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Rudaw Net
05-05-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
Why is the US 'reciprocal tariff' believed to hurt others and backfire on itself?
Also in Opinions Kurds amid the slow and fast rhythms of today's Middle Eastern politics Iran in the shadow of war talk Sharing development opportunities and welcoming the blessed Ramadan together Syria-SDF deal: What's really happening behind the scenes A+ A- Recently, the United States' "reciprocal tariff" policy has triggered global turmoil, with most stakeholders expressing concern that the US's abuse of tariff could severely undermine the international multilateral trade order and bring negative impact over the global economy. Meanwhile, US stock, bond, and currency markets have plummeted, and large-scale protests have erupted in multiple locations. People cannot help but ask: Is "reciprocal tariff" truly about "America First," or is it harming others without benefiting itself? I would like to share my views with the readers from the following five aspects. Was the US really 'treated unfairly' before 'reciprocal tariff'? In the era of globalization, the connotation of international trade has long extended beyond goods, and a trade deficit in goods is not the sole standard for trade balance. World Trade Organization Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala published an article titled "The US is a Trade Winner," pointing out that US service exports surpassed $1 trillion in 2023 (accounting for about one-seventh of total import & export), representing 13% of global service trade, with surpluses to most major economies, totaling $300 billion in 2024. The U.S. holds near-monopolies in high-value-added service sectors, earning nearly $150 billion annually in intellectual property royalties, and exports in finance, legal, technology, and other professional services, which support 4.1 million jobs. China-US economic and trade relations are in fact mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. In 2023, China's service trade deficit with the US was $26.57 billion, accounting for 9.5 percent of the US's total service trade surplus. More than 70,000 US companies have invested in China, generating annual profits of $50 billion. Considering goods trade, service trade, and local sales of domestic companies' branches in the other country, the economic and trade exchanges between China and the US are generally balanced. A foreign netizen posted on social media, stating that the US accuses China of benefiting from the trade deficit but does not acknowledge that high-quality and reasonably-priced Chinese goods support Americans' comfortable lifestyles. Can tariffs solve the US's debt problem? Raising tariffs contributes little to increasing US fiscal revenue. White House Trade and Manufacturing Policy Advisor Peter Navarro claimed that tariff would add about $600 billion annually to US government revenue, but this figure ignores that tariff will lead to reduced US import demand, causing tariff revenue to shrink accordingly. Moody's Chief Economist Mark Zandi stated that the US's goal of increasing revenue is unattainable. Currently, tariffs account for only 1.6% of US government revenue, if high tariffs trigger an economic recession, major fiscal revenue sources such as personal income tax, social security tax, and corporate income tax would be impacted, leading to a big loss for the economy. High tariffs will exacerbate the risk of US economic recession and debt problems. Morgan Stanley predicts that if tariffs are fully implemented, US GDP growth will drop from 1.3 percent to -0.3 percent, if tariffs continue until September, the probability of a U.S. economic recession will rise to 60 percent. Recession expectations have led investors to sell off US Treasury bonds, causing yields to rise sharply, contrary to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's goal of lowering Treasury yields to alleviate government debt pressure. Former US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated that the sell-off of US Treasury bonds indicates investors' loss of confidence in US economic policy and raises doubts about the safety of US debt as the cornerstone of the global financial system. Can high tariffs lead to a manufacturing revival? The US's push for manufacturing revival goes against the trend of international industrial division of labor. Countries participate in international division of labor and cooperation based on their own advantages, forming different industrial structures and production capacities, sharing the benefits of specialized division of labor, improving global resource allocation efficiency, and enhancing the well-being of people in all countries. Any high-tech product relies on the global manufacturing ecosystem, even Tesla, which claims the highest proportion of US-made components, must import some parts. The US ignores the reality that its economy has shifted from manufacturing-led to service and other advantageous sectors, forcibly using tariffs to compel manufacturing to return to the US, which violates economic laws and will lead to reduced productivity. According to Bank of America analysts, if the final assembly of iPhones is moved to the US, costs will be up by 25 percent, if "reciprocal tariff" is added, total costs could soar to 91 percent. Manufacturing investment cycles are long and require a country's industrial policies to maintain