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Hindustan Times
22-06-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Sri Lanka must move beyond triumphalism and bitterness
Sixteen years ago, Sri Lanka emerged from one of the bloodiest civil conflicts in modern Asia. The military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended a nearly three-decade war that cost tens of thousands of lives, displaced entire communities, and left deep scars on the national psyche. Activism that seeks to delegitimise an entire country risks alienating younger generations from any meaningful process of reconciliation (AFP) For many Sri Lankans, the end of the LTTE marks the return of peace. For others, it revives unresolved grief. But as a nation, it is time to move beyond both triumphalism and bitterness. Reconciliation — genuine, inclusive, and forward-looking — is the only viable path. The LTTE was one of the most ruthless terrorist organisations of its time. It pioneered suicide bombings, forcibly conscripted children, and assassinated elected leaders — including Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Yet disturbingly, efforts to romanticise the group and its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, have gained renewed currency in some quarters. Such narratives erase the fact that many of the LTTE's victims were Tamil moderates — people who believed in democratic solutions. Eminent figures like Lakshman Kadirgamar, Neelan Tiruchelvam, A Amirthalingam, and Alfred Duraiappah,were assassinated precisely because they posed a credible alternative to violence. The LTTE systematically eliminated internal dissent, tightening its authoritarian grip on Tamil society. Understanding how this insurgency came to dominate Sri Lanka's politics requires looking beyond its borders. In the 1980s, Sri Lanka's shift toward a liberalised, pro-western economy under President JR Jayewardene unsettled India. Fearing strategic encirclement, New Delhi initially supported Tamil militant groups. Domestic politics in Tamil Nadu, with its strong emotional ties to Sri Lankan Tamils, further shaped Indian policy. But what began as geopolitical manoeuvring soon became a Frankenstein's monster. When LTTE violence escalated, India deployed peacekeeping forces, resulting in the sacrifice of over 1,000 Indian soldiers in a tragic and complex intervention. This culminated in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, after which India recalibrated its approach. In the final years of the war, India provided crucial diplomatic and intelligence support to Sri Lanka and has since advocated a political settlement based on devolution and inclusion. Sri Lanka's Tamil community had legitimate grievances that should have been addressed through constitutional means and inclusive governance. The country has had universal franchise since 1931, and its democratic system, though not perfect, offered avenues for reform. Terrorism only deepened divisions and prolonged suffering. The war's end under President Mahinda Rajapaksa brought a chance to rebuild. His administration accomplished what many believed was impossible: the military defeat of a powerful terrorist group. Yet the peace that followed lacked closure. More than a million Sri Lankans — mostly Tamils — resettled abroad. Many have built successful lives in the West, holding positions of influence in their adopted countries. Sri Lanka's loss has, in many respects, been the West's gain. Successive governments have struggled to reconnect with this diaspora. Trust remains fractured. Worse, some diaspora voices and political actors remain locked in the past — vilifying Sri Lanka on global platforms and casting the Sinhalese population in monolithic, antagonistic terms. This approach does not serve justice; it entrenches division. We must discard the old playbook. Grievance must not become identity. Activism that seeks to delegitimise an entire country risks alienating younger generations from any meaningful process of reconciliation. If the Tamil diaspora is committed to Sri Lanka's future, it must focus on healing, not reopening wounds. But reconciliation is not the responsibility of the Tamil community alone. Sinhala political leaders must move beyond majoritarian complacency. A pluralist democracy cannot thrive without equal dignity and opportunity for all. Reconciliation is not about forgetting the past — it is about refusing to be imprisoned by it. Sri Lanka's challenges are no longer simply ethnic. The 2019 Easter Sunday bombings by Islamist extremists exposed other societal fractures. The Muslim community, like the Tamil one, must be part of the national healing process. Exclusion breeds radicalism; inclusion builds resilience. Perhaps the most troubling legacy of the war is the hopelessness that many young Sri Lankans, regardless of ethnicity, now feel. Amid economic collapse, political dysfunction, and deep mistrust, many see their future abroad. That is a tragedy no military victory can redeem. Fifteen years on, memory matters — but so does imagination. This is a moment for introspection, for shedding inherited resentments, and for building a national vision that transcends ethnicity and history. Revenge is not the answer. Nor is retribution. The only way forward is forward. Milinda Moragoda is a former Sri Lankan cabinet minister, high commissioner to India, and founder of the Sri Lankan strategic affairs think tank, Pathfinder Foundation. The views expressed are personal
The Hindu
11-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Sri Lankan refugees of 1990: A dark chapter in T.N.'s otherwise proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need
Tamil Nadu has an enviable track record of providing shelter to those in distress, regardless of their place of origin. But an episode in March 1990, concerning Sri Lankan refugees, marks an aberration to the State's tradition. This episode, involving 1,612 refugees — 353 women and 400 children —remains less discussed in public discourse, and its recall assumes relevance in light of World Refugee Day falling on June 20. Ranasinghe Premadasa's assumption of office of the President of Sri Lanka in January 1989 made a perceptible difference to the presence of Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in the neighbouring country. Five months later, Premadasa openly demanded the ouster of the IPFK, which went there in July 1987 on the request of his predecessor, J.R. Jayawardene, following the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The new incumbent made the demand, keeping in mind the separate anti-IPKF campaigns by two diverse militant groups, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, which