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The Diplomat
10 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora: An Interview with Dr. Edward Anderson
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar Shetty (Interviewer): We're pleased to be joined by Dr. Edward Anderson, Senior Fellow at SOAS* and Assistant Professor at Northumbria University*. His research focuses on the Indian diaspora, transnational politics, Hindutva, and Hindu nationalism, as well as British histories of migration, ethnicity, and multiculturalism. His latest book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora, is a fascinating deep dive into these topics, charting the origin and evolution of Hindutva in the British Indian diaspora and examining the organizational aspects of Hindutva-leaning groups. Edward, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thank you so much. It's lovely to talk to you. Tushar Shetty: Edward, I was reading your book on Hindu nationalism and the Indian diaspora, and what I found interesting was that it begins in an unusual place—not in India or the UK, but rather in Nairobi, Kenya, where the RSS actually set up its first overseas shakha* (branch) before India was even an independent country. Could you take us through the origins of transnational Hindutva in East Africa and how it spread to the UK and internationally? Edward Anderson: You're absolutely right. Hindu nationalism outside of India first established itself through the Sangh* in East Africa, specifically in Kenya. It's worth providing some historical context to explain how this happened. While Hindutva only became politically powerful toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, Hindu nationalism and Hindutva ideology have origins that go much earlier—to the early 20th century or even the late 19th century in some ways. As for why it established itself in East Africa, there had been, since the end of the 19th century and early 20th century onward, a substantial population of Indian people in East Africa. East Africa at this time was part of the British Empire—the countries I'm talking about are mainly Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. These parts of East Africa started to see growth in Indian communities, partly as a response to the British colonial state encouraging Indians to move over to work in various parts of the economy. Initially, they were brought over to help construct the Uganda Railway, bringing laborers and skilled workers from India. They were also given certain rights to set up businesses and trading rights, many of which were denied to the local African population. Some people were given positions within the colonial bureaucracy as well. From the outset, the Asian population of East Africa had a relatively privileged position in society and a segregated position as well. They kept to themselves, had their own communities, and lived in particular parts of towns—often parts that had been allocated to them by the British. They maintained quite a close connection with the homeland, with India, which was a short hop over the ocean. The east of Africa and the west of India have been connected via maritime trading routes for hundreds of years. In the mid-1940s, there's a legendary story of a fellow moving over to work in a school who was an RSS member in India. When he arrived in Kenya, he established the first shakhas*, the first branches of the RSS—the leading and most powerful Hindu nationalist organization. He set up the first shakha*, and from that point onward, it became quite popular. Many children were sent there by their parents as a place to socialize with other people from the same community and to learn about Hindu culture and Indian culture in various ways, developing a sense of cultural pride and assertiveness. From that point onward, it started to establish itself through branches of the Sangh* that were set up in other parts of the world. In the historical narrative, during the 1960s and 1970s, after the African countries I mentioned started gaining independence, they were keen to coerce, persuade, or even expel the Asian population in East Africa. Most famously and notoriously, there was Idi Amin's* expulsion of the Asians in 1972. At this point, many East African Asians moved to Britain—often they had British passports by virtue of being citizens of the British Empire—and to other places as well. This is when we start to see the real establishment of Hindu nationalist organizations in the UK, around the exact time when East African Asians were moving over in the 1960s. Tushar Shetty: That community of East African Indians has produced many interesting people who have ascended quite high in both UK and US politics. I believe Kash Patel* and Zoran Mamdani*, who is the mayor incumbent* of New York City, Priti Patel*, who was former Home Secretary in the UK—is Rishi Sunak* part of that East African Indian diaspora as well? Edward Anderson: Yes, you're absolutely right. This is a community that has produced incredibly interesting and successful people in all sorts of areas, and as you've identified, from all parts of the political spectrum as well. In the UK, Rishi Sunak*, the first non-white Prime Minister of the UK and leader of the Conservative Party, and also two subsequent Home Secretaries, Priti Patel* and then Suella Braverman*—all of these people have roots in East Africa. Tushar Shetty: This is a pretty well-educated, well-established community that also brought some Hindutva ideas to the UK. To what extent has the Indian community been receptive to what we would call Hindutva ideology, considering that political Hindutva didn't really take off in India itself until the late 1980s? What was the attraction to these ideas and organizations? Edward Anderson: It's an interesting question. First, it's important to note that there is a kind of received wisdom that the Indian diaspora is highly predisposed toward Hindutva ideology and very sympathetic to the RSS and Narendra Modi*. This has emerged particularly from dramatic political rallies that Modi has participated in that have taken place in London, New York, Texas, Sydney, and various other parts of the world. While it's certainly the case that there is sympathy for Hindutva, there's also a very strong tradition that resists that—a strong liberal, leftist, and socialist tradition. You've already alluded to that when mentioning a few of those names earlier. There's a very diverse range of perspectives in the diaspora, and it's really important not to essentialize, not to generalize, and not to be reductive. That being said, there are certain things that the Hindu nationalist movement and organizations have done that have attempted to cater to the diaspora in certain ways. They provide people with a sense of belonging and pride—people who might be marginalized by society around them more broadly. This is quite unusual and departs significantly from Hindu nationalism in India. The whole point of Hindu nationalism in India is that it's a majoritarian ideology relating to an ostensible majority community, an overwhelming majority community depending on how it's enumerated. Whereas in the diaspora, this is an ideology that appeals to quite a small minority—in fact, a minority that is significantly smaller than the Muslim minority in Britain and the US. That dynamic is notable, particularly in the context of the war on terror and Islamophobia in the West. There's clearly a way for Hindutva and certain Hindu nationalist mobilizations and ideas to engage with that tension and politics as well. Tushar Shetty: What's interesting when I was going through your book was the organizational aspect of this. Could you give us an overview of how Hindutva-leaning groups are organized in the UK and elsewhere – what sections of the