Latest news with #RikardJozwiak
Canada Standard
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Canada Standard
The Lowdown On This Week's NATO And EU Summits
Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two big gatherings: The NATO summit in the Hague, followed by the EU summit in Brussels a day later. Briefing #1: All You Need To Know Ahead Of The NATO Summit What You Need To Know:NATO leaders will gather in The Hague on June 2425 with one key question looming: Can they agree on a hefty new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP? The spotlight, however, will be firmly on US President Donald Trump. Ahead of the Hague meeting, speculation had been mounting that he may skip the summit altogether, although the White House eventually confirmed he will be present. The summit has essentially been designed to please the American leader and avoid any sign of disharmony in the club. Lingering fears remain of a repeat of the infamous 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, when Trump -- then in his first term -- threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance unless European countries and Canada significantly increased their defense outlays. Since then, most allies have ramped up spending, with most now reaching the 2 percent target agreed in Wales in 2014, driven by a mix of American pressure and the war in Ukraine. What was supposed to be a three-day-meeting in the Netherlands has now been reduced to a social dinner with spouses hosted by the Dutch king at one of the city's royal palaces on June 24, followed by a working session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) the following day -- a meeting not even expected to last three hours. And that's it. Deep Background:It is at the NAC session that leaders will agree on the so-called Hague Declaration. The document hasn't been finally approved yet, but earlier drafts RFE/RL has seen indicate it will be a short one. While previous summit texts stretched several pages, touching upon all sorts of policy items, this one may only have as few as five paragraphs. Last year, it was 38 paragraphs with an additional six-point annex outlining security assistance for Ukraine. The key issue is the 5 percent defense spending target and when it should be reached. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already sent a letter to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte ahead of the meeting saying the target is unreasonable and asking for an exemption for Madrid. Just before the summit, Spain was given some flexibility by Rutte to reach the target. The 5 percent target proposed by Rutte includes 3.5 percent for "hard" military spending on capabilities such as missiles, helicopters, and fighter jets. The other 1.5 percent has been earmarked for "resilience" -- a deliberately vague term for most member states as this spending can include pretty much anything. Most are likely to spend it on infrastructure, however, to improve military mobility. And they may also include contributions to Kyiv here, with the draft document noting that "allies reaffirm their commitment to provide support to Ukraine and, to this end, will include direct contributions toward Ukraine's defense and its defense industry when calculating Allies' defense spending." Drilling Down Disagreements also remain over the deadline for reaching the 5 percent target. Apart from the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, few are happy with 2032 as the target date, simply because they think it is impossible to meet this deadline. It now looks like 2035 will be the target instead. In any event, the declaration will include a reference to a review of the target in 2029. It has not been lost on NATO officials that this date comes a year after the next US presidential elections, even though they have been quick to insist that this is simply the halfway mark between now and 2032. To the relief of European allies, NATO's mutual defense clause -- Article 5 -- is referenced in the draft declaration amid persistent fears that Washington wasn't truly committed to coming to the aid of the other 31 allies if they were attacked. Russia is also mentioned in the text as a "long-term threat" to Euro-Atlantic security. The document will also reference transatlantic industrial cooperation, a nod to Washington's interest in ensuring US companies also benefit from a European defense splurge. Furthermore, it reveals next year's summit will be in Turkey followed by a meeting in Albania. Turkey has long sought to host a NATO summit, but several alliance members have for years been reluctant due to the ongoing crackdown on the Turkish opposition. Now, with Ankara's growing geopolitical clout, from the Middle East to Ukraine, that ambition will finally be realized in 2026. Another major uncertainty is how prominently Ukraine will feature at the upcoming summit. Kyiv's NATO membership aspirations were headline topics at the Vilnius summit in 2023 and again in Washington a year later, but talk about this has died down since Trump publicly dismissed the country's chances of joining. There is no mention of Ukraine's potential membership in the draft Hague texts, with some NATO diplomats telling RFE/RL under condition of anonymity they believe omitting any mention is better than including a watered-down version of the language from the Vilnius and Washington communiques, which at least promised future membership. With no formal NATO-Ukraine Council slated for the summit at the leaders' level, NATO foreign ministers will instead have something of a compensatory dinner on June 24 in the presence of their Ukrainian counterpart, Andriy Sybiha. