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Time Magazine
06-07-2025
- Business
- Time Magazine
Saab CEO Micael Johansson on the Future of Warfare
Swedish company Saab AB has been a cornerstone of the European aerospace and defense industry for almost nine decades. Renowned for its innovative approach, Saab develops military aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, and other defense systems for governments around the globe. Saab today sits at the cutting-edge of defense technology, continuously enhancing its product portfolio to meet evolving security challenges. And with security once again at the top of the world political agenda, Saab has benefited. The $27 billion firm has seen its share price double since the start of the year and rise eight-fold since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Micael Johansson has served as CEO and president of Saab since 2019. In May, he was also appointed president and chairman of the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), which represents over 4,000 defense-related companies across 21 European countries and works with policymakers and institutions across the continent to boost regional security. TIME caught up with Johansson on the sidelines of last month's Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore. This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity. We're here at Shangri-la Dialogue, where U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth just remarked that the Indo-Pacific is the 'primary theater' for the U.S. Is that how Saab is seeing things? Do you feel that this is a region for you to expand sales? We are not focusing only on Europe, and we are also in the U.S. But we have to be selective in what campaigns we can win, because bearing in mind Japan is very U.S.-oriented. [South] Korea as well. The Philippines has a big U.S. presence, especially in the naval domain. But we have things to offer that make a difference. And there is a feeling that, 'OK, we want to have the support of the U.S., but we also maybe need to work with a few others.' Even Japan is opening up a bit; South Korea as well—they selected the C390 transport aircraft [produced by Brazilian firm Embraer] and not [Lockheed Martin's] C130. So, of course, we can find our niches and work here. But it's super important the U.S. makes sure that these countries have the capabilities needed to work with them, and being interoperable is, of course, a given. That's the perception we have in Europe. [The U.S.] has been crystal clear, independent of administration, that Europe has to take responsibility for its security and create deterrence. And I agree completely that we've been too naive for decades now, since the [Berlin] Wall fell that eternal peace will happen, and we come from a peace dividend. So we have a lot to catch up to do, but we have a good foundation of defense industries. Secretary Hegseth talked about broadening the defense industrial base. That must be music to your ears in these days of 'America First' that the U.S. wants to be collaborative for military industries? Every politician, not only in the U.S. but also European, have now started to state that you don't have any defense capabilities unless you have a strong industrial base. And I also think it needs to be tighter—so much will be software-defined going forward, so you will need upgrades all the time. You see it in Ukraine. This means that you have to have a business model where you work closely in peace time and also in wartime, if that happens. What are some of the lessons Saab has learned from Ukraine in terms of the specific capabilities you've seen tested on the battlefield? It's going to be more and more autonomous systems in all domains going forward, for sure. Maybe one cannot draw full conclusions from the war in Ukraine—in terms of whether conflict will always look like that, if unfortunately we get a new one, because it depends on what kind of air superiority you have. And if that had happened, you maybe wouldn't have seen this standstill World War I type of war, at the same time with the drones taking everything out in a 10 km [6 mile] 'death valley' at the frontline. But autonomous systems and how often you have to upgrade your systems to cope with the congested environment, in terms of electronic warfare and stuff, we'll see a lot of that going forward. So these things we've learned, and then we learned a few things from what we have provided, either indirectly donated by other countries, or directly to Ukraine, and how things are actually working on the battlefield. And that's important feedback as well that affects our development going forward. Saab is a Swedish company and your country recently joined NATO. How has that affected government support and the mindset of your business? It's a big thing for our country. Because being an independent country, nonaligned, that is all about sovereign defense capabilities. Of course, we've had our bilateral relationships before and we have been supplying things that are interoperable with NATO, so that's not been a problem. But I think for the defense forces, being a country in the Nordic Region which now has to supply Finland—the transport perspective, the logistics, how to support the 1,300 km [800 mile] border that Finland has with Russia is, of course, something we never thought about. Before it's all about moving things south, north; now it's going to be west, east, and putting a number of capabilities and defense forces in Finland, and we're also doing that as we speak in the Baltic states. So the whole defense concept and NATO capability targets, which we've never had before, will be some new things. Saab as a company is well positioned—we have a portfolio of everything from fighters to submarines to globalized airborne early warning and also lots of sensors, command and control, and advanced weapon systems. So portfolio-wise we're in a very good position to support NATO adaptation. Read More: The Man Who Wants to Save NATO There's been a lot of focus on maintaining a status quo in the Taiwan Strait and you've started doing deals with U.S. allies here. Is Saab's Gripen E fighter a key component of that goal of maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific? We hope that we will be selected from some countries on the Gripen fighter side. Thailand has selected us, we have a campaign with the Philippines, we will see which way they go. They are U.S.