Latest news with #Salafism
ABC News
02-07-2025
- Politics
- ABC News
Defending Islam, dying for Islam: What the suicide attack on the church of Mar Elias portends for Syria - ABC Religion & Ethics
The suicide attack on Christians at prayer in the Greek Orthodox Church of Mar Elias (Saint Elijah) in Damascus on Sunday, 22 June 2025, left 25 dead and 63 wounded. World leaders were quick to condemn the attack, as were Syria's state authorities, who vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice. But condemnations offer little to Christian Syrians. Like Christians across the region, they feel increasingly unwelcome — religiously unwelcome — in lands where they've dwelt for 2,000 years. The group claiming responsibility for the attack is a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which issued a statement explaining its motive. In March 2025, the community of Mar Elias had driven away its members who had sought access to the church to call people to Islam. The group, a kind of Salafism, aims to purify the lands of Islam of non-Muslim elements through aggressive preaching, but if blocked from doing so, they'll resort to violence to achieve the goal. Christian Syrians, though shocked, deeply disappointed and fearful, are not surprised. They view the attack on Mar Elias through the lens of a long history of religiously inspired hostility towards Christianity in the region — including the well-known genocide against the Armenians and lesser-known genocides against the Assyrian and Chaldean Christians under the Ottoman Empire. Blood spatters cover some damaged artwork inside the Mar Elias Orthodox Church following a suicide bombing on 22 June 2025 in Damascus, Syria. (Photo by Ali Haj Suleiman / Getty Images) In October 2024, Pope Francis canonised 'the martyrs of Damascus', eleven Christians of varied origins, all of them residents of a monastery in Damascus, who in 1860 were set upon and killed, specifically out of hatred for their faith, in a context of widespread massacre of Christians. The latest chapter of this history opened with the rise of ISIS, which blew up churches and monasteries in Syria and subjected Christians to a slave-like status. Countless Christians paid with their life — some apparently by crucifixion — for refusing to renounce their trust in Christ. ISIS also attacks Muslims who reject its creed, but the cross enrages ISIS, making Christian sites high-priority targets their work of purifying the lands of Islam of non-Muslim elements. Who are the true 'martyrs'? Despite the claims of President Ahmed al-Sharaa that Syria is a pluralistic society, Christians — and others — have reason to doubt his words. The new regime has not clearly extricated itself from jihadist affiliates, proving unable or unwilling to protect Alawite and Druze communities from attacks earlier this year, or to denounce extremist preachers who make sense of the harassment of Christians by speaking of non-Muslims as 'a blight on the purity of Islam'. Particularly worrying for Christians is the fact that state authorities have not referred to the victims as 'martyrs' or invoked God's mercy upon them. This might sound trivial to Western ears, but it speaks volumes to Syrian ones. Not invoking God's mercy on the dead implies they have no value in God's eyes. In practice, Muslims invoke God's mercy on the dead irrespective of their religion, but the official position is that one is to invoke God's mercy only on the Muslim dead. In other words, the new regime would alienate its base if it spoke of Christians killed last Sunday as 'martyrs', worthy of God's mercy. But not doing so sends the message to Christians that they have less or even no value under a regime that seeks to establish itself on the rituals of Islam. In short, if Christians are martyrs, then Christianity is true, and in the current context of Syria, given the nature of the regime and the sentiments of its supporters, only Islam can be true. In contrast, last February, when a car bomb in the northeastern city of Munbij took the lives of twenty Muslim citizens, the president referred to the victims as 'martyrs'. What are Syrian Christians to think? They're frustrated not only over the lack of security. More fundamentally, they feel the wider society doesn't see Christians as a valued part of its overall good. Patriarch John X, in his sermon at the funeral for the victims of the attack, berated the state for failing to refer to the victims as martyrs who died 'in devotion to both religion and nation'. But the group claiming responsibility for the attack sees its suicide bombers as the true martyrs. In Islam, as in other traditions, martyrdom takes many forms. Traditionally, one is a martyr by dying in defence of Islam, but one has to meet certain conditions for one's death to be deemed a martyrdom. In particular, one's intention has to be sound. One isn't a martyr if one dies in defence of Islam to earn a glorious reputation for oneself, only secondarily for the sake of Islam. Defending Islam — but from whom, and why? So, if martyrdom means dying in defence of Islam, why the martyrdom operation in Syria where Islam is not under threat? In contrast to the Assad regime, the new state actively backs Islam, including the right of Muslims to express their faith in state institutions and in public in general. And why are they targeting Christians, who hardly represent a threat to Islam in Syria? ISIS now deems the new state under Ahmed al-Sharaa as a threat to Islam for his willingness to associate with Western (infidel) regimes — such as France and the United States — and with Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are seen by ISIS as