Latest news with #Russian-language
The Diplomat
a day ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Russian Without Russians: The Politics of Language in Uzbekistan
A new generation is questioning the privileged place of the Russian language in public education and everyday life – while still grappling with its utility, legacy, and political weight. Uzbekistan's Gen Z is tired of the Russian language's privileged status in the country. According to government statistics, approximately 2.1 percent of the country's 37.5 million people are ethnically Russian (less than 800,000). However, Russian is widespread both in the public and private sphere, especially in urban areas. 'I speak polnyy (fully) in Uzbek,' says 23-year-old Azizullo from Andijan, seemingly unaware that his sentence includes a Russian word. For most people in Uzbekistan, mixing Russian into everyday conversation is normal. 'A lot of things need to be removed – just completely erased. For example, all the Russian-language signs. I see it even in my own city, Andijan. There are still so many Russian signs on the streets. Even in places where only Uzbeks live and no Russians at all, you still find signs in Russian — like on barrier gates.' Russians are not the only minority group in Uzbekistan, and they are no longer the largest. Of the 1.6 million Russians living in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1989, more than half left the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A formal census has not been conducted since then, but according to official estimates, around 84 percent of the population of Uzbekistan are ethnically Uzbek. The largest ethnic minority is Tajiks, who make up nearly 5 percent of the population (approximately 1.7 million people). Uzbekistan is home to over 130 ethnicities and nationalities, yet, after Uzbek, Russian remains dominant in public life, sometimes among upper-class Uzbek families too. Those families are locally referred to as yevropozirovanniy or Europeanized. All government websites operate in Russian along with the state language, Uzbek, and sometimes English. Even state legislation in the national database is available in Uzbek and Russian and only sometimes in English. Almost all local mobile applications operate in Uzbek and Russian. Major local online news outlets in Uzbekistan – though privately owned – publish content primarily in Uzbek, Russian, and occasionally in English. While media outlets in other local languages such as Tajik, Karakalpak, and Kazakh do exist, they are limited to regional platforms and lack a national presence. 'The official state language is Uzbek, but if you don't speak Russian, it's hard to get a job in the public sector,' says Jakhongir, a 25 year old student from Khorazm who is himself a state employee. He sees the continued dominance of Russian as a lingering legacy of the Soviet era, when high-ranking officials – particularly party secretaries – were often ethnically Russian. In the Uzbek SSR, to make a career in the public sector, one needed to be fluent in Russian; knowing the language thus became a status symbol.
West Australian
6 days ago
- Business
- West Australian
The likes of BHP, FMG, Rio and Woodside listed as clients of hacked Bibra Lake contractor Pressure Dynamics
Some of the largest mining and energy companies in Western Australia are likely caught up in a cyber hack that allegedly saw huge amounts of data pilfered from a Bibra Lake business. Cyber-criminal syndicate DragonForce claims to have stolen more than 100 gigabytes of Pressure Dynamics International's employee and client data. This data reportedly includes technical drawings of equipment, sensitive operational documents, and medical reports of staff. 'Pressure Dynamics can confirm that it has recently identified a cyber security incident that had affected certain systems within our network,' a company spokesman said. 'Upon detection, our cyber security team immediately initiated our incident response protocols and locked down our systems. 'Pressure Dynamics has engaged cyber security experts to investigate the nature and scope of the incident and implement additional cyber security measures. We have also notified relevant authorities.' Businesses in Australia only have to report a cyber breach to the Office of Australian Information Commissioner if data has been compromised, or reasonably suspected to have been compromised, and these reports rarely become public. The spokesman also said the company had 'significantly increased' its cyber security measures as a result of the incident. A document published by the State Government dated November 2023 lists Alcoa, BHP, Fortescue, Glencore, Newmont, Rio Tinto, South32, Woodside and Chevron as clients of Pressure Dynamics. All of these companies were contacted by The West, but the