Latest news with #Strukov
See - Sada Elbalad
4 days ago
- Business
- See - Sada Elbalad
Russia nationalizes Yugoralzoloto, the country's third-largest gold company, strengthening its control during wartime.
Waleed Farouk In a notable development amid a series of acquisitions carried out by the Russian government since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, a court in the Chelyabinsk region ruled on Friday to nationalize Yuzhuralzoloto, Russia's third-largest gold producer. This move underscores Moscow's intent to strengthen its control over strategic assets during wartime. Prosecutor's Lawsuit and Allegations of Political Exploitation On July 2, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office filed a lawsuit seeking to seize the Yuzhuralzoloto Group of Companies (YUGK) and 10 affiliated firms from billionaire and regional Duma member Konstantin Strukov, who previously served as the company's CEO before entering politics. The prosecution accused Strukov of abusing his political influence to unlawfully acquire the company, restructuring it into a public joint-stock company, and transferring ownership to close associates, including his daughter Alexandra Strukova, a Swiss citizen. Swift Trial Behind Closed Doors According to Interfax, the Sovetsky District Court ruled in favor of the prosecution and ordered the immediate confiscation of all company assets. The trial was held in complete secrecy and lasted no more than two days. The company stated it would decide whether to appeal once the full court decision is released. Strukov: Billionaire and Influential Politician Konstantin Strukov ranks as Russia's 78th richest individual, with an estimated net worth of $1.9 billion. He serves as deputy chairman of the Chelyabinsk regional legislative assembly and is a member of the ruling United Russia party. Despite Yuzhuralzoloto generating revenues of 25 billion rubles (approximately $320 million) in 2023 from producing 10.6 metric tons of gold, the company reported a net loss of 7.2 billion rubles (around $90 million). Kremlin Expands Control Over Private Sector Assets This ruling is part of a broad state-led campaign to seize private assets since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Estimates suggest the government has confiscated private assets valued at over $50 billion, roughly one-third of Russia's annual military expenditure. Observers believe this move may herald a new wave of nationalizations in strategic sectors such as mining and energy, amid escalating geopolitical tensions and the growing role of the Russian state in managing the economy under the banner of a 'sovereign economy.' read more CBE: Deposits in Local Currency Hit EGP 5.25 Trillion Morocco Plans to Spend $1 Billion to Mitigate Drought Effect Gov't Approves Final Version of State Ownership Policy Document Egypt's Economy Expected to Grow 5% by the end of 2022/23- Minister Qatar Agrees to Supply Germany with LNG for 15 Years Business Oil Prices Descend amid Anticipation of Additional US Strategic Petroleum Reserves Business Suez Canal Records $704 Million, Historically Highest Monthly Revenue Business Egypt's Stock Exchange Earns EGP 4.9 Billion on Tuesday Business Wheat delivery season commences on April 15 News Israeli-Linked Hadassah Clinic in Moscow Treats Wounded Iranian IRGC Fighters News China Launches Largest Ever Aircraft Carrier Sports Former Al Zamalek Player Ibrahim Shika Passes away after Long Battle with Cancer Videos & Features Tragedy Overshadows MC Alger Championship Celebration: One Fan Dead, 11 Injured After Stadium Fall Lifestyle Get to Know 2025 Eid Al Adha Prayer Times in Egypt Business Fear & Greed Index Plummets to Lowest Level Ever Recorded amid Global Trade War News "Tensions Escalate: Iran Probes Allegations of Indian Tech Collaboration with Israeli Intelligence" News Flights suspended at Port Sudan Airport after Drone Attacks Arts & Culture Hawass Foundation Launches 1st Course to Teach Ancient Egyptian Language Videos & Features Video: Trending Lifestyle TikToker Valeria Márquez Shot Dead during Live Stream
Memri
7 days ago
- Business
- Memri
On Russia's 'Nationalization'
On July 2, 2025, the Russian bailiff service officers raided a private Bombardier Global 5000 business jet ready to take off from Chelyabinsk airport for Turkey,[1] preventing its owner, the billionaire politician Konstantin Strukov, from escaping the country. Strukov, the major stakeholder in one of Russia's largest gold producers, YuzhUralZoloto and a longtime member of the United Russia party, has been a deputy of Chelyabinsk regional legislature since 2000 and holds the position of deputy chairman of the body since 2020.[2] Earlier that day, the court in Chelyabinsk issued a ruling banning him from leaving Russia and seized his assets following an order from the office of from Russia's Prosecutor-General's Office.[3] Strukov is accused of amassing his fortune (he is listed in Russia's most recent Forbes list as No. 78 with assets valued at $1.9 billion)[4] via scam schemes that involved corruption and misuse of his administrative position. This looks like another case for confiscating the assets of a Russian businessman in favor of the state, which looks quite "normal" these days as more than 400 enterprises valued at at least 2.6 trillion rubles, formerly belonging to the Russian owners,[5] had already changed hands since 2022. I should mention from the outset that I am not talking about squeezing out investors from the so-called "unfriendly" countries, a process has been underway since the start of Russia's full-scale assault on Ukraine and which I had called "the robbery of the century" as it deprived Western companies of more than $100 billion in assets, handing them to Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin – the acquisition of Russian business of Société Générale by Vladimir Potatin, who himself had sold his Rosbank to the French financiers for $2 billion several years earlier, or appropriation of Danone's Russian factories by Ramzan Kadyrov's proxies are most notable examples of these confiscations.