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The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Reframing the French Indo-Pacific: French Polynesia, a Model of Shared Sovereignty?
French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific – and offers a compelling case study for shared sovereignty within the French Republic. As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France's commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN. Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region. The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France's specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy. Notably, 93 percent of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently. The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory. A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France's Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on French Polynesia. Encompassing five archipelagos and 118 islands, French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering nearly 4.8 million square kilometers, accounts for almost half of the total French EEZ – which is the second largest globally. Beyond its maritime significance, French Polynesia offers a compelling case study of how post-colonial legacies, nuclear trauma, and political evolution have shaped a successful model of shared sovereignty within the French Republic. Colonial Imprint and Nuclear Legacy Eastern Polynesia was among the last regions on Earth to be explored and settled by humans. In the case of French Polynesia, archaeological evidence suggests an initial wave of settlement beginning around 800 CE in Tahiti, between 800 and 900 CE in the Marquesas and Gambier Islands, around 1000 CE in the Tuamotu atolls and the eastern parts of the Society Islands, and approximately 1100 CE in the Austral Islands. French influence began formally in 1842 with the establishment of a protectorate, in a context of heated rivalries between French and British colonial power in the region. The territory underwent a major transformation in the 1960s, when France established its Pacific Experimentation Center (CEP), triggering a wave of modernization – and deep trauma. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests, including 41 atmospheric and 152 underground at Moruroa and Fangataufa (Tuamotu archipelago). These experiments left lasting social and environmental scars. Although long taboo in Paris, the nuclear legacy has since entered public debate. The current political party in power, the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira, has historically opposed nuclear testing and pushed for transparency and reparations. In 2010, a national law established a right to compensation for individuals recognized as victims of French nuclear testing. In a gesture of appeasement and openness, the French state granted access to the Moruroa site in March 2024 to a high-level Polynesian delegation, including President Moetai Brotherson, marking a shift from opacity to cautious transparency. The change is a rational response considering the evolving political dynamics between Paris and Papeete. Increased Autonomy French Polynesia's political evolution reflects France's gradual accommodation of demands for self-government. From a protectorate (1842–1880) to a colony (1880–1946), and then an overseas territory (1946–2003), the territory has undergone significant institutional transformations. Today, as an overseas collectivity, it enjoys broad autonomy, with its own laws and institutions – including a president, a government, and a parliament – managing key areas such as the budget, foreign investment, and resource exploitation. While sovereign competencies – such as national defense, justice, public order, internal security and currency issuance – remain under the authority of the French state and are implemented by the High Commissioner, foreign affairs may, in certain cases, be the subject of shared competence. A Quiet Model? French Polynesia represents a rare example of international agency of a non-state actor, as it holds formal membership in several interregional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. Successive presidents of French Polynesia have engaged in high-level meetings with foreign heads of state – a development that underscores the territory's growing diplomatic autonomy. This trend was exemplified by then-President Edouard Fritch's attendance at the first U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, and Brotherson's visit in 2023 to Washington for the second summit, where he met with U.S. President Joe Biden. This ad hoc model of shared competences in foreign affairs can at times create ambiguity. While French Polynesia is at the forefront of France's Indo-Pacific ambitions, local voices – including Brotherson – have expressed skepticism about the wider strategy. But this ad hoc relationship often functions harmoniously, as French presidents have repeatedly associated their counterparts from French Polynesia in the France-Oceania Summits, and even during presidential trips abroad, such as President Macron's visit to Vanuatu in 2023. Despite the enduring legacies of sensitive issues, including the public health consequences of nuclear testing, French Polynesia offers a relatively stable model of negotiated autonomy within the French constitutional order. The most recent example came when Brotherson and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly announced at the U.N. Ocean Conference in Nice that nearly the entire EEZ of the archipelago – 4.55 million sq km, or 47 percent of France's EEZ – would be designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA), in a mutually beneficial act of environmental diplomacy. Shared sovereignty in French Polynesia diverges from the impasse faced by New Caledonia, suggesting that calibrated devolution and respectful partnership can reconcile historical grievances while maintaining continued political association.