continuity and stability, but US government transitions and policy swings are highly uncertain. Meanwhile, the US lacks high-quality industrial workforce; TSMC's plant construction in the US was delayed due to a shortage of professional technicians, and high wages and other factors have led to a 30 percent increase in production costs. US infrastructure is also inadequate. Since 2000, China's per capita electricity generation has increased by 400 percent, while the US has stagnated. The US's power grid, roads, and ports cannot withstand the enormous pressure of restarting large-scale manufacturing. Therefore, the reasons behind the decline of US manufacturing are multiple, and relying solely on tariff increases cannot make up for manufacturing shortcomings. Is 'Reciprocal Tariff' legitimate? "Reciprocal tariff" is a manipulated numbers game. The US uses the ratio of trade deficits to import volumes to estimate the tariff rates other countries impose on the US, lacking any economic theoretical support and far from the facts. For example, the US imposed "reciprocal tariff" on the grounds that the EU's tariff on the US are as high as 39 percent and South Korea's tariff are as high as 50 percent, but actual calculations show that Europe's average tariff rate on the US is well below ten percent, and South Korea's tariff is close to zero. Use of fabricated data as a reason to abuse tariffs lacks legitimacy. The State of California filed a lawsuit against the US government over tariff, with the governor's office stating that the tariff policy is "illegal and unprecedented." Many small American businesses jointly sued the federal government in US courts, arguing that the Administration has no right to impose a comprehensive tariff without congressional approval. Millions of Americans chanted slogans like "Don't mess with tariffs on the streets." Does the US's use of tariff as a coercion tool work? "America First" will ultimately create an "Isolated America." An article in Foreign Affairs pointed out that "America First" actually means that other countries have to comply with US policies in exchange for military protection, market access, and diplomatic support. Tariff is essentially a coercive method and punishment to test global compliance. Facts have proven that coercion does not work in today's world and will only inspire more countries to unite against hegemony. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman stated that after the US announced a 90-day suspension of "reciprocal tariff" without reaching any agreement, it would gain nothing and instead lose enormous wealth. The only signal the US sent was that countries around the world should not trust in the US anymore and be ready to respond to the return of tariffs after 90 days. The Financial Times published an article stating that if the US positions itself against the majority of countries that uphold free trade and maintain a multilateral trading system, the ultimate outcome will not be "economic de-globalization," but rather "de-Americanization". Former Chairman of the US Council of Economic Advisers Jason Furman believes that more and more countries will bypass the US to reach free trade agreements, and "reciprocal tariff" is likely to become a turning point for the US to lose its central position in the global trade system. I would like to reiterate China's position here: tariff and trade wars have no winners. China does not look for a war, but neither are we afraid of it. China is open to negotiation, but will fight to the end if challenged. Over the past eight years of the China-US trade war, our foreign trade has continued to expand, with total trade volume up from 30 trillion Chinese yuan to 43 trillion Chinese yuan, and trade partners becoming increasingly diversified. In 2024, China's imports and exports with countries within the 'Belt and Road' framework grew by 6.4 percent, and our bilateral trade with Iraq reached $54.2 billion, a record high, with the KRI making due contributions. China's foreign trade dependence on the US market continues to decline. Currently, US tariffs on Chinese goods have been raised to 245 percent. Regardless of how reckless the US acts, China will resolutely manage our own things well. We are willing to work with trade partners, including Iraq the KRI, to uphold multilateralism, continue to promote high-level opening-up, so as to have clear message that in the face of the US's unpredictable barrage of trade tariff and subsequent actions, China will, with strong certainty, always be a reliable partner in the world. Liu Jun is the Consul General of the People's Republic of China in Erbil. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Rudaw Net
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Kurds amid the slow and fast rhythms of today's Middle Eastern politics
