Latest news with #Soleimani
Economic Times
18-07-2025
- Politics
- Economic Times
West Asia imbroglio: Lessons on geo political stratagems for India
Synopsis In 2025, a regional conflict erupted in West Asia between Iran and Israel, drawing in the USA. The conflict stemmed from Iran's 'deterrence' strategy against Israel and Israel's efforts to dismantle Iran's 'axis of resistance'. Israel strategically marginalized Iranian proxies, leading to direct confrontation and strikes on Iranian nuclear assets, highlighting key lessons for India's security challenges. TIL Creatives Representative Image West Asia was at the verge of a regional conflict, with USA entering the 12 day standoff kinetic confrontation, between Iran and Israel on 22 June 2025. The animosity considered existential threat by both, has two main facets that is of interest for the strategic community. These are the 'game plan' of 'deterrence', instituted by Iran, in the changing geo strategic construct of the Middle East, to checkmate Israeli threat and Israel's systematic neutralisation of Iran's 'axis of resistance', resulting in the current offensive and decapacitation of Iran's nuclear assets. Both issues have key pointers for India's asymmetric security policy of 'Forward Defence' or 'Forward Deterrence' is a strategic initiative, that commenced in the mid 1970s, to stop external support to Iran's internal dissidents. This led to Iran reaching out to Iraqi Shiite groups, Al Sadr family in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria. Gen Soleimani of IRGC, under the patronage of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, created the 'axis of resistance' of 'proxies', in target countries. Iran concurrently built up stand-off strike capability through ballistic missiles, UAVs and offensive cyber. The 'Quds' Force of IRGC, raised in 1988, controlled these regional proxies. It led to Iran's support to the Palestine cause, initially to 'Al Fatah' and later the Hamas. The Hezbollah was established in the early 1980s, in network, got a major boost post 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' in 2003, when in Iraq, the US gave power to Iran backed political parties and militias. Iran also exploited the power vacuum created in countries, during the 2011 Arab Spring, to prop up proxy regimes. The rise of Houthis, to power in Yemen, is a prime example. And its domination of Babel-Mandeb strait, gave it the capability to interdict key global SLOCs. As relations with Israel got further strained, Iran deepened support to Hamas and the Hezbollah, to empower them to open a second front in case of a conflict with Israel. There are also instances of Iran supporting non state actors, terrorists and rebel groups, to target adversarial marginalisation of these proxies by Israel, is a lesson on strategic foresight and machinations. The Israeli Prime Minister at the nadir of his political career, exploited the opportunity that arose from the heinous attack on bordering Israeli kibbutz's by Hamas, on 07 Oct 2023. Israel adopted the 'scorched earth' policy in Gaza, using disproportionate force. Iran, in support of the Hamas, activated the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Yemen's Houthis and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, to launch their own attacks, on Israel. The Israeli offensive within weeks, militarily degraded the Hamas and in the two years totally marginalised thereafter focused on neutralising the Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful, reliable and effective proxy. Mid-September 2024, Israel stunned the world by executing a coordinated attack, on the pagers and walkie talkies used by Hezbollah and its cadres. It remotely activated the concealed explosives planted inside the batteries of pagers, in a covert operation exploiting technology, decapacitating over 1500 of its cadres. Also, precision aerial strikes destroyed their large inventory of rockets and missiles, while targeted killing eliminated Hezbollah's senior leadership, including its Secretary General Hassan Nasrullah and his successor. The October 2024 ground offensive against Hezbollah, was the proverbial last nail in the impact was visible, as in December 2024 , Hezbollah was unable to support the President Assad and his Government, during the rebel offensive in Syria. It led to the fall of the Assad and ended decades old Iran – Syria relationship. Thus, Houthis