diaspora do they cater to, how are they financed, what services do they provide and what role do they play in the community? And to what extent does their messaging and culture differ from the Sangh Parivar* in India? Edward Anderson: That's a really good set of questions with a lot in it, and it's hard to give a short answer. Just like in India, Hindutva groups in the diaspora are extremely heterogeneous. There's a bewildering plethora of different groups, and it feels like there are new ones being set up every year. While some groups might function in one way and reach out to a particular demographic, others might be very different. Even the type of Hindutva that they espouse—the tone and messaging—might differ drastically. In terms of which sections of the diaspora they cater to, one answer would be 'all.' Hindutva is a majoritarian ideology and needs to create an ostensibly monolithic and unified majority community to fulfil its ambitions. In this sense, Hindutva can be all-encompassing. We often hear the term 'Dharmic religions' being used in efforts to incorporate Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs into the fold, although this can be highly contentious. On one hand, they try to cater to many people, but on the other hand, there are clearly specific focuses. I've already mentioned a notable concentration of East African Asians. Reflecting the demography of East African Asians, there's quite a striking proportion of middle and upper-caste Gujarati Hindus. Another area of focus has been younger generations, which relates to another part of your question about the roles these groups play. These groups are eager to provide a service to the diaspora, particularly second and third generations and their parents, by positioning themselves as a place where they can convey particular versions of Hindu culture, history, and spirituality to people who are dislocated from that and living in another part of the world where they're not necessarily surrounded by it. They function by having classes—language classes, for instance. There's a very pedagogical role that these groups often play. There's a wide range of them as well. I'm referring quite broadly to the Sangh*, but there are also diasporic branches of the VHP* (Vishva Hindu Parishad). The more political side is reflected in the Overseas Friends of the BJP*. There are also various student groups and charities. The other interesting thing is that in the diaspora—and this is something I discuss in relation to an idea called 'Neo-Hindutva,' which I wrote about initially about 10 years ago and pursue further in this book—Neo-Hindutva is a term I've used to explain the way Hindutva has evolved and entered into spaces well beyond the Sangh Parivar*. We see completely new groups that operate and distance themselves from both the ideology of Hindutva and the organizational structures of the Sangh Parivar*. Yet when we look at them closely, we can identify them as Hindutva in ideology, even though they're functioning more in a multicultural context. Tushar Shetty: I recall reading about the HSS* (Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh) in the UK, which is quite similar to the RSS, but I think you noted that they claim to just be influenced by them and not have direct links. To what extent are these Hindu advocacy groups linked to or influenced by the RSS and its affiliates – are they just Sangh Parivar* subsidiaries abroad, or do they have their own independent agenda or presence? We're seeing a wider rise of Hindu advocacy groups gaining ground in places like the US and Canada, e.g. The Hindu American Foundation* comes to mind. Are all these groups linked to the RSS, or are they just a natural consequence of diaspora mobilization, similar to other immigrant communities in the Anglosphere? Edward Anderson: This is an important question and one I try to delve into in depth in the book. The overseas equivalent or wing of the RSS in the diaspora is called the HSS*, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh*. Originally in East Africa, it was called the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh*. This group does try to occasionally distance itself from the main RSS in India. They often talk about being inspired by or having ideological commonality with the RSS without being structurally connected. That being said, if you look at the organizations side by side, it's very clear that they are deeply connected. Full-time workers of the RSS in India—Pracharaks*—are sent abroad and work in various communities outside India to facilitate coordination. The Supreme Leader, the Sarsanghchalak* of the RSS, Mohan Bhagwat*, was present in Britain in 2016 for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the HSS* in the UK. We can see RSS leaders traveling across the diaspora, so there are clearly institutional connections. That being said, these groups are vernacularized—they do evolve in slightly different directions. They're not carbon copies of what we see in India in various ways. They also rely to some extent on organic, local volunteers and dynamic local leaders who are heavily invested in what they do. So there is a degree of separateness as well, even though there are clearly institutional links. These institutional links are something that many of these groups have been quite keen to obfuscate, not least because these are registered non-profits in the US and registered charities in Britain. The connection with political organizations is something that's quite contested and has been discussed and debated in various settings over quite a long period of time. Tushar Shetty: Do you think this is substantially different from the way other communities mobilize? We have different examples of this—I'm thinking of AIPAC* in the US, which advocates for Israeli interests, even though it's not necessarily connected to Israel directly in terms of donations, and is supported by the American Jewish community. We have Sikhs in Canada and the US who have strong political networks because of community connections. Is this mobilization or growth of Hindu-focused organizations substantially different from that, or is it just following a familiar pattern? Edward Anderson: I think there are some levels of similarity and other levels of distinctiveness. I wouldn't say that you can reduce all motivations of ethnic minority communities or diasporic communities to being all the same—there is real distinctiveness there, and it's important to study different groups and individuals on their own terms. That being said, there are certainly connections and links, not just across different communities but also across time. I'm a historian, although I work on topics that go almost right up to the present day. If you look at the political identities that were being formed and long-distance activism that was being conducted by Indians in Britain in the very early 20th century—people campaigning against the British Empire, seeking independence from Britain, people considered freedom fighters, including interestingly a founding father of Hindutva, Savarkar*, who was a student in London in the very early part of the 20th century—we can see a longer theme where there are similarities across different groups. But the sorts of connections and ways of doing politics have definitely been different in different parts of the world, in the US and Canada. As you say, there's a diversity of political perspectives among South Asian diasporas. Sometimes, in the case of some Sikh and Khalistani* activists, they come up in very heated and highly contested ways with other sections of the broader South Asian diaspora. Tushar Shetty: Mobilization in any community tends to be disruptive to politics – I wonder how these groups have impacted local politics in the UK and elsewhere. Do