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Iraqi News
07-07-2025
- Business
- Iraqi News
US sanctions on Iran oil smuggling threaten to hinder Iraq's investment drive
Baghdad ( – A new wave of intensified U.S. sanctions targeting Iranian oil smuggling networks is threatening to create significant collateral damage for Iraq's own economic ambitions, according to a recent report by the energy-focused American website The analysis suggests that as Washington escalates its 'maximum pressure' campaign against Tehran, Iraqi entities and infrastructure are being caught in the crossfire, potentially hindering Baghdad's efforts to attract international investment. This new phase of sanctions comes just weeks after a hypothetical second Trump administration conducted major military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. Treasury Department has now designated over 30 new entities, individuals, and vessels involved in what it calls an illicit, multi-billion-dollar trade network. The report highlights that the sanctions focus on a network allegedly run by British-Iraqi citizen Salim Ahmed Saeed. According to the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), this network has been smuggling Iranian oil by disguising it as or mixing it with Iraqi oil since at least 2020. Specific Iraqi-linked assets have been targeted, including the VS Oil Terminal at Iraq's Khor Al-Zubair port, which is owned by Saeed. The U.S. also noted ship-to-ship transfers occurring near this terminal and pointed to the routine use of forged documents to mask the oil's origin. The sanctions also named the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker 'Dijla' and other UAE-based companies and vessels involved in the network, some of which facilitated sales for Iran's IRGC-Quds Force. For Iraq, the implications are severe. The report argues that while Baghdad is actively trying to boost cooperation and investment with the West, sanctions that include Iraq-linked operators can make international investors wary of entering the country's vital oil, gas, and port sectors. This development adds another layer of instability to an already complex situation. Iraq is still navigating its own energy needs, internal political dynamics including the federal-KRG oil dispute, and the presence of armed factions. The broader U.S.-Iran conflict directly exacerbates these political and economic uncertainties. The report frames Washington's actions as a dual strategy under a second Trump administration: first, to exert maximum economic pressure on Tehran to force negotiations, and second, to actively attempt to pull Iraq into the Western sphere of influence, countering the growing regional roles of China and Russia. Ultimately, Iraq finds itself in a perilous position—geographically and economically tied to Iran, yet seeking the Western investment necessary for its development. Navigating this geopolitical minefield will be a critical challenge for Baghdad as it tries to pursue its own national interests amidst a major regional power struggle.
Gulf Insider
02-07-2025
- Business
- Gulf Insider
Iraq Leads in OPEC Crude Exports to U.S.
Authored by Charles Kennedy via Iraq exported nearly 7 million barrels of crude to the U.S. in May, surpassing all other OPEC members. The surge in Iraqi shipments meets U.S. demand for heavier Middle Eastern crude grades amid OPEC+ output cuts. Rising oil exports provide vital fiscal support for Iraq, where crude sales generate about 90% of government revenue. OPEC's second-largest producer, Iraq, was the single biggest supplier of crude from the cartel to the United States in May, per data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) cited by Iraqi media outlets Shafaq News and IraqiNews. Iraq ranked first among the 12 OPEC producers in terms of exports to the United States in May. Shipments totaled nearly 7 million barrels of crude, 6.95 million barrels to be precise. The second-largest OPEC supplier to the U.S. was Nigeria with 6.803 million barrels of crude oil exports, followed by Saudi Arabia with 6.208 million barrels of crude. Iraq has boosted exports in recent years, including to the United States, as it hasn't adhered to its supply quota under the OPEC+ agreements. Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Russia have been overproducing above targets for years. But in May, Iraq cut its crude oil production by 50,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 3.93 million bpd, compared to its target of 4.049 million bpd, according to the latest OPEC data from secondary sources. Iraq is compensating for previous overproduction as it has been one of the main overproducers in the OPEC+ deal for years, alongside Kazakhstan and Russia, non-OPEC members of the OPEC+ pact. Last month, estimates put Iraq's crude oil exports to the United States surging past 5 million barrels in May, marking Baghdad's highest monthly volume to U.S. refiners so far this year. The surge reflects sustained U.S. appetite for heavier Middle Eastern grades, with Iraqi crude averaging between 160,000 bpd and 190,000 bpd in May. As OPEC+ maintains voluntary output curbs and U.S. shale growth moderates, Iraq has solidified its position among Washington's top five crude suppliers. Iraq's export increase also provides critical fiscal relief for Baghdad, with crude sales accounting for roughly 90% of Iraq's state revenue. Recent price support near $80 per barrel has further underpinned Iraq's monthly revenues, helping finance public sector wages and infrastructure projects. Also Read: US Health Secretary RFK Jr. Unloads Disturbing Vaccine Secrets
Yahoo
13-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
What Are Iran And Russia Really Up To In The Caspian Sea?
