Latest news with #Sahelian
LeMonde
19 hours ago
- Politics
- LeMonde
Jihadists are intensifying drone attacks in the Sahel
In the Sahel, drone warfare has reached unprecedented levels. On July 14, the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan research institute, published a report that sheds light on the growing intensity of attacks with these devices that are being carried out by armed groups in the region − particularly by Nusrat al-Islam (JNIM), Al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate. The institute has recorded more than 30 confirmed drone attacks since September 2023, of which 82% (24 attacks) were concentrated between March and June 2025. These included the assault on the Malian military base in Boulikessi on June 1, when JNIM used drones to drop explosives and claimed to have killed more than 100 Malian soldiers. These devices, which had previously been limited to surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, have evolved into weapons capable of carrying out direct strikes. In September 2023, the report stated, JNIM conducted its first armed drone attack, "dropping two [improvised explosive devices] on Dan Na Ambassagou [a Dogon militia fighting jihadist groups] positions in Bandiagara," in the Mopti region in central Mali.
Daily Maverick
a day ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Old alliances could bridge west Africa's security cooperation gaps
The politically neutral Conseil de l'Entente could revive urgently needed security partnerships among Sahel and coastal states. Security and economic cooperation in west Africa was dealt a blow by the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) in January. The three countries are governed by coup leaders, and in September 2023 formed an alternative security partnership – the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Pragmatic bilateral cooperation between the AES and other west African countries, such as Senegal and Togo, has taken place, and in May the AES and Ecowas agreed on the need to jointly tackle terrorism. These are positive steps but don't match the benefit of institutional security alliances in a volatile region. Many parts of west Africa are affected by cross-border terrorism, organised crime and localised conflicts between communities in border regions. The Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranks Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger among the world's top five countries most affected by terrorism, and the violence is spreading southwards. This deteriorating security landscape underscores the urgent need to revitalise regional cooperation. Two platforms besides Ecowas could help achieve that: the Accra Initiative and the Conseil de l'Entente. The Accra Initiative includes Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and was created to tackle terrorism and transnational organised crime. It is built on three pillars: joint military operations, intelligence and information sharing, and the training of security and intelligence personnel. However, the initiative has been largely inactive in recent years. Its last joint military operation was in 2021, with no plans for future actions. Activities related to the other two pillars have largely ceased, and member-state representatives stationed at the Executive Secretariat in Accra have returned to their home countries. Several factors have contributed to its inactivity, including dynamics within the organisation. Diplomats interviewed by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) identified mistrust between AES states and their coastal neighbours stemming partly from Ecowas decisions to establish a regional force to counter coups. This was after the overthrows in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in July 2023. After Niger's coup, Ecowas threatened to intervene militarily to restore constitutional order. In September 2023, relations deteriorated after Niger accused Benin of authorising deployments to restore deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power. Despite these challenges, cooperation remains essential. ISS research shows that violent extremist groups in the Sahel are using illicit networks that operate through coastal states. Disrupting these resource flows would significantly weaken the groups, offering mutual security benefits for both Sahelian and coastal countries. Given a weakened Ecowas and an inactive Accra Initiative, the Conseil de l'Entente is a promising alternative for renewed collaboration. Based in Abidjan and founded in 1959, the organisation includes nearly all members of the Accra Initiative – excluding Ghana. Mali has observer status. Like the Accra Initiative, the Conseil has three main organs: the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers and Committee of Experts. Its core objectives include promoting peace, security and stability. One of its defining principles is the sovereign equality and independence of member states. Unlike Ecowas, it does not suspend or sanction members following coups or constitutional crises. This politically neutral stance has likely contributed to Burkina Faso and Niger's continued membership, alongside the need for economic integration. Notably, its deputy executive secretary is from Niger. This commitment to neutrality is reinforced by the Conseil