they wield enough power to influence legislation and foreign policy, and how do other communities respond to this? We've talked about Khalistani* groups reacting to certain aspects of Hindu nationalism emanating from India, and we also saw the riots in Leicester. I'd be grateful if you could talk about that for our listeners, and if there are other instances of negative fallout or reactions to Hindu politics in the Indian diaspora. Edward Anderson: Let me first address the Leicester tensions. What we saw in Leicester in August and September 2022 was rather unprecedented and extremely upsetting scenes of tension and violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the city. Leicester is a city in the Midlands in the middle of the UK that saw a very large influx of Asians, particularly South Asian people, in the 1960s and 1970s. It's one of the most diverse parts of the country, with nearly 45% of people identifying in the census as Asian, nearly 20% of the city being Hindu, and nearly 25% being Muslim. It's a very multicultural city that has seen various difficulties over the years, but multiculturalism is often identified as one of the great successes of the city and has enabled it to be economically successful. Tensions between communities have been present, and this reached a head in the summer of 2022. Various triggers have been suggested for what happened, but one might have been a cricket match between India and Pakistan. Following this, tensions spilled over into violence. We saw on social media videos of people walking through parts of the city shouting 'Pakistan Murdabad*' (death to Pakistan) and chanting 'Jai Shri Ram*'—a religious chant often associated with Hindutva. Subsequently, there were retaliations, including a flag being pulled down from a Hindu temple. There was a lot of rumor spreading and social media misinformation. Certain extremist elements, including the far right, were clearly stirring things up. We have evidence suggesting that a large amount of social media interaction on this matter originated in the Indian subcontinent, with hashtags like 'Hindus under attack' being spread in tens and hundreds of thousands of tweets. The flames were clearly being fanned from various parts of the world. This was a moment of considerable tension, and a lot of work has been done subsequently to try to build bridges between communities. While I said it was unprecedented, the unprecedented nature was in its scale and visibility and the reaction to it, but there have been tensions previously. If you go back three decades to 1992, one of the most pivotal moments for Indian democracy was the demolition of the Babri Masjid* by Hindu extremists. This led to significant outbreaks of violence and many deaths between Hindus and Muslims in various parts of India. There are reports from 1992 and 1993 showing that communal tensions had also found their way to Britain and other parts of the diaspora. There were reports of attacks on both Hindu and Muslim places of worship, and suggestions that opportunistic right-wing groups were also stirring things up. These tensions have existed for quite a long time. As well as tensions, there is also a lot of solidarity and groups working together—a lot of good relationships as well. Regarding the impact on UK politics, there has definitely been a concerted effort to influence legislation and be a force of lobbying. This comes back to your previous question about AIPAC*. What we can definitely identify is a desire to replicate the kind of level of influence that certain other communities have, notably the level of influence of certain elements of the Israeli lobby. It's not just a desire to replicate or mimic that but to form alliances as well. This is explored in depth in a new book called Hostile Homelands by Azad Essa*. There's definitely an effort to do advocacy and influence members of parliament, and we've seen this happen in numerous settings. One of the most dramatic was in 2019, when the Labour Party was still being led by Jeremy Corbyn*, who has been quite critical of Modi, has been a strong advocate for Dalit* rights, and has spoken out on the Kashmir issue and human rights issues in Kashmir. This led to an enormous backlash and resistance, with an effort by the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign against the Labour Party in 48 constituencies. This was quite unusual—for the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign specifically on a UK election and try to ensure that someone they framed as being anti-Indian and anti-Hindu would not get into office. There's definitely a level of influence going on there. The extent to which that influence has reaped rewards is a moot point—it's hard to identify necessarily. Tushar Shetty: How is Modi utilizing the Indian diaspora to advance some of his or India's foreign policy goals? Post-2014, do you think Modi's personal popularity has changed the dynamics of the Indian diaspora's politics and contributed to the rise of Hindutva ideas? Perhaps more controversially, could Modi's popularity in the diaspora have any impact on domestic politics in India, either indirectly through media coverage or perhaps directly through campaign contributions? Edward Anderson: This is an important question, certainly one that people have discussed perhaps more than any other aspect of diasporic Hindu nationalism. What we've definitely seen is the BJP being more proactive since 2014—and before that as well—in engaging the diaspora, perhaps much more dynamically than any of their rivals. The rewards they seem to be reaping perhaps reflect that. In 2014, after the election, Modi embarked upon a series of international visits—diplomatic visits, but also visits in which the diaspora featured quite heavily. The first and most striking was him filling out Madison Square Garden, a venue that usually has sports superstars and rock stars on its stage. This was a rock star-type event that the diaspora were extremely excited about in the US. In the following year, we saw a similar event with even more people—maybe 50,000 or 60,000—filling much of Wembley Stadium in west London, England's national football stadium. These were really dramatic scenes, and all of these were livestreamed back to India, which I think is crucial. What you're seeing is the diaspora being engaged with and maybe thanked for their influence and the way they can promote the BJP, Modi, and India more broadly. But what those rallies do is provide really powerful images for media back in India, both via social media—which Hindu nationalists have been very adept at using—and also via mainstream media, which has been very sympathetic to the BJP in recent years. They provide striking images that reflect popularity abroad or try to instill this idea of popularity abroad, which might be influential. The diaspora is still looked up to in many ways for their success and often enhanced levels of cultural, political, and economic capital. While the diaspora might not actually be voting—Indians who take citizenship of another country lose their Indian citizenship, as there's no dual nationality—even NRIs* (Non-Resident Indians) who still have Indian citizenship very often don't vote because it's logistically very complicated. The majority of the Indian diaspora don't vote, and unlike other countries, there's no distance voting option yet. The influence they might have in terms of PR influence or ability to influence people on the ground in India is possibly considered much greater than people who just turn up and vote. Modi has definitely been a key figure—he has inspired people, there's that charisma, assertiveness, and feeling of strength that has been conveyed. The diaspora participate in lots of aspects of that rallying around the individual. One of the early