had subsequently abandoned its militant path and joined the political mainstream) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After the IPKF's de-induction commenced by the end of July 1989, the LTTE began taking control of areas in the northern and eastern regions. As the end of the political set-up in the then North East Provincial Council (NEPC), headed by A. Varatharaja Perumal of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), became evident, the influx of refugees to Tamil Nadu resumed in a big way. It was against this backdrop that two ships, Harsh Vardhana and Tippu Sultan, carrying about 1,250 refugees, were not permitted for disembarkation of passengers at what was then known as the Madras harbour, on March 8 and 9. Both were diverted to Visakhapatnam, after which the passengers were taken to Odisha (then Orissa) for transit camps in Malkangiri, about 125 km from Koraput town. A report of The Hindu, published on March 10, quoting 'official and other sources,' stated that 'the decision to ferry the refugees from Trincomalee to Madras was taken at a meeting' of the External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral and the NEPC Chief Minister in New Delhi in January/February 1990. Only on the basis of that decision, both Harsh Vardhana and Tippu Sultan were hired to transport about 1,300 refugees. The report went on to state that 'most probably, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister [M. Karunanidhi] does not know about it.' K. Premachandran, Sri Lanka's Member of Parliament belonging to the EPRLF, was bitter about the treatment. The passengers, at the time of embarkation at Trincomalee, were assured they could disembark at Madras. 'Imagine their mental agony. They were in the middle of the sea, not knowing what was happening,' the report added, quoting him as having said. P. Upendra, Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the National Front government led by V.P. Singh, told reporters in the city on March 9 that there were doubts whether the passengers aboard the ship were 'real refugees or EPRLF cadres.' On the apprehension that the refugees could be the cadres of the EPRLF and Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), who could have spirited off weapons on board the vessels, Mr. Premachandran said, 'each and everyone was thoroughly checked at China Bay in Trincomalee and the IPKF also made sure that there was not a single weapon on board the ships.' According to Anil Dhir, Bhubaneshwar-based researcher-writer, the then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister M. Channa Reddy, who allowed the ships to drop anchor at the outer harbour of Visakhapatnam port and gave food and water, however, refused disembarkation of the passengers. A similar stand was taken by other Chief Ministers too, who did not want any trouble in their respective States. Eventually, it was Biju Patnaik who had agreed to take the refugees. 'The fact that he had been sworn in as the Chief Minister just four days earlier (March 5) did not deter him from taking such a vital decision.' Patnaik, who became Chief Minister again after a gap of over 26 years, had again responded to Singh's request for accommodating the EPRLF general secretary, K. Padmanabha along with others, a fact acknowledged by Mr. Perumal in a recent conversation with this writer. That Odisha, despite its modest economic condition, had come forward to accept the refugees did not go unnoticed among parliamentarians. On March 29, 1990, A.N. Singh Deo, Member of Parliament from the Aska constituency in the eastern State, called his State 'a very poor State' and asked Gujral whether the Centre would bear the whole cost of providing shelter to the refugees. The Minister assured the Member that the Centre would bear the entire burden. It was a fact that there were EPRLF cadres among the refugees. But they claimed that they were not 'more dreadful than the LTTE militants,' Sukumar, an activist of the (EPRLF) and an inmate of the Malkangiri camps, told The Hindu, as published in a report on March 13, 1990. But Karunanidhi had reasons to justify his government's refusal to provide asylum to the seekers. On April 26, 1990, intervening in a discussion in the Assembly, the Chief Minister cited law and order as the main reason for the move. 'He felt that militants should be kept off even from neighbouring States,' The Hindu reported on April 27, 1990. Karunanidhi had even suggested to the Central government to shift the refugees, sheltered in Odisha, to Andamans, as a majority of them were militants. A fortnight later, he told reporters that he had discussed his suggestion with Singh and Gujral. Parliament had also discussed the refugee matter. On March 28, 1990, the External Affairs Minister told the Rajya Sabha that 'hospitality does not mean open the door.' At the same time, in keeping with India's 'humanitarian traditions, we have never refused entry to refugees who, as in the present case, felt that their lives were at risk,' Gujral said. He added the refugees were brought by sea and air to the country. Notwithstanding the Patnaik administration's sympathetic treatment of the refugees, most of them did not find Odisha a conducive place to stay. In fact, Karunanidhi had then informed the House that the 'militants' continued to arrive in the city from Orissa camps by train and they were apprehended by the police. In the middle of May, he described the refugees' action of deserting the camps as 'wrong' and contended that 'of those who had come to Tamil Nadu, 190 persons who were militants were taken into custody. Other refugees, including women and children, had not been arrested,' stated this newspaper in its report on May 17, 1990. A few days later, after a protest-fast by 111 refugees at the Central Prison who came from the eastern State, the Chief Minister ordered their release. Within a year, the number of refugees in Odisha dwindled to 218, according to the Annual Report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs for 1990-91. [As on March 31, 1991, there were about 2.1 lakh Sri Lankan refugees living in the country.] The former CM of the NEPC recalls that a majority of those who left the camps had finally settled in the Western countries. He and his family were initially taken to Mauritius before being taken to central and northern parts of India. He now shuttles between India and Sri Lanka. The episode ended on a further sad note, as the EPRLF's general secretary and 14 others were gunned down allegedly by a killer squad of the LTTE on the evening of June 19, 1990, while he was holding a meeting in a flat at Kodambakkam, a busy locality of Chennai.