vast majority did not respond with a comment. Some companies, like South32, were aware of the incident, while others, like Chevron, were not. Pressure Dynamics specialises in building and maintaining a wide array of hydraulic systems used in mining, oil and gas extraction, and military equipment. On mine sites, Pressure Dynamics touts its work on bucket-wheel stacker reclaimers, which are essentially large pickers that retrieve mined ore from stockpiles. And in the oil and gas industry the company appears to mainly work on offshore platforms. It also does work for defence heavyweights, including the Australian arm of US-based missile and radar systems manufacturer Raytheon. Pressure Dynamics is owned by Snjezan Mackic, Esteban and Alessandro Cesan, Thomas Brennan and David Houston, according to documents filed with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. It is understood the Bibra Lake-based company has about 200 employees on its books. Pressure Dynamics' cyber attacker — DragonForce — is a prolific and anonymous cyber-criminal syndicate that is thought to be based in Russia, given the group reportedly advertises its services on Russian-language Dark Web sites. Curtin University Associate Professor of computing Mihai Lazarescu told The West last year that Russian cyber gangs were among the world's best at stealing troves of valuable data. 'If you define success in in terms of how many systems you manage to breach, the Chinese will be way ahead,' he said. 'But the Russians are better at getting the crown jewels.' DragonForce typically demands a ransom paid in cryptocurrency from its victims in exchange for the impacted business to regain access to its stolen information and for that data to not be published on the Dark Web. It is believed to have successfully penetrated the firewall defences of nearly 200 companies globally, including the Australian division of milk beverage maker Yakult and local lottery broker TheLotter. Last year, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner was notified of 1113 data breaches, which was a 25 per cent increase from 893 notifications in 2023.
Yahoo
25-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Breaking down claim Trump was recruited by KGB with code name 'Krasnov'
In February 2025, Alnur Mussayev, a former Soviet and Kazakh security official, claimed in a Facebook post that U.S. President Donald Trump was recruited in 1987 by the KGB, the intelligence agency of the Soviet Union, and assigned the code name "Krasnov." In May 2025, Mussayev made another post furthering his allegations — that agents "affectionately called him [Trump] Danila Krasnov among themselves." Neither of Mussayev's posts stated state whether he personally recruited Trump or simply knew about the recruitment, nor did it state whether Trump actively participated in espionage or was just a potential asset. Trump did visit Moscow in 1987, but there is no clear evidence suggesting he was actively recruited by the KGB during that trip or at any other time. Mussayev's allegations that Trump was recruited by the KGB at that time don't line up with Mussayev's documented career path. Several biographies of him on Russian-language websites suggest that at the time Trump was supposedly recruited, Mussayev was working in the Soviet Union's Ministry of Internal Affairs, not the KGB. Trump's pro-Russia stance (compared with other U.S. presidents) has fed into past allegations that he is a Russian asset — for instance, the 2021 book "American Kompromat" featured an interview with a former KGB spy who also claimed the agency recruited Trump as an asset. Again, however, there is no clear evidence supporting this claim. Throughout 2025, a rumor circulated online that U.S. President Donald Trump was recruited as an "asset" by Russian intelligence in the late 1980s and given the codename "Danila Krasnov," following allegations from a former Soviet and Kazakh security official, Alnur Mussayev. The claim initially spread on TikTok, Facebook and X in February 2025, where one account published a thread in response to the rumor, purporting to tie together evidence to support it (archived, archived, archived, archived, archived). (@anthony7andrews / X) That user wrote: "Now that it's been reveals that Trump has been a Russian asset for 40 years named Krasnov by the FSB, I will write a simple thread of various pieces of information that solidifies the truth of everything I've written." At the time of publishing this article, the thread had been viewed more than 10 million times. The claim gained traction when the news website The Daily Beast published a now-deleted story (archived), titled, "Former Intelligence Officer Claims KGB Recruited Trump," using only Mussayev's Facebook post as a source. The article described Mussayev's allegations as "unfounded." We contacted The Daily Beast to ask why the story was deleted and will update this story if we receive a response. We also reached out to Mussayev for comment on the story and will update if he responds. Meanwhile, Snopes readers wrote in and asked us whether the rumor that Trump was recruited to be a Russian asset was true. Here's what to know: The allegations originated from a Facebook post that Mussayev published on Feb. 20, 2025 (archived). The post alleged that in 1987, the KGB recruited a "40-year-old businessman from the USA, Donald Trump, nicknamed 'Krasnov.'" (Mussayev said without providing evidence that KGB agents "affectionately called him Danila Krasnov among themselves" in another Facebook post made in May 2025). Mussayev claimed he was serving in the KGB's Moscow-based Sixth Directorate at the time, and it was "the most important direction" of the department's work to recruit businessmen from "capitalist countries." His post didn't specify whether Trump participated in any spying, only that he was recruited. In an earlier post (archived) from July 18, 2018, he described Trump's relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin as follows: Based on my experience of operational work at the KGB-KNB, I can say for sure that Trump belongs to the category of perfectly recruited people. I have no doubt that Russia has a compromise on the President of the United States, that for many years the Kremlin promoted Trump to the position of President of the main world power. Trump did visit Moscow in 1987, reportedly to look at possible locations for luxury hotels. However, several Russian-language websites (of unknown trustworthiness) with short biographies of Mussayev revealed a discrepancy: While Mussayev claimed he worked in the Sixth Directorate of the KGB in 1987, those online biographies, including one from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, placed him in Kazakh KGB counterintelligence from 1979 until 1986, when he moved to the Soviet Union's Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is absolutely possible that the public timeline of Mussayev's work history was established by the KGB as a cover for more covert activities. At face value, however, information on Mussayev's background does not completely align with what he claims. Other sources corroborated that the Sixth Directorate's main focus was not foreign intelligence. The journalist and author W. Thomas Smith Jr.'s book "Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency" states that the directorate was responsible for "enforcing financial and trade laws, as well as guarding against economic espionage," in line with the counterintelligence descriptions present in the online biographies. Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate was the KGB's main espionage arm. Trump's relatively pro-Russian positions compared with those of other U.S. presidents have led to past allegations that he is or was a Russian asset in some way. For instance, the controversial, flamboyant and untrustworthy Steele Dossier, released just before Trump took office in 2017, claimed Russia had incriminating tapes of Trump engaging in sexual activity with prostitutes in Moscow, among other scandalous accusations. CNN reported that the dossier's main source, Igor Danchenko, was mainly relaying "rumor and speculation," and in 2022 he was acquitted of charges of lying to the FBI about the dossier's sources. In the 2021 book "American Kompromat," journalist Craig Unger interviewed a former KGB spy, Yuri Shvets, who also alleged that Trump was compromised by Russia. Snopes previously covered that claim. The British newspaper The Guardian reported that Shvets had said Trump was "cultivated as a Russian asset over 40 years." Shvets claimed Trump first appeared on the Russians' radar in 1977, when he was the target of a spying operation — 10 years before the recruitment alleged by Mussayev took place. Shvets said the KGB later went on a "charm offensive" when Trump visited Moscow and St. Petersburg for the first time in 1987 — the same year specified by Mussayev. Shvets told The Guardian that Trump proved so willing to spread anti-Western propaganda that there were celebrations in Moscow. We aren't aware of any evidence corroborating these claims. The Mueller report documented the official findings of former Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, as well as allegations of conspiracy or coordination between Trump's presidential campaign and the Kremlin. That investigation — which found that the Russian government did interfere in the 2016 presidential election "in sweeping and systemic fashion" and that there were "links" between Trump campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government — did not establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government. Cohen, Marshall. "The Steele Dossier: A Reckoning | CNN Politics." CNN, 18 Nov. 2021, "Donald Trump's Russian Spy Connection: Social Media Explodes with 'Evidence' about #Krasnov. Is It Just Another Wild Conspiracy Theory?" The Economic Times, 23 Feb. 2025. The Economic Times - The Times of India, Former Intelligence Officer Alnur Mussayev Claims KGB Recruited Donald Trump Under Codename 'Krasnov.' 