campaigns was 'Chai pe Charcha*' (discussions over tea), in which support for Modi was promoted. These took place across India but also in the diaspora. The diaspora have also been involved via the Overseas Friends of the BJP*, doing car rallies, driving around in different contexts, and even turning up for particular protests. When the BBC released its very controversial two-part Modi documentary, which was banned in India, members of the Indian diaspora went outside BBC headquarters in London and protested against that. There are lots of ways in which support for Modi has been manifested, and he is clearly an important figure. One caveat to add is that there have been surveys that push against the idea of universal support. A survey conducted by the Platform for Indian Democracy* at the end of 2023 suggested that more people of Indian origin in Britain had a negative view than a positive view of Modi and the BJP, particularly among younger generations. Yes, there is hero worship for Modi, like there is among many Indians. There's also a significant proportion of members of the Indian diaspora who would turn up when he comes overseas not to support him but to protest against him. Tushar Shetty: Before we end, I want to ask you—you're a historian, and I was reading recently Lee Kuan Yew's* autobiography, where he talked about the changing dynamics in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in response to the unification of the People's Republic of China. He discussed how the Malayan Communist Party* attracted many more recruits from the Chinese diaspora, not necessarily due to a flare-up of Communist ideology, but because there was a flare-up of nationalist pride. In that light, to what extent do you think the popularity of Modi and the rise of India as a global power has propelled these Hindutva ideas among the diaspora? Is this just a natural inclination toward Hindutva ideas, or is it also a response to the perceived rise of India in the global arena? Edward Anderson: I certainly wouldn't ever say anything's natural. I think there are always ways of explaining and understanding how things happen. There's not an innate predisposition to any particular sort of politics or identity. What the book discusses is the much longer picture that goes back to the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. There's a long backstory to the institutional establishment of Hindu nationalism and the ideological inculcation of Hindu nationalism among the Indian diaspora. This goes back a long time, clearly to a period long predating Modi and the 21st century saffronization of India—the 'New India' in which Hindu nationalism and Hindutva have had an impact on almost all aspects of society. But definitely, something different has happened over the last decade or so, and part of that is due to a new level of confidence. Previously, people inclined toward Hindutva might have been more reticent, maybe even secretive about it, less keen to show their cards. But the election of Modi since 2014 has completely changed that. There has been a renewed level of assertiveness and confidence. People are much less shy to discuss that aspect of their politics. Another big difference is that the world is so much more interconnected than it was. The experience of being a member of a diaspora in 2025 is significantly different from what it must have been like in the 1960s or 1970s. I'm not suggesting that in the 1960s or 1970s there was no connection with the subcontinent—that's obviously not the case. There was communication and interaction, but today you're instantly connected and almost constantly connected via social media and a device in your pocket to what's going on in other parts of the world. You're living a transnational life. Those levels of influence—whether it's important news stories, memes, viral YouTube videos, or the latest speech of a political leader—that's all coming to you directly, and you're participating in that directly. That's a phenomenon that has shifted in a very big way over the last decade or so, and I think that, as much as anything else, has had a big impact on the politics of the diaspora. Tushar Shetty: To those who want to read more, I would definitely recommend Edward's book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora. Is this available in India? Edward Anderson: Yes, it was published by Penguin and is available in India. It's published in the US by Oxford University Press and in the UK by Hurst. Tushar Shetty: Fantastic. Edward, thank you so much again for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thanks, it's been great talking to you. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
Time of India
05-07-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Dalai Lama issue: India can't be compliant to China or seen as insensitive to Tibetans, says Robert Barnett
. STRAP: Just days before his 90th birthday on July 6, the Dalai Lama — the revered spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism — declared that he would have a successor. The announcement is more than a theological decision since China has long sought control over the succession process. Neelam Raaj spoke to Robert Barnett, a leading Tibet scholar at SOAS, London, for insights into this high-stakes contest between faith and power. As someone who has studied Tibet closely, were you surprised by the Dalai Lama's recent announcement regarding his succession, especially given his earlier remarks suggesting he might be the last incumbent? For many years, the Dalai Lama has been reminding the public that he can choose from innumerable options and alternatives in terms of his succession. Sometimes he expressed this in a light-hearted way, such as saying he might come back as a butterfly, while at other times he referred to not returning at all, or he listed little-known theological alternatives, such as transmitting his consciousness to another adult through a process called 'trulwa' or emanation. But all of these alternatives were reminders that in Tibetan Buddhism it is the individual lama, and the karma of that individual lama, which decides how or whether a lama returns. Of course, these have all been messages to China and its rulers that their claim to have the sole right to control reincarnations makes little sense in the religious context. The Dalai Lama had also always said that the decision about whether he returns would depend on the wishes of his followers, and his officials spent the last year or more getting written opinions from the wider Buddhist community about that request. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like 5 Books Warren Buffett Wants You to Read In 2025 Blinkist: Warren Buffett's Reading List Undo This process was partly ceremonial – it reflects a very traditional understanding that a lama reincarnates only if his or her followers request for him or her to do so. So, no one doubted that the community would ask the Dalai Lama to return, and his decision to reincarnate is not a surprise. But here again the Dalai Lama seems to be sending a message to China, namely that, unlike Beijing, his decisions and his legitimacy are not based on the use of force or the resort to traditional authority, but on processes of consent and consultation. Tell us about the history of this contentious golden urn method of picking a successor. Contemporary Chinese officials say that in 1792-3 an order was given by the then emperor of China requiring Tibetans to use a golden vase or urn as the final stage in deciding between three children identified as candidate reincarnations of a high lama. After reciting appropriate prayers, the winning name would be drawn from the urn. This claim is correct, and , , the golden urn system was used scores of times in Tibet and Mongolia and other areas