apostates for their ties to the West. By attacking Christians, ISIS sends the message that it is doing what the new rulers are not doing: disassociating ( baraa' ) from all that is not Islam by attacking all that is not Islam. In other words, by attacking Christians, ISIS seeks to highlight two things: that al-Sharaa has turned his back on his jihadist convictions, making him unworthy to rule over the lands of Islam; that al-Sharaa has turned his back on his jihadist convictions, making him unworthy to rule over the lands of Islam; that ISIS remains true to its jihadist convictions, willing to die in defence of Islam in battle against infidels (Christians). ISIS is claiming that it is the last bastion of true Islam, unsullied by any association with infidels and apostates, alone worthy of leading the community of Muslims. In this sense, Christians are collateral damage in a larger battle between ISIS and the new Syria. While Western political analysts would leave it there — seeing the suicide attack as a weapon ISIS uses against a superior enemy — it would be a mistake to neglect the theological angle. Two points need to be made in that regard. First, the existence of Christianity represents a latent threat to the truth of Islam. (Judaism represented a similar threat in medieval Christendom.) How is it that Christian Arabs are still Christians after so many years of living under Islam? This specifically religious concern has only intensified in the modern period when school textbooks across the wider region — along with the rhetoric of Islamist movements, notably the Muslim Brotherhood — reduce citizenship and national belonging to being Muslim. Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa meets with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace on 7 May 2025 in Paris, France. (Photo by Tom Nicholson / Getty Images) Second, why are so many Muslim youth ready to enlist for martyrdom operations against both non-Muslims and also Muslims whose faith falls short of the ISIS creed? Traditionally, defence of Islam meant defending a moral order that Islam was understood as guaranteeing. Thus, one was deemed a martyr for dying in defence of the lands of Islam as a moral order that preserved justice for all, not for attacking non-Muslims in the lands of Islam. However, only in recent decades has this traditional view been radically altered. A key trigger has been the penetration of a Western-led globalism into the lands of Islam. Muslim youth, it is felt, are now more attuned to Western culture and Western ideas than to the teachings of Islam. True or not, that's the perception in terrorist circles. Islam itself is under existential threat since it no longer has dominion over people's minds, even in the lands of Islam. In a world where the number of Muslims approaches two billion, such a view is incredibly naïve, but it generates a sense of despair over Islam that inspires youth to commit suicide — to die and go to heaven where Islam has dominion rather than stay in a world where Islam no longer holds sway. Oddly, death becomes the goal of religion, departing a world that rejects Islam. But the adherent has to show that they are dying for Islam , and there's no better way of doing so than 'fighting' Christian infidels at prayer in a martyrdom operation. The theological basis of a new Syria The attack on Mar Elias recalls ISIS attacks on churches in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, which aimed to discredit the new Iraq as a pluralistic society where all are religiously valued, destabilising society and undermining confidence in the country's future. Syria need not end up like Iraq, but that requires the state to do two things: deploy its security to protect the religious sites of all communities; deploy its security to protect the religious sites of all communities; revise a religious curriculum in state schools that suggests that Islam can only be Islam when it has dominion ( haymana ) in society religiously — the new curriculum can affirm both Islam as the true religion and the religious bonds it shares with other communities, countering the idea that they're somehow a foreign presence in the lands of Islam, deprived of God's care and a threat to Islam's truths. Syria's most urgent need is rebuilding its infrastructure after years of war, but sustainable development can't happen in a highly religious country without a life-giving theological vision. So long as the school curriculum in the wider region implies that Islam is to dominate, rather than be the defender of a moral order where all are equally valued by God, the terrorist call to youth — to prove their worth to God by attacking Christians at prayer — will continue to resonate. The new regime is staking its credibility on developing a piety-based economy with massive investment especially from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But more is needed for Syria to succeed — namely, a religious message that all people have equal dignity in God's eyes and that all who are killed unjustly, irrespective of their religious community, are martyrs and thus 'alive with God'. Only by reconsidering the brand of piety that state education communicates can Syria — and other countries in the wider region — turn the tables on those who confuse death with life and see the purification of the lands of Islam of non-Muslim elements as a way to win God's favour. Paul L. Heck is Professor of Theology and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University. His most recent books are Skepticism in Classical Islam: Moments of Confusion and Political Theology and Islam: From the Birth of Empire to the Modern State.