-oriented but you never know; maybe they may need a more agile fleet, or dual fleet. But everyone selects what they think would be needed. But these megadeals are extremely political. So, it's prime minister level or defense minister level. So even if you have a fantastic product, they involve security agreements, and you have a government-to-government agreement. And if a country like the U.S. leans in and uses its leverage, of course, it's difficult to win. But there are countries that do not want that and those are where we try to be successful. But we have a fantastic product, that's not a problem. But if you're supplying countries which are U.S. allies enlisted as part of Washington's strategy of containment of China, Sweden might face pushback from Beijing. Is that something which enters into your calculus? It's never been something that's popped up. We never had any pushback from China for being in the region. Absolutely not. But it's an interesting question. Can that happen? I don't think so. But I can't be 100% sure. How are AI and other future technologies being infused into your products? And how do they aid the product development in terms of digital twins and things to be able to reach the market quickly? AI agents are incredibly important when you have so much information to digest and to quickly get to a situation awareness picture. If you don't use AI, you won't be able to make out a reasonable situation awareness, and the quicker you can do that, the better you will [respond] toward your aggressor. The future is not to create a super-secret electronic warfare library, where you would have your sensors picking out signatures on certain platforms and next time you fly you recognize: 'This is a MIG29, this is a SU57.' Now the sensor systems are intelligent in the way that you can reshape your signal so that you have cognitive understanding of what the threat looks like. If you don't use AI in that perspective, you're done. That's also the future. So we do include AI agents in our electronic warfare systems to continuously understand what you're looking at, what you're trying to hit. And in terms of gray zone tactics, what are you learning from both Ukraine and what's happening in other theaters? There are lots of gray zone things happening, of course. It's obvious … when you deliberately ruin cabling at the sea bottom, and the Nord Stream gas [pipeline] blowing up, and there are shadow ships 'by mistake' dragging their anchors for 20 km. Crazy, of course. But also probing critical infrastructure and power junctions and stuff like that. And also agencies, authorities, even community offices have been taken out by cyber. Of course, there's a cyber threat all the time and it's a battle in itself to cope with that. You've been made president and chairman of ASD. How do you expect to use this position to strengthen Europe's security landscape? These are very important times. We need to push for more collaboration and creating scale and to actually run a few flagship projects together, and to get the incentives from the [European] Commission to do that. To have countries put some money into a common bucket where we can do things together is important. Then I want the U.K. to be part of the European way of working on defense as if they were still in the E.U. That's super important. But then we have the regulation perspective. So there's lots to do from a European perspective. And the challenge is that the E.U. is a consensus organization. But industry can do a lot to create bridges by working together to create stronger defense in Europe. We have a good foundation of a defense industrial base, and that's because we are globally competitive as industries, but we have so much spending going outside Europe in a different direction, mainly the U.S. I want a competitive landscape. But you can't have the U.S. buying everything from the U.S.—98% or something—and then we've been spending like 78% outside Europe, and the majority of that in the U.S. We have to do more ourselves to be really competitive going forward and to take care of our security landscape. As such, are President Trump's tariffs positive for you, given selling between Europeans means avoiding these levies? Or will they still affect your supply chains? In the end, it will [affect supply chains.] Of course, trade wars are terrible but I think we have a bit more resilience in our business segment, because we carry more stockpiles, we have some protection when it comes to contracts, we don't have a hub somewhere where all the components are being built for everything we do—like the car industry, which could be extremely dependent on what's happening in Mexico, for example. [Our industry] is more regionalized when it comes to the supply chain as well. But, of course, we have dependencies, and it's not good, but it will take a little bit longer before we are super affected. Also, so many countries have reciprocal agreements between Europe and the U.S., where this is exempted from tariffs and taxes. I don't know whether these executive orders overrule all of this—that has never been discussed—but, of course, it's not good to have tariffs. Are they dangerous for global security? Yeah, I think they'll create complexities, and maybe you don't get the best capability because you have to rely upon other things—you can't afford, or you can't work with some companies, and then you get stuff that is not the best. So in the