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Euronews
6 days ago
- Politics
- Euronews
Exclusive: Who are Syria's Druze and why are they under attack?
After violent clashes between Druze and Bedouin militias erupted in Syria's southern Suwayda region last week – killing over 1,000 people and displacing almost 130,000 others – the religious group has been cast into the global spotlight. Despite the violence, one of the three Druze religious leaders, Hekmat Al-Hijri, said in an interview with Euronews that the group was formed by 'peaceful people who have never attacked anyone in the past' on three foundational tenets. 'The use of reason, non-aggression, and truthfulness" is what Druze anchor themselves with, Al-Hijri explained. Yet, throughout their 1,000-year history, the Druze have been no strangers to conflict. Religion of unity Explaining the history of one of the Middle East's most complex religious groups is no easy feat, even for the insiders. As one Druze religious leader told Euronews, 'we'd have to go back to the time of the Prophets Shuayb and Moses.' Founded in Egypt in the early 11th century as an offshoot of Ismaili Islam — itself an offshoot of Shi'a Islam — Druze doctrine was reportedly first preached in Cairo in 1017, ending in riots in the Egyptian capital. Much of the foundational ideology was based around the personality of Fatimid leader Al-Hakim, dubbed pejoratively 'The Mad Caliph' by some while revered by others as a divinely chosen supreme leader. A controversial figure accused of persecuting Sunni Muslims, as well as Christians and Jews, Al-Hakim disappeared mysteriously in 1021. What followed for the newly founded Druze minority was marked by discrimination and persecution. They were largely driven out of Egypt by Al-Hakim's successors and settled in the mountainous regions of the Sham, which encompasses modern-day Syria, Lebanon and contested parts of Israel. Much of Druze dogma remains shrouded in secrecy, but a Druze resident of Suwayda who comes from a family of sheikhs but wanted to remain anonymous for reasons of safety told Euronews that the group 'follows the religion of Tawhid (unity), which is an intellectual and spiritual faith based on the idea that a person's relationship with God is a spiritual and intellectual one, not dependent on imposed religious rituals.' In short, 'it is a voluntary, not compulsory, faith' that is not part of any other religion, including Islam. In the Druze worldview, this means the group is "capable of harmonising with various sects, religions and ethnicities.' Since 1043, the Druze religion has been closed to new converts. Today's Druze population numbers just 1 million globally, over two-thirds of whom live in Syria. Struggling for freedom Throughout their millennium-long history, the Druze have frequently formed alliances with various broader powers. During the Crusades, Druze soldiers aided the Ayyubid and later Mamluk forces by resisting Crusader advances at the Lebanese coast. They also maintained a relatively high level of autonomy during centuries of Ottoman rule, even challenging their authority in the 1600s after forming a coalition with Maronite Christians. More recently, when the region was carved up by European powers into the modern nation states whose often porous borders remain indelibly inked onto maps today, Sheikh Al-Hijri notes that the Druze "were among those who helped found the state of Lebanon.' In Syria's neighbour, they remain a powerful political force headed by a dynasty of the Jumblatt family, generations of whom have run the Druze-majority Progressive Socialist Party. In Syria, it has been a different story, one stained by 'extreme marginalisation and repugnant sectarian treatment,' contends the sheikh. Not only was the community split when Israel annexed the Druze-majority Golan Heights in the 1967 Six-Day War, but four years later, the al-Assad-led Ba'ath party came to power in what Druze leaders and activists told Euronews was the start of five decades of discrimination. 'The al-Assad regime marginalised the Druze to such an extent that it was forbidden to dig a water well or build a factory, and they were barred from attaining senior military ranks,' Al-Hijri maintains. This said, not everyone paints the relationship between the Druze and Hafez Al-Assad and his recently deposed son, Bashar, as so difficult. Some see the old regime as quashing religious tensions in a country where some 20% of the 24-million population comes from religious minorities. There were even accusations of the al-Assads — who themselves derive from another Shi'a offshoot group, the Alawites — giving preferential treatment to non-Sunni groups. As a prominent member of the Druze community in Suwayda put it to Euronews: 'Druze personalities benefited from the last regime; they made deals with it, they supported the ideas and the actions of the regime.' However, Druze artist and activist Tamara Abu Alwan is adamant that many, if not most, members of the minority were fervently against al-Assad. 