News18
02-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Same Target, Different Tactics
Last Updated: May 02, 2025, 13:00 IST Two deadly terror organisations, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), are led by deadlier commanders with distinct tactics and two different ideologies. While Rauf Azhar of JeM believes in high-intensity attacks, Sajid Jatt of LeT prefers sustained insurgency under the guidance of the ISI, posing a long-term threat to regional stability. Rauf Azhar is the mastermind behind some of the deadliest attacks in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2016 Pathankot airbase assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing that resulted in the death of 40 CRPF personnel. He also orchestrated the 1999 Kandahar hijacking, which led to the release of Masood Azhar. Rauf Azhar embodies JeM's sectarian radicalism and high-risk operations. On the other hand, Sajid Jatt represents LeT's insurgency, closely aligned with the ISI. While Rauf's attacks have immediate devastating impacts, Jatt's adaptive insurgency presents a prolonged challenge to regional peace. CNN-News18 delves into the operational methods of both terrorists. The commanders of Jaish and Lashkar share similar goals but differ in ideologies and tactics. Rauf Azhar, from the Deobandi sect, emphasises strict Sunni orthodoxy and violence against Shias and other minorities. His leadership has led to internal splits within JeM, with members rebelling against Masood Azhar for prioritising Kashmir over global jihad. Historically, Rauf Azhar's faction has targeted Pakistani Christians and state symbols, including assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf. Sajid Jatt, influenced by the Ahl-e-Hadith sect followed by LeT, aligns with Salafism and focuses on Kashmir-centric jihad while avoiding direct confrontation with the Pakistani state. Unlike JeM, LeT maintains close ties with the ISI. Post-2019, TRF, a proxy of LeT, was created to portray terrorism as a local Kashmiri movement, thereby avoiding international scrutiny. Rauf Azhar masterminded major attacks like the 2001 Parliament strike, the 2016 Pathankot assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing, escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. He relies on encrypted devices and public rallies in Pakistan to incite violence, as seen in his 2017 speech threatening an attack bigger than Pathankot. Sajid Jatt manages TRF operations under a domestic front disguise, using drones for weapon drops and encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp for recruitment and propaganda. Recent attacks, such as the 2025 Pahalgam massacre, involved checking victims' IDs to target Hindus and spare Muslims, aiming to incite communal tensions. JeM has splintered into factions like Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JuF) due to internal dissent against Masood Azhar's loyalty to Pakistan. Rauf Azhar's leadership is marked by alliances with Al-Qaeda and internal conflicts. Jaish operates like a family enterprise, with Rauf Azhar and his brother Masood Azhar centralizing control, resulting in operational rigidity. LeT maintains a structured hierarchy under Hafiz Saeed, with TRF acting as a deniable proxy. Sajid Jatt coordinates with senior LeT leaders and ISI handlers. LeT fighters are trained in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and associated with Al-Qaeda. They are suspected of procuring encrypted technology through ISI-China networks.
