Latest news with #PL-480
Indian Express
3 days ago
- Health
- Indian Express
To improve both crop and human nutrition, India needs a paradigm shift
Who would have imagined that India, which lived from 'ship to mouth' with heavy dependence on food aid under the US PL-480 programme in the 1960s, would emerge as the world's largest rice exporter? In 2024-25 (FY25), India exported 20.2 million tonnes (MT) of rice in a global market of 61 MT. The country also runs the world's largest food distribution programme, the PM-Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMGKY), which provides 5 kg of free rice or wheat per person per month to more than 800 million people. Yet, the Food Corporation of India holds about 57 MT of rice — the highest stock in 20 years and nearly four times the buffer norm of 13.54 million tonnes as of July 1, 2025. Poverty, too, has receded significantly. The extreme poverty head count (those earning less than $3/day at 2021 PPP) dropped from 27.1 per cent in 2011 to just 5.3 per cent in 2022. Notwithstanding these achievements, malnutrition amongst children remains a challenge. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS 5) (2019–21) reports that 35.5 per cent of children under five years of age are stunted, 32.1 per cent are underweight, and 19.3 per cent are wasted. Food security in India has evolved beyond merely ensuring caloric sufficiency; it must now encompass nutritional security as well. One critical, and often overlooked, factor here is the health of soils. Soil micronutrient deficiencies not only impair agricultural productivity but also degrade the nutritional quality of crops. Crops grown on nutrient-deficient soils often mirror those deficiencies, leading to a silent but pervasive form of malnutrition in humans. Take zinc. Its deficiency in soils translates into low zinc content in cereals like wheat and rice, which in turn is linked to childhood stunting — a condition that affects the physical development, long-term cognitive health, as well as the professional life of a person. Let us now turn to the status of Indian soils. Of more than 8.8 million soil samples tested under the Soil Health Card Scheme in 2024, less than 5 per cent have high or sufficient nitrogen (N), only 40 per cent have sufficient phosphate (P), 32 per cent have sufficient potash (K) and just 20 per cent are sufficient in soil organic carbon (SOC) (see graph). Importantly, SOC is a critical parameter defining the physical, chemical, and biological properties of soil — these govern its holding capacity and nutrient use efficiency. There is also a debate as to how much SOC is considered sufficient. As per the Indian Institute of Soil Science (IISC), SOC in the range of 0.50- 0.75 per cent is adequate. But the World Food Laureate, Rattan Lal, who has worked on soil health throughout his career, prescribes that the carbon content in soils should be at least 1.5 to 2 per cent. Our soils also suffer from a deficiency of sulphur, as well as micronutrients like iron, zinc and boron. These deficiencies range from moderate to severe. It won't be an exaggeration to say that many parcels of Indian soils need to be immediately taken to an intensive care unit (ICU) to restore them to normal health so that they can produce nutritious food on a sustainable basis. We have also observed that in some parts of the country, nitrogen (N) is overused while phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) are underused. For example, in Punjab, nitrogen use exceeds recommendations by 61 per cent, while potassium use is short by 89 per cent, and phosphorus use is short by 8 per cent. Telangana also mirrors this imbalance — it overuses N by 54 per cent but its use of K is 82 per cent less, and that of P is 13 per cent less. The situation is similar in several other states. The highly imbalanced use of N, P and K and the neglect of micronutrients leads to suboptimal agricultural productivity. Nationwide, the fertiliser-to-grain response ratio has declined significantly from 1:10 in the 1970s to a mere 1:2.7 in 2015. Moreover, the application of granular urea results in substantial nitrogen losses, with only 35-40 per cent of the nitrogen being absorbed by the crops. The remaining nitrogen is either released into the atmosphere as nitrous oxide — a greenhouse gas that is 273 times more potent than carbon dioxide — or leaches into groundwater, contaminating it with nitrates and making it unsafe for consumption. So, in a way, the imbalanced use of N, P and K is also increasing the pollution, rather than increasing grain yields. Additionally, a significant portion of urea is diverted to non-agricultural uses and also finds its way to neighbouring countries. This needs to change. To restore soil health and improve both crop and human nutrition, India needs a paradigm shift — from indiscriminate use of fertilisers to tailored and science-based soil nutrition management. This calls for more precise and customised fertilisation strategies, which are informed by rigorous soil testing and aligned with the nutritional needs of different soils and crops. Only when soils receive the nutrients do they produce food that nourishes rather than merely fills stomachs. This is no longer just an agricultural issue; it is a public health imperative. Recognising the urgency of this challenge, the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) and OCP Nutricrops have committed to collaborating to improve soil health in India and beyond. OCP Nutricrops brings cutting-edge expertise in soil nutrition and fertiliser solutions aimed at addressing global challenges in sustainable food production. The collaboration aims to develop, implement, and scale region-specific, data-driven soil nutrition solutions that enhance crop productivity while improving their nutritional profile. Thus, to truly move from plate to plough — and back to plate — we must start by healing Mother Earth. Only then can we walk as a healthy nation. Gulati is distinguished professor at ICRIER, Vergutz is chief scientific officer at OCP Nutricrops, and Juneja is research fellow at ICRIER. Views are personal