in Yemen were the only remaining proxy for Iran's future geo political last and most critical step for Israel was to get Iran in a direct engagement. It achieved that by bombing of the Iranian embassy complex in Syria, in April 2024. It was escalatory and the war that for long had been fought through proxies and targeted killings had now come into the crumbling of the proxies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, now gave Israel the opportunity to conduct aerial strikes on Iran, with impunity. And the rest is history. In which the 12 day missile exchanges, culminated with US attack on nuclear facilities. And Mr Netanyahu, managed to secure freedom from Iran's nuclear 'Sword of Damocles'.India strategic mandarins can take pointers from this protracted engagement. Firstly, for instituting an effective 'deterrence' strategy for India, with 'out of box' options, of exploiting societal fissures, use of cyber, social networking platforms and emerging technologies for effective perception management in adversarial countries and pro-active diplomacy for global support. A shortcoming noticeable post 'Op Sindoor'. Secondly, unanimous political consensus, across party lines, on issues of national security. Thirdly, essentiality for continuity of policy, that is not hostage to changing political dispensations in need an organisation that provides continuity and maintains non-attributability of actions from the Government in power. Fifthly, availability of reliable and timely intelligence, which has been the cornerstone of Israel's meticulous plans and in stitching together multiple options, that could be unfolded with precision, at an opportune the capabilities and capacities, was built up systematically, to a planned doctrinal philosophy. India therefore needs to ensure that the 'Make in India- Defence' follows a similar trajectory, with suitable inputs and timely modulations. The author is a former Army Commander Indian Army. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of
Time of India
18-07-2025
- Business
- Time of India
West Asia imbroglio: Lessons on geo political stratagems for India
West Asia was at the verge of a regional conflict, with USA entering the 12 day standoff kinetic confrontation, between Iran and Israel on 22 June 2025. The animosity considered existential threat by both, has two main facets that is of interest for the strategic community. These are the 'game plan' of 'deterrence', instituted by Iran, in the changing geo strategic construct of the Middle East, to checkmate Israeli threat and Israel's systematic neutralisation of Iran's 'axis of resistance', resulting in the current offensive and decapacitation of Iran's nuclear assets. Both issues have key pointers for India's asymmetric security challenges. Iran's policy of 'Forward Defence' or 'Forward Deterrence' is a strategic initiative, that commenced in the mid 1970s, to stop external support to Iran's internal dissidents. This led to Iran reaching out to Iraqi Shiite groups, Al Sadr family in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria. Gen Soleimani of IRGC, under the patronage of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, created the 'axis of resistance' of 'proxies', in target countries. Iran concurrently built up stand-off strike capability through ballistic missiles, UAVs and offensive cyber. The 'Quds' Force of IRGC, raised in 1988, controlled these regional proxies. It led to Iran's support to the Palestine cause, initially to 'Al Fatah' and later the Hamas. The Hezbollah was established in the early 1980s, in Lebanon. Explore courses from Top Institutes in Select a Course Category Finance Operations Management MBA MCA Technology Digital Marketing Product Management Healthcare others Degree Project Management healthcare Data Science Management Artificial Intelligence Leadership Cybersecurity CXO Public Policy PGDM Others Data Science Data Analytics Design Thinking Skills you'll gain: Duration: 7 Months S P Jain Institute of Management and Research CERT-SPJIMR Fintech & Blockchain India Starts on undefined Get Details Skills you'll gain: Duration: 9 Months IIM Calcutta SEPO - IIMC CFO India Starts on undefined Get Details The network, got a major boost post 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' in 2003, when in Iraq, the US gave power to Iran backed political parties and militias. Iran also exploited the power vacuum created in countries, during the 2011 Arab Spring, to prop up proxy regimes. The rise of Houthis, to power in Yemen, is a prime example. And its domination of Babel-Mandeb strait, gave it the capability to interdict key global SLOCs. As relations with Israel got further strained, Iran deepened support to Hamas and the Hezbollah, to empower them to open a second front in case of a conflict with Israel. There are also instances of Iran supporting non state actors, terrorists and rebel groups, to target adversarial countries. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Villas Prices In Dubai Might Be More Affordable Than You Think Villas In Dubai | Search Ads Get Quote The marginalisation of these proxies by Israel, is a lesson on strategic foresight and machinations. The Israeli Prime Minister at the nadir of his political career, exploited the opportunity that arose from the heinous attack on bordering Israeli kibbutz's by Hamas, on 07 Oct 2023. Israel adopted the 'scorched earth' policy in Gaza, using disproportionate force. Iran, in support of the Hamas, activated the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Yemen's Houthis and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, to launch their own attacks, on Israel. The Israeli offensive within weeks, militarily degraded the Hamas and in the two years totally marginalised it. Israel thereafter focused on neutralising the Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful, reliable and effective proxy. Live Events Mid-September 2024, Israel stunned the world by executing a coordinated attack, on the pagers and walkie talkies used by Hezbollah and its cadres. It remotely activated the concealed explosives planted inside the batteries of pagers, in a covert operation exploiting technology, decapacitating over 1500 of its cadres. Also, precision aerial strikes destroyed their large inventory of rockets and missiles, while targeted killing eliminated Hezbollah's senior leadership, including its Secretary General Hassan Nasrullah and his successor. The October 2024 ground offensive against Hezbollah, was the proverbial last nail in the coffin. This impact was visible, as in December 2024 , Hezbollah was unable to support the President Assad and his Government, during the rebel offensive in Syria. It led to the fall of the Assad and ended decades old Iran – Syria relationship. Thus, Houthis in Yemen were the only remaining proxy for Iran's future geo political plans. The last and most critical step for Israel was to get Iran in a direct engagement. It achieved that by bombing of the Iranian embassy complex in Syria, in April 2024. It was escalatory and the war that for long had been fought through proxies and targeted killings had now come into the open. The crumbling of the proxies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, now gave Israel the opportunity to conduct aerial strikes on Iran, with impunity. And the rest is history. In which the 12 day missile exchanges, culminated with US attack on nuclear facilities. And Mr Netanyahu, managed to secure freedom from Iran's nuclear 'Sword of Damocles'. India strategic mandarins can take pointers from this protracted engagement. Firstly, for instituting an effective 'deterrence' strategy for India, with 'out of box' options, of exploiting societal fissures, use of cyber, social networking platforms and emerging technologies for effective perception management in adversarial countries and pro-active diplomacy for global support. A shortcoming noticeable post 'Op Sindoor'. Secondly, unanimous political consensus, across party lines, on issues of national security. Thirdly, essentiality for continuity of policy, that is not hostage to changing political dispensations in elections. Fourthly, need an organisation that provides continuity and maintains non-attributability of actions from the Government in power. Fifthly, availability of reliable and timely intelligence, which has been the cornerstone of Israel's meticulous plans and in stitching together multiple options, that could be unfolded with precision, at an opportune time. Lastly, the capabilities and capacities, was built up systematically, to a planned doctrinal philosophy. India therefore needs to ensure that the 'Make in India- Defence' follows a similar trajectory, with suitable inputs and timely modulations. The author is a former Army Commander Indian Army.