to select reincarnations up until the early 1900s. The current Chinese government claims that it is thus merely invoking a long-running legal precedent that requires Tibetans today to only use the same system and at the same time to recognise that only the Chinese government can authorize and select reincarnations. However, there are major weaknesses in this claim. Firstly, there had been scarcely any mention or use of the golden urn system for nearly 100 years before Beijing abruptly reintroduced it in 1995. Secondly, the emperors in the past who were involved with reincarnations and the golden urn were not Chinese and their governments were not Chinese – they were Manchus and were Buddhist believers, and were regarded by Tibetans at the time in many cases as emanations of the Buddha. Thirdly, it is not clear that use of the urn had meant in the past that the government in Beijing was seen by Tibetans as a sign of imperial sovereignty; according to the pioneering work of the historian Max Oidtmann, the process seems to have been more one of cooperation between Tibetans and the Manchus rather than one imposed on the former by the latter. And fourthly, the Manchu involvement in reincarnations seems to have been often understood by Tibetans as a kind of available option at times of dispute, rather than a law they were required to follow. And in general, religions and their believers tend to give priority to traditions and beliefs, rather than state laws. So, Beijing's invocation of 18th-century Manchu-Tibetan religious relations as proof of Chinese sovereignty today describes a world that seems vastly different from the contemporary situation. How do you anticipate Beijing will respond to this announcement? If China proceeds to name its own successor, are we looking at the possibility of two Dalai Lamas? It seems very likely, now that the Dalai Lama has announced that there will be a 15th Dalai Lama, that China will feel required to assert its sovereignty in these matters by naming its own Dalai Lama. So we are looking at a future, after the lifetime of the present Dalai Lama, where there will be two competing Dalai Lamas. But this will not be like a medieval competition between two rival popes, because only one of these Dalai Lamas will have been selected according to religious traditions and with the imprimatur of the previous Dalai Lama – the one who will be selected by the exiles. The Chinese candidate will have been selected by the Chinese state, whose rulers are by definition atheists if not, at times, outright enemies of religion. So, the Chinese candidate is at risk of having limited credibility among the Buddhist community and worldwide. Yet we might want to keep in mind that everything we are reading about is at some level a process of signalling to China. So the Dalai Lama's announcement is also an indirect reminder that if China wished to, it could still offer him a settlement. That settlement is actually easy to imagine, in theory: the Chinese could simply return to the position they took on reincarnation in the 1980s and the early 1990s, when they claimed only the right to confirm the choices made by the relevant lamas and did not claim any role in the reincarnation process or selection itself. But few people currently expect today's Chinese leaders to make concessions. The Dalai Lama has suggested that his reincarnation could be found outside China. If that successor emerges from the Tibetan diaspora in India, what kind of diplomatic and political challenges might this pose for New Delhi? The succession of the Dalai Lama has become a controversy because of Beijing's claim in 1995 to have sole authority over that process. Why did it make that claim, which is clearly one that would lead to conflict and dispute? One theory is that Chinese foreign policy strategists see an advantage in using this issue to advance China's aims abroad. According to this theory, the succession issue provides a new opportunity for China's diplomats to seek compliance from other governments – it provides an entry-point for China to call on those governments to support its claims and to denounce any claims or actions by the Tibetan exiles. If so, it's a clever move, because most governments have few exiles and few Buddhists in their population. Such governments might feel it less costly to comply with China's request than to refuse on what for them will seem a minor or obscure issue. But this is not, of course, the case for India, for whom such a request would have major implications in terms of soft power, international diplomacy, religious respect and even border negotiations. Whatever happens, India will be the chief focus among all nations of China's strategic interests in this matter, and will likely come under significant Chinese pressure. India's policy makers and diplomats will certainly be deploying all their skills and resources in order to find a way to respond to those pressures without seeming compliant to China or insensitive to Tibetan or religious priorities. How do you interpret China's recent efforts in Tibet — including large-scale infrastructure projects, population resettlements, and the campaign to re-educate Tibetan children? It used to be rather difficult for outside analysts to characterise Chinese policies in Tibet – they varied, being sometimes extremely harsh and in other ways and at certain times less so. But since 2014 a new policy has emerged under Xi Jinping which is clear: minorities, including the Tibetans and others, are to be gradually 'integrated' (jiaorong in Chinese) into the larger Chinese 'community' or nation (Zhonghua minzu). It has also become clear that Xi Jinping has ordered this process to begin from early childhood, because since 2021 his government has required all kindergartens – and kindergarten attendance is more or less compulsory these days for children aged 3-5 or so – to teach primarily or solely in the Chinese language. These schools and preschools increasingly teach children about Chinese or Communist history and values, rather than Tibetan ones. So there are serious concerns about the extent to which the next generation of Tibetans, Uyghur, Mongols and others within China will have substantive knowledge of their mother-tongue or their culture. At the same time, China has been moving many thousands of rural and nomadic Tibetans to settlements in or near towns, or to remote border regions, sometimes for very unclear reasons, and this too is likely to have a dramatic impact on cultural traditions and identity. There will be practical benefits for some of these relocated people, in terms of work, medical access and knowledge of Chinese, but there is much uncertainty about the overall effect of what is an ongoing process of massive social and cultural engineering.
Sky News
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Sky News
Why does China care who the next Dalai Lama is?
👉 Listen to Sky News Daily on your podcast app 👈 The Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is turning 90 and has confirmed - after years of uncertainty - that he will have a successor after his death and will not choose to end the line. In Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the Dalai Lama is reincarnated after they die. Monks search, select, and school a successor - usually a child. The current Dalai Lama was recognised at the age of two. He and an estimated 150,000 Tibetans now live in exile in India, and other countries, after China annexed Tibet decades ago. And that makes who the next Dalai Lama is, a concern of China's. Joining Matt Barbett is Professor Robert Barnett, who founded the Modern Tibetan Studies Programme at Columbia University and is now at University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). He has also met the Dalai Lama several times.