Iran is making 'good progress' on its first concerted oil drilling operation in the Caspian Sea in 30 years, a senior energy source who works closely with the Islamic Republic's Petroleum Ministry exclusively told over the weekend. 'The signs are promising in the block ['18' in the Roudsar formation from 70-metre waters around 15 kilometres from the northern Iranian coastline] and if it continues to be so then there is great potential there,' he said. 'Official estimates are that this small area could have around 600 million barrels of oil and around two trillion cubic feet of gas in it,' he added. This is not surprising, as across the wider Caspian basins area, including both onshore and offshore fields, there are a conservatively estimated 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. Around 41% of total Caspian crude oil and lease condensate and 36% of natural gas exists in the offshore fields, with an additional 35% of oil and 45% of gas estimated to lie onshore within 100 miles of the coast, particularly in Russia's North Caucasus region. The remaining 12 billion barrels of oil and 56 Tcf of natural gas are believed to be variously located further onshore in the large Caspian Sea basins, mostly in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The area accounts for an average of 17% of the total oil production of the five littoral states that share its resources, on average totalling 2.5-2.9 million barrels per day (mbpd). Given these numbers, two natural questions emerge: why has Iran not resumed drilling activity here earlier, and why is it doing so now?On the first point, several factors have conspired to keep Iran from focusing on drilling in the Caspian Sea, despite its vast potential resources, but one in particular has prevented it from doing so in recent years. Of the broader reasons, a great degree of the engineering, technology, know-how, and money required for Iran to develop its Caspian reserves, much of which are located in challenging geological areas, has been denied it through the various sanctions regimes in place since its 1979 Islamic Revolution. Given this, Iran has focused instead on its multitude of oil sites offering easy development opportunities, with the lifting cost in many of these equalling the lowest rate in the world – around $1-3 per barrel – along with some sites in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This is one part of the explanation as to why Iran dug the last shallow-water well in its Caspian Sea region in 1997 and stopped developing the deep-water wells in 2014. The other – special – reason why it has done nothing to restart these operations more recently dates back to the 2018 signing of the stunningly dull-sounding 'Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea', which in reality surely figures as one of the biggest – but least well known -- swindles in recent years in the global oil industry, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The officially published papers on the agreement refrain from going to details about share allocations in the Caspian Sea resource and talk only vaguely about giving the area 'a special legal status'. However, the Iran source exclusively told at that time in 2018 that there was a second part to the deal, never officially released, that has proven explosive for the perennially-fractious relations between the Caspian states -- in particular Iran's with every other partner -- and its genesis lies in what happened when the USSR collapsed and fractured into its constituent independent states. Prior to this, Iran and the USSR had struck the original agreement in 1921 to split all 'fishing rights' in the Caspian area 50-50. This was amended in 1924 to include 'any and all resources recovered', meaning in practical terms that all hydrocarbons resources would be shared equally between Russia and Iran. However, following the dissolution of the USSR, three new independent countries adjoining the Caspian Sea were created – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan - to add to the original partnership of Russia and Iran. 