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Daily Mirror
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Daily Mirror
'UK citizens could be harmed as Iran widens its target library'
World events have drawn the UK increasingly into Iran's crosshairs which have in recent years and previously been firmly focused on anti-regime dissidents, Jewish targets and Israel. As junior partner to America, which has been dubbed by Tehran as 'the great Satan' this makes us stand out as somewhere where people can be targeted in the future. But in the recent past there have been many attempts at violence against Iranian dissidents here, Jewish sites and people and, it is thought, the Israeli embassy. The UK's intelligence and security committee chairman Lord Beamish has warned: 'Iran poses a wide-ranging, persistent and unpredictable threat to the UK, UK nationals and UK interests.' It is the word 'unpredictable' that is particularly alarming as perhaps it means the library of possible targets for Iran has widened in recent years. Any attack on narrowly drawn up targets can harm British civilians but there may be a suspicion in our intelligence agencies that Tehran is widening its ambitions. Anti-Tehran regime dissidents with the Iranian diaspora have been the main targets because they are viewed as harming the Iranian revolution. The uprising in 1979 that led Iran to where it is is seen as a continuing project, spreading power and influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. Conflict with Israel following the Gaza war has been ruinous to this project, crippling its proxies Lebanese Hezbollah, Gazan Hamas and seriously damaging the Iran backed Yemeni Houthis. In just three years Israel has dismantled decades of achievement for Tehran which had slowly and cleverly gained the 'Shia Crescent.' This was a major Middle East foothold and terror super highway stretching from Tehran, across Iraq north of Baghdad, across swathes of Syria and all the way down through Lebanon. Tehran had placed its military and proxies right on Israel's doorstep. It has lost much of this, even its ally Bashar al-Assad's deposed and a Sunni ex-jihadist religiously antagonistic towards Shia-led Tehran has taken over in Syria. At home too Iran has lost for now supposedly its nuclear programme, its air defences and its military commanders have been picked off. Israel has cost Iran dear and despite the many voices in our government against its actions in Gaza it is an ally of the UK. As a military power Iran has shed so much credibility and actual power that its regime will feel it must close down opposition abroad and try and regain respect. Below the threshold for war cyber warfare against the UK is being committed by Iran and its allies North Korea and Russia. But exporting sabotage, violence and espionage to the UK is clearly now an Iranian regime project. Tension between Iran and the UK goes back decades. Britain covertly aided Iraq in its war with Iran during the 1980s and subesequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not eased the situation - and US assasinations of Iranian commanders did not draw us any closer to Tehran. UK fighter jets have operated against Yemeni Houthis and helped defend Israel against Iran but the Britishn government has stressed they were not involved in attacking Iran with the US and Israel. It is doubtful Tehran will appreciate the subtle differences between these two defensive and offensive operations. Just as the Iranian diaspora in the UK is vast, so too is the opportunity for Tehran's agents to recruit someone to commit hard on British soil. As Lord Beamish says, it is "unpredictable." There is a hint of 'not sure' about this statement, as discussed, and it could mean our intelligence agencies do not yet know what Tehran is planning. In the shadows MI5 and MI6 will be immensely trying to identify targets for surveillance in a bid to clsoe down, disrupt and smash Iranian plots. There has not been a suggestion of this yet but could Iran and Russia join hands in these efforts to do harm in the UK? Only time will tell but it is clear the British government is putting the UK public on notice that Iran is every bit as much of a threat as Russia.