[6] Unlike these cases, the pressure on the Russian businesses that has been mounting since 2023 is, to my mind, less driven by the wish to "redistribute" valuable assets from one group of oligarchs to others – the underlying mechanics looks at least somewhat different this time. Confiscations Are Politically Motivated First, it should be noted that almost every single case of what I would call "nationalization" applies to companies that were at some time bought by their current owners from the Russian state or from regional authorities (therefore one may also use the term "de-privatization").[7] Even while Russian President Vladimir Putin has been saying for years that the Russian government has no intention of depriving "well-behaving" and "law-abiding" proprietors of their assets,[8] the prosecutor-general reiterated many times that his entity is doing a lot for "returning to the State what belongs to it." This looks like a serious claim since there are few cases of the confiscation of companies that were started and developed without any state-owned assets.[9] The most telling case was that of Lesta Games, a company that acquired a Russian subsidiary of the famous Wargaming, the developer of the realistic online game, World of Tanks.[10] The Russian owners were declared extremists for their alleged support for Ukraine and their holdings were confiscated.[11] In all other cases, the Russian prosecutors cite either irregularities with privatization or corruption and conflict of interest issues for claiming the property. To facilitate the process, Russian lawmakers eventually annulled the statutes of limitation on the "wrongdoings" linked to privatization deals (formally, they are still in place, but several court rulings, including one by the Constitutional Court, say that this term should now start not from the day of sell-off but from the one the prosecutors found out it was illegal).[12] Therefore, any privatization deal may now be disputed, as the company may have been merged with another, or sold, or transformed into limited liability companies and made public.[13] If one looks carefully at the ongoing confiscation processes, one can find out that they are initiated mostly against those who can be accused of privatizing the initial assets for pennies (but this applies to almost all of those who participated in the 1990s sell-off since the asset prices were then extremely low),[14] who are combining their business activities with administrative and elected positions (it seems to be linked to attempts to "fight corruption") and who used off-shore holdings for their business operations and/or hold foreign citizenships and foreign residence permits (this seems to be a continuation of the famous "nationalization of the elites" proclaimed by Putin as early as in 2013).[15] The latter issue has seemingly become one of the most crucial in recent months (both Konstantin Strukov and Dmitry Kamenshchik, the famous owner of the Domodedovo Airport, which was confiscated by the government this June, were called "influenced from abroad").[16] So there is no doubt that confiscations are politically motivated and therefore inspired more by the state itself, rather than by some oligarchic groups. It may be noted that for a long time both in the Russian independent media and in foreign sources a popular concept has been disseminated, linking this "new nationalization" to the Rotenberg brothers, Arkady and Boris, who are longtime friends of Putin.[17] The main rationale beyond it was the fact that, since 2020, the Kremlin has initiated several cases for stripping Russian businessmen of their assets – and some of the properties ended up in the Rotenbergs' hands. In August 2020, President Putin called the Prosecutor-General's Office to investigate the 1992 privatization of the Bashkir Caustic Company. In December of the same year a Russian court ordered its shares to be returned to the state and transferred to Rosimuschestvo, or the Federal Property Management Agency.[18] Four years later, the company was excluded from the strategic enterprises' list, and the majority stake was sold to a company called Roskhim, allegedly owned by the Rotenbergs.[19] The same, but a bit earlier, happened to Metafrax Chemicals, Russia's largest methanol manufacturer, which was also nationalized due to 1992 privatization irregularities and soon resold to Roskhim together with some other companies, including the Kuchuksulfat factory, based in the Altai region.[20] I would not exclude some influence that the Rotenbergs brothers may have on the current confiscations (many insiders claim that they were the people behind the long-lasting attacks on the Domodedovo airport), but to my mind one should take into consideration the changing nature of current Russian "nationalizations." This change seems to be manifested by the fact that – unlike the Western companies handed to new Russian owners in 2022-2023 – most of the assets currently retributed by the state either remain in the state's possession or are transferred to companies and banks that belong to the state. For example, in nine of the 12 largest cases recorded in 2023-2025, the assets were either transferred to the balance sheet of Rosimuschestvo, or went to corporations and banks that are in state ownership (for example, FESCO and the Solikamsk magnesium plant were granted to Rosatom, the Makfa pasta factory went to Rosselkhozbank, and the Pokrovsky meat holding to VTB).