'Iran should have said back then that Russia should have shared its Caspian stake with the three former USSR states, but it [Iran] was content to wait for the official legal dispute to be settled,' underlined the Iran source. Iran's trust in Russia's fair play was of course misplaced, and by changing the legal definition of the Caspian from a 'lake' – its original designation in the original agreement – to a 'sea' (because Russia had opened up the channel from the Volga River into the Caspian to prevent the levels dropping), the original even share distribution of oil and gas profits for the region no longer held good. Instead, Russia was effectively able to divide up the shares as it saw fit, and the way it saw fit was to benefit its existing ally, Kazakhstan (which was assigned a 28.9% share), and its wished-for ally, Azerbaijan (which secured a 21% stake), while Russia saw a slight increase (to 21%), Turkmenistan's share went down (to 17.225%), and Iran's share plummeted to just 11.875%. This switch from 50% to just over 11% meant that based on hydrocarbons values at that time Iran was set to lose at least US$3.2 trillion in revenues from the disputed and lost value of energy products going forward. Unsurprisingly, then, Iran's appetite to start drilling again in its Caspian region was further diminished. So what has changed now? The answer in part is financial necessity – not just on Iran's part given the parlous state of its economy, but also on Russia's for the same reason. The Islamic Republic's development efforts will provide it with 11.875% of the value of the oil and gas drilled but it will give Russia 21%. The other part of the answer is that even Iran's relatively paltry share is increasingly required to service the terms of the ongoing multi-layered oil-for-arms swaps taking place between it and Russia. These swaps are of an altogether greater complexity than those between Iran and North Korea, for example, which were characterised by the latter sending personnel, information, and technology (much of which first came from China) relating to its nuclear weapons programme to Iran in return for oil being sent back to it. The swaps between Russia and Iran, according to the Iran source, involve oil-only (designed to reduce transport and distribution costs on both sides), weapon-only (Iranian drone and ballistic missiles in exchange for Russian assistance on nuclear weapons development), and a combination of oil for weapons in each direction. All of this was agreed as part of the 20-year comprehensive cooperation deal between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, agreed by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, on 18 January 2024, as exclusively revealed at the time by In several key respects, this new deal – 'The Treaty on the Basis of Mutual Relations and Principles of Cooperation between Iran and Russia' – mirrored key elements of the all-encompassing 'Iran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement', as first revealed anywhere in the world in my 3 September 2019 article on the subject and analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. It is no secret now that Iran has been supplying Russia with munitions, artillery shells, drones and ballistic missiles since the onset of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Iran has also long been promised Suhkoi-35 fighter jets, Mig-28 attack helicopters, and the S-400 missile defence system, although several of these assurances remain unfulfilled by Russia. However, according to a senior figure in the European Union's energy security complex spoken to exclusively by in the past two weeks: 'Verified reports show that Iran is becoming ever more active in the Russia-Belarus campaign of eroding NATO's eastern flank defences particularly along the vulnerable northern and southern border defences that are most vulnerable.' He added: 'In the last delivery of mid- and long-range missiles from Tehran to Moscow, for the first time the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps] included as they had promised in February in a meeting a visit to Moscow, Etemad [a late generation ballistic missile], and Fath 360 [a multi-lunch ballistic missile launching system], with most of the latter to be positioned by Moscow near the Belarus border with Poland.' Consequently, Russia for its part has increased the assistance it is giving to Iran on its nuclear programme, for which it is charging Iran much more than for any such assistance previously given, so Iran now needs more money, which means developing its Caspian resources too. By Simon Watkins for More Top Reads From this article on Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
Yahoo
03-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Is A New Oil Price War Between The West And OPEC About To Break Out?