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will also be in The Hague to attend the leaders' social dinner, an event that NATO's Indo-Pacific partners -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea -- are also due to attend. Zelenskyy may also take part in some sidebar events at the summit, such as the NATO defense industry forum. There may also be a "mini summit" on Ukraine with Rutte and other European leaders after the formal NATO meeting is over. Briefing #2: And The EU summit In Brussels What You Need To Know:A day after the NATO summit in The Hague ends, EU leaders will take the short journey south to Brussels for their regular summer European Council. Kicking off on the morning of June 26, this summit may continue into the next day as there are plenty of items on the agenda -- most notably Iran, where the EU is struggling to stay relevant. According to the Brussels diplomats I have spoken with, however, the bloc stillaims to act as a conduit for potential direct talksbetween the United States and Tehran. That said, there are also several key political decisions on the table -- especially concerning Ukraine. When Poland took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union with much pomp and circumstance at the start of the year, the stated goal was that formal EU accession talks would start with Ukraine and Moldova during the first six months of 2025. Polish diplomats had even confidently voiced hopes that more than one of the six negotiating clusters would be opened during their chairmanship. It's fair to say that things have not panned out as expected. Deep Background:Unanimity is needed for every cluster to be opened, and Hungary has persistently blocked any move to this effect, even conducting a widely criticized consultative referendum on Ukrainian EU membership. This summit is something of a "last chance saloon" to unblock the situation, but few diplomats believe Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will give it much thought. Some think that maybe things will get moving on this issue after the summit in July when Denmark takes over the presidency. However, since this has increasingly become a domestic political issue in Hungary, most believe Budapest will continue vetoing progress until the country's parliamentary elections in April 2026. As regards Ukraine and Moldova, the draft summit declaration seen by RFE/RL states that "the European Council looks forward to the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met." The key question now is whether Ukraine and Moldova should be separated in the accession process, as none of the 27 EU member states appears opposed to allowing Chisinau to proceed. Several member states, however, are reluctant to green-light this "decoupling" as they don't want to "succumb to Hungarian blackmail," as they put it, and believe the pair should continue together on the road to membership. On the other hand, the EU also wants to give Moldova a carrot, with thefirst-ever EU-Moldova summit in early Julyand what are expected to be tightly fought parliamentary elections in September. Drilling Down The most likely scenario, however, is that all preparatory work on the accession talks will continue in the hope that every cluster can be opened once there is approval from everyone. For now, the most likely candidate to show concrete progress at the end of June is Montenegro, which is expected to close a cluster of chapters on June 27. So much for the "EU enlargement momentum" that eurocrats have so often keenly propagated in previous years. If there is one area where Hungary -- and increasingly Slovakia -- may be more willing to move forward, it's sanctions against Russia. There are two decisions to be taken on sanctions: the newly proposed18th round of restrictive measuresand the six-month rollover of all sanctions imposed on the Kremlin since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago. Several European diplomats have indicated there might be something of a quid pro quo during the summit, whereby both sanctions decisions will be adopted, but it will be generally accepted that Ukraine cannot move forward on the accession path for now. For most officials, the most important thing is to get an extension of all the previous sanctions. This includes all frozen Russian assets in the bloc, totaling over 200 billion euro ($230 billion). Hungary was toying with the idea of not a giving thumbs-up to the prolongation last time around in January, but officials think it won't be too dramatic this time, with Russia's increased attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets making any calls for potential peace talks moot. The fact that the actual deadline for the extension isn't till the end of July means most people RFE/RL has spoken are confident that something can be worked out. For the 18th sanctions package, most things have been agreed on a diplomatic level already. This is not too surprising, as most of the blacklistings and proposals -- such as de-SWIFTing Russian banks and sanctioning Nord Stream 1 and 2 -- have been relatively uncontroversial. Quick approval is also more likely now that the headline proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel appears unlikely to gain traction. The United States didn't get onboard with this idea at the recent Group of Seven summit, and few believe that the EU -- even with potential political support from allies such as Britain and Canada -- is willing or able to lower the cap without Washington. Looking Ahead On June 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be in Strasbourg to sign the final document establishing a new tribunal investigating the Russian crimes of aggression against Ukraine. The new court has been in the works ever since the full-scale invasion of the country over three years and will now be one step closer to realization. That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail atjozwiakr@ Until next time, Rikard Jozwiak If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribehere.