end, indirectly, it could be affecting what capabilities you build. There's been lots of changes in defense procurement like drone technology and undermanned submersibles. But what is the next great leap you are looking at in the future of the security industry? Obviously, lots of swarm technology and drones and collaborative combat aircraft. But I also think [it will be] the connectivity aspect of systems. Everything will be connected going forward. And then you have hypersonic weapon systems and being able to protect yourself from them. That's the big next step. It's going to be dangerous, it's going to be super quick, and that's probably the next step. But how to use AI's compute power is also absolutely something we put a lot of effort into. President Trump recently advocated a Golden Dome missile defense system for the U.S. Is this something which Europe should also consider? Absolutely. That's the flagship project that I would like to push for—not only for Saab but also for ASD. We need to come together—industries and countries—to create things like that: integrated enemy cell defense systems with short, medium, and long-range capabilities. We don't have that in Europe. We need to have that. Is there enough cohesion and unity in Europe for this type of thing to happen? I think so. We have the capabilities to do it. It's just how you create that industry construct, and how do you align the requirements. It comes with aligning requirements and demand, and then industry will come together. We're not really there yet. There have been political statements like the European Sky Shield Initiative, but it's really slow. That's the problem.
Japan Forward
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Japan Forward
Japan-US Security Challenges from the Atlantic to the Pacific
Hudson Institute's Japan Chair challenges conventional international relations thinking by integrating a wide range of perspectives toward beyond-the-horizon policy issues. JAPAN Forward is pleased to amplify the voices of its experts by sharing this report with our readers. The world's strategic focus is today centered on regions far distant from the Indo-Pacific in the Middle East, on Israel's June 13 preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, joined by the United States on June 21. And on Israel's continuing efforts to root out Hamas in Gaza, in addition to Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Yet, the challenges to stability and security in the Indo-Pacific have only intensified. At the time of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida cautioned lest Ukraine preview the future of East Asia. His concerns are even more relevant today. On the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong Un, now with Vladimir Putin's support, has continued to advance North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, daily increasing the threat posed to the security of the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States. In turn, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have moved to enhance alliance-based trilateral security and intelligence cooperation. Meanwhile, China has intensified and expanded the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) threatening military exercises that simulate an attack on or blockade of Taiwan. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently reminded the audience at the Shangri-la Dialogue that Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027. The Chinese naval aircraft carrier "Shandong" sails. China Central Television Online showed this on July 2 as part of a training exercise around Taiwan. (via CCTV Online via Kyodo) . A Taiwan contingency could present Japan with security-related challenges for the defense of Japan as well as the alliance. As former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe observed, "A Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan …it is also a contingency for the Japan-US Alliance." And a decision by the US to engage in a Taiwan contingency is, as Abe noted, likely also to involve Japan. Former diplomats, defense officials, foreign policy and security analysts have recognized Japan's likely involvement. Liberal Democratic Party Vice President Taro Aso has expressed his view that a Taiwan contingency would likely present Japan with a "survival-threatening situation," which would evoke a response under Japan's Peace and Security legislation. Articles by Admiral Yoji Koda, former commander of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Nobukatsu Kanehara, former assistant chief cabinet secretary, have addressed issues related to the defense of Japan and the alliance. Keio University professor Ken Jimbo wrote that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would inevitably lead to a joint Japan-US response. Meanwhile, Japan's think tanks, the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security have convened study groups and conferences focused on a Taiwan contingency. Unfortunately, the articles and conference reports have all too quickly faded from public debate and the political forum, left by Japan's political leaders to backroom discussions and foreign ministry and Ministry of Defense bureaucrats. It's a political exercise of whistling past the policy graveyard. Yet, within Japan and across the alliance, diplomats and defense planners have increasingly focused on a Taiwan contingency. The joint statement issued at the March 2016 Security Consultative Meeting, for the first time, referred to the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for Japan and United States' security interests. Subsequent joint statements have reiterated their importance. Over the past several years, the media have reported Japan-US agreement on operational plans in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Also, Japanese and US forces have conducted joint exercises focused on China as a hypothetical enemy. Today, Japan's 