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Business Times
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Times
This isn't the Iranian regime change you're looking for
Back when I used to be able to visit Iran, I remember always being surprised by the popularity of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) elite Al-Quds force, who was assassinated on US President Donald Trump's orders in 2020. This was true even of Westward-looking Teheranis who loathed the regime and held parties where the alcohol flowed and the skirts were short. Asked why, the answer was always the same. Soleimani kept the foreign threats destabilising other countries of the Middle East at bay; he fought them abroad so they would not have to be fought at home. Islamic State, a Sunni-Islamist terrorist organisation, could terrorise Shiites in Iraq and their Alawite cousins in Syria – but the streets of Teheran were safe. Soleimani played on this. He would be photographed wearing fatigues out with pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, carefully curating a near mythological image of daring and skill. This resonated, even though he stood at the core of a hated regime, because he seemed to hold the ring for what most Iranians craved: normal lives, safety and a chance at prosperity. They wanted a nuclear reconciliation with the US and Europe, allowing for sanctions to lift and investment to return, for precisely the same reasons. But that was then. A 2015 nuclear deal was agreed but quickly eviscerated by Trump. The IRGC profited from the 'maximum pressure' sanctions that followed, taking over much of the domestic economy and trade (which became primarily smuggling). Inflation soared. Private business withered. Living standards plummeted. And the worse things got, the more the IRGC cracked down domestically. There is no new Soleimani. The very source of his popularity – that he kept the dogs of war from Iranian doors – has become cause to despise his successors. Al-Quds increasingly was in the business of using the proxy network he built to poke the US and Israeli bears. That obsession backfired spectacularly this month, with Israeli jets bombing Teheran and US B-2s dropping bunker busters on Iranian nuclear facilities. Soleimani would be hated, too, were he alive today, because he was a leading architect of all this hubris. Indeed, attitudes were changing even before he died. But I think his passage from hero to villain is the context in which to see Iran's next move, now that the US and Israel have called off their jets. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up Change will come in some form, though likely not one we would all prefer. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 86 years old. He rules a youthful nation in which some 70 per cent of the population were not even born when the revolution that drives him took place. Having led the country into so desolate a cul-de-sac, his regime will pay a price. The question is how and at whose expense. Change – but with limits Change can form around Khamenei or by the IRGC replacing or marginalising him. But there are clear limits; the regime cannot afford to acknowledge that the billions upon billions of dollars it has spent on a nuclear programme, and the hundreds of billions more lost due to the sanctions, were all for nothing. It cannot be seen to surrender to 'The Great Satan'. Nor can it realistically afford to just carry on as before, pursuing reckless aggression abroad, while ruling by fear alone at home. A successful popular uprising is unlikely. Khamenei and the IRGC have faced major protests before, and repeatedly crushed them. They have about one million men under arms, many of them heavily indoctrinated. Urban Iranians are also by now cautious, not just because of that experience, but also because they know theirs is an ethnically fractured country. They have no interest in becoming the next Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan. This leaves the best plausible outcome as a return to the popular age of Soleimani, so an internal regime recalibration rather than regime change. Flexibility in survival As Cameran Ashraf, an Iranian human rights activist and assistant professor of public policy at the Central European University in Vienna, puts it, we may all be surprised by how things unfold. 'The regime has had very strong emphasis on survival from day one,' he said. 'So, I think there is a type of flexibility there.' We saw some of that already in the carefully choreographed response Iran gave to the US bombing of Fordow. In such a scenario, negotiators would return to talks this week in search of ways to relieve pressure on the regime and Iran's economy, making limited concessions on the nuclear programme in exchange. The IRGC would take a more defensive posture abroad. At home, authorities would relent in some areas of needlessly provocative domestic repression – like enforcement of headscarf laws – as they have done at times in the past. Any such course correction would be tactical. The Islamic Republic will not change its spots, until it is no more. But as I argued before, there is no one-and-done when it comes to Iran's nuclear programme, neither by diplomacy nor by force. Both sides would be trying to buy time. The alternative is that Khamenei simply doubles down, concluding that no diplomatic settlement is possible because the US is bent on Iran's destruction and cannot be trusted. The focus would be on regime consolidation, rebuilding defences and acquiring a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible. So far, most signs point to this uglier outcome. Driven to paranoia by the level of Israeli intelligence penetration that led to the killing of dozens of top military commanders and nuclear scientists, a brutal domestic crackdown is underway. As at Sunday (Jun 29), there was little sign the nuclear negotiations Trump has trailed for this week will in fact take place. The US and the West as a whole need to play a more subtle game. In the wake of the bombings, keeping Iran from pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and from expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors is vital. This should not be sacrificed to the pursuit of an unachievable certainty. Failure to reach a political settlement would all but guarantee further airstrikes and leave the region more unstable and prone to a nuclear arms race than before Trump's military intervention. BLOOMBERG
Time of India
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Iranian regime change? Not the kind you're looking for.
