil have the opportunity to fully develop their language, culture and traditions," Tokayev highlighted. Meanwhile, he also underscored Kazakhstan's friendly ties with Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. 'There are no unresolved issues between us,' he noted, adding that regional cooperation is a hallmark of Kazakhstan's diplomacy. To mark the 30th anniversary of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, citizens were awarded state honors by presidential order for promoting peace, friendship and interethnic harmony. "We need unity. Unity means happiness, kindness, support for each other, and love for people,' Anel Marabayeva, one of the recipients of the President's award, told The Korea Herald. 'Interethnic coexistence, unity, kindness, and mutual support are the backbone of a diverse society,' she added. sanjaykumar@