Canada News.Net
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Canada News.Net
The Lowdown On This Week's NATO And EU Summits
Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two big gatherings: The NATO summit in the Hague, followed by the EU summit in Brussels a day later. Briefing #1: All You Need To Know Ahead Of The NATO Summit What You Need To Know: NATO leaders will gather in The Hague on June 2425 with one key question looming: Can they agree on a hefty new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP? The spotlight, however, will be firmly on US President Donald Trump. Ahead of the Hague meeting, speculation had been mounting that he may skip the summit altogether, although the White House eventually confirmed he will be present. The summit has essentially been designed to please the American leader and avoid any sign of disharmony in the club. Lingering fears remain of a repeat of the infamous 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, when Trump -- then in his first term -- threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance unless European countries and Canada significantly increased their defense outlays. Since then, most allies have ramped up spending, with most now reaching the 2 percent target agreed in Wales in 2014, driven by a mix of American pressure and the war in Ukraine. What was supposed to be a three-day-meeting in the Netherlands has now been reduced to a social dinner with spouses hosted by the Dutch king at one of the city's royal palaces on June 24, followed by a working session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) the following day -- a meeting not even expected to last three hours. And that's it. Deep Background: It is at the NAC session that leaders will agree on the so-called Hague Declaration. The document hasn't been finally approved yet, but earlier drafts RFE/RL has seen indicate it will be a short one. While previous summit texts stretched several pages, touching upon all sorts of policy items, this one may only have as few as five paragraphs. Last year, it was 38 paragraphs with an additional six-point annex outlining security assistance for Ukraine. The key issue is the 5 percent defense spending target and when it should be reached. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already sent a letter to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte ahead of the meeting saying the target is unreasonable and asking for an exemption for Madrid. Just before the summit, Spain was given some flexibility by Rutte to reach the target. The 5 percent target proposed by Rutte includes 3.5 percent for "hard" military spending on capabilities such as missiles, helicopters, and fighter jets. The other 1.5 percent has been earmarked for "resilience" -- a deliberately vague term for most member states as this spending can include pretty much anything. Most are likely to spend it on infrastructure, however, to improve military mobility. And they may also include contributions to Kyiv here, with the draft document noting that "allies reaffirm their commitment to provide support to Ukraine and, to this end, will include direct contributions toward Ukraine's defense and its defense industry when calculating Allies' defense spending." Drilling Down Disagreements also remain over the deadline for reaching the 5 percent target. Apart from the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, few are happy with 2032 as the target date, simply because they think it is impossible to meet this deadline. It now looks like 2035 will be the target instead. In any event, the declaration will include a reference to a review of the target in 2029. It has not been lost on NATO officials that this date comes a year after the next US presidential elections, even though they have been quick to insist that this is simply the halfway mark between now and 2032. To the relief of European allies, NATO's mutual defense clause -- Article 5 -- is referenced in the draft declaration amid persistent fears that Washington wasn't truly committed to coming to the aid of the other 31 allies if they were attacked. Russia is also mentioned in the text as a "long-term threat" to Euro-Atlantic security. The document will also reference transatlantic industrial cooperation, a nod to Washington's interest in ensuring US companies also benefit from a European defense splurge. Furthermore, it reveals next year's summit will be in Turkey followed by a meeting in Albania. Turkey has long sought to host a NATO summit, but several alliance members have for years been reluctant due to the ongoing crackdown on the Turkish opposition. Now, with Ankara's growing geopolitical clout, from the Middle East to Ukraine, that ambition will finally be realized in 2026. Another major uncertainty is how prominently Ukraine will feature at the upcoming summit. Kyiv's NATO membership aspirations were headline topics at the Vilnius summit in 2023 and again in Washington a year later, but talk about this has died down since Trump publicly dismissed the country's chances of joining. There is no mention of Ukraine's potential membership in the draft Hague texts, with some NATO diplomats telling RFE/RL under condition of anonymity they believe omitting any mention is better than including a watered-down version of the language from the Vilnius and Washington communiques, which at least promised future membership. With no formal NATO-Ukraine Council slated for the summit at the leaders' level, NATO foreign ministers will instead have something of a compensatory dinner on June 24 in the presence of their Ukrainian counterpart, Andriy Sybiha. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will also be in The Hague to attend the leaders' social dinner, an event that NATO's Indo-Pacific partners -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea -- are also due to attend. Zelenskyy may also take part in some sidebar events at the summit, such as the NATO defense industry forum. There may also be a "mini summit" on Ukraine with Rutte and other European leaders after the formal NATO meeting is over. Briefing #2: And The EU summit In Brussels What You Need To Know: A day after the NATO summit in The Hague ends, EU leaders will take the short journey south to Brussels for their regular summer European Council. Kicking off on the morning of June 26, this summit may continue into the next day as there are plenty of items on the agenda -- most notably Iran, where the EU is struggling to stay relevant. According to the Brussels diplomats I have spoken with, however, the bloc stillaims to act as a conduit for potential direct talksbetween the United States and Tehran. That said, there are also several key political decisions on the table -- especially concerning Ukraine. When Poland took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union with much pomp and circumstance at the start of the year, the stated goal was that formal EU accession talks would start with Ukraine and Moldova during the first six months of 2025. Polish diplomats had even confidently voiced hopes that more than one of the six negotiating clusters would be opened during their chairmanship. It's fair to say that things have not panned out as expected. Deep Background: Unanimity is needed for every cluster to be opened, and Hungary has persistently blocked any move to this effect, even conducting a widely criticized consultative referendum on Ukrainian EU membership. This summit is something of a "last chance saloon" to unblock the situation, but few diplomats believe Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will give it much thought. Some think that maybe things will get moving on this issue after the summit in July when Denmark takes over the presidency. However, since this has increasingly become a domestic political issue in Hungary, most believe Budapest will continue vetoing progress until the country's parliamentary elections in April 2026. As regards Ukraine and Moldova, the draft summit declaration seen by RFE/RL states that "the European Council looks forward to the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met." The key question now is whether Ukraine and Moldova should be separated in the accession process, as none of the 27 EU member states appears opposed to allowing Chisinau to proceed. Several member states, however, are reluctant to green-light this "decoupling" as they don't want to "succumb to Hungarian blackmail," as they put it, and believe the pair should continue together on the road to membership. On the other hand, the EU also wants to give Moldova a carrot, with thefirst-ever EU-Moldova summit in early Julyand what are expected to be tightly fought parliamentary elections in September. Drilling Down The most likely scenario, however, is that all preparatory work on the accession talks will continue in the hope that every cluster can be opened once there is approval from everyone. For now, the most likely candidate to show concrete progress at the end of June is Montenegro, which is expected to close a cluster of chapters on June 27. So much for the "EU enlargement momentum" that eurocrats have so often keenly propagated in previous years. If there is one area where Hungary -- and increasingly Slovakia -- may be more willing to move forward, it's sanctions against Russia. There are two decisions to be taken on sanctions: the newly proposed18th round of restrictive measuresand the six-month rollover of all sanctions imposed on the Kremlin since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago. Several European diplomats have indicated there might be something of a quid pro quo during the summit, whereby both sanctions decisions will be adopted, but it will be generally accepted that Ukraine cannot move forward on the accession path for now. For most officials, the most important thing is to get