Also in Opinions Iran in the shadow of war talk Sharing development opportunities and welcoming the blessed Ramadan together Syria-SDF deal: What's really happening behind the scenes Rudaw: the strongest Kurdish voice on the global stage Trump's two-month deadline for an agreement or confrontation with Iran, the Iranian leader's hope that in the future "by divine grace" a miracle will occur and his opponents will fall, Turkey's rush to dismantle the PKK, Qandil's requests for "an appropriate opportunity" to hold a congress, or Ahmed Shara's initiatives for "rebuilding Syria" - all these express that in the current geopolitical issues of the Middle East, accelerating, speediness or moving slowly has become a strategic option. In reality, political moments are no longer the same; for some, it's too early while for others it's far too late. This duality of speed versus slowness in events exists because changes in timing might translate into changes in alliances and political balance. Yet amid all this, the pieces on the Kurdish political chessboard still move slowly. Policies of Speed and Slowness in the Superpowers' Game In today's world, the competition between global powers is somewhat tied to who can move faster or who can exercise more restraint. Trump stands above all those who are in a hurry. In reality, it's a big question how an issue like Iran's nuclear program, which has been troubling 6 US presidents for more than 25 years since 1999, can be resolved in his two-month timeline, or how the 3-year Russia-Ukraine war can be ended in a day as he had claimed. Just as ending the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not an easy task, especially when his deadline for the release of hostages held by Hamas at the end of January this year did not succeed. Perhaps one reason for Trump's policy is that he believes if things continue as they are, his country will fall behind China. As Putin appears to be in no hurry to end the Ukraine war, which is increasing costs for Europe and America, China's President Xi Jinping is also approaching issues cautiously, at a slower pace, and has said that in the current situation, he favors stability, perhaps because the time factor is currently working in his country's favor. Beijing has established three phases to gradually transform its military into a global force by 2027, 2035, and 2049. In 2024, China's third aircraft carrier - Fujian (CV-18) - began its sea trials. It has developed the DF-27 hypersonic intercontinental missile with a range of 5000-8000 km that can reach into American territory. China wants to become dominant in AI, semiconductors, quantum science, and biotechnology, as it will invest the equivalent of 23% of its GDP in technology by 2026. In space, it has surpassed Russia and wants to become America's main competitor. Trump is concerned about China's monopoly over valuable global mines, energy corridors, and supply chains increasing, so he wants to limit China's access to the Middle East, particularly Iran's cheap oil, attract significant Saudi and Gulf investment to his country, and through the Abraham Accords and reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, find more opportunities to counter Beijing. This can directly impact the Kurdish issue. In this framework, Trump's desire for a rapid withdrawal from Syria may increase Washington's pressure for an agreement between the Kurds and the new Syrian government, similar to the role the US military played in the Jolani and Kobani agreements. He may also increase his efforts to encourage Turkey to reach an agreement with the PKK. Similarly, he might support strengthening the Kurdistan Region's role in Iraq, especially as Iraq moves toward another decisive election at the end of this year. Kurds and the Pieces of Regional Politics Trump's two-month deadline for Iran, which as he says, must result in either an agreement or confrontation, is important for the Kurds. Iran's leader Ali Khamenei in his latest speech mentioned that "Imam Hassan's agreement with his opponents" was temporary. This may be to calm the ultra-conservative wing of his political system who daily speak against the Pezeshkian government's negotiation efforts, but in reality, he views political timing from an ideological-political perspective and believes that everything happening now is temporary and one day the situation will reverse. Iran uses its relationship with China and Russia as a pressure card against America, hoping that American pressures won't last long. Besides that, it aims to proceed without issues until October this year to eliminate the risk of international sanctions being reimposed. Meanwhile, Israel is concerned that Trump's "America First" policy might limit Washington's support, so it wants to take quick action regarding Iran's nuclear dossier. Although Iran has spoken about its strategic relationship with China, a gas purchase agreement with Russia, and the establishment of a new nuclear facility by Russia, it is unlikely that a businessman and politician like Trump would make a deal that doesn't bring economic benefits to his country while allowing China, Russia, or Europe to take advantage. Therefore, there is still uncertainty about the possibility of an agreement or confrontation between Tehran and Washington. If an agreement is reached, which might include opening doors for American companies to enter Tehran, it means that Iran's situation, both internally and externally, will move toward more change. This could potentially create important opportunities for the Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. However, if it turns into conflict, Kurdistan will undoubtedly become part of that battleground. If a war breaks out, the Zagros Mountain range, which is an important part of Iran's military geography and surrounds Kurdish cities, will become a sensitive security field, which could translate into the government's efforts to increase military-political control in these areas. Additionally, American bases in the Kurdistan Region might again become targets for armed groups from Iraq or even Iran. Quick