[21] In all these cases, it can hardly be said that the enterprises passed to some oligarchic companies on the basis of ownership – the maximum that can be asserted is that certain people close to the authorities may in the future benefit from their work, but this also needs to be proven. I would add that the concentration of industrial assets in state ownership might be accelerated also by the ongoing crisis in some industries – for example, coal production faces incredible pressures from the global market,[22] and the aviation industry might increase its operational losses, as the disruptions mount in the Russian air traffic caused by the ongoing drone war with Ukraine,[23] so I would not exclude developments that may cause a state takeover of these industries allowing their direct financing from the federal budget. The Kremlin Believes Time For Russian Big Private Business Is Largely Over The main result of the current "deprivatization" seems to be not so much the redistribution of property among the oligarchs as the consolidation of new assets for the state. Of 2.4 trillion rubles at which the companies that the Prosecutor-General's Office seized from their owners were valued, Rosimuschestvo retains assets worth almost one trillion, and more than 800 billion were transferred to various state companies or state banks, while the new private owners received no more than one-fourth of what was confiscated. Of course, there are certain expectations that Rosimuschestvo will not end up as the final owner of the confiscated assets, but I think that, given the logic of the current regime's actions, most of the assets will still end this part of their journey in the hands of state structures, so this is clearly not so much a redistribution as nationalization. Moreover, the initiative to open the new cases on the basis of which property can be seized and then converted into state revenue belongs not so much to the president, but it is now almost entirely in prosecutors' hands (97 percent of cases are opened by Prosecutor-General's Office and about two percent by the Investigative Committee). Hence, I would say that those who argue that the 50-year-old Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov is the main (and autonomous) figure behind all this, who thereby strengthens his reputation among the aging leading security officials and accustoms business and officials to recognize his powers and authority, might be right. Some insiders even began to treat him as a potential successor to President Putin, which, I would say, cannot be proved by any means. However, all such rumors confirm my opinion that "de-privatization" is not a process of inter-oligarchic redistribution, but something much more political in nature. The latter, of course, does not exclude the material interest of both the security officials and many of Putin's friends – but most likely they intend to profit from financial flows provided by using the new assets under state ownership than to formally become their owners. This is a much more familiar way of earning money for officials, who rarely want to turn themselves into classic entrepreneurs. What one may see now in Russia looks like a profound change is government's policies. It seems that for years, the Kremlin had opted for a "soft management" of the national economy based on manipulations with taxes or "corporate responsibility," meaning the exchange of some entrepreneurial freedoms for loyalty and cooperation. The businesses were expected to limit their offshore activities, to re-register in Russia, to pay taxes, and comply with their increases (in some cases predictable, in some, as in 2023-2024, unexpected), etc.[24] Those who violated these terms faced pressure, and, under some conditions, confiscation of their assets – primarily in case of open disloyalty, stealing funds or engaged in acute conflict of interests. Under such a regime, the redistribution was familiar, with more loyals rewarded by the assets that formerly belonged to less loyal ones (the attitude to the foreign investors that resulted in massive confiscations of 2022-2023 and in continuing attempts to prevent their return to Russia were driven by the same rationale).[25] Now, it looks like the main logic has changed – the state wants not to tax successful and profitable large enterprises but rather to own them. I would not say whether it wants either to maximize its own revenues or just to increase its control over the economy – but the drive is clear: the Kremlin believes the time for Russian big private business is largely over. The entrepreneurship should become limited to the mid-sized and small business that would dominate the logistics, retail, and service sectors while the industrial sector must, more-or-less, return to state ownership to meet the state's demand and promulgate its interests. The exceptions may remain – but they nevertheless will be just the exceptions that prove the rule. Some time ago President Putin had one more time called for not taking the ongoing process for nationalization – pretending that "nationalization is a process that is prescribed by law, [but] we do not apply this law, these norms."[26] Of course, the president lied as he does most of the time: I would say that there is still no law in Russia that would clearly regulate the nationalization process (there is only Art. 306 of the Civil Code, which refers to the possibility of its adoption),[27] but the distinct law that might be applied was never deliberated. Moreover, according to the Civil Code norms, any case of nationalization must be accompanied by the redemption of the asset's value (presumably based on market-driven estimates), and not its requisition. Lenin's "New Economic Policy" Yet, looking on what is going on in Russia, it is hard to agree with Putin: One may call the process as "etatization," emphasizing that the Russian state has little to do with the Russian people, but the essence remains the same – Russia is turning back to something resembling Lenin's "New Economic Policy" (NEP): a regime that allows private business to operate on the lower level, reserving the large productive enterprises to the state's sphere of interest. The problem, nevertheless, resides in a fact that no one can properly fix the dividing line between big and small, crucial and unimportant – and this opens a broad perspective for an overall increase of state influence. In the Soviet times, it took less than ten years to dismantle the NEP regime, and, it might be that a decade from now looks like a realistic timeframe for the complete destruction of Russia's big business. *Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and founder and director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.