an extension of all the previous sanctions. This includes all frozen Russian assets in the bloc, totaling over 200 billion euro ($230 billion). Hungary was toying with the idea of not a giving thumbs-up to the prolongation last time around in January, but officials think it won't be too dramatic this time, with Russia's increased attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets making any calls for potential peace talks moot. The fact that the actual deadline for the extension isn't till the end of July means most people RFE/RL has spoken are confident that something can be worked out. For the 18th sanctions package, most things have been agreed on a diplomatic level already. This is not too surprising, as most of the blacklistings and proposals -- such as de-SWIFTing Russian banks and sanctioning Nord Stream 1 and 2 -- have been relatively uncontroversial. Quick approval is also more likely now that the headline proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel appears unlikely to gain traction. The United States didn't get onboard with this idea at the recent Group of Seven summit, and few believe that the EU -- even with potential political support from allies such as Britain and Canada -- is willing or able to lower the cap without Washington. Looking Ahead On June 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be in Strasbourg to sign the final document establishing a new tribunal investigating the Russian crimes of aggression against Ukraine. The new court has been in the works ever since the full-scale invasion of the country over three years and will now be one step closer to realization. That's all for this week! [email protected]. Until next time,
Yahoo
10-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
European Commission to present 18th package of sanctions against Russia on 10 June
The European Commission is expected to present a new package of sanctions against Russia on 10 June, including the lowering of the price cap on Russian oil. Source: Europe Editor Radio Free Europe Rikard Jozwiak, as reported by European Pravda Details: According to Jozwiak, the European Commission will present a new, 18th package of sanctions against Russia for its war against Ukraine on June 10. The key proposal will be to reduce the price cap on Russian oil from US$60 per barrel to US$45. The Baltic and Northern European countries have long advocated for such a step. Background: On 20 May, the EU Council approved the 17th package of sanctions against Russia for its war against Ukraine, as well as individual sanctions for the use of chemical weapons against Ukraine, and personal sanctions for the Russian Federation's hybrid destabilisation activities against EU members and allies. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda criticised the 17th package as being too weak and called for tougher measures in the next one. Support Ukrainska Pravda on Patreon!
Yahoo
06-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Ukraine completes preparations to join EU's roam like at home zone
The European Commission received formal notification from Ukraine confirming the completion of all legislative procedures required to join the EU's Roam Like at Home zone. Source: Rikard Jozwiak, an editor at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as reported by European Pravda Details: Moldova is expected to submit a similar notification soon, with both countries set to join the roaming-free zone simultaneously. According to Jozwiak, Ukraine and Moldova will become part of the EU roaming zone from 1 January 2026. The roaming zone encompasses all 27 EU member states, as well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. This marks the first time the zone will expand to include candidate countries for EU membership. "I know that the word 'historic' is overused these days but this is exactly that," Jozwiak said. On 2 June 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the Law of Ukraine On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Implementation of the European Union's Legislation on Electronic Communications (reg. No. 12150). The European Commission is now expected to initiate a decision on mutual provision of the internal market regime for roaming between the EU and Ukraine, effectively enabling full accession to the roam like at home policy. Once implemented, Ukrainians will be able to use roaming services at domestic tariff rates when travelling in EU countries, with no variation in costs or conditions based on the country of residence within the EU. Background: Since Russia's war of aggression began, millions of Ukrainians in the EU have communicated with relatives in Ukraine without additional roaming charges, thanks to agreements between operators. This temporary arrangement, prompted by the displacement of many Ukrainians to European countries, was last extended in July 2024 for one year. Support Ukrainska Pravda on Patreon!