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Business Standard
07-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Standard
Technology must aid, not replace, human mind in judicial decision: CJI
Technology must complement, not replace, the human mind in judicial decision-making, Chief Justice of India BR Gavai has said while emphasising that the value of discretion, empathy and judicial interpretation is irreplaceable. In his keynote address on "Role of Technology in the Indian Legal System" at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University of London, the CJI said while the judiciary welcomes innovations like automated cause lists, digital kiosks and virtual assistants, it must ensure that human oversight, ethical guidelines and robust training are integral to their implementation. "The value of discretion, empathy and judicial interpretation is irreplaceable," Justice Gavai said and pointed out that the Indian judiciary is well-positioned to develop homegrown ethical frameworks tailored to the country's constitutional and societal realities. "We possess the technological expertise, the judicial foresight and the democratic mandate to build systems that reflect our values of equality, dignity and justice," he said. "In fact, in the very first week after assuming office as the chief justice of India, I initiated a discussion with the Centre for Research and Planning of the Supreme Court to prepare a comprehensive note on the ethical use of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies in the judiciary. "Technology must complement, not replace, the human mind in judicial decision-making," the CJI said, adding, "The emphasis must always be on using technology to enhance trust and transparency -- never to replace the human conscience at the heart of justice." He said though the judiciary has started to embrace technology, with the emergence of artificial-intelligence (AI) tools in judicial processes -- from case management to legal research, document translation and even predictive analytics -- there must be caution. "Around the world, debates are ongoing about the ethical use of AI in legal systems. Concerns include algorithmic bias, misinformation, data manipulation and breaches of confidentiality. For instance, sensitive information, such as the identity of a victim of crime, must never be disclosed due to AI error or the absence of clear protocols. Additionally, a few recent cases have shown that AI tools can generate fabricated citations or biased suggestions if not properly regulated and monitored," the CJI underscored. He added that technology, if anchored in constitutionalism and empathy, can transform access to justice from an abstract ideal into a lived and shared reality. "As we continue our journey toward modernising the Indian legal system, our approach must remain deeply rooted in constitutional values. The integration of technology must be people-centric, inclusive and guided by ethical clarity. Our ultimate goal should be to make justice accessible to every citizen, regardless of language, geography, income or digital literacy," he said. Concluding his address, Justice Gavai said, "I firmly believe that access to justice is not solely the responsibility of the judiciary. It is a shared national commitment. Law schools, civil society, legal-aid institutions and governments must work in unison to develop and promote technological models that are accessible, transparent and inclusive." Meanwhile, at a joint event of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and Trilegal organised on the occasion of London International Disputes Week, CJI Gavai said in recent decades, the justice-delivery mechanism, once confined within the boundaries of courtrooms, has witnessed a significant shift towards modes of alternative dispute resolution, with arbitration emerging as a prominent pillar of that transformation. The CJI was speaking on the topic of "Navigating the evolving landscape: The impact of the 7th edition of the SIAC Rules on India-Related Arbitrations". "At the cusp of this evolution lies the recognition that justice, particularly in complex commercial disputes, need not be adversarial or bureaucratic. Rather, it must be confidential, expert-driven and above all, tailored to the needs of those who seek it. Arbitration, in this context, is a substantive recalibration of how we understand and deliver justice," he said. Justice Gavai pointed out that over the last 10-15 years, India has made a multi-pronged effort towards its aspiration of building a favourable and sought-after place for arbitration. "While legislative reforms have significantly strengthened India's arbitration framework, the judiciary has also played a proactive role in fostering a more arbitration-friendly environment. Various progressive judgments by the Supreme Court of India over the last few years stand testament to this. Nonetheless, the enormity of India as a country has ensured that certain on-ground challenges continue," he said. "The Indian judiciary has and will continue to recognise and respect the autonomy of the arbitral process, ensuring that the courts step in only when demanded by the needs of justice," he added. The CJI said, "In conclusion, I am happy to note that the 7th edition of the SIAC Rules is a forward-looking endeavour, aimed at enhancing efficiency while balancing fairness. For India, whose commercial players are increasingly global in outlook and operation, these rules offer both an opportunity and a challenge -- the opportunity to align with international best practices and the challenge to elevate our own standards while balancing them with India's practical realities.
The Wire
06-06-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
An Anti-Caste Counterculture Is Gradually Taking Root in UK Universities
In a darkened lecture theatre in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, about 50 people gathered on a Sunday morning for a special screening of Court by Chaitanya Tamhane, a movie that critiques casteism in the Indian legal system. Meanwhile, 400 kms away in northwest England, a book stand in the library of Lancaster University showcased a special collection on caste and Ambedkar. And in another part of the UK, at the University of Leeds, students gathered to commemorate Ambedkar's birth anniversary and discuss plans for the newly formed Dr Ambedkar Society. These scenes from Dalit History Month celebrations in April this year in different parts of the UK represent a quiet but growing assertion taking root in many English university campuses. With more Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi students going to the UK for higher education in recent years, they are creating a counterculture on campus, challenging how 'India' and 'South Asia' are understood among British and international students and faculty. Through organising lectures, workshops and film screenings, and by forming anti-caste and Ambedkarite student societies on campus, marginalised students in the UK are amplifying voices from within their communities on an international platform and contributing to the global understanding of caste and resistance to it. Some are taking the effort further by trying to push for their universities to recognise caste in their policies, to help address the familiar patterns of discrimination and structural inequality marginalised students experience in the UK. Creating a new cultural presence on campus With tens of thousands of Indian students enrolling in UK universities every year, it is commonplace to find 'India Societies' and 'Hindu Societies' among the many student-run clubs on campuses across the country. In fact, societies that promote Hindu religion and culture on campus have been around in the UK since at least 1991 . Through these groups, students organise a variety of events including Bollywood nights, aartis , Diwali and Garba celebrations, and discussions on Indian politics and society Dalit students who came to the UK to study did not feel represented by any of these existing societies, said Abhishek Bhosale, PhD scholar and current President of the SOAS Ambedkar Society. When the society was formed in 2018, the idea was to create a safe space where Dalit students could get together, as well as to democratise and diversify the campus by putting forward their stories and perspectives, he said. In the past year, during Abhishek's tenure as president, the society has organised several public events including a discussion with The Wire' s Sukanya Shantha and her lawyer Disha Wadekar on their petition in the Supreme Court about caste-based discrimination in Indian prisons. The society also organised discussions on Shahu Patole's book Dalit Kitchens of Marathwada and Anand Teltumbde's book Iconoclast. What impact do students hope to have through these events? Abhishek explained that by telling the story of caste in a university like SOAS with an international, politically engaged student body, sensitisation about caste inequalities can reach the wider world through these students when they return to their home countries. 