EVN Report
04-07-2025
- Politics
- EVN Report
Armenia, the 12-Day War and Strategic Ambiguity
On June 13, a development that Armenia's political leadership, past and present, had feared as one that would place Armenia in an impossible position, materialized when Israel unleashed the 12-Day War against Iran to destroy Tehrans's burgeoning nuclear program. On June 22, the United States joined the onslaught by striking the Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz nuclear sites with B-52 bombers and Tomahawk missiles. In practical terms, the entirety of Iran's air defense capabilities were destroyed, allowing Israel and the U.S. complete aerial superiority, with Iran's ballistic missile sites, military bases, and military leadership becoming sitting ducks. In the broader theater of war, in what was to be a competition for regional hegemony, Iran was reduced to a paper tiger, having no deterrence capacity against the U.S.-Israel tandem. From the geostrategic perspective of Israel and America, not only did the Shia Crescent (also referred to as the Axis of Resistance) collapse, but more specifically, Iran's ability to be an effective regional actor was exponentially diminished. Iran's regional grand strategy, which for 40 years had been successfully developed through asymmetrical modeling, had relied on its expansive network of regional proxy militias and footholds in Iraq and Syria. Israel's decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was the most powerful and strategically important of proxies that Iran had developed since the 1980s, dismantled an important instrument in Iran's toolkit. The subsequent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and Tehran's loss of what had become its quasi-client state, further severed the strategic tentacles defining Iran's power-projection capacity. In this context, the main instruments within Iran's asymmetrical model, which had served as the foundational framework of the Shia Crescent, had been neutralized. Collectively, the security architecture that Iran had meticulously built in the last 40 years eroded in a one-year time span. That is, whatever mechanisms of strategic depth and layers of deterrence that Iran had developed have now been dismantled. This, in turn, brings about an important question: how will Iran rebuild its deterrence capability, and considering the failure of the asymmetrical model, what other options remain open for Tehran? The answer is quite straightforward: if Iran operated off of the logic that it could preserve its security architecture while negotiating a nuclear deal with the U.S., this paradigm is now dead. This leads to one tenable alternative for Tehran, and that is to develop a nuclear weapon as soon as possible. In essence, having been painted into a corner, Iran is even more incentivized now to develop its nuclear program, lest it concedes that it is truly a paper tiger with almost no substantive deterrence capability. Herein lies the conundrum at hand, and for Armenia's regional foreign and security policy, an extraordinarily complex and structurally difficult position to be in. Unfortunately, it is a dilemma that cannot be resolved without another war. Iran, for reasons outlined above, and in pursuit of what it sees as advancing its national interest, will neither abandon nor dismantle its nuclear program, viewing it as the only tenable deterrent against its regional enemy. Israel, on the other hand, along with the U.S., will never tolerate the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. These positions are not open to compromise or interpretation, but rather, are very clear and concrete postures that place both sides on an inevitable collision course again. If Iran abandons its nuclear program, the regime will very likely collapse, since a regime that espouses strength and regional dominance will not be able to domestically bear the costs of assuming such a weakened and humiliated posture. Especially following Israel's unequivocal dominance in the 12-Day War, official Tehran will have no other options but to proceed, in whatever iteration, with the process of quickly developing nuclear deterrence. Israel and the United States, ever vigilant, will not hesitate, not for a second, especially after the precedent set with the 12-Day War, to immediately unleash another attack against Iran. In more simple terms, the 12-Day War was not a singular event, but rather, it is and will be the first of more to come, until the conundrum is resolved. And from the perspective of the Israeli-U.S. tandem, the resolution is quite clear: regime change. Not as a matter of some ideological precept, but rather, from their perspective, a solution to the conundrum: as long as the current regime is in power, Iran will never give up its nuclear program. Removing the regime, then, is being equated with ending the nuclear program. Whether this will be successful or not is besides the point, but what matters to Armenia is the growing contours of this conundrum and the implications of its attempted resolution. U.S.-Armenia relations are extraordinarily strong, as Washington has played a crucial role in the last two years of restraining Azerbaijan and utilizing acute diplomatic pressure to deter Baku from incursion or re-initiation of hostilities, while also taking the lead in advancing the peace process. Further, as strategic partners, U.S.-Armenia relations are growing quite rapidly, from security cooperation to deepening of diplomatic relations to economic and technological engagements to strengthening Armenia's energy independence. For official Yerevan, the relationship with the United States, at this point, is the most important bilateral relationship in its portfolio. For over three decades, Armenia and Iran have maintained healthy and stable relations. Tehran has consistently demonstrated diplomatic support for Armenia against Baku's aggression and has served as a vital logistical route south, particularly crucial given that Armenia has been surrounded and blockaded by its predatory neighbors. Similar to Georgia in the north, Iran has served as a lifeline for Armenia to the south. Stability in Iran is of utmost importance to Armenia, and any developments that can lead to fracture, destabilization, and thus threaten Armenia's access to its south poses immense dangers to Armenian strategic interests. In the confluence of Iran's conflict with the U.S.