The Print
01-07-2025
- Business
- The Print
How Shastri and Subramaniam sowed the seeds of MSP
Once he accepted the position, Subramaniam drew from his experience in the Steel Ministry and concluded that the core reason for stagnation in Indian agriculture was that 'farmers were not given a fair and remunerative price for their efforts.' He was dismayed to see the government continuing with wartime strategies of imposing controls, rationing, and a procurement system that adversely impacted the primary producer. When two of Shastri's senior colleagues, Jagjivan Ram and Swaran Singh, refused the agriculture portfolio, Shastri rang up C Subramaniam. CS reportedly asked, 'Why me?' To which Shastri replied, 'Because no one else is willing.' Subramaniam asked for time to consider — he was well settled in the Steel Ministry. But Shastri prevailed, assuring him of the fullest political support in the challenging task of tiding over the crisis and making India self-sufficient in food. When Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as Prime Minister in June 1964, the Agriculture Ministry was considered a 'political graveyard', on account of massive food deficits after successive crop failures in different parts of the country. Agricultural production had plummeted to 62 million tonnes per annum, and India was critically dependent on food shipments from the United States under PL-480. Unlike John F Kennedy, who saw US food aid as humanitarian, his successor Lyndon B Johnson was a brusque bully who expected recipients to kowtow to his political preferences. Subramaniam appointed a Foodgrains Prices Committee under LK Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister, to determine the 'producer price' for paddy and wheat for the 1964–65 crop year. In his first Cabinet note of October 1964, backed fully by Shastri, CS proposed an unprecedented 15 per cent hike in prices for both Rabi and Kharif seasons. This was opposed by Finance Minister TT Krishnamachari, who saw it as inflationary, and Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda, who feared unrest among industrial workers. However, even more important than this episodic 15 per cent hike was the establishment of the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) from 1 January 1965. Its role was to advise on price policy, on a continuing basis, not only for paddy and wheat but also for coarse cereals, pulses, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton, and jute. Over the years, the mandate expanded, and APC (now CACP) recommendations today cover 23 commodities. Gandhian economist ML Dantwala was appointed the first chairperson of the APC. He had earlier worked on the Indian cotton economy and understood the need to balance the interests of farmers with those of the textile industry. In his new role, he had to recommend Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) to incentivise farmers to adopt new technologies, optimise resource use, and increase productivity. It was clear by then that the community development approach had its limitations. What was needed was higher economic returns and a state guarantee for procurement — either through direct procurement for the PDS or price support for oilseeds and pulses. According to Harsh Damodaran, the idea of the APC had also featured in a Ford Foundation study, but this was underplayed, since anything 'American' was viewed with suspicion in those days. Ironically, the trio behind this transformation — minister C Subramaniam, scientist MS Swaminathan, and agriculture secretary B Sivaraman — were all accused of yielding to American pressure. As an aside: while the Americans were advocating for smallholder agriculture, the USSR promoted collectivisation and professionalisation, both of which had already failed in the USSR and China. Meanwhile, Dantwala's advocacy for a more interventionist approach, including price stabilisation to protect farmers and ensure food security, was challenged by V.M. Dandekar. He argued that such policies would encourage inefficiency and corruption, and hinder natural growth in the agribusiness sector. This intellectual debate played out in the Economic and Political Weekly. Dandekar (and co-author Rath) argued that although poverty and undernourishment were correlated, they were often independent variables and needed distinct policy responses. Also read: The real White Revolution—Shastri's NDDB built a farmers-first economy that still works Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan Yet a quiet transformation took place in India's rural economy within five years of MSP's introduction. If one had to choose the most understated yet transformative five years in the seven decades and eight years of Indian Independence (from 1947 to the present), it would be 1965–66 to 1970–71. During this period, India's foodgrain production rose to 108 million tonnes, laying to rest all doubts about the nation's ability to feed itself. The kisan had delivered. India became more than self-sufficient in food, just in time for the jawan to secure a decisive victory in the 1971 war on both the western and eastern fronts, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. By