'We want to internationalise the authentic stories of people from Dalit backgrounds. For example, if not for the SOAS Ambedkar Society, there wouldn't be a discussion in London on Patole's book about Dalit food,' Abhishek said. They also try to bring the academic discussions to life through cultural events such as the Anti-Caste Film Festival they organised in April this year, where the Court was screened. With support from the filmmakers who obliged without a screening fee, the students also showed Jai Bhim Comrade , Fandry , Kaala , and Dr B R Ambedkar to a diverse audience of 60-70 members in London. Poster of the Anti-caste film festival organised by the SOAS Ambedkar Society (Left). A scene from the screening (Right). Photo: Abhishek Bhosale/ SOAS Ambedkar Society. SOAS is also home to the first known Adivasi student society in the UK, the Maki Munda Indigenous Studies Society. In the 2023-24 academic year, a few students from Jharkhand who were at SOAS on various government scholarships created this society to engage with Adivasi issues on an international platform. In their public events, they make it a point to invite Adivasi scholars and grassroots activists as panelists, often joining virtually from India, to share their indigenous knowledge and first-hand experiences. During a student fair in January 2024, the society also organised an Adivasi dance from the Chotanagpur region. 'People write about the poverty among Adivasis, their trauma and rights abuse but rarely do they embrace Adivasi culture. As Adivasis, we constantly battle damnation and shame in being who we are. Through the dance, we wanted to showcase our rich heritage and give it due regard in an international space,' said Madhuri Xalxo, a PhD scholar and founding member of the society. A handful of universities in the UK now have Ambedkarite or anti-caste societies formed by students. The Ambedkarite Society of Edinburgh at the University of Edinburgh was formed in January 2024 as a response to various incidents of casteism that marginalised students experienced from fellow Indian students of privileged caste backgrounds. 'I was very taken aback by the lack of sensitivity among many Indians. So we formed the society to promote an anti-caste consciousness among students from India, among diaspora and among international students,' said Aniruddha Mahajan, PhD scholar and founding president of the society. At the prestigious London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), a few Dalit students started an LSE Ambedkar Society in January 2024 to give the iconic social reformer's ideas due regard in his alma mater. Ambedkar enrolled as a student in LSE in 1916 and completed a master's degree and a PhD from the university. Ritu Kochar, PhD student and founding president of the society, said, 'I was very proud to join the same university where Babasaheb once studied. But when I came here, I realised that even though Ambedkar is featured prominently as a notable alumni of LSE, there is hardly any engagement with his ideas on economics, caste or religion.' Through its activities, the society aims to change this and bring focus to his scholarship. At the University of Oxford, the Oxford South Asian Ambedkar Forum (OxSAAF) was formed in 2021 with the intention to create an alternative to the existing Indian cultural presence on campus, mostly associated with Diwali and Bollywood. 'One thing we wanted to do from the beginning was to create a desi counterculture of food, clothing, films and so on, in Oxford,' said Shireen Azam, DPhil scholar and founding member of OxSAAF. For instance, in 2022, OxSAAF organised a screening of the film Kaala by anti-caste filmmaker Pa Ranjith. 'After the screening, we gave out food coupons which said 'India is not a vegetarian country'. We served both veg and non-veg food but we wanted to push against the widespread association of India with vegetarianism,' Shireen said. Most societies have about 6-10 core members from different caste backgrounds and nationalities, with many more students and members of the public participating in their events. Despite their resolve to assert their presence, keeping the societies active year after year is a challenge since master's students leave when their one-year courses conclude, and PhD students are often kept busy by research and academic commitments. Outside of societies, some individual students like Mayur Helia, PhD scholar Lancaster University, are also doing their bit to bring insider perspectives to conversations on caste within academia. When he first enrolled here, he noticed that the university's library did not have many books on caste or Ambedkar. 'The library had whole sections of books on Gandhi and on Nehru but there was hardly anything on caste, especially those written by people from within the Dalit community,' Mayur said. This prompted him to write to the library's administration in 2024, suggesting that they commemorate Dalit History Month just as they mark occasions like Black History Month and LGBTQ+ History Month. The library staff obliged and in April 2024, for the first time, the library had a bookshelf showcasing books such as Caste Matters by Suraj Yengde and Coming out as Dalit by Yashica Dutt, along with a note on the significance of Dalit History Month. This year, too, the library celebrated the occasion with a dedicated bookshelf. Instagram: Lancaster University Library. Perhaps the biggest shift is the presence of so many researchers from marginalised caste backgrounds in the UK, engaged in academic knowledge production on caste, its history and its contemporary life. Students see this as an opportunity to correct the 'Savarna gaze' in research on the subject and to tell overlooked stories of resistance and dignity. 'There are enough privileged caste researchers doing research on us. I want Dalits to come here to the UK and talk about the community. Now it is time for insiders to get their voice and for the mic to be passed,' said Mayur, whose own PhD research is on caste, resistance and surveillance among sanitation workers in South Asia A growing push for recognition of caste in policies within UK universities Ambedkar famously said that caste would migrate with Hindus wherever they went, a prediction that has been visibly borne out in recent years across the globe. In the UK, too, students from marginalised castes experience subtle and unsubtle forms of discrimination from South Asian faculty and fellow students, and even outside the campus For instance, as a master's student at the University of Edinburgh, Vaishnavi (who goes by first name only) felt alienated by fellow Indian students when she told them she was on the Maharashtra government's overseas scholarship for OBC students 'After I told them, those students didn't want to go out with me, they didn't want to be friends. It disturbed me,' she said. It reminded her of similar experiences of discrimination she had endured during her undergraduate studies in India. 