de l'Entente's discreet consensus-based diplomatic style. It often engages member states at the highest political levels on sensitive issues while avoiding public pressure. A diplomat told ISS that this approach fosters long-term trust and confidence, ensuring that member states see the organisation as a partner rather than an enforcer. The Conseil has experience in convening regional stakeholders to discuss shared security challenges. Since 2016, it has held annual meetings of security ministers, preceded by expert consultations involving heads of police, gendarmerie and border management agencies. These gatherings have addressed the growing threat of violent extremism in both the Sahel and coastal regions. Beyond national governmental engagement, the organisation has supported knowledge and experience sharing among local government officials, civil society actors and other stakeholders affected by violent extremism. With technical support from the ISS and funding from Switzerland, the Conseil organised regional workshops on preventing violent extremism in Abidjan (2018), Ouagadougou (2019) and Lomé (2023). Given its neutrality and sustained connections with both AES and coastal states, the Conseil is well positioned to initiate mediation that could gradually restore cooperation. Plans along these lines are already under way, alongside ministerial and expert meetings in 2025 to review the implementation of national strategies to prevent violent extremism. There are also ongoing discussions about Ghana potentially joining the organisation. This would create a membership base similar to the Accra Initiative – though with a broader mandate and a different operational approach. Ghanaian representatives, including the current Special Envoy to the AES states, have previously participated in Conseil de l'Entente activities. Burkina Faso and Niger's continued participation in the Conseil suggests a degree of confidence in its neutrality and an openness to renewed dialogue. That means the Conseil is uniquely positioned to facilitate the revival of sustainable regional security cooperation. However, a comprehensive independent assessment of both bilateral relations within the organisation and its institutional capacity to mediate ongoing tensions is essential. The findings could inform the design of targeted support to strengthen the Conseil de l'Entente's role in regional peace and security. DM Sampson Kwarkye, project manager, Littoral West African States, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel.
Business Insider
7 days ago
- Politics
- Business Insider
Exclusive: How misunderstanding with countries like France is worsening insecurity in West Africa
The relationship between France and most of West Africa, particularly the nations that comprise the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has changed dramatically in recent years. France's relationship with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has shifted significantly with these nations moving away from French support towards other allies. French military operations over the years, despite initial acceptance, faced criticism over perceived inefficacy and alleged neocolonial motives. Political instability, including military coups between 2020 and 2023, further strained ties between France and the Sahel nations. Formerly seen as key partners in the war against terrorism in the Sahel, these nations have grown more distant from their former colonial power, opting instead to chart a new course that challenges decades of French military and political dominance in the region. This subject was highlighted by Christophe Ouatarra, Regional Director for East Africa, World Neighbors, during an exclusive with Business Insider Africa. Following the emergence of Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel in the 2010s, France established itself as a crucial security partner for its former colonies. Military actions such as Operation Serval in Mali (2013) and Operation Barkhane (2014–2022) were conducted to combat terrorism and stabilize the area. Although initially welcomed by Sahelian administrations, these missions ultimately lost popularity due to their poor efficacy in quelling violence and rising views of neocolonial intervention. Between 2020 and 2023, the Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, saw a succession of military coups as a result of mounting unrest. In each case, the new military governments showed great mistrust about French motivations and began to shift their focus to other global allies, including Russia, Turkey and China. The junta governments accused France of prolonging the turmoil to legitimize its stay and plunder the region's resources, and thus buttressed resentment, which led to the Sahel countries expelling France's military from their borders. Christophe Ouatarra take on rural development in the Sahel region in the face of insecurity Christophe Ouatarra spoke about the insecurity in the region and how it affects rural development. He asserted that what is going on in the region could pass as a full-scale war, as opposed to a security challenge. 