2016 Peace and Security laws provide the legal framework for Tokyo's response to a Taiwan contingency. The laws establish distinct operational commitments under distinct security situations. For example, an "Important Influence Situation" is defined as "having an important influence on Japan's peace and security that could lead to a direct armed attack on Japan itself if left unattended." The laws would enable the SDF to provide rear-area support to United States forces engaged in activities aimed at securing the objectives of the security treaty. They do not allow the provision of weaponry, but they support the provision of ammunition, refueling, and aircraft maintenance in support of combat operations. LDP's Taro Aso referred to an "armed attack, anticipated armed attack, or survival-threatening situation" in his remarks on Taiwan. He added that Japan could use force in response to "an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan, which, as a result, threatens Japan's survival." An attack by the PLA on US forces engaged in a Taiwan contingency could bring about a survival-threatening situation for Japan. Looking ahead, what is to be done? For starters: In both Tokyo and Washington, policymakers must consider and work through various scenarios involving a potential United States decision to engage in a Taiwan contingency. This would not only enhance deterrence but also serve to develop an alliance-based response across a broad spectrum of potential conflict and escalatory scenarios. Joint military exercises toward this end are critical. This will also require policymakers in Tokyo and Washington to work closely to align their countries' respective national interests with respect to China, Taiwan, and a Taiwan contingency. At the same time, diplomats and defense officials should work to coordinate respective national policy decision-making processes. Because a Taiwan contingency could occur unexpectedly, time would be of the essence in developing critical policy responses. A situation in which the United States moves to engage in a Taiwan contingency while the Diet debates its response and what support it can provide its ally should be avoided at all costs. Finally, political leaders in Japan and the United States need to bring the complexities and potential consequences of a Taiwan contingency into the public forum. This is critical to ensure a sustainable, long-term political foundation for future policy decisions. Unfortunately, this remains a work in progress. And 2027 is only 18 months away. Author: James J Przystup Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, The Hudson Institute The Hudson Institute's Hudson Chair contributed this report on July 4, 2025. Learn more about Hudson on its home and Japan Chair pages.
Focus Malaysia
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Focus Malaysia
Is America pulling a fast one on China threat?
THE United States and Malaysia are standing poles apart when it comes to dealing with China, as revealed in the recent Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. When US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth took to the podium, he promptly portrayed China as a very dangerous enemy preparing to 'use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific (region).' 'The threat from China is real,' he told participants from 47 countries gathered at the annual security forum to debate some of the pressing security challenges in these increasingly turbulent times. Presumably, he is raising the red flag over a potential conflict with China should the communist behemoth invade tiny Taiwan that could ignite a wider regional or even a global conflagration. The Indo-Pacific region covers the whole of Asean including Australia, Fiji, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. But Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, who also attended the forum, had a different take that is not exactly in line with the American political playbook. Essentially, he believes in promoting active non-alignment in foreign policy where all countries can pitch in to help 'shape a meaningful global order'. In other words, Malaysia, or Asean, will not side with anyone in a renewed Cold War. Being the Asean chair for this year, Anwar probably thinks he can steer the Asean ship of state away from the turbulent storms emanating from some hotspots around the world. But keeping-your-hands-off policy is unlikely to be effective as a diplomatic tool to calm tempers down because big powers will not listen to the likes of Anwar trying to broker a peace deal. These days the sounds of a world war are getting shriller and it appears the loudest noise is originating from China. America tells the nations in Southeast Asia and other countries the threat from that huge country is credible and hence, there is an urgent need to spend more on defence to meet the Chinese threat. Hegseth may be crying wolf but Asean must not dismiss his warning as just an American ploy to deliberately create trouble in order to pull the bloc away from Beijing and into the US orbit. Is the US pulling a fast one on the China threat? It is highly improbable that Washington wants to play a game of deception when the world knows that China is building up its military arsenal in a possible confrontation with the US over the contentious issue of Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. When Hegseth removed the sugar from the coat to expose the unpalatable fact about this looming threat, he must have said it based on solid information about China's rapid military build-up. Where did he obtain such irrefutable proof of this disturbing development? It must have come from US satellite images which clearly showed China's massive expansion in the South China Sea's disputed Spratly Islands archipelago. Malaysia does not possess such technologically advanced 'spies in the skies' that can locate with pin-point accuracy any military