International Business Times
08-07-2025
- Business
- International Business Times
Who Is Konstantin Strukov? Russian Billionaire Gold Tycoon Targeted as Putin Seizes His Private Jet and Passport in Asset Crackdown
Russian President Vladimir Putin is cracking down on wealthy businessmen as the country faces deep financial strain from its ongoing war in Ukraine. One of the latest targets is billionaire Konstantin Strukov, owner of the gold mining giant Yuzhuralzoloto, who is worth over $3.5 billion. On July 5, Strukov's private jet was stopped at a Russian airport as it prepared to depart for Turkey. Authorities seized his passport and grounded the flight following a court order enforced by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). According to a Kyiv Insider report, Strukov is under investigation over how he accumulated his fortune. Russian prosecutors accuse Strukov of illegally enriching himself through the use of shell companies and the names of family members. His company has denied these claims, stating he was in Moscow on the day in question and calling the news "disinformation." However, court records reportedly confirm that a travel ban was placed on him and his family earlier. This move is part of a larger trend in Putin's Russia—shifting focus from political dissenters to wealthy elites in key industries such as gold, oil, and defense. These sectors are now considered essential to sustaining the war economy. Not even loyalty to Putin seems to provide protection anymore. Strukov, who has previously held political roles in support of the Kremlin, is now facing legal heat. Until recently, the government mostly targeted those who opposed the war or fled the country. Now, financial power alone is enough to draw attention. As Western sanctions squeeze Russia's economy and oil revenue drops, the Kremlin appears to be tapping into billionaire assets to bridge budget gaps. In recent months, several wealthy Russians have faced investigations, asset seizures, or have died under unclear circumstances. A court hearing on July 8 is expected to decide the fate of Strukov's business empire. But for Russia's ultra-rich, the signal is already clear: wealth and connections are no longer a guarantee of safety in wartime Russia.
Time of India
07-07-2025
- Business
- Time of India
Russia's elites in panic as Putin seizes empire of gold mogul Konstantin Strukov - private jet and passport seized
Russian President Vladimir Putin has started taking away assets from Konstantin Strukov, one of the richest businessmen in Russia. Strukov is worth over $3.5 billion and owns Yuzhuralzoloto, a huge gold mining company in Russia, as per the news reports. On July 5, Strukov's private jet was stopped at the airport as it was getting ready to fly to Turkey. His passport was taken away, and the plane was not allowed to leave the country. The Federal Security Service (FSB) acted on a court order, stopping the flight. The court is investigating how Strukov got his wealth, as per the report by Kyiv Insider. Why Russian government is doing this Prosecutors say Strukov used shell companies and family members to get rich illegally. Strukov's company denied everything, saying he was in Moscow on July 5 and called the reports 'disinformation.' But court documents prove that a travel ban was already placed on Strukov and his family, as per the Kyiv Insider report. This is part of a bigger trend in Putin's Russia—taking wealth from rich businessmen to support the war economy. The government is now focusing on industries like gold, oil, and defense, which are useful for funding the Ukraine war, as per the reports. ALSO READ: Trump reveals his secret nickname for Melania, and even he says 'It's terrible' Live Events Being loyal to Putin doesn't help anymore Strukov has always been loyal to Putin and even held political roles with the ruling party. But even loyalty is not protecting oligarchs anymore. Earlier, the government went after people who spoke out against the war or ran away. Now it's going after anyone with money, even if they support Putin, as per the report by Kyiv Insider. Russia is struggling financially—sanctions, less oil money, and budget problems are forcing the Kremlin to take money from billionaires. In the last few months, many rich Russian businessmen have faced legal cases, had assets taken, or even died under suspicious circumstances, as stated by the reports. The old deal was: stay loyal, stay rich. But now, even that "social contract" is breaking under the pressure of war. A court hearing on July 8 will decide what happens to Strukov's gold empire, as per the reports. ALSO READ: 102-year-old World War II hero's viral message about America will leave you inspired But the message is already clear to Russia's oligarchs: No one is too rich or too connected to be safe anymore. Putin is turning Russia's billionaires into targets, using their money to fund a war Russia can't afford, according to the report by Kyiv Insider. FAQs Q1. Why did Putin seize Konstantin Strukov's assets? Putin's government claims Strukov got his wealth through illegal means and is now targeting rich businessmen to fund the war in Ukraine. Q2. Was Konstantin Strukov trying to flee Russia? Yes, his private jet was stopped on July 5 as it was about to fly to Turkey, and his passport was taken by authorities. Economic Times WhatsApp channel )