Canada Standard
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Canada Standard
From Tallinn To The Hague: The Run-Up To The NATO Summit
Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on one thing: my take from Tallinn and the road ahead. Embed share From Tallinn To The Hague: The Run-Up To The NATO Summit byRFE/RL Embed share The code has been copied to your clipboard. The URL has been copied to your clipboard No media source currently available 0:00 0:10:05 0:00 Direct link 128 kbps | MP3 64 kbps | MP3 Pop-out player The Briefing: From Tallinn To The Hague: The Run-Up To The NATO Summit On May 13, a Russian military jet violated Estonian and NATO territory for close to a minute after the Estonian Navy made an attempt to intercept a flag-less tanker, named Jaguar, thought to belong to the Kremlin's so-called shadow fleet transporting EU-sanctioned oil to and from Russia. The Sukhoi Su-35 was deployed to protect the vessel that later returned to the Russian port of Primorsk. The incident was the first reported breach of Estonia's airspace since 2022 and somewhat indirectly set the tone for theLennart Meri conference in Tallinnon May 16-18. The Baltic state's largest annual think tank event was full of Western officials putting on a brave face when discussing the state of the war in Ukraine, Russian threats to the rest of the continent, and the United States' increasingly thorny relations with Europe. The American Presence In Europe Perhaps the most eagerly anticipated appearance was that of Matthew Whitaker, US President Donald Trump's newly appointed ambassador to NATO, especially with so many worries, notably in eastern flank countries like Estonia, over American commitment to the military alliance. Seemingly hanging on to every word he said, most people in the room appeared relieved that he ticked most boxes. Yes, NATO is "the greatest alliance in world history." And yes, Russia is the security threat to the organization. He seemed to comprehend the argument, put to him by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, that if the Europeans will splash the cash on the defense, quite a lot of it will be spent on European arms companies as Europeans also have an electorate and workforce to satisfy. Refusing to be drawn into discussion about his boss's designs on Greenland, he simply noted that Denmark, which the giant island belongs to, is "a great NATO ally" but that bilateral relations weren't his responsibility. Then there was the whole issue of the American force posture review, which will happen in the latter half of the year. There is plenty of speculation among diplomats that Washington will cut down on troops in Europe and boost its presence in the Indo-Pacific theater instead. Whitaker noted that nothing had been determined yet and that allies will be consulted on the process. He also promised everything would be orderly, meaning the United States would "ensure that there are no security gaps." Did that reassure nervous NATO members bordering Russia? Not really, but those diplomats I spoke to were still defiant, pointing out that the United States could also remove soldiers from the western part of the continent to the eastern one as it's cheaper to maintain their presence there and it offers good exercise conditions. Another one tried to sound reassuring by arguing that the US flag -- meaning any presence -- was still better than the actual number of boots on the ground. The Hague (No) Show? Otherwise much of the discussion in Estonia focused on the upcoming NATO summit at The Hague at the end of June. While the previous two summits, in Vilnius back in 2023 and Washington a year later, were all about Ukraine and the haggling about whether Kyiv should get a NATO membership invite and how to phrase the country's eventual path into the club, the war-torn country will not be almost absent from the discussions. There is still not even confirmation that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be invited to the Netherlands after being the star guest at previous gatherings. Whitaker did, however, note that he expected him to be present. The Estonian foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, pointed out that it would be "a major stratcom mistake" if he didn't come as that would be all the media would write about from the gathering. But forget any invitations or any other language on Ukraine's future place in the alliance, especially since Trump has seemingly ruled out Kyiv joining anytime soon. In fact, Ukraine may not be mentioned at all in the final summit declaration. One European official told me it's probably better for now as any attempts to negotiate about it would probably make the text worse for Ukraine than the 2024 Washington summit declaration, which at least states that NATO "will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership." The same dilemma is true for any wording on Russia, so Moscow simply might not be mentioned at all. In fact, the entire text might just be a few paragraphs, compared to nearly 40 from last year that covered all manner of topics. Instead, the summit, which now has been shortened from three to two days, will focus on ramping up European defense spending and building up a transatlantic defense industrial base, according to NATO Deputy Secretary-General Radmila Sekerinska. The main headline will be the commitment