activity in any country. Hence, it will be in the dark about what is secretly going on behind the Great Wall of China. But the US has sounded the alarm and Asean must sit up and prepare for a possible aggressive encounter with this giant northern neighbour. It would do well to remember that before Ukraine was invaded, the US, through satellite images, had warned its President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia was massing troops on the country's borders for an invasion. But Zelensky dismissed the information as an attempt by the West to create unnecessary panic and he paid a heavy price for ignoring the dire warning. Now, a similar pattern is unfolding with, this time, China as the belligerent. There is no escaping from the fact that this superpower is flexing its military might as seen through the eyes of the spies in the skies. Although it is important to maintain vibrant ties with China, it is also equally crucial not to overlook the danger the nuclear-armed country poses to the rest of the world. In the rush to yet another world war, no country can stay neutral or stay safe. All will be sucked into the maelstrom. The weaker ones will have to seek protection from one of the superpowers or band together to help themselves. The danger is real and we ignore it to our own peril. ‒ June 12, 2025 Phlip Rodrigues is a retired journalist. The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia. Main image: Reuters
AllAfrica
12-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
US lethality not enough to counter China's malign influence
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The Trump administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, correctly identifies the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the primary threat to regional security, especially its stated ambitions for Taiwan. Were the PRC to seize Taiwan militarily without US intervention, Beijing could dictate the terms of trade past the island, project power farther into the Pacific and cause Washington's allies in East Asia and emerging partners on the Indian subcontinent to question US willingness to stand up for them. Hegseth has called for a defense budget increase, and the Pentagon is currently drafting its new national security strategy, due in August. He has also made clear that the United States would be ready to respond if Taiwan were attacked. Yet he also notes, correctly, the need to deter such a conflict. The effects of a war over Taiwan would be so catastrophic that neither side could win – not the United States, whose aircraft carriers would be vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles; not China, whose troops would be vulnerable during the initial strait crossing and whose economy might contract as much as 25%; not Taiwan, which might see its miraculous economic growth erased even if it survived as an autonomous entity. And not the world, which is ever more dependent on the technology-fueled growth enabled by the semiconductors that Taiwan plays the leading role in fabricating. Hegseth is signaling that the United States will prioritize countering an invasion and mobilize the necessary resources to do so, including reviving the industrial base and investing in shipyards. He also noted that deterring conflict with the PRC is not America's role alone, and his remarks at the Shangri-la Dialogue last month demonstrated a keen interest in working with US partners in the region in that endeavor. He called upon them to make a similar investment in their defense and combat readiness. Hegseth has emphasized the need to prioritize the 'lethality' of America's armed forces, also using similar descriptors like 'warfighting' and 'readiness.' It would appear that this administration views hard power as the key to keeping the PRC from achieving its aims for the region. However, do the Pentagon and its sister agencies have a plan to prevent China from winning without war? It has been easy in recent years for the PRC's critics to mock its political shortcomings as Beijing's prickliness over issues it considers core strategic areas has overridden its diplomatic professionalism, leading to it alienating previously ambivalent partners. In 2011, China took the step of withholding rare-earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute; within a decade, Japanese leaders would openly discuss defending Taiwan as a national security priority despite Tokyo's pacifist constitution. From 2016-2022, China enjoyed warm relations with the Philippines under the Duterte administration – which considered ending their hosting of US bases – only for public outrage over Chinese aggression in the South China Sea to prompt a course change by Duterte and the election of a pro-US administration in 2022. South Koreans, who had long seen China as essential not only for economic growth but for a resolution to inter-Korean division, now have among the world's most negative views of China following years of PRC enabling of North Korea plus the spread of Covid-19 and sanctions imposed on the country following THAAD deployment. Taiwan, which until 2016 had leadership that desired to deepen cooperation with the PRC and eventually achieve unification, now has elected three successive administrations supportive of independence, and the PRC's response has been a series of punitive measures that have only deepened the public's antipathy toward Beijing. It must be stressed, again, that those 'wins' for Washington were the product of PRC actions taken in defense of what Beijing considers core interests – whether concerning territorial rights, defense of the Chinese mainland or the credibility of Communist Party rule – and had little to do with US messaging or improvements to the American reputation in the region. And political successes in these countries may not be as durable as they appear. Taiwan's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party recently launched a