Business Times
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Times
This isn't the Iranian regime change you're looking for
Back when I used to be able to visit Iran, I remember always being surprised by the popularity of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) elite Al-Quds force, who was assassinated on US President Donald Trump's orders in 2020. This was true even of Westward-looking Teheranis who loathed the regime and held parties where the alcohol flowed and the skirts were short. Asked why, the answer was always the same. Soleimani kept the foreign threats destabilising other countries of the Middle East at bay; he fought them abroad so they would not have to be fought at home. Islamic State, a Sunni-Islamist terrorist organisation, could terrorise Shiites in Iraq and their Alawite cousins in Syria – but the streets of Teheran were safe. Soleimani played on this. He would be photographed wearing fatigues out with pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, carefully curating a near mythological image of daring and skill. This resonated, even though he stood at the core of a hated regime, because he seemed to hold the ring for what most Iranians craved: normal lives, safety and a chance at prosperity. They wanted a nuclear reconciliation with the US and Europe, allowing for sanctions to lift and investment to return, for precisely the same reasons. But that was then. A 2015 nuclear deal was agreed but quickly eviscerated by Trump. The IRGC profited from the 'maximum pressure' sanctions that followed, taking over much of the domestic economy and trade (which became primarily smuggling). Inflation soared. Private business withered. Living standards plummeted. And the worse things got, the more the IRGC cracked down domestically. There is no new Soleimani. The very source of his popularity – that he kept the dogs of war from Iranian doors – has become cause to despise his successors. Al-Quds increasingly was in the business of using the proxy network he built to poke the US and Israeli bears. That obsession backfired spectacularly this month, with Israeli jets bombing Teheran and US B-2s dropping bunker busters on Iranian nuclear facilities. Soleimani would be hated, too, were he alive today, because he was a leading architect of all this hubris. Indeed, attitudes were changing even before he died. But I think his passage from hero to villain is the context in which to see Iran's next move, now that the US and Israel have called off their jets. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up Change will come in some form, though likely not one we would all prefer. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 86 years old. He rules a youthful nation in which some 70 per cent of the population were not even born when the revolution that drives him took place. Having led the country into so desolate a cul-de-sac, his regime will pay a price. The question is how and at whose expense. Change – but with limits Change can form around Khamenei or by the IRGC replacing or marginalising him. But there are clear limits; the regime cannot afford to acknowledge that the billions upon billions of dollars it has spent on a nuclear programme, and the hundreds of billions more lost due to the sanctions, were all for nothing. It cannot be seen to surrender to 'The Great Satan'. Nor can it realistically afford to just carry on as before, pursuing reckless aggression abroad, while ruling by fear alone at home. A successful popular uprising is unlikely. Khamenei and the IRGC have faced major protests before, and repeatedly crushed them. They have about one million men under arms, many of them heavily indoctrinated. Urban Iranians are also by now cautious, not just because of that experience, but also because they know theirs is an ethnically fractured country. They have no interest in becoming the next Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan. This leaves the best plausible outcome as a return to the popular age of Soleimani, so an internal regime recalibration rather than regime change. Flexibility in survival As Cameran Ashraf, an Iranian human rights activist and assistant professor of public policy at the Central European University in Vienna, puts it, we may all be surprised by how things unfold. 'The regime has had very strong emphasis on survival from day one,' he said. 'So, I think there is a type of flexibility there.' We saw some of that already in the carefully choreographed response Iran gave to the US bombing of Fordow. In such a scenario, negotiators would return to talks this week in search of ways to relieve pressure on the regime and Iran's economy, making limited concessions on the nuclear programme in exchange. The IRGC would take a more defensive posture abroad. At home, authorities would relent in some areas of needlessly provocative domestic repression – like enforcement of headscarf laws – as they have done at times in the past. Any such course correction would be tactical. The Islamic Republic will not change its spots, until it is no more. But as I argued before, there is no one-and-done when it comes to Iran's nuclear programme, neither by diplomacy nor by force. Both sides would be trying to buy time. The alternative is that Khamenei simply doubles down, concluding that no diplomatic settlement is possible because the US is bent on Iran's destruction and cannot be trusted. The focus would be on regime consolidation, rebuilding defences and acquiring a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible. So far, most signs point to this uglier outcome. Driven to paranoia by the level of Israeli intelligence penetration that led to the killing of dozens of top military commanders and nuclear scientists, a brutal domestic crackdown is underway. As at Sunday (Jun 29), there was little sign the nuclear negotiations Trump has trailed for this week will in fact take place. The US and the West as a whole need to play a more subtle game. In the wake of the bombings, keeping Iran from pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and from expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors is vital. This should not be sacrificed to the pursuit of an unachievable certainty. Failure to reach a political settlement would all but guarantee further airstrikes and leave the region more unstable and prone to a nuclear arms race than before Trump's military intervention. BLOOMBERG
Time of India
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Iranian regime change? Not the kind you're looking for.