Los Angeles Times
5 days ago
- Business
- Los Angeles Times
Opinion: Offshore balancing – The proper solution to Trump's whims with Europe
Over the past few months, Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO, citing concerns about a lack of European defense investment. Later on, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Hegseth confirmed Trump's sentiments, stating that they were 'pushing our allies in Europe to own more of their own security — to invest in their defense, things that are long overdue' so 'we can increase our focus on the Indo-Pacific, our priority theater.' This is the perfect time to begin planning a new grand strategy, one that replaces our long history of firm interventionism in favor of a restrained approach that preserves US national security, reduces costs, and empowers allies. The most promising option appears to be offshore balancing. What is Offshore Balancing? Offshore balancing is a selective, interventionist approach. It advocates for withdrawal of US forces from regions without a great power or a firm national security interest. Instead, the United States would equip and strengthen local forces – with arms, training, and intelligence – as a counterweight to regional powers. But, if regional allies are ineffective in deterrence or a local country grows too powerful, the United States would intervene into the region to protect its and its allies' security. Europe is a perfect place for the United States to exercise restraint. Due to large equipment and personnel losses, Russia is weak and unable to pursue attacks against other nations. This presents a unique window of opportunity for the US to shift the burden of defense onto Europe. Why Offshore Balancing? Currently, the United States faces threats in three, main global theaters: the Persian Gulf, South China Sea, and Europe. For years, this 'three-war standard' has significantly strained the US military and industrial base. In fact, signs of trouble have already started to show. The number of defense contractors in the US has dwindled to less than 10 due to consolidation, thus hurting product quality, while the United States is struggling to 'to maintain robust munitions levels' and supply our allies adequately. At the same time, our allies are particularly under-equipped. Europe is overly dependent on the United States for its technological capabilities, has limited interoperability across weapon systems, and invests a limited amount of money into its own defense. Overall, this situation is dangerous as it provides our adversaries – China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran – an opportunity to mount a challenge against the liberal international order the United States has worked so tirelessly to create. Under current geopolitical situations, Washington would be unable to defend all regions simultaneously, forcing a tradeoff between abandoning hegemony or quickly ramping resources (at a great financial cost) to defend regional allies. By employing a grand strategy of offshore balancing in Europe, the United States can find a balance between credible deterrence and military overstretch. First, by significantly withdrawing from Europe, the US military would free up resources (weapon systems, personnel, money) that they can instead commit against China, the biggest threat to US national security. While Russia does pose considerable risks to the US, its status quo engagement in Ukraine limits its overall influence and strong regional allies can counterbalance against them. Additionally, in Europe, the United States would shift some of the defense burden to its allies, forcing them to act as a unified front (something lacking right now) and work together for collective security. If successful, in the advent of a conflict, Europe can support the US military by leveraging its own capabilities (weapons production, technology sharing, etc) and taking control of a majority of the fighting in Eastern Europe, thus maintaining US hegemony. Concerns? At first glance, this proposal may seem as if we are abandoning NATO and endangering our alliances globally. However, the baseline for comparison shouldn't be the status quo, rather the future. Due to military overstretch, the ability for the United States to maintain military presence in Europe is rapidly decreasing, negatively affecting our ability to protect our alliances in the long-term. Offshore balancing, if designed right, can not only address the aforementioned long-term threats to our alliances, but can also cushion any international fallout the US might face. By gradually withdrawing US forces, our European allies can be given plenty of time to ramp up their own defense production and military capabilities. By maintaining our nuclear deterrent and a limited ground presence in the region, the United States can firmly demonstrate commitment to its allies. Absent offshore balancing however, European allies have no i55ncentive to share the defense burden: despite agreeing in 2006 to spend 2% of the GDP on defense, most NATO member states only reached that target now, after Trump's threats. At the same time, harsh rhetoric on Europe should be avoided. Earlier, Trump had stated he would not protect and instead encourage Russia to attack non-paying NATO member states. This language distances our allies and weakens our ability to form a regional bloc to counter a rising and revisionist Russia. The Future As new global threats gain traction, the United States will need to calibrate its military grand strategy accordingly. Offshore balancing is a realistic solution that simultaneously empowers allies and bolsters US defense capabilities. For Europe, there is a limited window of opportunity for it to build its defense up. Maj. Gen. Davis (rtd.) estimates that only 3 to 5 years after Ukraine, Russia will have the capabilities to mount another challenge against a European state.