but fragile reconstruction of Syria and the issue of PKK disarmament Ahmed Shara, who suddenly emerged like a lightning bolt last year and toppled Assad's government, wants to close Hezbollah's transit routes on the border, although it seems difficult for him to fully succeed in this. He closed the bases and headquarters of many Palestinian groups close to the Resistance Front in Damascus and arrested some Islamic Jihad leaders. Apparently, he has incorporated most armed groups into the army, although in reality none has actually disbanded. He has moved softly with Kurds and Druze in hopes of gaining Western support, lifting Syria's sanctions, and recovering billions of dollars of frozen Syrian assets. In his relations with the SDF, he hoped to resolve all issues within 3-4 months, while the other side believed it would take several years. Finally, they agreed to resolve their issues by the end of this year, but disagreements over implementing the Tishrin Dam agreement, Kurdish language education, and the Kurdish unity conference in Qamishlo may indicate the fragility of the agreement made between both parties. Additionally, the recent movements of the Ansar al-Sunna group, which announced in recent days that it will start punishing officials of the former regime itself, could put al-Shara's government in a difficult position, especially as Shara wants to promise the world that radical Islamic groups will not gain strength while fearing the possibility of an Alawite uprising. Both Turkey and Israel are in a hurry to improve the situation in Syria for themselves. Netanyahu considers Trump's first year as the greatest opportunity to use the Washington-Tel Aviv alignment on preventing Iran, the Abraham Accords, and redesigning Syria's new situation according to its own strategic security. Turkey is also in a hurry to resolve the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army and prevent an autonomous administration. Beyond geopolitical goals, it sees Syria's reconstruction as a golden opportunity for its economy, especially Turkey's construction sector, which accounts for 30% of the country's GDP. This could be good news for Turkey's ruling party, as many construction companies appear as its supporters. Iran, meanwhile, prays for the day when Syria's situation deteriorates and turns upside down for Turkey and Israel. In this situation, the Qamishlo conference was a late but important step for the Kurds, although it faced many internal and external obstacles. Just as three flags were raised instead of one, the diversity of different perspectives is one obstacle, and the fate of Ocalan-Turkey negotiations on PKK disarmament is another. The Kurds betting on the reemergence of Syria's civil war is a mistake; that war may eventually return, but the problem is that Kurds have little time at their disposal. Therefore, while rushing may not be good, moving too slowly might also be costly. Hoping for Israeli support for Kurds may also be a mistake, as it is unlikely that Israel would exchange the possibility of reconciliation with Turkey for costly support of the Kurds. While negotiations to end the long-standing conflict between Turkey and PKK are taking place, both sides are fighting a time battle. Ankara wants the PKK to disarm and dissolve itself in the near future. Devlet Bahceli has demanded that the PKK hold its congress early next month. Erdogan, while facing obstacles with the Istanbul mayor and CHP, wants to resolve the PKK issue as soon as possible to use it as an important political achievement domestically, not to mention that it provides commercial opportunities and economic growth for his country in Syria and Iraq. However, it seems that the PKK is not in a hurry like Ankara. Therefore, it is likely that this issue will not succeed in its current form, and if it does, it will only be superficial. So, the PKK and Turkey issue will continue until the parties feel they are winning. Another point is that, in all likelihood, the issue of PKK disarmament is not only a Turkish matter but also a major issue for Iran, as for many years the PKK's presence in the mountains has served as a barrier for Iran to prevent the establishment of anti-Iranian armed groups. Besides, any peace between the PKK and Turkey would make Iran the only Middle Eastern state that has not yet opened up on the Kurdish issue. Conclusion After more than six months since the election, the Kurdistan Regional Government has still not been formed. This is while in less than 7 months, another election will be held that could change the dynamics behind the government formation process. The fate of the government may depend on the type of expected alliances in Iraq's upcoming election, just as the previous one in 2021 turned the relationship between Kurdistan's two main parties upside down. If the KDP and PUK are not on the same alliance line, then any coalition government will face problems in the future. Additionally, regional changes and expectations regarding the outcome of Iran-US negotiations may be another influential factor in the timing of government formation. In today's Middle East, speed and slowness are no longer just measures of time, but part of geopolitical competition. Just as Kurdish geography is at the heart of competing powers' areas of influence, so too are its timelines divided between the poles of speed and slowness. Certainly, navigating this situation in a way that minimizes harm requires masterful rearrangement of political timing! Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Rudaw Net