'You come from India and you are trying to run away from that but even here, you are getting the same experience,' Vaishnavi said Many students are first-generation learners who don't have the support networks or resources to tide over these challenges of moving to a new country with an unfamiliar academic system. Even the scholarships, particularly the National Overseas Scholarship, has its issues with students complaining that the stipend amount is insufficient to cover the high cost of living in the UK, forcing them to work part-time jobs Although university administrations in the UK are generally sensitive to the diverse needs of students, a lack of understanding of caste and its impact on the student experience means that universities are ill-equipped to address the specific issues of marginalised caste students. As president of the Ambedkarite Society of Edinburgh, Aniruddha tried to help a few students seek redressal after being subjected to caste-based discrimination from fellow Indian students. But the institutional mechanisms of the Edinburgh University Students' Association (EUSA) in place to deal with such grievances fell short. 'It was difficult to make them understand the seriousness of the complaint and the overt and covert ways in which caste discrimination takes place. Most importantly, they didn't understand the impact it has on the victims and the trauma they experience,' Aniruddha said. When contacted, the EUSA said they were not in a position to comment since they are in the process of changing their representatives for the new academic year. To tackle this lack of understanding, students are now also trying to bring an acknowledgement of caste in policies within their universities. In 2023, students at SOAS, led by Sushant Singh who was then the union's co-president for Welfare and Campaigns, made a proposal to the Students' Union to add 'caste' to their Equality and Diversity policy. Now, as per the amended policy , the union is committed to creating equal opportunities and eliminating discrimination on the basis of caste, along with other characteristics such as age, race, and gender identity. The policy, however, applies only to the students' union and not to the university since the two are separate legal entities. Some students, like Yashashwani Srinivas, a PhD candidate at the University of Leeds, are trying to bring change by taking up positions with some influence. Yashashwani is a recipient of the White Rose doctoral studentship funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK. She applied to be on the Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) Committee for the studentship, and once on it, she advocated for caste to be included in the diversity monitoring. She was successful and, since October 2023, the studentship guidance states that while students will not be discriminated against on the basis of caste, age, race, gender and so on, this information will be collected anonymously to monitor the diversity of the cohort. It's a small change but in the process of doing it, Yashashwani hoped to begin important conversations around caste, conversations which she and fellow students now plan to keep going through the newly formed Dr Ambedkar Society at Leeds. Students are not alone in this fight – they are supported, with evidence and advice, by existing networks of anti-caste advocacy groups in the UK. Santosh Dass MBE, chair of the Anti Caste Discrimination Alliance (ACDA) in the UK, argued that these small wins, like Yashashwani's and the one at SOAS, are 'vital' even if they don't have an immediate impact. 'Maybe having the word 'caste' in the diversity policies will make them think about how people in positions of power may be treating Dalit students differently,' she said Dass and others in the UK's decades-old Ambedkarite movement have been campaigning for caste to be included in the UK's 2010 Equality Act which provides legal protection from discrimination at the workplace and in wider society on the basis of nine protected characteristics, including race, gender, sexual orientation, and age Previously, their efforts were thwarted by counter-lobbying from groups such as the Hindu Forum and the Hindu Council in the UK. Now, with students and Ambedkarite societies on campus trying to bring a recognition of caste within their universities' policies, activists like Dass are hoping that it creates a bottom-up demand for the UK government to include caste as a protected characteristic in the law If caste is added to the Equality Act, universities would be required to take active steps to eliminate discrimination on the basis of it and advance equality of opportunities, said Meena Dhanda, Professor of Philosophy and Cultural Politics at the University of Wolverhampton and long-time anti-caste activist. This could result in sensitisation for all staff and more targeted support for marginalised caste students with finding accommodation, navigating academics, scholarships and addressing any discrimination What happened in Oxford in 2023 is an indication of how the work of student societies and anti-caste groups in the UK can come together to create a wider impact. In June 2023, OxSAAF organised a one-day conference on the theme 'Caste Beyond South Asia' with participation from academics, senior university administration staff, and key activists from the UK. Professor Annapurna Waughrey and Professor Meena Dhanda, both academics involved in the anti-caste movement, and Dass of ACDA shared their research on caste discrimination in the UK in housing, education and employment. Holly Cooper, Equalities Officer for the Oxford branch of the University and College Union (UCU) which represents academic and support staff in higher education, was present at the meeting. ' The conference revealed the extent of the injustices related to caste-based discrimination at Oxford and the wider community. As Equality Officer, my main job is to address injustices, and so taking action was a necessary step,' Holly said in an email response. The discussions prompted Holly to take up the issue of caste at a meeting of the Oxford UCU branch, ultimately leading to them passing a resolution to recognise 'caste' as a protected characteristic within the branch. The motion also led to many conversations among branch members on what caste is and what caste discrimination looks like. Yet, the Equality Act even as it exists today does not hinder universities from making positive change, if they have the intent to do so. Since the 2023-24 academic year, the Oxford India Centre for Sustainable Development (OICSD) offers the Savitribai Phule Graduate Scholarship , the first of its kind, targeted at students from Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Caste backgrounds as well as first-generation learners to study on eligible master's programmes. The centre, based in Somerville College, University of Oxford, made a case for the scholarship on the basis that students from historically marginalised castes faced a higher barrier of entry to study at the University of Oxford. Commenting on the role of UK universities in addressing caste inequity, Baroness Jan Royall, Principal of Somerville College, said in an email, 'Universities have a responsibility to ensure that students from all backgrounds have equal access to education and opportunities. While caste discrimination may not be as widely discussed in the UK, it remains a deeply entrenched issue for many South Asian students. If we are serious about global inclusivity, we must acknowledge these challenges and take meaningful steps to address them.' Anti-caste activists, academics and students believe that the clamour for change within universities will only gain momentum in the coming years. As more students from marginalised castes come to the UK to study, there will likely be more instances of discrimination from privileged caste peers, and a greater push for universities to take notice and address inequities within South Asian and Indian communities. 'It is one thing to be interested in issues of caste out of intellectual curiosity. But it is different when it's intimately connected with your own lives. The presence of people for whom it's a question of their own lives has changed everything. Their presence will force a change which is urgently needed,' Professor Dhanda said. Meghana Choukkar is a journalist and researcher affiliated with King's India Institute at King's College London. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