Business Times
5 days ago
- Business
- Business Times
Japan says no US demand for defence spending worth 3.5% of GDP
[TOKYO] Japan denied a report that the US directly asked Tokyo to raise its defence spending to 3.5 per cent of annual gross domestic product, with its top government spokesperson saying that the amount of spending was less important than how Japan raises its military capabilities. 'Regarding defence spending, there's no truth to that,' Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said at a press conference on Monday (Jun 23) when asked about a Financial Times (FT) report that a senior Pentagon official had told Japan to boost military spending. The comments come as US President Donald Trump's administration ramps up pressure on its allies to boost defence spending amid mounting global security concerns. Tensions continue to build with conflict in the Middle East intensifying, Russia's war in Ukraine rumbling on and China continuing to intimidate its neighbours through military activity. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said at a security conference in late May that US allies in Asia should boost total spending related to defence, warning that more urgency is needed to prepare for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 'Nato members are pledging to spend 5 per cent of their GDP on defence – even Germany,' Hegseth said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. 'So it doesn't make sense for countries in Europe to do that while key allies in Asia spend less on defence.' A Pentagon spokesperson told Japanese media outlets last week that the 5 per cent goal should apply to Japan. Nato countries formally approved the plan at their summit meeting over the week, setting a target for defence spending at 5 per cent of GDP. Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte has framed that target as spending of 3.5 per cent on core defence items such as weapons, and an additional 1.5 per cent in defence-related spending such as cybersecurity and infrastructure. In his comments, Hayashi also pushed back against the FT's claim that Tokyo scrapped a meeting of US-Japan defence and foreign affairs ministers in response to the US demand. 'The date for the next Japan-US 2+2 meeting has yet to be decided,' the spokesperson said. According to the FT report, Tokyo decided to put off that meeting after the spending demand from a senior Pentagon official. That demand, reportedly issued by Elbridge Colby, undersecretary of defence for policy, comes as Japan is working towards raising its defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027 from its long-held stance of keeping it around 1 per cent. BLOOMBERG
The Star
7 days ago
- Business
- The Star
South Korea says defence spending against GDP already ‘very high'
US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth (left) talks to Singapore's Prime Minister Lawrence Wong during the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore on May 31, 2025. - Photo: Yonhap SEOUL: South Korea's Defence Ministry on Friday (June 20) hinted at concerns over an announcement by the Donald Trump administration that its Asian allies are subject to the 'new standard' of spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defence. South Korea's defence spending, which stands at some 51.2 trillion won ($37.5 billion) or 2.32 percent of its GDP, is already 'very high,' the ministry noted in a statement. "Among key US allies, South Korea is one of the countries that has an extremely high defence spending to GDP ratio," the ministry said in a statement. "We have continuously hiked our defence spending in consideration of our serious security situation involving North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.' South Korea will continue its efforts to maintain necessary capabilities and posture for the defence of the Korean Peninsula as well as regional peace and stability, the ministry said. Seoul's statement follows remarks made earlier this week by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, regarding a 'new standard' now in place for all US allies' defence spending, 'including in Asia.' Hegseth's remarks, made during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, are aligned with US President Donald Trump's call for NATO members to increase their defence spending to 5 percent of their GDP. This is more than double the 2 percent defence spending guideline agreed upon by the leaders of the trans-Atlantic alliance in 2014. Last month, Hegseth, during the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual defence forum held in Singapore, said that it 'doesn't make sense' for key US allies in Asia to 'spend less on defence' than countries in Europe, despite dealing with 'more formidable threats,' including North Korea provocations. Concerns are rising in South Korea over reports that Trump may shore up South Korea's defence spending while the US adjusts the role and reduces the size of the US Forces Korea. A May report by The Wall Street Journal claimed that the Trump administration is mulling the option of pulling some 4,500 personnel out of the 28,500-strong USFK and relocating them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific region. Last month, Hegseth directed Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby to draw up a US national defence strategy that focuses on burden sharing with allies as the nation navigates to deter threats from China. More than doubling defence spending would deal a heavy blow to South Korea, as it would cost Seoul over 100 trillion won to meet the 'new standards' suggested by the Trump administration. An expert pointed out that it would require the government to significantly reduce other budgets allocated to areas, including welfare, to uphold such a scenario. 