Back when I used to be able to visit Iran , I remember always being surprised by the popularity of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary's Guard Corps ' elite Al-Quds force , who was assassinated on US President Donald Trump 's orders in 2020. This was true even of Westward-looking Tehranis who loathed the regime and held parties where the alcohol flowed and the skirts were short. Asked why, the answer was always the same. Soleimani kept the foreign threats destabilizing other countries of the Middle East at bay; he fought them abroad so they wouldn't have to be fought at home. Islamic State, a Sunni-Islamist terrorist organization, could terrorize Shiites in Iraq and their Alawite cousins in Syria, but the streets of Tehran were safe. Soleimani played on this. He'd be photographed wearing fatigues out with pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, carefully curating a near mythological image of daring and skill. This resonated, even though he stood at the core of a hated regime, because he seemed to hold the ring for what most Iranians craved: normal lives, safety and a chance at prosperity. They wanted a nuclear reconciliation with the US and Europe, allowing for sanctions to lift and investment to return, for precisely the same reasons. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Moose Approaches Girl At Bus Stop In Bejaia - Watch What Happens Happy in Shape Undo But that was then. A 2015 nuclear deal was agreed but quickly eviscerated by Trump. The IRGC profited from the 'maximum pressure' sanctions that followed, taking over much of the domestic economy and trade ( which became primarily smuggling). Inflation soared. Private business withered. Living standards plummeted. And the worse things got, the more the IRGC cracked down domestically. There is no new Soleimani. The very source of his popularity — that he kept the dogs of war from Iranian doors — has become cause to despise his successors. Al-Quds increasingly was in the business of using the proxy network he built to poke the US and Israeli bears. That obsession backfired spectacularly this month, with Israeli jets bombing Tehran and US B-2s dropping bunker busters on Iranian nuclear facilities. Live Events Soleimani would be hated, too, were he alive today, because he was a leading architect of all this hubris. Indeed, attitudes were changing even before he died. But I think his passage from hero to villain is the context in which to see Iran's next move, now the US and Israel have called off their jets. Change will come in some form, though likely not one we'd all prefer. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 86 years old. He rules a youthful nation in which some 70% of the population weren't even born when the revolution that drives him took place. Having led the country into so desolate a cul-de-sac, his regime will pay a price. The question is how and at whose expense. Change can form around Khamenei or by the IRGC replacing or marginalizing him. But there are clear limits; the regime can't afford to acknowledge that the billions upon billions of dollars it has spent on a nuclear program, and the hundreds of billions more lost due to the sanctions, were all for nothing. It cannot be seen to surrender to 'The Great Satan.' Nor can it realistically afford to just carry on as before, pursuing reckless aggression abroad, while ruling by fear alone at home. A successful popular uprising is unlikely. Khamenei and the IRGC have faced major protests before and repeatedly crushed them. They have about 1 million men under arms, many of them heavily indoctrinated. Urban Iranians are also by now cautious, not just because of that experience, but also because they know theirs is an ethnically fractured country. They have no interest in becoming the next Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan. This leaves the best plausible outcome as a return to the popular age of Soleimani, so an internal regime recalibration rather than regime change. As Cameran Ashraf, an Iranian human rights activist and assistant professor of public policy at the Central European University in Vienna, puts it, we may all be surprised by how things unfold. 'The regime has had very strong emphasis on survival from day one,' he said. 