-Israeli tandem, Armenia's situation not only borders the impossible, but in the domain of risk analysis, produces a lose-lose framework. In essence, Armenia has nothing to gain from any future wars between the two sides, yet a lot to lose with respect to logistics, economy, and potential humanitarian crisis to its south. How can Armenia manage this exceedingly complex and volatile situation, while mitigating its own vulnerabilities and situating itself in the best position possible regardless of outcome? Armenia's policy, as it stands and going forward, will be defined by strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity is the tactical act of being deliberately ambiguous with respect to specific decision-making processes, operations, or policy positions. It is a mechanism of directly avoiding conflict, not being drawn into a quagmire, and allowing a state to manage a crisis situation without being forced to choose sides between warring powers. The scope of strategic ambiguity for large or middle powers is quite different than that of small states, for large or middle powers use strategic ambiguity to cultivate uncertainty, thus keeping their enemies or allies guessing, which offers the given power flexibility and an enhanced toolkit in advancing its policy interests. For small states, strategic ambiguity is more confined, as it is used primarily as a tool of risk-aversion, and it is mostly a tactical act, as opposed to a grand strategy. Within the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Armenia's preferred policy position is more specifically known as 'situational ambiguity.' In this context, U.S.-Armenia relations or Armenia-Iran relations are not defined by strategic ambiguity, since there is clarity, structure, and functional engagement with each bilateral partner on a wide range of issues. Hence, the stipulation that strategic ambiguity, for Armenia, is not a grand strategy or foreign policy doctrine. But within the specific domain of conflict, such as the 12-Day War, and anticipated reinitiation of hostilities in the future, Armenia's tactical preference becomes strategic ambiguity, or more precisely, situational ambiguity. Thus, in the event of another war between Iran and the US-Israeli tandem, Armenia's policy position, as it pertains to this situation , will be defined by strategic ambiguity. For official Yerevan, strategic ambiguity will be operationalized through the following logic: ambiguity shall be strategically used to foster agreement on abstractions without stipulating specific interpretations. Thus, Armenia will rely on fostering such abstractions that are commensurate with its interests, while also finding agreements with those of the conflicting parties: Armenia will call for peace, mutual restraint, serve as a bridge in conflict-resolution, support post-conflict stabilization initiatives, promote resolutions to humanitarian concerns, and communicate Armenia's limited agency in the war with each side. What Armenia will not and cannot do is engage in specific interpretations, signal or indicate preferred outcomes, or much worse, choose a side. The objective of situational ambiguity is to manage the complex process of not being drawn into the narrative of the conflict, because if a state is drawn into the narrative of the conflict, they will then be forced to choose sides. For Armenia, not only would this represent a highly-dangerous trap, but more so, a high-risk lose-lose situation. The fundamental objective of Armenia's use of strategic ambiguity will be two-fold: first, to avoid entanglement, and second, to avoid defection from partner states. Thus, not to be drawn into the conflict or be pulled into having to choose sides remains the primary postulate in entanglement-avoidance. Second, to make certain that neither of the partners defects from the partnership, that is, making certain that relations are not harmed due to Armenia not meeting the presumed expectations of that partner. Strategic ambiguity allows for the management of such expectations with partners, as it relies on situational configurations, while not touching the wide range of factors that define the bilateral relationship. In this context, Armenia cannot and will not take sides in the next flare-up, and this is not a position that is defined by values or preferences, but rather, the hard core interests of Armenia. It does not matter whether Armenia wants Iran to be successful in the conflict, or for the U.S.-Israeli tandem to destroy Iran's nuclear program, or for there to be regime change, or for the regime to continue to survive, or for there to be a compromise that strengthens one side over the other. All of this is immaterial, because Armenia has no agency in shaping or defining such developments. Armenia cannot 'balance' the two sides that are at war; balancing is a broad, long-term geostrategic initiative, not a situational act. Thus, Armenia has no concrete policy preference with respect to such developments. What Armenia has, and will have, are 'agreements on abstractions,' such as achieving peace and stability between the warring sides: anything other than this, such as 'stipulating specific interpretations,' will be against the strategic interests of the Armenian Republic. What many pundits, pseudo-analysts, Diasporan social media warriors, and even well-intentioned idealogues fail to understand is that Armenia does not have the luxury to moralize, take sides, or even hedge a preferred outcome. In the domain of risk-propensity, such alternatives are so high-risk that they border on the irrational. It is for this reason that it is against the national interests of Armenia to entangle itself, in any iteration, whether rhetorically or substantively, in the ever-evolving conflict to its south. Indeed, lamentations on values, principled opposition to aggression, and emotive anger at perceptions of unjust war will always be a constant feature of the social media ecosystem that drives much of the public discourse in Armenia and the Diaspora. And in of itself, that is a good thing, for open discourse is vital to a healthy political culture. But geopolitical and geostrategic realities do not care for values, principled opposition, or emotive anger. What has and will define Armenia's approach is the empirical treatment of risk. Armenia cannot engage in 'risk-seeking' behavior when the 'gain-loss asymmetry' unequivocally stipulates that Armenia must be risk-averse with respect to this specific situation. To this end, Armenia does not operate in the domain of gains when it comes to the conflict between Iran and the U.S.-Israeli tandem, but rather, Armenia operates in the domain of mitigated losses. And when a state has to operate within this domain, strategic ambiguity and situational ambiguity are the most preferred policy positions.