04-04-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
Iran in the shadow of war talk
Also in Opinions Sharing development opportunities and welcoming the blessed Ramadan together Syria-SDF deal: What's really happening behind the scenes Rudaw: the strongest Kurdish voice on the global stage Russian role in drawing up Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement Iran and the United States have moved from correspondence to open threats of war. While it can be said that both sides do not want war, at least for now, it must also be acknowledged that the possibility of war is greater than ever because this issue cannot be decided solely in Tehran or Washington. The future of the China-US and Europe-Russia geopolitical rivalry, along with Israel's policy toward Iran, are among the factors that need to be considered in understanding the potential for either war or dialogue. Another important point is that, whether war or dialogue unfolds, a change is already at Iran's doorstep - one that has begun to develop gradually. Iran-US uncertainties Last year was a difficult year for Iran and, if it faces an attack now, this year will be even more challenging. Iran's current concerns may not be limited to a potential US-Israeli strike on its nuclear and missile programs, but rather to the possibility that crippling economic sanctions could trigger a resurgence of domestic protests, which could ultimately determine its political future. For the US, the issue of Iran has become a complex political and military knot that, if left unresolved, will create significant headaches on a broader geopolitical scale. Iran's political and military cooperation with Russia and China has the potential to create obstacles for the US, not only in the Middle East but also in other regions of the world. This issue is not only important for the US but also for Europe, as demonstrated by the impact of Iranian drones in the war in Ukraine. General John Daniel Caine, who US President Donald Trump has nominated for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that he agrees with the president's stance that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons. However, he also believes that a military solution alone may not be sufficient. Additionally, it may be true that, due to the existence of an extensive uranium enrichment program spread across multiple sites - such as Fordow and Natanz - at varying depths ranging from seven to 90 meters underground, and the use of hexafluoride gas, which makes enrichment easier compared to other fuels, it would be difficult to halt the program with a single strike, although such an attack could delay it. Another point is that Iran may pursue the development of nuclear weapons following a hypothetical attack, as some political and military officials are now discussing. While it is true that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, it is important to note that in Shiite religious law, a fatwa can be revised. On the other hand, as the world slowly moves toward a war that "no one wants," Iran's position has become increasingly important to global powers. Extending the imposition of sanctions on Iran benefits China's economy, as it imports 15 percent of its oil from Iran at cheaper prices. This, coupled with the strong ties between Beijing and Tehran, enhances China's influence in one of the world's key energy transit points and supply chains. From Greenland to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, China's visible and uncertain role in global supply chains, as well as the world's crucial maritime and land routes, directly threatens US hegemony. Due to its geostrategic location, military significance, and its ability to produce inexpensive weapons and deploy proxy groups in various regions, Iran holds great importance for the world's major powers in any potential conflict. In this context, the China-Iran-Russia triangle presents a direct challenge to the US. Therefore, excluding Iran from the Russia-China circle or at least neutralizing its position is of immense geopolitical and geoeconomic importance to Washington, whether through war or diplomacy. Let us not forget that during both World Wars I and II, one of the reasons for the occupation of Iran was its geostrategic importance to the major powers. In addition to this, the issue of Iran serves as a significant test for Washington. When Trump took office, he claimed he would end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, but neither has come to a close. Now, he has given Tehran two months - one of which has already passed. If he fails to resolve the Iranian issue, his discourse on "peace through strength" will amount to little. Many countries around the world have expressed their positions on the possibility of a war between Iran and the US, indicating that the world sees it as more than just a war of words. Khamenei has stated that he does not believe attacks from abroad will occur, but that Iran will respond strongly if they do. Militarily, this suggests that Iran has prepared for war, just as the US is deploying aircraft and weapons to its military bases and allies in the Middle East. Alongside Iranian officials, the resistance front has intensified its rhetoric against the US and some Iraqi officials have warned that any potential conflict would draw them in and devastate the