'So, I think there is a type of flexibility there.' We saw some of that already in the carefully choreographed response Iran gave to the US bombing of Fordow. In such a scenario, negotiators would return to talks this week in search of ways to relieve pressure on the regime and Iran's economy, making limited concessions on the nuclear program in exchange. The IRGC would take a more defensive posture abroad. At home, authorities would relent in some areas of needlessly provocative domestic repression — like enforcement of headscarf laws — as they've done at times in the past. Any such course correction would be tactical. The Islamic Republic will not change its spots, until it is no more. But as I argued last week, there is no one-and-done when it comes to Iran's nuclear program, neither by diplomacy nor by force. Both sides would be trying to buy time. The alternative is that Khamenei simply doubles down, concluding that no diplomatic settlement is possible because the US is bent on Iran's destruction and can't be trusted. The focus would be on regime consolidation, rebuilding defenses and acquiring a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible. So far, most signs point to this uglier outcome. Driven to paranoia by the level of Israeli intelligence penetration that led to the killing of dozens of top military commanders and nuclear scientists, a brutal domestic crackdown is underway. As of Sunday, there was little sign the nuclear negotiations Trump has trailed for this week will in fact take place. The US and the West as a whole need to play a more subtle game. In the wake of the bombings, keeping Iran from pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and from expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors is vital. This should not be sacrificed to the pursuit of an unachievable certainty. Failure to reach a political settlement would all but guarantee further airstrikes and leave the region more unstable and prone to a nuclear arms race than before Trump's military intervention.
CBC
11-03-2025
- Politics
- CBC
Violent clashes between Syria's government, Assad loyalists left hundreds dead. Here's what to know
Social Sharing Hundreds of people were killed in Syria over four days after violent clashes between the army and loyalists of the deposed president Bashar al-Assad swept its western coastal region. What began as an ambush on Syrian security patrol by Assad loyalists brought havoc to several cities and towns on the coast. The attack sparked the worst violence Syria has seen since the end of 13 years of conflict in the country and three months after the Assad regime was overthrown in an offensive by opposition fighters led by the Sunni-Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS. Here's what we know so far about the attacks and where things currently stand in the region. How did the violence erupt? The violence unfolded on Thursday, after a surprise attack by gunmen from the Alawite community on a police patrol near the port city of Latakia spiraled into widespread clashes across Syria's coastal region. The attacks — which appeared to be co-ordinated — were a major escalation and a challenge to the new government in Damascus, where the former insurgents now in power have pledged to unite Syria after more than 50 years under the Assad dynasty. In their ambush, the armed pro-Assad fighters overwhelmed government security forces and later took control of Qardaha, Assad's hometown, as Damascus scrambled to bring in reinforcements. The majority of the population in the coastal cities are members of the ousted president's Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam. The Alawites previously formed the core constituency of Assad's government in the Sunni-majority country, linking the community to the regime's brutal rule over Syria, in the eyes of its opponents. But many Alawites said that they suffered like other Syrians under the rule of Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad. Eyewitness reports and videos from the coastal region showed houses in several neighbourhoods set on fire and bloodied bodies laid on the streets. Many residents said they were too afraid to leave their homes. The government poured reinforcements to coastal cities including Latakia, Banias, Tartous and Jableh, to crush what it described as a deadly, well-planned and premeditated assault by remnants of the Assad regime. On Monday, the government said it had ended its military operation in Latakia and Tartous. Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa later acknowledged that some armed groups had entered without prior co-ordination with the defence ministry. The Syria Campaign and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) said Saturday that both security forces and pro-Assad gunmen were "carrying out mass executions and systematic killings." Who was targeted? Despite authorities calling for an end to the sectarian incitement, the clashes turned deadly, and many civilians were killed. Between Thursday and Monday, roughly 779 people were killed, according to the SNHR. The SNHR told CBC News in a statement that at least 383 people were killed by remnants of the Assad regime. Of those 383 people, 172 were members of the General Security Forces and 211 were civilians. CBC News could not independently verify these numbers. Meanwhile, armed forces — composed of military factions, armed local residents (both Syrian and foreign) and members of the general security forces — were responsible for the deaths of at least 396 people, according to SNHR. "Distinguishing between civilians and disarmed members of the Assad regime has proven particularly challenging, as many of them were dressed in civilian clothing," the organization said. The SNHR also noted that its death tolls exclude "combat-related" fatalities among the Assad loyalists, "as such deaths are not classified as violations of international law." CBC News's verification team has verified a video posted on Saturday by the Syrian Coast Observatory on Telegram showing men in Public Security Forces uniform shooting at unarmed people in civilian clothes. Five bodies of people killed were shown on video. The UN human rights office said Tuesday that entire families including women and children were killed as part of a series of sectarian killings by the army against an insurgency by Assad loyalists. How has the new government responded? Defence Ministry spokesperson Hassan Abdel Ghani said Sunday that security forces have restored control of the region and will continue pursuing leaders of the galvanized insurgency. Four people were arrested Tuesday by the Public Security Department for allegedly committing illegal and bloody violations against civilians in the region, according to Syria's state news agency SANA. On Monday, Sharaa told Reuters that he could not yet say whether forces from Syria's Defence Ministry — which has incorporated former rebel factions under one structure — were involved in the sectarian killings. "Syria is a state of law. The law will take its course on all," he told Reuters in an interview. "We fought to defend the oppressed, and we won't accept that any blood be shed unjustly, or goes without punishment or accountability, even among those closest to us." Sharaa blamed pro-Assad groups backed by foreigners for triggering the bloodshed but acknowledged that revenge killings had followed. Sharaa, appealing to Syrians and the international community in an address over the weekend, called for accountability for anyone who harms civilians and mistreats prisoners and said said Syria will not be dragged into civil war. WATCH | Hundreds in Syria killed in deadly clashes: More than 1,000 civilians reported killed as violence in Syria spirals 2 days ago Duration 3:14 The Syrian fact-finding committee investigating sectarian killings said it would seek the arrest and prosecution of any perpetrators involved. "No one is above the law, the committee will relay all the results to the entity that launched it, the presidency, and the judiciary," the committee's spokesperson Yasser Farhan said in a televised news conference Tuesday. The committee was preparing lists of witnesses to interview and potential perpetrators, and would refer any suspects with sufficient evidence against them to the judiciary, Farhan added. What has happened since? Several demonstrations were held in Syria following the onslaught of violence. Syrians gathered Tuesday in Latakia to demonstrate against the recent mass killings. "One, one, one. The Syrian people are one," demonstrators chanted in videos out of Latakia, calling for security in the region and for protection from the government against sectarian violence. The Syria Campaign shared a statement on Instagram Tuesday following the events. "Our hearts break for all the families who lost loved ones to [the] horrific massacres," it said, adding that many are still unable to bury their loved ones while others are flee their homes in fear for their lives. "Indifference equals complicity. Speak up against these atrocities and demand accountability and justice for all," the statement said. Since Assad was ousted, Sharaa has pledged to run Syria in an inclusive way. While many Syrians believed the Alawites were favoured under Assad, who had included many senior bureaucrats and military officers, thousands have continued to call for unity among all sects since the new interim government was formed. The UN refugee agency said in a statement that 6,078 Syrians have arrived in about a dozen villages in northern Lebanon's Akkar province after fleeing the fighting in Syria's coastal area, according to local authorities.