It is highly unlikely that anyone with even a modicum of intelligence has lost money in the past ten years or so by trading against the predictable thinking of those in charge of Saudi Arabia's oil policy. Quite the reverse, in fact, with enormous profits available from the failures of the enormously well-flagged and exceptionally predictable strategy of the 2014-2016 and 2020 Oil Price Wars -- launched by the Kingdom with the intention of destroying or disabling the U.S. shale oil sector, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. As OPEC members and their toxic companion in the OPEC+ formation, Russia, mull keeping oil production on the high side of recent historical averages, the key question for the oil markets is -- surely they are not going to launch another oil price war using the same strategy as failed twice before? It is apposite here to recall the reasons for the failure of the two previous oil price wars since 2014. The first (2014-2016) was based on Saudi Arabia's belief – shared by many in the oil market at the time, it must be said -- that U.S. shale oil producers had a breakeven price point of US$70 per barrel (pb) of for the West Texas Intermediate benchmark. Therefore, the Saudis reasoned, if the price of oil was pushed below that level for long enough -- by it and its fellow OPEC members dramatically increasing production while demand in the global market was predicted to remain around the same level for some time -- then many of the new U.S. shale oil producers would go bankrupt. Any others would have to cease production at such uneconomic price levels and shelve future investment plans aimed at boosting their production even more. So confident was Saudi Arabia of the success of its strategy that shortly after the onset of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, senior figures in its government and oil ministry it held a series of private meetings in New York to tell them in detail about the strategy it was to use and how well it would go, as also detailed in full in my latest book. At these meetings, the Saudis revealed that, far from looking to keep prices high – as had also been the usual inclination of OPEC for many years to boost the prosperity of member states – it was willing to tolerate 'much lower' Brent prices 'of between USD80-90 pb for a period of one to two years or even lower prices if necessary'. According to several sources at the New York meeting exclusively spoken to by at the time, the Saudis made it clear that it aside from destroying the then-nascent U.S. shale sector, the Oil Price War also aimed to re-impose a degree of supply discipline on other OPEC terms of the first objective, the initial signs augured well for a Saudi victory. The U.S. oil rig count in January/February 2015 saw its biggest period-on-period fall since 1991, and the gas rig count fell substantially at that time as well. According to industry figures as at the end of the first quarter of 2015, around one third of the 800 oil and gas projects (worth US$500 billion and totalling nearly 60 billion barrels of oil equivalent) scheduled for final investment decisions in that year were unconventional and were subject to possible postponement or cancellation. Over the year as a whole, output from the U.S. shale producers typically fell by by around 50%, forcing them to cut investment to approximately US$60 billion over the year, compared to the US$100 billion or so spent in 2014. Crucially, though, from around that point the U.S. shale sector reorganised into a meaner, leaner, lower-cost production machine that could – at that time – broadly survive and profit at WTI prices above around US$35 pb from above US$70 pb previously. They managed to achieve this mainly through the advancement of technology that enabled them to drill longer laterals, manage the fracking stages closer and maintain the fracks with higher, finer sand to allow for increased recovery for the wells drilled, in conjunction with faster drill times, as industry experts old back then. These operations gained further cost benefits from multi-pad drilling and well spacing theory and practice. During this period, Saudi Arabia had moved from a budget surplus to a then-record high deficit in 2015 of US$98 billion and it had spent at least US$250 billion of its precious foreign exchange reserves over that period that even senior Saudis said was lost forever. Moreover, according to International Energy Agency estimates, OPEC member states collectively at least US$450 billion in revenues during the 2014-2016 Oil Price War. The 2020 Oil Price War – using exactly the same overproduction strategy as before -- failed less through the long-term effects of misjudging the effectiveness of the U.S. shale producers and more through the direct political intervention of its then first-term President Domald Trump. Given the potentially disastrous economic and political consequences for the U.S. and its sitting president of sharp and sustained rises in oil – and crucially, gasoline – prices, as also analysed in full in my latest book, Trump began by warning Saudi Arabia repeatedly that the U.S. would not tolerate any sustained threat to its shale oil sector (and, by extension, to its economy and its domestic political landscape) – in speeches and tweets and in the increasingly close-run legislative passage of the 'NOPEC Bill'. He also directly warned Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud that the U.S. might withdraw U.S. military support for the Al Sauds, and by extension to Saudi Arabia, with the additional observation that: 'He [King Salman] would not last in power for two weeks without the backing of the U.S. military.' With no sign by the end of March 2020 that the Saudis