Straits Times
07-07-2025
- Business
- Straits Times
Explainer-Konstantin Strukov, the Russian gold billionaire facing Russian asset seizure
Sign up now: Get ST's newsletters delivered to your inbox MOSCOW - Russian prosecutors are seeking to seize billionaire Konstantin Strukov's majority stake in major gold producer Uzhuralzoloto (UGC) for the state. A hearing at the Sovetsky District Court in the Urals city of Chelyabinsk is scheduled for July 8 in a case that marks the latest in a string of asset seizures by the Russian state. WHO IS KONSTANTIN STRUKOV? Strukov, born in Russia's Orenburg Region in 1958, worked in mining straight after graduating from Magnitogorsk State Technical University. Uzhuralzoloto was founded as a Soviet enterprise in 1976 and was privatised in 1993 following the Soviet Union's collapse. Production had almost ground to a halt by 1997, when Strukov became head of the unprofitable enterprise. A business of the same name was created and assets, including the Svetlinsky gold deposit - the largest in the Urals region - were transferred to it. The company subsequently went bankrupt and Strukov was able to acquire its underlying assets and shares in a new company for 12.8 million roubles ($162,600). Top stories Swipe. Select. Stay informed. 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The company has 17 core assets and eight processing facilities across two major regional bases. Production in 2024 fell by 17% to 10.6 tons year-on-year, due to some mines being closed at the regulator's behest. UGC expects output to increase this year to as much as 14.4 tons. Strukov, whose fortune is estimated by Forbes at $1.9 billion, was placed under sanctions by some Western countries after Moscow sent troops into Ukraine, including Britain, which has said his work as a director of a company in the Russian extractives sector supported the Russian government. Since 2000, Strukov has served on Chelyabinsk Region's legislative assembly. He is deputy speaker of the region's parliament and a member of the ruling United Russia party. WHAT IS THE CASE AGAINST STRUKOV? The Chelyabinsk court told Reuters that Russia's deputy prosecutor general had filed a lawsuit against Strukov and several other people, accusing them of obtaining property "through corruption". It did not specify further details, but Russian news agencies reported, citing a law enforcement source, that prosecutors were seeking to convert Strukov's entire stake in UGC to state property. The Kommersant daily, citing court documents, reported that prosecutors believe Strukov used the bankruptcy procedure and his position as a state official to transfer assets to UGC. According to Kommersant, searches were conducted at UGC offices last week in relation to alleged violations of environmental legislation and industrial safety rules. The newspaper also reported, citing court documents, that 200 billion roubles of Strukov's assets could be confiscated and that he had used a Cypriot offshore company to conceal his involvement with UGC. Reuters has sought comment from Strukov through UGC. Strukov owns a 67.8% stake in UGC, according to company data as of the end of 2024. A company connected to Gazprombank bought a 22% stake late last year and the remaining 10% of shares floated on the Moscow Exchange in 2023 and 2024 in two public offerings. The central bank suspended trading of UGC's Moscow-listed shares on Friday after they slumped almost 30% in two sessions. The company said in an investor-focused blog on Friday that protecting minority shareholders' rights was a top priority. An anonymous comment on that post said: "The casino is safer than the stock market." IMPACT ON RUSSIA'S BUSINESS CLIMATE? Foreign companies have grappled with the risk of state seizure since Russia sent troops into Ukraine in February 2022, but Moscow, citing strategic stability and domestic security, has increasingly turned its attention to domestic assets too. It was not clear why Strukov and UGC were targeted. Moscow has been sending mixed messages on foreign investment, seeking to present Russia as a viable destination for foreign capital, while also arresting top business figures. Foreign investment has declined sharply since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. Vadim Moshkovich, the billionaire founder of Russia's top agriculture company Rusagro, has been held in pre-trial detention since late March on charges of embezzlement that he denies. REUTERS