Back when I used to be able to visit Iran , I remember always being surprised by the popularity of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary's Guard Corps ' elite Al-Quds force , who was assassinated on US President Donald Trump 's orders in 2020. This was true even of Westward-looking Tehranis who loathed the regime and held parties where the alcohol flowed and the skirts were short. Asked why, the answer was always the same. Soleimani kept the foreign threats destabilizing other countries of the Middle East at bay; he fought them abroad so they wouldn't have to be fought at home. Islamic State, a Sunni-Islamist terrorist organization, could terrorize Shiites in Iraq and their Alawite cousins in Syria, but the streets of Tehran were safe. Soleimani played on this. He'd be photographed wearing fatigues out with pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, carefully curating a near mythological image of daring and skill. This resonated, even though he stood at the core of a hated regime, because he seemed to hold the ring for what most Iranians craved: normal lives, safety and a chance at prosperity. They wanted a nuclear reconciliation with the US and Europe, allowing for sanctions to lift and investment to return, for precisely the same reasons. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Moose Approaches Girl At Bus Stop In Bejaia - Watch What Happens Happy in Shape Undo But that was then. A 2015 nuclear deal was agreed but quickly eviscerated by Trump. The IRGC profited from the 'maximum pressure' sanctions that followed, taking over much of the domestic economy and trade ( which became primarily smuggling). Inflation soared. Private business withered. Living standards plummeted. And the worse things got, the more the IRGC cracked down domestically. There is no new Soleimani. The very source of his popularity — that he kept the dogs of war from Iranian doors — has become cause to despise his successors. Al-Quds increasingly was in the business of using the proxy network he built to poke the US and Israeli bears. That obsession backfired spectacularly this month, with Israeli jets bombing Tehran and US B-2s dropping bunker busters on Iranian nuclear facilities. Live Events Soleimani would be hated, too, were he alive today, because he was a leading architect of all this hubris. Indeed, attitudes were changing even before he died. But I think his passage from hero to villain is the context in which to see Iran's next move, now the US and Israel have called off their jets. Change will come in some form, though likely not one we'd all prefer. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 86 years old. He rules a youthful nation in which some 70% of the population weren't even born when the revolution that drives him took place. Having led the country into so desolate a cul-de-sac, his regime will pay a price. The question is how and at whose expense. Change can form around Khamenei or by the IRGC replacing or marginalizing him. But there are clear limits; the regime can't afford to acknowledge that the billions upon billions of dollars it has spent on a nuclear program, and the hundreds of billions more lost due to the sanctions, were all for nothing. It cannot be seen to surrender to 'The Great Satan.' Nor can it realistically afford to just carry on as before, pursuing reckless aggression abroad, while ruling by fear alone at home. A successful popular uprising is unlikely. Khamenei and the IRGC have faced major protests before and repeatedly crushed them. They have about 1 million men under arms, many of them heavily indoctrinated. Urban Iranians are also by now cautious, not just because of that experience, but also because they know theirs is an ethnically fractured country. They have no interest in becoming the next Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan. This leaves the best plausible outcome as a return to the popular age of Soleimani, so an internal regime recalibration rather than regime change. As Cameran Ashraf, an Iranian human rights activist and assistant professor of public policy at the Central European University in Vienna, puts it, we may all be surprised by how things unfold. 'The regime has had very strong emphasis on survival from day one,' he said. 'So, I think there is a type of flexibility there.' We saw some of that already in the carefully choreographed response Iran gave to the US bombing of Fordow. In such a scenario, negotiators would return to talks this week in search of ways to relieve pressure on the regime and Iran's economy, making limited concessions on the nuclear program in exchange. The IRGC would take a more defensive posture abroad. At home, authorities would relent in some areas of needlessly provocative domestic repression — like enforcement of headscarf laws — as they've done at times in the past. Any such course correction would be tactical. The Islamic Republic will not change its spots, until it is no more. But as I argued last week, there is no one-and-done when it comes to Iran's nuclear program, neither by diplomacy nor by force. Both sides would be trying to buy time. The alternative is that Khamenei simply doubles down, concluding that no diplomatic settlement is possible because the US is bent on Iran's destruction and can't be trusted. The focus would be on regime consolidation, rebuilding defenses and acquiring a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible. So far, most signs point to this uglier outcome. Driven to paranoia by the level of Israeli intelligence penetration that led to the killing of dozens of top military commanders and nuclear scientists, a brutal domestic crackdown is underway. As of Sunday, there was little sign the nuclear negotiations Trump has trailed for this week will in fact take place. The US and the West as a whole need to play a more subtle game. In the wake of the bombings, keeping Iran from pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and from expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors is vital. This should not be sacrificed to the pursuit of an unachievable certainty. Failure to reach a political settlement would all but guarantee further airstrikes and leave the region more unstable and prone to a nuclear arms race than before Trump's military intervention.