News18
02-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Same Target, Different Tactics: How Commanders Of Jaish And Lashkar Operate
Last Updated: While Rauf Azhar of JeM believes in high-intensity attacks, Sajid Jatt of LeT prefers sustained insurgency with help from ISI, posing a long-term threat to regional stability. Two deadly terror organisations, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), are led by deadlier commanders with distinct tactics and two different ideologies. While Rauf Azhar of JeM believes in high-intensity attacks, Sajid Jatt of LeT prefers sustained insurgency under the guidance of the ISI, posing a long-term threat to regional stability. Rauf Azhar is the mastermind behind some of the deadliest attacks in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2016 Pathankot airbase assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing that resulted in the death of 40 CRPF personnel. He also orchestrated the 1999 Kandahar hijacking, which led to the release of Masood Azhar. Rauf Azhar embodies JeM's sectarian radicalism and high-risk operations. On the other hand, Sajid Jatt represents LeT's insurgency, closely aligned with the ISI. While Rauf's attacks have immediate devastating impacts, Jatt's adaptive insurgency presents a prolonged challenge to regional peace. CNN-News18 delves into the operational methods of both terrorists. The commanders of Jaish and Lashkar share similar goals but differ in ideologies and tactics. Rauf Azhar, from the Deobandi sect, emphasises strict Sunni orthodoxy and violence against Shias and other minorities. His leadership has led to internal splits within JeM, with members rebelling against Masood Azhar for prioritising Kashmir over global jihad. Historically, Rauf Azhar's faction has targeted Pakistani Christians and state symbols, including assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf. Sajid Jatt, influenced by the Ahl-e-Hadith sect followed by LeT, aligns with Salafism and focuses on Kashmir-centric jihad while avoiding direct confrontation with the Pakistani state. Unlike JeM, LeT maintains close ties with the ISI. Post-2019, TRF, a proxy of LeT, was created to portray terrorism as a local Kashmiri movement, thereby avoiding international scrutiny. Rauf Azhar masterminded major attacks like the 2001 Parliament strike, the 2016 Pathankot assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing, escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. He relies on encrypted devices and public rallies in Pakistan to incite violence, as seen in his 2017 speech threatening an attack bigger than Pathankot. Sajid Jatt manages TRF operations under a domestic front disguise, using drones for weapon drops and encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp for recruitment and propaganda. Recent attacks, such as the 2025 Pahalgam massacre, involved checking victims' IDs to target Hindus and spare Muslims, aiming to incite communal tensions. JeM has splintered into factions like Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JuF) due to internal dissent against Masood Azhar's loyalty to Pakistan. Rauf Azhar's leadership is marked by alliances with Al-Qaeda and internal conflicts. Jaish operates like a family enterprise, with Rauf Azhar and his brother Masood Azhar centralizing control, resulting in operational rigidity. LeT maintains a structured hierarchy under Hafiz Saeed, with TRF acting as a deniable proxy. Sajid Jatt coordinates with senior LeT leaders and ISI handlers. LeT fighters are trained in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and associated with Al-Qaeda. They are suspected of procuring encrypted technology through ISI-China networks. LeT, co-founded by Osama bin Laden, prioritises Kashmir over global jihad to retain ISI support. The organisation receives funding and political cover from Pakistan, with leaders like Hafiz Saeed operating openly. JeM aims to provoke military retaliation from India to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as seen after Pulwama. Jaish also targets Shias and Christians within Pakistan, complicating its relationship with ISI. Lashkar focuses on sustained warfare in Kashmir, using TRF to maintain a low-intensity conflict while avoiding Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklisting. LeT exploits social media to glorify militancy and recruit youth, presenting TRF as a resistance movement. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from geopolitics to diplomacy and global trends. Stay informed with the latest world news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! First Published: May 02, 2025, 12:58 IST
Asharq Al-Awsat
20-03-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
How Al-Sharaa Led Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to the People's Palace