'Personally, I've been involved in the revolution for 14 years. My father also lost his job because he was an opponent of the regime. We were all in opposition. We were a family that supported each other and extended help to areas outside government control — even though it put our lives at risk.' When forces under the command of Ahmed Al-Sharaa, a former Islamist militia leader whose nom-de-guerre Al-Jolani derived from the Arabic name for the Golan Heights, Abu Alwan told Euronews, 'I was so happy. I believed that the 14 years with all the martyrs who shed blood were over.' 'But then it turned out to be only the beginning of something even worse.' The plot thickens The new authorities in Damascus have largely been met with a cautious sigh of relief by the international community. Al-Sharaa has met with leaders from Western powers, including the UK, the EU and the US. Donald Trump even called the new president 'handsome'. What followed was the lifting of many crippling sanctions that were imposed on the Assad regime for crimes against the Syrian people. Today, 90% of the population still lives below the poverty line, and the economy hangs by a thread. Although many have lauded al-Sharaa for providing stability to a country ravaged by over a decade of war, Syria has endured multiple eruptions of interethnic violence, notably in early March when Alawite communities were massacred in coastal regions. While al-Sharaa at the time called for calm and promised an independent investigation into claims that government-affiliated forces initiated what one commentator called the 'orgy of violence,' many believe the president was complicit. 'They asked (the Alawites) to hand over weapons,' the Suwayda resident said during their interview. 'When the weapons were handed over, and the Syrian coastal area became isolated ... they attacked and committed terrible massacres against humanity." "The entire villages were killed and exterminated. Houses and houses were burned.' Sheikh Hikmat agreed, adding, 'They use a local group to stir up strife, and then they carry out mass killings against their opponents.' The spiritual leader contends that he foresaw the recent violence months in advance. 'They spent seven months conducting a systematic media campaign,' Sheikh Hikmat recalled, which he said fomented ethnic tensions. 'There were even weeks when Suwayda occupied more than 25% of the Arab world's news reports, at a time when there were no overt disputes or clashes, clearly pointing to a premeditated plan against the Druze.' Trust in al-Sharaa eroded? In late April, tensions spilt over into violence, leading to almost 100 deaths amongst Druze fighters. More than 30 government fighters were also killed, and the Israeli Defence Forces launched airstrikes, including near the presidential palace. This turned out to be a prelude of what was to come. On 13 July, fighting again broke out in southern Syria, with both Bedouin and Druze militias accusing the other of committing war crimes, including wholesale massacres. The international community quickly condemned the violence, with the EU saying it was 'appalled,' without apportioning blame on one side or the other. However, Syria's newfound and tentative Western supporters 'welcomed' a ceasefire announced by al-Sharaa last Thursday, in which the Syrian leader said it was his 'priority' to protect the Druze. For Tamara Abu Alwan, his words ring hollow. 'He has lost respect for the Syrian people,' she told Euronews. 'I lost loved ones and friends for the sake of nothing, for the sake of those criminals taking over a regime that they don't deserve. So, I really do not think Ahmed Sharaa will last too long.' In his address to the nation, al-Sharaa also condemned Syria's neighbours in Israel for launching airstrikes and trying to 'entangle our people in a war that serves only to fragment our homeland and sow destruction.' There was little international support for Israel's latest attacks in the heart of Damascus. Yet, stating that '99%' of the Druze population were behind him, Al-Hijri leapt to Israel's defence. "Israel tried to establish relations with the Damascus regime and was one of the countries that gave it a chance. But when the regime attacked the Druze and ignored multiple warnings, they struck Damascus," Al-Hijri said. "We welcome this action, which could help stop the savage and barbaric campaigns against us.' Privately, some Druze whom Euronews spoke to were more reticent about Israel's actions. 'I heard about these attacks in the area of Damascus,' one person said. 'At the same time, we were just trying to escape from the massacres. We were trying to get out of this country.'
Yahoo
13-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
13-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel.