'The difference is that we are in a war. War is very expensive, so that means that the three countries, instead of financing development aspect, they have to finance the war,' he said when asked what the difference between the state of rural development is between AES countries and other West African countries. ' The war is very expensive; they have to buy weapons and other logistics,' he added. When asked about the progress of rural development in spite of what he had described as a war, he noted that there has been some progress in the last year. 'We are working with communities, and provided they let them cultivate their farms, there are good opportunities,' he stated. 'An example is Burkina Faso. Last year, the government bought tractors and fertilizers and deployed the land for farmers for free, and in one year, we noticed an increase in the crop yield, 80% compared to the previous year, and the increase of 21% compared to the 5% last year,' he explained. When asked about how international relationships key into the issue of security, Christophe Ouatarra noted that a lack of understanding from foreign parties has exacerbated a problem that can be handled. He specifically alluded to how some countries have hindered the ability of countries in the Sahel to defend themselves by denying said countries access to arms. 'The problem is to understand what people are facing in the region, not what people are saying about the region. If others can understand our problem without lies, that would help us a lot,' he said. 'For example, when terrorists were attacking the three nations, they (AES countries) wanted to buy arms to defend the population, but at the international level, they were blocked,' Christophe Ouatarra stated. He went on to elaborate on the issue, explaining; 'The governments wanted to buy weapons in order to protect the population, but at the international level, there was a breakdown, which means we are not understanding the problem in the same way. When asked for examples of countries that don't understand what the AES region is going through, Do Outarra stated; "I think you may have heard this in the media, even our president said that they ordered weapons and France blocked it, this is not a secret, it's well known in the media, our authorities are always talking about that.' The interview concluded with his thoughts on the growing popularity of Ibrahim Traore, the current Junta leader of Burkina Faso and in his opinion, Ibrahim Traore is loved because he seems like a leader that cares. 'What I can say is that the population really wants someone who cares for them, who is here to solve the problem, when they know you are here, not for your own interest, but for the well-being of the whole population, they will support you,' he stated.
Euractiv
7 days ago
- Politics
- Euractiv
Final post: France's military disengagement from Africa continues with Senegal exit
PARIS – Since 2022, Paris has been forced to evacuate most of its military bases in Africa, as countries that were once part of the former French colonial empire seek new international partners. A remnant of French colonialism in Senegal has now disappeared. In a very modest ceremony on Thursday, the French army officially handed over the keys to Camp Geille to the country's authorities. Located in the centre of the capital, Dakar, the camp had been occupied by French forces since Senegal's independence in 1960 and was still home to 350 troops. 'This handover carries strong symbolic weight, as Dakar was the former capital of French West Africa and the leaders of both countries long maintained very close ties,' noted Pierre Jacquemot, former ambassador and member of the Observatory for Sub-Saharan Africa at the Jean Jaurès Foundation. The evacuation of the military bases in Senegal, which began in March, is another step in France's military disengagement from Africa. Following a series of coups in the Sahel, French troops have since 2022 been forced to leave Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where they were swiftly replaced by soldiers from the Africa Corps, a special unit of the Russian defence ministry. French forces were also asked to withdraw from Chad last December. And at the end of February 2025, France handed over to Côte d'Ivoire the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion's military camp in Abidjan, leaving only two remaining installations on the continent: one in Djibouti and one in Gabon. France 'is reorganising' On 6 January, during his address to ambassadors, Emmanuel Macron insisted that 'France is not retreating in Africa' but rather 'reorganising." The French president sparked controversy at the time by suggesting that African leaders had 'forgotten to say thank you to France' for its military support against Sahelian jihadists. That remark did not sit well with Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, who responded just a few hours later, arguing that Paris had 'often contributed to destabilising certain African countries such as Libya, with disastrous consequences for the stability and security of the Sahel." Brought to power in spring 2024, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced that all foreign military presence on national soil would end in 2025. However, Dakar's authorities insist that this does not represent a 'break' with Paris, but rather the need to build a 'renewed partnership' with the former colonial power. 