then, the Agriculture Ministry had become one of the most coveted portfolios. From the 1970s onward, it has been held by stalwarts like Jagjivan Ram, Balram Jakhar, Devi Lal, Nitish Kumar, and Sharad Pawar. Today, it is held by Shivraj Singh Chouhan, one of the longest-serving Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh. Also read: Nothing like deviation in democracy. Even Lenin & Stalin adapted: Lal Bahadur Shastri Empirical norms for MSP From a policy perspective, subsequent APC chairpersons — distinguished agricultural economists such as Abhijit Sen, T Haque, and Ashok Gulati — developed empirical norms for determining MSP. By 1980, APC evolved into the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), as India had achieved a more than adequate food surplus. Three new cost concepts entered farmers' political vocabulary: A2, A2+FL, and C2. — A2 includes all paid-out expenses: seeds, fertilisers, chemicals, machinery, irrigation, interest on working capital, depreciation, and rent for leased land. — A2+FL adds the imputed cost of unpaid family labour. — C2, proposed by MS Swaminathan when he chaired the National Commission on Farmers in 2006, includes A2+FL, plus the imputed rent on owned land and other imputed costs. Raising A2+FL by 50 per cent suggested that family labour (time spent by the farmer and their family in the production field) was valued 50 per cent higher than hired wages (money paid to hired labourers). It recognised the sweat equity of farming households. Also read: MSP isn't the real issue. Indian farming has changed, so should protests CACP in a balancing role CACP's job is not easy. Each crop has multiple stakeholders. For example, jute farmers in West Bengal, Assam, and Bihar demand higher MSPs, but grain-producing states like Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh as well as the Union food ministry oppose this. Their argument is that higher jute prices inflate the cost of gunny bags for wheat procurement. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs worries about inflation. The Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare tries to double farmers' income. Balancing these competing demands is a delicate act. Food inflation must be balanced with farmers' incomes. Changes over time As someone who has served as Agriculture Secretary in Uttarakhand and West Bengal, and as Joint Secretary at the Centre and MD of NAFED, I've had candid exchanges with Alagh, Sen, Haque, and Gulati. Like Dantwala, the first three believed in the dominant role of the state in agricultural economics. However, post-liberalisation, Indian agriculture has changed. No longer an economy of shortages, it began to reflect shifts in consumer demand and market orientation. Gulati's tenure reflected this transition. By the early 2000s, farmers near Tier I and Tier II cities were earning more from high-value agriculture — dairy, livestock, fisheries, and horticulture — than from grains. By 2015, horticulture production exceeded cereals in volume, weight, and value. Like the Dantawala-Dandekar debate, Swaminathan was sceptical of liberalised export policies, while Gulati argued that government restrictions on trade in agricultural products prevented farmers from securing better prices and thus better incomes. Freer trade, including external trade, will benefit farmers. Many agricultural commodities, including rice and wheat, remained barred from being exported. This meant Indian farmers could not benefit from global price surges. In Gulati's view, more private procurement and scrapping mandi taxes would narrow the wholesale-retail price gap. He rejected the idea that rising MSPs caused food inflation. He instead pointed to non-MSP items — vegetables, fruit, milk, meat, and fish — that drove food inflation. Also read: Nobody fully understands MSP legal guarantee even now. A panel of experts shows The road ahead The current CACP Chairman, Vijay Paul Sharma, who is now in his second term and a professor at IIM Ahmedabad, brings management expertise in agri-value chains. His tenure has witnessed a successive volley of farmer protests demanding statutory backing for CACP and MSP. Having worked in both central and state governments, I believe the focus should be less on the legal status of MSP or CACP, and more on strengthening infrastructure: warehousing, market linkages, farm machinery hubs, credit access, value addition, and transparent price discovery. Indian agriculture has travelled far since the time of Shastri. The institution he set up must evolve with the times. While principles, such as ensuring the best price for farmers, must be preserved, strategy and practice must adapt to modern realities. This is the second article in a series on Lal Bahadur Shastri and the institutions he helped establish. Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal. Disclosure: The columnist is a trustee of the Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial (LBS Museum). (Edited by Prashant)
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Business Standard
30-06-2025
- Business
- Business Standard
Slashing food tariffs: NITI's push for US mkt access may hurt food security
In the 1960s and early 1970s, India faced food shortages and depended on US food imports under PL-480 - a US law that allowed surplus food to be sold or donated to countries like India Ajay Srivastava Listen to This Article A recent NITI Aayog paper recommends sweeping tariff cuts on a range of agricultural imports from the United States — including rice, dairy, poultry, corn, apples, almonds, and genetically-modified soya — as part of the proposed India-US Free Trade Agreement. The paper, titled 'Promoting India-US Agricultural Trade under the new US Trade Regime,' was published in May. We look at its key recommendations and what they could mean for India's food security. Let's start with rice — India's staple food across states. Rice: The paper suggests scrapping import tariffs on US rice, as India already exports large amounts