by the 32 allies to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending, up from the current target of 2 percent. They should also dedicate 3.5 percent to "hard targets" such as arms and artillery, and the remaining 1.5 percent to cyberdefense, investment in military mobility, and the like. But of course, all eyes will be on Trump, both in the Netherlands and in the run-up. Despite the fact that the much-hyped first direct Russia-Ukraine meeting in three years in Ankara last week turned into a lower-level nothing burger in which Moscow only repeated its "maximalist" positions of land grabs and Ukrainian neutrality, most people in Tallinn still cautiously think a cease-fire of some sort is possible in the run-up to the NATO summit. Trump, Putin, Cease-Fire The expectation is that Trump and Putin will eventually meet. They spoke on the phone once again on May 19, but there are clear European fears about what Trump might agree to in such a setting. No one I spoke to believes Trump is truly serious about imposing hard-hitting measures on the Kremlin. Republican lawmaker Lindsey Graham proposed imposing 500 percent tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil, and there has been talk of other "secondary sanctions" hitting countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, which import a lot of Russian liquefied natural gas. I also sensed a fear among officials that reestablishing US-Russia bilateral relations, including striking some sort of trade and investment deal, is more important to both sides than actually having a lasting peace deal in Ukraine. The almost universal assessment I heard is that Putin is playing "the long game" over Ukraine, and while the Ukrainian lines won't breach anytime soon, he thinks he is winning. Or as one official put it: "Ukraine and Russia are in fact both losing, but Russia is losing more slowly." This all puts Europe in a bind. I've heard Paris is mulling reestablishing a direct line with the Kremlin. "The Americans cannot be the only ones speaking to them," as one official put it. But no official meeting with Moscow is in the making. When asked at a panel discussion whether it was time to have another NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a dormant political format since 2022, the answer from both Tsahkna and Sikorski was an emphatic "no" with the latter adding, "It was an instrument in times of peace which limited troops in eastern flank states. As long as Putin is president, we cannot trust that country." More Sanctions? So, Europe will continue to push for more sanctions for now. Its 17th package, probably thebloc's puniest yet, will be officially agreed on May 20, and there is already work on the next one, which will contain more blacklistings, including both Russian entities and individuals but also vessels thought to belong to the shadow fleet. There might also be sanctions against more Russian banks and against Nordsteam 1 and 2, which are no longer operational but still aren't officially targeted. There is also a desire from the Europeans for the Group of Seven summit in Canada next month to lower the oil price cap for Russia from the current $60 per barrel to at least $50. However, EU officials I spoke to don't believe all of the measures will pass, notably as Hungary can continue to be a spoiler. Most are also worried that thesanctions rollover in July will still be a proper strugglewith alternative solutions being studied, for example, not to allow Russian frozen assets in the bloc to expire. The Dilemma But the threat from Russia will still be there. And the Europeans, while saying they're ready to stand up to Moscow even without American help, are wary. Thereassurance forcemeant for Ukraine once there is a cease-fire probably won't be particularly reassuring. European army officials have admitted they lack the long-strike capabilities of the United States and notably its supreme intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. And time is short. An assessment earlier this year from the Danish intelligence service claimed Russia could be capable of starting a major war in Europe (outside of Ukraine) within five years. But the Europeans might have to be ready well before that. Onno Eichelsheim, chief of defense for the Netherlands armed forces, told the Lennart Meri conference crowd that "Russia can give us 'a dilemma' already within a year after a potential end of the fighting in Ukraine." What that dilemma might be, he didn't specify. But as Estonia experienced with the airspace violation earlier in the week, all options appear to be on the table. Looking Ahead EU enlargement is stuck for Ukraine and Moldova as well as most candidate countries in the Western Balkans for various political reasons. But there is one country that appears to be rapidly marching toward Brussels and EU membership right now: Albania. On May 22, the country will start negotiations on another eight EU accession chapters (there are 33 in total), and it comes just a month after it opened another batch of chapters. The key going forward for Tirana will be to actually close negotiations on these chapters, which is much harder than opening them. Feel free to reach out to me on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail atjozwiakr@ Until next time, Rikard Jozwiak If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribehere.