were going to cease the war, Trump clearly and specifically told de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the telephone on 2 April that unless OPEC started cutting oil production – so allowing oil prices to rise above the danger zone for U.S. shale oil producers – that he would be powerless to stop lawmakers from passing legislation to withdraw U.S. troops from the Kingdom, according to a very senior source in the White House exclusively spoken to by a the time. Oil production consequently came back down again, and the 2020 war had ended. As of now, the low breakeven cost resilience of the U.S. shale sector is not quite the same as it was before. The recent Dallas Fed Energy Survey suggests that it is around US$65 pb for new wells drilled, although for existing wells it is significantly lower. It is also true that the lifting cost of oil in Saudi Arabia has also risen since 2014 from around US$1-2 pb, but it is still only about US$3-5 pb now. However, the Kingdom's 2025 fiscal breakeven price per barrel of the Brent crude benchmark is a minimum of US$90.9, according to IMF figures. Consequently, it can no better afford a major, sustained fall in oil prices now than it could in either 2014-2016 or in 2020. With Trump back in the White House, it is also no better off politically either. Indeed, with Republicans majorities in both houses, it is worse positioned to deal with the likely threats and actions that Trump would use against it if it went head-to-head with the U.S. again. Instead, according to a senior energy source who works closely with the U.S. Presidential Administration, Washington believes the Saudis will take a modulated approach to further oil production increases, in tandem with the U.S. 'Oil prices at the lower end of recent historical averages suit the U.S. from an inflationary perspective, as long as they don't go too low, and Washington has made this clear to the Saudis,' he said. In fact, these conversations were part of the dialogue that U.S. officials had with their Saudi counterparts during Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia on 13 May to sign a broad-based economic agreement between the two countries. 'There are longer-term financial and security benefits for the Saudis in taking this softer approach, even if oil is below the number they want for their budget in the shorter-term, and to bridge the gap they will have no problem in borrowing more in the capital markets,' he concluded. By Simon Watkins for More Top Reads From this article on Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
Yahoo
05-05-2025
- Automotive
- Yahoo
Gas in Michigan jumps 17 cents a gallon in a week, despite falling oil prices
Michigan gas prices jumped up in the past week, landing at $3.21 a gallon, an average increase of 17 cents. The gas prices went up as oil prices went down and the president repeated a claim in a "Meet the Press" interview that aired on Sunday that he had brought gas prices "down to $1.98 in many states." Adrienne Woodland, a spokeswoman for the AAA auto club, which tracks prices, said Monday that "drivers across Michigan are seeing higher prices at the pump as we enter the month of May." Still, the price was 5 cents less than a month ago and 40 cents less than a year ago. Metro Detroit's gas price average was $3.17 a gallon, with the highest gas price averages in Lansing, $3.27; Saginaw, $3.26 and Grand Rapids, $3.25; and the lowest in Traverse City, $3.02; Marquette, $3.16 and Jackson, $3.16. About half the retail cost of gasoline is made up by crude oil prices, the American Petroleum Institute estimates; and crude oil prices have been trading down as gas demand in the United States has decreased. Other factors that affect gasoline prices are: refining costs, about 25%; distribution and marketing costs, 11%; and federal and state taxes, 14%, according to the oil and natural gas industry trade group. West Texas Intermediate, a benchmark representing oil produced in the United States, has been trading below $60 a gallon, a $ 4-a-barrel drop from a week ago. But some analysts have said that could be a sign of looming economic trouble. While low oil prices tend to translate to lower gas prices, in countries that produce and export oil, like the United States, it also, noted, can "lead to job losses, reduced tax revenues and broader economic consequences." The energy publication added that falling oil prices also could "worsen the U.S. trade deficit — the very thing that tariffs are supposedly being used to fix," and it added, "the loudest advocates for tariffs — arguing they'll fix our trade imbalance — are also cheering falling oil prices." President Donald Trump has largely dismissed concerns on "Meet the Press," telling moderator Kristen Welker in an interview from his Mar-a-Lago home in Palm Beach, Florida, that "many businesses are being helped" by the tariffs. He said gas prices are falling, repeatedly claiming throughout the broadcast that the prices "are down at tremendous numbers for gasoline," and are "down to $1.98 in many states right now." More: Gas prices fall below $3 a gallon in Michigan, but analysts warn drop may not last Later in the NBC show, one of the show's roundtable guests, Democratic strategist Symone Townsend, challenged Trump's remarks, noting that "nowhere in this country is gas $1.98." The average price of gas on Sunday was $3.17 a gallon nationally, according to AAA, and GasBuddy, which tracks prices at more than 150,000 stations, told CBS News in late April that it was aware of no station in the nation selling gas at $1.98 a gallon. Contact Frank Witsil: 313-222-5022 or fwitsil@ This article originally appeared on Detroit Free Press: Gas prices in Michigan rise as oil prices fall