Indian Express
30-06-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
The crisis before the crisis — how a failing economy was one of the triggers for the Emergency
While a swelling Opposition campaign and an Allahabad High Court order setting aside Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's election to the Lok Sabha in 1971 were the immediate trigger for the imposition of Emergency, trouble had been brewing for the better part of a decade in the non-political sphere. After a strong 1963-64 and 1964-65, over which GDP growth averaged 6.7%, the Indian economy was hit by a phenomenon not seen in 75 years of official data — two consecutive years of decline in overall economic activity. In 1965-66, India's GDP shrunk by 2.6%. This was followed by a 0.1% decline in 1966-67. It was because of another rare occurrence — consecutive droughts. According to a 2005 India Meteorological Department paper, the previous 130 years had only seen one such other case, in 1904 and 1905. Inflation, as a result, shot up to nearly 16% in 1966-67. The twin droughts came at a time when India was already a huge importer of foodgrain. With grain output crushed by a fifth, India leaned heavily on the US's PL-480 scheme for grain – under which the US distributed foreign food aid – and was soon the programme's biggest beneficiary. Not helping matters was the tension with Pakistan, with the Budget for 1965-66 estimating that of the total revenue expenditure of Rs 2,116 crore, Rs 749 crore or roughly 35% would be spent on defence services. 'With two wars (1962 and 1965), a series of poor harvests including two droughts, and an unstable external environment, the 1960s were years of severe strain for the Indian economy,' as per the second volume of the History of The Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India also required significant financial assistance from Western countries and the World Bank. As its current account deficit rose to 3.7% of GDP in 1966-67 and foreign exchange reserves declined, there were concerns about how India would meet its external debt repayments. In June 1966 — just a few months after taking over as PM – Mrs Gandhi had already approved the devaluation of the rupee by 36.5%, to Rs 7.50 per dollar from Rs 4.76 per dollar. In the 10 years starting 1965-66, the economy averaged just 2.6% growth. The share of the biggest employer, agriculture, in India's GDP fell to 31.5% in 1966-67 from over 40% a decade ago. Come 1974-75, agriculture's share had changed little, being about 31.1%, while the share of manufacturing had edged up by 60 basis points to 13.8%. To say that Mrs Gandhi inherited a flailing economy in January 1966 would be an understatement. But the years that followed were not easy either, with her government's first challenge being the peasant movement in Naxalbari, which hit its peak in May 1967. While growth somewhat recovered in the late 1960s and averaged 5.7% in the four years ending 1970-71, by then Mrs Gandhi, having survived a split in the Congress, had nationalised banks, abolished privy purses and privileges and hiked income tax rates to above 90%. Her government had also approved a licence for her son Sanjay Gandhi to manufacture an 'Indian Volkswagen'. Amid all the tumult, Indira announced that the next general elections would be held a year early, in 1971. 'The millions who demand food, shelter, and jobs are pressing for action. Power in a democracy resides with the people. That is why we have decided to go to our people and seek a fresh mandate from them,' she said in December 1970 in a broadcast to the nation. As the Opposition came up with the slogan 'Indira Hatao', she countered with 'Garibi Hatao (remove poverty)'. While this worked, the tide was already turning before an old foe struck again – India saw another drought in 1972. 'As famine loomed in rural India, Indira's slogan 'Garibi Hatao'…came back to haunt her. She told her growing chorus of critics that poverty could not be eradicated overnight. They said she was not removing poverty; she was removing the poor,' American biographer Katherine Frank wrote in her 2001 book Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi. The domestic unrest was fuelled further by the 1973 oil crisis, which pushed up wholesale inflation to more than 20%. The government responded by cutting expenditure and enforcing mandatory savings on salaries. Corruption was rife, factories shut down, and strikes became regular. Pressure further increased against the Indira Gandhi government with the successful Navnirman Andolan in Gujarat and a 1974 Railway strike led by George Fernandes, then president of the All India Railwaymen's Federation. The rail strike was cited by Mrs Gandhi as an attempt by the Opposition to paralyse the country for political gains. It was crushed with wide-scale firings and evictions from staff quarters, among other measures. However, the end was nigh. June 12, 1975, was a particularly difficult day for Indira. First, her confidant and then Ambassador to the Soviet Union, D P Dhar, died in hospital. Then came the results of the Gujarat Assembly elections, with a united Opposition under the Janata Morcha defeating the Congress. Finally, in the afternoon, came the Allahabad High Court order. Less than two weeks later, the Emergency was declared.