Since the Syrian revolution transitioned into armed conflict—after the regime ruled out negotiations and used excessive force to suppress protests in 2011—the country witnessed a surge in armed factions. These ranged from jihadist Islamist groups to more moderate ones, differing in their levels of extremism and religiosity. In late 2011, one of the largest factions, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, was established, blending jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies with a local agenda. Ahrar al-Sham was the first faction to merge global jihadist thought with local objectives, even preceding Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in this approach. HTS, originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, upheld global jihadism until its formal split from the organization in July 2016. Throughout its various transformations and ascents—culminating in the 'Deter the Aggression' battle that propelled HTS and its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa') to power in Syria—the group maintained a precise internal structure, resembling a military academy, as described by a former HTS leader who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat. Ahrar al-Sham: The First Hybrid Jihadist Faction At its peak, Ahrar al-Sham was among Syria's most ideologically driven and organized factions. Its leaders, such as Hassan Abboud and Abu Yazan al-Shami, held strong charisma and influence within the revolutionary circles, alongside figures like Abdul Qadir al-Saleh, the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid. This dominance continued until September 9, 2014, when a mysterious explosion targeted Ahrar al-Sham's Shura Council meeting in Idlib's Ram Hamdan, killing its leader Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi (Hassan Abboud) and nearly 40 other senior figures. This incident marked the beginning of the faction's decline. Within a short period, Ahrar al-Sham shrank into a minor faction, fragmented between larger groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and HTS. The Syrian National Army (SNA) itself was formed on December 30, 2017, comprising 36 armed factions, including the Sham Front, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Majd, and Sultan Shah Division, which was predominantly Turkmen. Liwa al-Tawhid: A Brief Yet Powerful Force Another major faction that enjoyed significant strength and popularity—more than Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS's predecessor) at one point—was Liwa al-Tawhid, established on July 21, 2012. This group brought together various local battalions primarily operating in northern Aleppo's countryside. At its height, Liwa al-Tawhid was the largest opposition formation, embodying a 'moderate Islamist' trend that blended Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, and nationalist rhetoric. It was one of the few factions that initially attracted a diverse spectrum of fighters, from moderate jihadists to nationalists. The group fought on multiple fronts, including a notable battle against Hezbollah in Qusayr (2013). However, after its leader Abdul Qadir al-Saleh was killed in an airstrike on November 18, 2013, Liwa al-Tawhid quickly disintegrated, with its members dispersing among various factions based on their ideological leanings. Jaysh al-Islam: A dominant power in Damascus' suburbs among the most prominent factions that played a key role in the war was Jaysh al-Islam, headquartered in Douma (Eastern Ghouta, Damascus countryside). The group established control over most opposition-held areas surrounding Damascus, including Eastern Ghouta, Qalamoun, and even neighborhoods inside the capital such as Qaboun, Barzeh, and Jobar—reaching as far as Abbasid Square, one of Damascus' key landmarks. Jaysh al-Islam was a declared Salafi-jihadist group, which, by 2013, had amassed over 25,000 fighters. It possessed medium and heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored vehicles, and short- to mid-range missiles—as showcased in its 2015 military parade, where 1,700 fighters graduated. Despite its Salafi-jihadist ideology, Jaysh al-Islam engaged in fierce battles against Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS's predecessor), Faylaq al-Rahman (an ally of Nusra), and even ISIS. These internal conflicts weakened the group, yet it maintained cohesion until its leader, Zahran Alloush, was assassinated in a suspected Russian airstrike on December 26, 2015. Like many other factions that collapsed after losing their leaders, Jaysh al-Islam failed to maintain its influence, despite receiving external support. It ultimately lost its territories, especially compared to HTS, which proved more resilient. How HTS Survived Where Others Failed Many factions, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid, once outnumbered HTS (then Jabhat al-Nusra) and enjoyed greater material, media, and popular support. However, Nusra was designated a terrorist organization early on, leading to its international isolation. While this seemed like a disadvantage, it allowed HTS to consolidate power away from external interference. Over time, as other factions splintered due to leadership losses, internal strife, and external pressure, HTS remained intact, strategically evolving. This resilience and adaptability—under Abu Mohammad al-Jolani's leadership—ultimately positioned HTS as the dominant force, culminating in its rise to power in Syria's new political landscape. While most leaders of the armed opposition factions—such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid—were preoccupied with competing for power in areas outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa') operated quietly and behind the scenes. He remained out of the public eye until 2016, when he announced his split from al-Qaeda, after which he once again withdrew from the spotlight. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was formed through both voluntary and forced alliances among several militant factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq. It also absorbed a wide range of smaller al-Qaeda-linked factions, such as the Caucasus Emirate, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaysh al-Izza, and Jaysh al-Nasr. Like other militant groups, HTS underwent major transformations, splits, and internal shifts. However, what set it apart was its ability to adapt ideologically in response to local, regional, and international realities. Unlike other factions that were forced into mergers for survival—such as Ahrar al-Sham, which combined with Nour al-Din al-Zenki under the name 'Syrian Liberation Front'—HTS managed to maintain its organizational independence. In fact, rather than dissolving into other groups, it continued to absorb smaller al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Nasr. As time passed, HTS grew stronger. By early 2019, after intense battles against Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and other factions, it secured full control over Idlib Province, along with large parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia. Sami Mohammad, a former religious and military leader within HTS, explained that the most important factor behind the group's survival was its independent decision-making, the charisma of Ahmad al-Sharaa' (Jolani), and the strong discipline within its ranks. He emphasized the personal trust that Jolani built with both his commanders and fighters, noting that Jolani knew all his field commanders, even the lower-ranking ones, and met with them regularly. This personal involvement strengthened his position within the organization and fostered loyalty, unlike other factions that suffered from chaos and disorganized leadership. Mohammad described HTS as a 'true military academy,' in contrast to most Syrian opposition factions, which were structured around local or tribal affiliations. HTS, he explained, had a clear organizational hierarchy and centralized decision-making, ensuring strategic consistency. Mohammad Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander in an Islamist faction, noted that the key to HTS's rise was its relative independence and its ability to break established political boundaries. He explained that most armed factions were directly tied to foreign states, forcing them to adhere to external agendas, whereas HTS was not directly controlled by any state. This allowed it more freedom to act in its own interests, even if that meant eliminating rival factions. He also pointed out that HTS's designation as a terrorist organization worked in its favor, as it prevented major countries from openly engaging with it like they did with other factions. This, in turn, gave HTS greater flexibility in its decision-making, allowing it to maneuver more effectively and eliminate competitors. Yahya emphasized that Jolani always pursued his own faction's interests ruthlessly, unlike other rebel groups that often compromised or sought partial solutions. He argued that while Jolani fought with extreme determination and always aimed to win, many other factions settled for half-measures. A leaked audio recording of Hassan al-Daghim, a former moral guidance officer in the Syrian National Army, further supports this view. In the recording, Daghim states that Jolani is a pragmatic leader who will sacrifice anything or anyone to achieve power. Abu Yahya concluded that Jolani's practical experience came from Syria itself, as he was not originally this skilled. However, his ambition, ability to capitalize on victories, and lessons learned Abu from the mistakes of both ISIS and Nusra contributed to his success. HTS's dominance was not only due to military strategy but was also aided by religious legitimacy. Several influential clerics and political figures played a key role in legitimizing Jolani's rule through religious rhetoric. Among them were Zaid al-Atar (Abu Aisha), a former HTS political liaison who later became Foreign Minister under the name Asaad al-Shaibani, and Abu Ahmad Hudud (Anas Khattab), a former security chief who is now head of HTS intelligence. These figures helped consolidate Jolani's leadership, ensuring that HTS eliminated all potential challengers, leaving only its own government—the 'Salvation Government'—as the ruling authority. Ultimately, HTS's tactical flexibility, military discipline, and ruthless pragmatism allowed it to outlast and surpass all other opposition factions. Unlike groups that were either fragmented by infighting or constrained by foreign backers, HTS retained control over its own fate. With the fall of the previous regime, it successfully transitioned from an opposition faction to the dominant force in post-war Syria, with its leadership now firmly established in Damascus. Victory... A Shared Triumph Alaa al-Din Ayoub, known as 'Farouq Abu Bakr,' a former commander in the Free Syrian Army who led negotiations for the withdrawal of opposition factions from Aleppo in 2016, reflected on the past conflicts with Jabhat al-Nusra—later known as Fatah al-Sham and eventually Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). 