21 Feb. 2025, Kazakh Ex-Security Chief's False 'Trump KGB Recruitment Story' Gains Media Traction - The Times Of Central Asia. 24 Feb. 2025, Luczkiw, Stash. "'Trump Recruited as Moscow Asset,' Says Ex-KGB Spy Chief." Kyiv Post, 22 Feb. 2025, Muller, Robert. Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election. U.S. Department of Justice, Mar. 2019, No Label Defined. Accessed 24 Feb. 2025. Palma, Bethania. "Did Ex-KGB Spy Say Russia Cultivated Trump as an 'Asset' for 40 Years?" Snopes, 2 Feb. 2021, Polantz, Katelyn. "How the FBI Attempted to Verify a Salacious Allegation in the Steele Dossier | CNN Politics." CNN, 9 Dec. 2019, Smith, David. "'The Perfect Target': Russia Cultivated Trump as Asset for 40 Years – Ex-KGB Spy." The Guardian, 29 Jan. 2021. The Guardian, Smith, W. Thomas, and W. Thomas Smith. Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. Infobase Publishing, 2003. "The Daily Beast Publishes, Then Deletes Story Alleging Trump Was Recruited by Soviet Spies." Yahoo News, 22 Feb. 2025, Trump-Russia Steele Dossier Source Acquitted of Lying to FBI. 18 Oct. 2022. Unger, Craig. American Kompromat: How the KGB Cultivated Donald Trump, and Related Tales of Sex, Greed, Power, and Treachery. Penguin, 2021. Web Page Template. Accessed 24 Feb. 2025. "Who Is Alnur Mussayev? The Former USSR KGB Officer at the Center of Explosive Donald Trump 'Russian Spy' Allegations." The Economic Times, 23 Feb. 2025. The Economic Times - The Times of India, "Мусаев, Альнур." Accessed 24 Feb. 2025. МУСАЕВ Альнур Альжапарович | ЦентрАзия. Accessed 24 Feb. 2025.
Yahoo
23-05-2025
- Yahoo
Russia court jails Russian-Italian man for 29 years over Ukraine-backed 'act of terror', RIA reports
MOSCOW (Reuters) -A Russian military court on Friday jailed a Russian-Italian man for 29 years after finding him guilty of various terrorism-related charges and of blowing up a freight train at Ukraine's behest, Russia's RIA state news agency reported. It said a military court in the western Russian city of Ryazan had ordered that Ruslan Sidiki serve nine years of his sentence in a prison and the rest in a maximum security prison camp. RIA cited Sidiki's lawyer as saying his client had partially admitted his guilt. Russian-language news outlets have in the past reported that Sidiki admitted his actions, but denied intent to harm anyone or acting on anyone else's orders. He viewed his actions as sabotage rather than terrorism and himself as a prisoner of war, those reports said. State prosecutors had accused Sidiki of using a home-made bomb to blow up a freight train in November 2023, causing 19 wagons to derail, and of a drone attack on an airbase earlier the same year. Russia's FSB security service said in a statement at the time that Sidiki had been recruited by Ukrainian military intelligence while in Istanbul in 2023 and had then received sabotage training in Latvia before returning to Russia. There was no immediate comment from Ukraine.
Straits Times
23-05-2025
- Straits Times
Russia court jails Russian-Italian man for 29 years over Ukraine-backed 'act of terror', RIA reports
MOSCOW - A Russian military court on Friday jailed a Russian-Italian man for 29 years after finding him guilty of various terrorism-related charges and of blowing up a freight train at Ukraine's behest, Russia's RIA state news agency reported. It said a military court in the western Russian city of Ryazan had ordered that Ruslan Sidiki serve nine years of his sentence in a prison and the rest in a maximum security prison camp. RIA cited Sidiki's lawyer as saying his client had partially admitted his guilt. Russian-language news outlets have in the past reported that Sidiki admitted his actions, but denied intent to harm anyone or acting on anyone else's orders. He viewed his actions as sabotage rather than terrorism and himself as a prisoner of war, those reports said. State prosecutors had accused Sidiki of using a home-made bomb to blow up a freight train in November 2023, causing 19 wagons to derail, and of a drone attack on an airbase earlier the same year. Russia's FSB security service said in a statement at the time that Sidiki had been recruited by Ukrainian military intelligence while in Istanbul in 2023 and had then received sabotage training in Latvia before returning to Russia. There was no immediate comment from Ukraine. REUTERS Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