region. In fact, US intelligence reports suggest that Iran still possesses the capability to threaten American interests using both conventional and unconventional weapons. This means Iran could create significant problems for the US with drones, missiles, and proxy groups, even though ultimately winning the war would be difficult. The shadow of a possible war and the internal situation in Iran The Iranian leader has warned of potential attempts to create a "fitna" (sedition) at home, to which the people will respond. This indicates the possibility of a resurgence in domestic protests, which could prove decisive for Tehran. In previous demonstrations, Iran was a dominant force regionally and many countries around the world preferred not to interfere. Iranian officials seem to be increasingly concerned about this, as the number of countries that no longer support Iranian hegemony in the Middle East has likely grown since the events of October 7, 2023. Talk of war is bad news for Iran's economy, as its currency declines day-by-day. In 2025, Iran's economic growth rate is expected to fall to 3.1 percent, down from five percent the previous year. Inflation is over 40%, which has reduced people's purchasing power, and the unemployment rate remains around 8%. With Iran's population exceeding 90 million, this means there are 7.25 million unemployed individuals. One of Iran's biggest challenges now is the growing demand for energy for domestic consumption, which has increased by 6%. For example, one of the government's options is to raise diesel prices, but it appears to have delayed this move due to concerns that it could lead to higher prices and domestic protests. Similarly, the government may have suspended or softened the implementation of the hijab law, which conservatives have been pushing for, for similar reasons. Continued US sanctions and pressure to reduce oil sales to Chinese companies could deepen Iran's economic crisis, but this is not the only obstacle the government faces. In parallel, there is rising tension between the government and the ultra-conservative wing of the political system, which could lead to further complications if it persists. The hardline conservatives, who hold a majority in parliament, withdrew their confidence from Economy and Finance Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati in Masoud Pezeshkian's cabinet. Additionally, Pezeshkian's deputy, Mohammad Javad Zarif, resigned following the recommendation of the head of the judiciary. In fact, Zarif's resignation was not due to Iran's refusal to negotiate with the US, as some commentators have suggested, especially considering that figures like Abbas Araghchi, who has personally negotiated in the past, currently hold the position of foreign minister. This situation appears to be more about internal political rivalry than foreign policy matters. Given the economic and social challenges, along with the polarization of domestic politics, war may be the worst option for Iranian officials, as it could pave the way for greater political change within the country, much like the first Gulf War led to gradual change in Iraq. What's ahead If an attack occurs, Iran will likely respond in a similar manner. In addition to using the missiles and drones it has recently showcased, Iran will encourage its supporting armed groups, such as those in Iraq, to take action. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the extensive American assault on the Houthis in Yemen, the armed groups in Iraq remain largely inactive, partly due to pressure from Iraqi politicians but also because Iran did not want such movements. Amidst American sanctions, Iraq served as a crucial outlet for Tehran, providing some relief. However, this may no longer be the case, as the US maximum pressure policy has now extended to Iraq. Baghdad can no longer purchase Iranian gas and electricity, and some officials have even criticized Iran for selling its oil under Iraq's name. Therefore, if war breaks out, it is highly likely that the pro-Tehran groups in Iraq will begin to take action because a potential attack could raise the question of Tehran's political survival, a matter that may be a red line. Alongside the harsh statements from various parties, negotiation efforts are also ongoing, even if indirectly. However, even if negotiations do take place, they will not succeed unless there is a shift in Iran's foreign policy. It appears that for the US, the issue is not solely Iran's nuclear program. On a broader geopolitical scale, Iran's regional influence and its role in the China-Russia-Iran triangle are key concerns. Trump's America seeks a Middle East where Israel's dominance is in its security architecture, Saudi Arabia plays a greater political role, and Turkey acts as a counterbalance to Iran. From the outset, the reason Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement was not just about nuclear issues. Therefore, assessing the possibility of war or dialogue in light of the changing geopolitical landscape of the world and the Middle East is a more accurate approach than limiting it to the nuclear program alone. Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Rudaw Net
17-03-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
Sharing development opportunities and welcoming the blessed Ramadan together