'The new team that came to power in Senegal a year and a half ago – much younger than its predecessors – has a sovereignist agenda and seeks to regain full autonomy, which is, of course, incompatible with the continued presence of foreign troops,' Jacquemot added. Economic ties between Senegal and France nonetheless remain strong. During a visit to Dakar last March, Thani Mohamed-Soilihi, Minister Delegate for Francophonie and International Partnerships, noted that France was Senegal's leading provider of public aid and top foreign investor, with '€3.5 billion invested in 250 projects' in 2024. New players 'Willingly or not, France is undergoing a 'banalization' of its relations with a number of African countries,' said Caroline Roussy, director of research at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS). 'Dakar's authorities have been attempting for several years to forge partnerships with other countries, but these efforts remain rather haphazard for now,' she added. At the end of June, Prime Minister Sonko was in Beijing to sign a 'strategic partnership' with China, aimed at boosting cooperation 'within the Global South," according to President Xi Jinping, as discussions also touched on Chinese investment in energy and digital infrastructure. China was already Africa's leading trading partner in the first half of 2024, with €151 billion in trade, and Beijing had pledged just a year earlier €45 billion in 'financial support' over three years to African countries. 'It is difficult to identify a single overarching trend in France's relations with African countries, as they are deeply influenced by local political dynamics,' Roussy continued. 'But there is no doubt that many feel they have long played the role of Paris's lackeys, without reaping the benefits they had hoped for.' More than 65 years after the end of colonisation, it is therefore 'only natural' that countries on the continent are now looking to 'open up to new partners," said Jacquemot. (mm)
The Star
17-07-2025
- Politics
- The Star
Analysis-Rise in Al Qaeda attacks revives spectre of West African caliphate
DAKAR (Reuters) -At dawn on June 1, gunfire shattered the stillness of Mali's military base in Boulkessi. Waves of jihadist insurgents from an al-Qaeda-linked group stormed the camp, catching newly deployed soldiers off guard. Some troops, unfamiliar with the base, which lies near Mali's southern border with Burkina Faso, scrambled to find cover while others fled into the arid brush, according to one soldier, who spoke to survivors of the attack. The soldier, who had completed a tour at the camp a week before, requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to journalists. Hours after the attack, videos circulated online showing jubilant fighters from Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), stepping over the bodies of fallen soldiers. JNIM claimed it had killed more than 100 troops and showed around 20 soldiers who said they were captured at the base. Reuters was unable to verify the claims independently. The Boulkessi assault was one of more than a dozen deadly attacks by JNIM on military outposts and towns across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May and June. The insurgents claimed to have killed more than 400 soldiers in those attacks. Mali's military government has not commented on the toll. Reuters spoke to five analysts, a security expert and a community leader in the region who said the surge in violence reflects a strategic shift by JNIM - a group founded by a veteran Islamist who rose to prominence by briefly seizing northern Mali in 2012. JNIM is moving from rural guerrilla tactics to a campaign aimed at controlling territory around urban centres and asserting political dominance in the Sahel, they said. "The recent attacks point a concrete effort to encircle Sahelian capitals, aiming for a parallel state stretching from western Mali to southern Niger and northern Benin," said Mucahid Durmaz, senior Africa analyst at risk intelligence group Verisk Maplecroft. Attacks by JNIM left more 850 people dead across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May, a rise from the average rate of killings of around 600 in previous months, according to data from U.S. crisis-monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). The surge in attacks in May and June marks one of the deadliest periods in the Sahel's recent history and underscores the threat posed by jihadist groups at a time when regional governments are estranged from former Western military allies, analysts say. More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel has caused mass displacement and economic collapse. The violence has steadily spread towards coastal West Africa, straining regional stability and fuelling migration toward Europe. On July 1, JNIM carried out simultaneous attacks on army camps and positions in seven towns in central and western Mali, according to an army statement and claims by the insurgents. The army said 80 militants were killed. Reuters was unable to reach JNIM for comment. The group releases its statements and videos on social media, and has no media spokesperson. Mali's army did not respond to Reuters requests for comments about the wave of JNIM attacks. It said in a statement after the Boulkessi assault that troops responded "vigorously" before retreating. "Many soldiers fought, some to their last breath," the statement said. STRATEGIC PIVOT JNIM's leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, has been instrumental in its transformation. A former rebel leader in Mali's Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s, Ag Ghaly led the fundamentalist group Ansar Dine that was part of a coalition of groups that briefly occupied northern Mali in 2012. The militants imposed a harsh version of sharia law - banning music, imposing mutilations as punishment for crimes, and holding public executions and floggings. Thousands fled, and cultural sites were destroyed, leaving lasting trauma in the region before the rebels were driven out by a French military intervention the following year. Ag Ghaly is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, who seized power between 2020 and 2023 on the back of the prolonged insurgencies, promise to restore security before returning their countries to democratic rule. They've cut ties with Western nations and expelled their forces, blaming them for failing to end the insurgencies and turning instead to Russia for military support. After deploying mercenaries, the Russians have also suffered setbacks and been unable to contain the uprisings. In Burkina Faso — a country about half the size of France — militants exert influence or control over an estimated 60% of the territory, according to ACLED. Ag Ghaly, who has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, has positioned himself as the leader of a jihadist coalition that includes al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina after they merged into JNIM in 2017. A Western security source, who requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak publicly, told Reuters that JNIM has emerged as the region's strongest militant group, with an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters. Ag Ghaly's goal, the analysts said, is to impose Islamic rule across the Sahel and extend its influence to coastal West Africa, a region twice the size of Western Europe, with a population of around 430 million people, many of them Christian. In a rare video released in December 2023, he denounced the military governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and called on Muslims to mobilize against them and their Russian allies. Ag Ghaly could not be reached for comment. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger did not respond to requests for comment. SOPHISTICATED TACTICS, LOCAL OUTREACH JNIM's battlefield tactics have grown increasingly sophisticated, including the use of anti-aircraft weapons and drones for surveillance and precision strikes, Durmaz said. It has amassed substantial resources, meanwhile, through raids, cattle rustling, hijacking of goods, kidnappings and taxes on local communities, the five analysts said. While it has not appointed local administrators in areas under its control, JNIM has imposed a tax known as 'Zakat' for protection, according to two residents and a former militia fighter. They have quelled some inter-communal conflicts and imposed a form of Sharia law, requiring women to wear veils and men to grow beards. But they have refrained from severe punishments, such as amputating the hands of thieves. Heni Nsaibia, Senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, described its recent activity as a "step change". He said JNIM seizing Burkina Faso's northern provincial capital Djibo, a town of over 60,000 people, on May 11 and Diapaga, an eastern provincial capital of around 15,000, two days later was unprecedented. "In Djibo they stayed for 11 hours or plus. In Diapaga they remained for two-three days even. And that is very much something that we haven't seen before," Nsaibia said. According to Nsaibia, the group has captured an estimated $3 million worth of munitions in Djibo alone. The repeated attacks have left the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso unsettled, and idea of JNIM taking over Bamako or Ouagadougou, once considered far-fetched, is a plausible threat, according to Nsaibia. JNIM's outreach to marginalized communities, particularly the Fulani, a widely dispersed pastoralist group, has been central to recruitment, the analysts said. "JNIM is advancing its narrative as a defender of marginalised communities," Durmaz said. "They are not just fighting for territory — they're fighting for legitimacy." Fulani have increasingly found themselves targeted by authorities across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso under the banner of counter-terrorism, a Fulani community leader told Reuters, requesting anonymity for safety reasons. While not all Fulani are involved in armed groups, their presence is significant among insurgents in rural areas, driven more by frustration and lack of opportunity than ideology, the leader said. JNIM's ambitions now stretch beyond the Sahel. The group has expanded its operations into northern Benin and Togo, and are threatening Gulf of Guinea states which they use as a rear base, according to analysts. Both countries have deployed more security forces in the northern regions as insurgents ramp up attacks. "Togo and Benin are the most vulnerable due to their limited counterterrorism capabilities, existing local grievances in their northern regions, and porous borders with Burkina Faso," Durmaz said. ($1 = 554.9000 CFA francs) (Additional reporting Robbie Corey-Boulet and Bate Felix Writing by Bate Felix)