Yahoo
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
A weakened Tehran lashes out performatively against US airbases to save face
An empty base as a target, with many hours warning, and a limited number of missiles fired at some of the best air defense systems in the world. Iran's retaliation for the US's weekend strikes on three of its nuclear facilities can only have been designed to deescalate. The US-run Al Udeid airbase in Qatar had been evacuated days earlier, with satellite images showing the departure of planes and personnel widely publicised in the media. It is the most important US military airbase in the region, the home of Central Command. It even launched the drone that killed Iran's top military personality, General Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, Iranian state media said in the hours after 'Operation Glad Tidings of Victory.' The Monday strike against Al-Udeid had close to zero chance of American casualties – and provided the perfect moment of quasi-absurd face-saving for Iran. The first hint of a possible strike came when the US Embassy in Doha, Qatar, issued an emergency 'shelter in place' order for US citizens. As if to remove any doubt, Qatar closed its airspace about an hour prior to the launch of what appears to have been close to a dozen missiles by Iran. Adding to the favourable conditions of the launch for Iran's dwindling arsenal, Qatar is close enough to permit the use of shorter-range missiles, stocks of which have not been as depleted as the medium-range missiles used to hit Israel over the past week. To pour water on anything resembling a flame, Iran's National Security Council said moments after the attack the number of missiles fired had been 'as many as the number of bombs used in the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.' Packaging the barrage as the definition of a proportionate response, the Iranian statement went on to insist the attack posed 'no dangerous aspect to our friendly and brotherly country of Qatar and its noble people.' Tehran's method of retaliation-without-fangs has been successfully tried and tested. After Soleimani was killed, Iran's retaliatory missile attack against the US's Al Asad airbase in Iraq was reportedly telegraphed to Baghdad beforehand, possibly helping reduce the level of US injury suffered to mostly concussions. Iran's response to Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024 in the heart of Tehran heavily telegraphed in advance. 'We knew they'd retaliate. They had a similar response after Soleimani,' a senior White House official said Monday night. A playbook appears to be forming. But it is one that compounds Iran's military weakness each time it is employed. In 2020, the Islamic Republic lost its pre-eminent military personality – an Iranian hardline hero. In 2024, it showed that valuable allies were not safe in central Tehran. This year, the regime has lost control of its own airspace to the point of previously unthinkable strikes on their prized nuclear facilities by both Israel and the US. This is stark testament to the differing powers on display. Iran has to feign its strength in a managed presentation of restrained and muted anger. The US and Israel get to break taboos daily, shattering Iran's long-held position as a regional power in under ten days, and perhaps ending its ambitions to be a nuclear power. There is now only one real red line left for the United States or Israel to cross, and that is to directly target Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But that may seem ill-advised, given the likelihood this octogenarian theocrat would be replaced by a younger hardliner who is keener to flex Iran's muscles of deterrence. Better to accept toothless retaliations amid Tehran's slow decline. Each expression of Iran's anger has confirmed its slow erosion of power. An angry fledging nuclear power would have accelerated its race to an atomic bomb. That may still happen. But it looks more likely that Iran is desperately hoping its performative lashing out can sate what remains of its hardliners, decimated by Israeli strikes. It may even hope to shuffle back to diplomacy, with talks to contain a nuclear program and ballistic missile stockpile likely severely depleted to shadows of what they were merely ten days ago.