Also in Opinions Syria-SDF deal: What's really happening behind the scenes Rudaw: the strongest Kurdish voice on the global stage Russian role in drawing up Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement The narcissist's playbook: how autocrats manipulate fear and power A+ A- On the occasion of the sacred and auspicious month of Ramadan, I extend, on behalf of the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Erbil, the most sincere greetings and blessings to our Muslim friends in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). May this month of piety and compassion bring you peace, joy, and abundance, and may Allah bless all those working for peace and development on this land. Amidst the blessings of this sacred time, please allow me to share with you the springtime news of China's development. The recently concluded "Two Sessions" in Beijing—the third session of the 14th National People's Congress and the third session of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference—demonstrated to the world the vitality of this ancient Eastern nation. Over the past year, China's economic ship has navigated steadily through challenges, with its GDP surpassing $18.74 trillion, growing at 5 percent and continuing to lead major global economies. China contributed nearly one-third of global economic growth, with high-quality development advancing steadily, new quality productive forces taking shape, and Chinese modernization making solid strides. China's development has always resonated with the world. We remain committed to peaceful development and to sharing opportunities and pursuing common prosperity with all nations. China stands ready to work with all nations including Iraq as well as the KRI, to advocate for an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, implement the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, engage in reforming and improving the global governance system, and build a community with a shared future for mankind. These goals align perfectly with the spirit of unity and mutual assistance championed during Ramadan. In the new year, Chinese diplomacy will continue to serve as an anchor for global peace, injecting certainty into global governance through Eastern wisdom. Taking this auspicious occasion, I would like to share with you the Ramadan scene of China's Muslim community. In Xinjiang, one of the major regions where Chinese Muslims reside, over 25 million people of various ethnic groups live in harmony, with Muslims constituting more than half of the population. During Ramadan, as dawn breaks, the aroma of freshly baked naan bread fills the streets, and Muslim compatriots peacefully observe their religious duties. The regional government has designated Eid al-Fitr as a public holiday and ensures meticulous services for the festival—from traffic management around mosques to abundant holiday market supplies, from officials sharing Iftar meals with communities to special cultural events—all reflecting the governance philosophy of 'celebrating diversity in harmony.' This inclusive development approach has allowed Xinjiang to shine brightly. In 2024, the GDP of this Silk Road gem exceeded $285.7 billion, growing at 6.1 percent, a testament to the seamless blend of tradition and modernity. In the Kashgar Economic Development Zone, Aideles silk dances alongside robotic arms, while photovoltaic arrays and drip-irrigated farmlands dot the edges of the Taklimakan Desert. As Mr. Shorsh Saeed, the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry of Iraq for Multilateral and Legal Affairs and former Ambassador to China, remarked during his visit to Xinjiang: 'The historical resolution of absolute poverty, robust infrastructure, and high-level development in the economy, society, and culture exemplify the Communist Party of China's unwavering commitment to putting the people first.' Ramadan is a sacred time for Muslims to purify their hearts and practice benevolence, as well as an opportunity for civilizations to learn from one another and deepen understanding. The friendship between China and the Islamic world dates back millennia, with Chinese porcelain, tea, Middle Eastern spices, and ancient texts bearing witness to East-West exchanges along the ancient Silk Road. Today, as natural partners in high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, China and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq are forging even stronger ties. In recent years, China-Iraq bilateral trade has grown steadily, reaching a record $54.2 billion in 2024, a 9 percent year-on-year increase, to which the KRI contributed significantly. Chinese enterprises' strengths align closely with the KRI's development strategies, with robust cooperation in traditional energy and infrastructure and vast potential in digital economy and advanced manufacturing. We are confident that more Chinese companies, products, and investments will enter the region, boosting local socio-economic growth. We firmly believe that win-win cooperation bridges regions and cultures, and the spirit of unity and dedication emphasized during Ramadan forms the cornerstone of deepening partnerships. In the face of global challenges—from climate change and sluggish economic growth to rising trade protectionism—let us seize the spirit of Ramadan to strengthen friendship, deepen collaboration, sow goodwill, overcome difficulties, and jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind! Liu Jun is the Consul General of the People's Republic of China in Erbil. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