'It won't be an easy process for Seoul as it would be required to cut back budgets set aside for other matters, including welfare, and funnel (the funds) into defence spending if the 5 percent of GDP rule is applied,' said Yang Uk, a research fellow at Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Observers say that if South Korean President Lee Jae Myung decides to participate in the upcoming NATO summit scheduled for June 24-25 in the Netherlands, an opportunity might arise to discuss the defence cost issue with Trump. However, the presidential office here has yet to confirm whether Lee will attend the summit, as of press time, but said the previous day that it is coordinating the details of a potential summit with Trump. First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo said in a Friday interview with Yonhap News TV that 'the current situation where the US has been requesting several countries to shore up their defence costs is true.' He vowed to review the matter in detail and continue 'close negotiations' with Washington. - The Korea Herald/ANN
Miami Herald
20-06-2025
- Business
- Miami Herald
South Korea says defense spending ‘very high' compared to U.S. allies
SEOUL, June 20 (UPI) -- South Korea's Defense Ministry said Friday that its defense spending as a share of gross domestic product is already "very high" compared to other U.S. allies, as Washington calls for NATO members and Asian countries to increase their military budgets. "Among major U.S. allies of the United States, South Korea has a very high ratio of defense spending to GDP," the ministry said in a message to reporters. "We have continuously increased our defense budget in consideration of the serious security situation, including North Korea's nuclear and missile threats." "South Korea will continue to make efforts to secure the capabilities and posture necessary for the defense of the Korean Peninsula and peace and stability in the region," the ministry added. In 2024, South Korea spent $47.6 billion, or 2.6% of GDP, on defense, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That share is higher than Britain's 2.3%, France's 2.1%, Germany's 1.9% and Japan's 1.4%. Seoul's statement suggested concerns over remarks by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth earlier this week calling for a "new standard" for allies in NATO and Asia to spend 5% of GDP on defense. "We expect NATO allies to commit to spending 5% of GDP on defense or defense-related investment," Hegseth said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday. "We now have a new standard for ally defense spending that all of our allies around the world, including in Asia, should move to," Hegseth said. "It's only fair that our allies and partners do their part. We cannot want their security more than they do." Hegseth also called for Asian countries to increase their spending in remarks at a defense forum in Singapore last month. "It doesn't make sense for countries in Europe to [spend 5% of GDP] while key allies in Asia spend less on defense in the face of an even more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea," he said at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue. The defense spending issue looks to be a potentially contentious topic at next week's NATO Summit in The Hague. NATO countries committed to a goal of 2% of GDP in 2014, which two-thirds have reached, but U.S. President Donald Trump has long called for an increase and has been demanding the 5% figure since his reelection. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said last week he expected the allies to agree to the 5% target. "It will be a NATO-wide commitment and a defining moment for the alliance," he said in a speech at Chatham House in London. However, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pushed back on the proposal, which must be agreed to unanimously, in a letter to Rutte this week. "For Spain, committing to a 5% target would not only be unreasonable, but also counterproductive," Sanchez wrote Thursday, according to El Pais. "It would move Spain away from optimal spending and would hinder the EU's efforts to strengthen its security and defense ecosystem." South Korea's newly elected President Lee Jae Myung has not confirmed whether he will attend the NATO Summit, which will be held on June 24-25. His office had anticipated a meeting with Trump on the sidelines of last week's Group of Seven meeting to discuss tariffs and defense cost-sharing issues, but the U.S. president departed early. Copyright 2025 UPI News Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