'We had our differences regarding how they dealt with the Free Syrian Army factions,' he said, 'but we cannot deny that they were the most organized and well-trained among us. HTS focused on structuring its ranks and training its fighters, yet the recent victory cannot be attributed solely to them.' Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayoub emphasized that the success in repelling aggression resulted from multiple factors, both external and internal. International power struggles and geopolitical conflicts played a role, but so did the resilience of tens of thousands of fighters across revolutionary factions. However, he acknowledged that HTS stood out for its ability to seize opportunities better than others. 'We all remember the phase before HTS took control of Idlib and the battles it fought against other factions,' he continued. 'In my opinion, the main reason it succeeded where others failed was the fragmentation of the opposition factions and their inability to present a unified, cohesive model.' Fragmented Alliances Regarding political formations, particularly the Syrian National Coalition—the political wing of the armed opposition that was tasked with negotiations before the fall of the regime—Ayoub pointed out that its creation was backed by Türkiye and other regional powers. As a result, most of its members and factions were beholden to the interests of the states that helped establish it. Reflecting on the Syrian revolution's fourteen-year history, Ayoub noted the emergence of various influential leaders with religious, grassroots, and revolutionary backgrounds. Figures like Zahran Alloush, Abdel Qader Saleh (leader of Liwa al-Tawhid), and Hassan Abboud (leader of Ahrar al-Sham) along with Abu Yazan al-Shami left a significant mark. Others, such as Jamal Maarouf, who led the Syria Revolutionaries Front before being eliminated by HTS in 2014, were eventually removed from the scene—either through assassination or political marginalization. 'In contrast,' Ayoub concluded, 'Jolani was the luckiest of them all. After a period of hiding, he not only survived but ultimately prevailed. His past experience in Iraq, along with his security and military acumen, were key factors in his rise to power.'
Yahoo
30-01-2025
- Yahoo
Muslim convert found guilty of planned terror acts
A Muslim convert who threatened to "flatten" a mosque and plotted to attack an Islamic cleric who was an outspoken critic of terrorism has been found guilty of preparing a terrorist act. Jason Savage, 35, was convicted at Birmingham Crown Court on Thursday. Video footage released by West Midlands Police after his conviction showed him filming reconnaissance near a mosque in Wright Street, Small Heath. Savage, from Fourth Avenue in Small Heath, was remanded in custody for sentencing at Birmingham Crown Court on 11 April. A three-week trial was told Savage was arrested shortly after sending online messages to someone he did not know was an undercover officer, saying he was waiting to see what "opportunities come to present itself". Jurors also heard that Savage had taken screenshots of the West Midlands Police headquarters, police stations in Perry Barr and Stechford and various military locations in Birmingham, and told the undercover officer he was putting his neck on a "chopping block". Prosecutor Peter Ratliff alleged that Savage had planned to commit and film an attack. He told the court the defendant converted to Islam at some point in the 2010s and followed an "extreme and violent" part of the Salafi movement of which organisations such as al Qaida and so-called Islamic State were "particularly notorious" examples. Prosecutors alleged that Savage had carried out reconnaissance with a view to attacking a cleric, book shop and mosque in the Small Heath area, whose approach to the Salafi movement was "entirely at odds" with his own. The mosque, shop and publishing house advocated a strand of Salafism that stressed the importance of non-involvement in social or political activism, the court heard, while the cleric was an "outspoken critic" of Islamist terrorism, arguing that it was entirely incompatible with the true essence of Islam. Mr Ratliff said: "A key feature of the defendant's words and writings was his real disapproval of 'disbelievers' - but particularly those he considered were false followers of Islam." By February 2024, the court heard, Savage was referring to watching knife-fighting techniques on YouTube and posted a video of Osama bin Laden. Mr Ratliff said Savage claimed the mosque he filmed outside needed "flattening" and spoke about how his targets were to be "hunted down". On 11 March, the court heard, Savage went to the area around the mosque and recorded three mobile phone videos. Two days later, the jury heard, Savage made internet searches about homemade firearms and ammunition, including pipe guns, nail guns, firing pin mechanisms and shell casings. His conduct also included research into the manufacture of components of firearms and the "lethal use of knives". Mrs Justice Farbey ordered pre-sentence and psychiatric reports of Savage to be prepared before his sentencing. Follow BBC Birmingham on BBC Sounds, Facebook, X and Instagram. Muslim convert planned mosque attack, trial hears HM Courts & Tribunals Service