sweeping set of measures designed to counter PRC influence, but its pro-unification opposition still finds much success in local elections and now holds the majority in the Legislative Yuan, where it has used that majority to fight the defense budget increases the Trump administration wants to see, and even civil defense-bolstering programs. The current leadership of the Philippines has been strident in its support for the US alliance and has done the most among ASEAN nations to shine a light on the PRC's coercive tactics in the South China Sea. Yet the former president, who enjoyed a much friendlier relationship with China, remains a popular figure despite his recent arrest by the International Criminal Court. Duterte's party did very well in recent Senate elections, increasing the chances that his daughter, the current vice president, will survive upcoming impeachment proceedings and run for president herself in 2028. South Korea, after three years of close cooperation with the United States and Japan, just elected a candidate much more open to cooperation with China. Even Japan, where the success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is rarely in doubt, currently labors through a period of weak governance that makes the formulation of effective defense policy difficult, especially in terms of overcoming its post-war pacifism and insularity and preparing for an operation as risky as the defense of Taiwan. If the United States is to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific and prevent PRC domination, it faces obstacles that cannot be solved by lethality alone. The PRC currently wages a campaign that lethality cannot counter. As Xi Jinping continues to purge high-ranking officers, the PRC would seem to lack the capability to direct an invasion even if it has the manpower and equipment to wage one. Therefore, its assaults on these locations will remain more subtle. These will include: seeking to co-opt the target countries' politicians, academics, media and social media personalities with paid trips to China, directing and controlling diaspora communities through the presence of overseas 'police stations' that some countries are not legally equipped to counteract, buying up crucial assets and establishing partnerships to ensure deference from business communities, and spreading narratives through official and unofficial channels that the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy and unable to counter the inevitability of China's rise. If the United States is not engaged in countering such influence, in the next five years Taiwan could again have a pro-unification leadership – or, at least, gridlock could prevent it from adequately prepping its defenses – while Manila could turn against hosting US military bases, Seoul could vow neutrality in a Taiwan contingency and Tokyo might not have made any meaningful preparations to counter PRC ambitions in the region. Under such circumstances, even if the defense secretary does get the most lethal US military in history, the US armed forces may be rendered helpless by politics in partner countries. The recent departure of Elon Musk, the Department of Government Efficiency's founder, from the US government is an opportunity to begin rebuilding soft power organs – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the State Department – that were targeted by spending cuts. The Defense Department should be part of broader, whole-of-government efforts – including State, Commerce, Energy, Treasury and others – not just to counter the PRC, but also to erode its influence. The lethality of US forces should not merely be enhanced; partners should know the United States will use it to good ends, including their defense against unprovoked aggression. The Trump administration need not worry about empowering political leaders who do not share its vision – political parties of the right are leading the charge against Chinese influence in Manila, Seoul, Tokyo and elsewhere and, despite its name, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party is a big tent more committed to Taipei's autonomy than to political progressivism. Nor should such moves be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of partners; Washington has worked with unlikely partners in countries where politicians have campaigned on skepticism of the United States – until they, and the constituencies that elected them, saw what the alternative to the United States was. But before the United States can convince these countries that they should arm themselves, Washington must first convince regional countries that there is a threat to prepare for and that the United States is the reliable partner it claims to be. A trillion dollars in lethal weapons systems, by itself, will not buy that. Rob York ( rob@ ) is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum International. He is the editor of Pacific Forum publications and spearheads Pacific Forum outreach to the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, as well as programming on countering malign influence in US partners. He earned his PhD in Korean history in December 2023.
Sky News AU
02-06-2025
- Business
- Sky News AU
Albanese ‘rules out' increase to defence spending despite ‘grave concerns'
Sky News host Sharri Markson says Anthony Albanese is 'refusing to commit' to boosting Australia's defence spending despite an urgent call from US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth. The United States has called on Australia to boost its military budget to 3.5 per cent of GDP 'as soon as possible', but Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has refused to change his policy position. 'Hegseth delivered this message to Defence Minister Richard Marles directly at a meeting in Singapore, and gave these pointed remarks in his speech to the Shangri-la Dialogue,' 'Marles indicated he was willing to discuss this – but Albanese has ruled it out.'
