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The Diplomat
2 days ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
Lessons from Middle Powers for the EU's China Policy: Japan, Canada and Australia
In anticipation of the late July EU-China summit in Beijing, held at China's insistence, there are so far no visible concessions from the Chinese side. Europe should thereafter consider the recent experience of some middle powers in dealing with the People's Republic of China. At first glance, there is not much in common between Australia, Canada, Japan and the European Union. Australia and Canada are middle powers by virtue of their size, and both share the peculiarity of being large energy, raw materials and agricultural exporters to China: 74 percent of Australia's sales to China, including LNG; 66 percent in Canada's case. Japan is the largest of the so-called 'middle powers,' and still has China as a key industrial partner, especially in the automotive industry and consumer electronics. As for the European Union, which by some counts deserves a seat at the table of the world's great powers, it mixes some agricultural exports to China — often exploited by the Chinese side in current trade tensions — with a much larger exposure to China's industrial overcapacity. Proximity or distance from China also matters. Seen from Beijing, however, all four are considered to be potential swing partners between China and the United States. Nothing new there: This is what Mao Zedong and, later, Deng Xiaoping termed in 1974 as the 'Second World' between the two superpowers — the Soviet Union being one at the time — and a supposedly revolutionary Third World. In the past two decades, a chain of events has reinforced the perception that a swing was indeed possible to achieve. Chief among them, of course, is the added economic leverage that China now wields over all four, through economic interdependence or outright dependance, as the rare earths issue now shows, and China's willingness to practice coercion and link trade with security postures. Ironically, Chinese op-eds do not hesitate to condemn such 'economic bullying' — solely when it comes from others. But skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States has also built up in Australia, Canada, Japan and the European Union. There was the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Barack Obama's watch, and the U.S. withdrawal under his successor, Donald Trump; a tighter Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) which never took off between the United States and Europe; and asymmetries between U.S. hard power or willingness to go into conflict and Europe's uncompleted common defense. With Asia, the U.S. alliance as a 'hub-and-spoke' relationship endured. The term, often attributed to John Foster Dulles in the making of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, is being given world-wide relevance by Donald Trump: America now prefers bilateral deals to multilateralist interaction. The net result, now compounded by a strong reengagement of Russia by the United States, leads every one of its partners to deeper doubts about the latter's reliability. Not even the so-called 'prioritizers' in the Trump administration can fully reassure some of them. This, and the vigor and unpredictability of Trump's trade bargaining since the April 2 'Liberation Day' announcement, naturally leads to examining the case for re-engaging China — or for accepting to be re-engaged. It is, after all, the world's first trading nation and one that might perhaps concede better terms if it fears an 'encirclement' led by the United States. A look at the diplomacy of Japan, Australia, and Canada shows that reengagement has indeed happened. These three countries all started from a high point in trade and mutual linkages with China, only to go through a protracted period of trade tensions and in some cases acute political and diplomatic crises. Today, without apologizing for downturns that were largely due to China's own behavior, they seek to normalize the relationship, and perhaps to upgrade it. This is the case of Australia's recently re-elected Labor government, even if it still endorses its predecessors' Indo-Pacific strategy; Canada's Liberal government, embroiled as it is in acrimonious debates with the United States; and Japan's Liberal Democrats, who are clinging to their traditional relationship with Washington but seeking a form of normalization with Beijing. An exploration of Chinese views on this shift and the relative détente reveals that it is highly conditional on China's part: The main concession being a fall in aggressive rhetoric, except when the United States or supposed local 'hawks' are castigated as the culprits for previously souring relations. That military issues are paramount, whether China's offensive or defensive positions, is well demonstrated in Australia's case. Rarely do Chinese commentators criticize their own country in matters of foreign policy. They now do so vis-à-vis Australia, blaming China's coercive tactics for a change of posture that has created, among other developments, the Quad and AUKUS. Australian pushback, such as practiced by ASPI, Australia's well-known security think tank, demonstrates that it may indeed hit a raw nerve in Beijing. This is a rare (and unofficial) walk back by China. In other cases, what China rescinds is sanctions it had imposed in the first place, usually, but not always, in retaliation for measures it disliked. The hostage-taking of two Canadians in response to the proceedings against Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, the trade sanctions and duties on canola against Canada after it imposed a large tariff on Chinese-made electric vehicles, the tariffs and non-tariff barriers on Australian beef, barley, copper, coal, timber, wine (and lobsters) but not iron ore, which China needed, are as many examples of removable sanctions put in place. Small countries such as Lithuania and middle powers, starting with South Korea, have been the first on the receiving end of these tactics. These tactics are also meant to have a chilling effect on others. A 'normalization of relations' expressed with much fanfare and rhetorical goodwill from Chinese officials does not include concessions on previous demands from their international partners. Thus, the ban on fish from Japan was lifted — but not for Fukushima and Tokyo, although there are no more sanitary reasons. The European Union received a lifting of sanctions on sitting EU Parliament members but not on other personalities or institutions. The diagnosis from relations with Australia, Canada and Japan matches the trend with Europe. To whom does China hint at a real willingness to negotiate, implying not just words, but actual concessions on both sides? Well, to its nemesis, the United States. In an authoritative albeit anonymous commentary published on July 8, the People's Daily exhorts Washington to 'continue to meet China half-way,' which obviously implies China will also walk half of the path to a compromise. You would not find that kind of language with any other nation. In a nutshell, this gives away Beijing's strategy toward all but the number one global power: Talk the walk rather than walk the talk. There is now more frankness in acknowledging hyperrealism. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi admitted to Kaja Kallas, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, that China cannot accept Russia's defeat. This follows years of pretended 'neutrality' on an issue that Europeans placed on top of their agenda with Beijing. Lambasting Vietnam for accepting additional U.S. duties on reexports from China is also a broad recognition that China uses all available detours in its international trade. This could be one of the factors that has pushed the new Trump administration to tactics that often mirror China's own actions. While China is usually more polite about it, both countries now favor bilateral and issue-by-issue negotiations and, in principle or practice, shun multilateral agreements. Both use extraterritorial means, and both impose duties or other coercive measures as bargaining tools. This paradox should not be pushed too far as we are in front of unfolding events: The United States does walk back measures, sometimes very quickly, while China remains more predictable, mostly on the side of rigidity. What this demonstrates is that, seen from Beijing, small or middle nations have no agency, unless they have an irreplaceable asset and no vulnerability to trade or security threats. Very few cases of agency remain in a world where the United States and China are the first and second economic and military powers — with the ensuing dependencies from their partners. To counter trade fragmentation and, more broadly, the breakdown of international rules, do these other nations have the wherewithal to form coalitions based on shared interests: What Thucydides would have called a Lacedemonian League or, more aptly, an Achaean League? This coalition would have to counter Athens (the United States) when needed, while excluding Sparta or Macedonia (China) in principle. That is a tall order, yet that may be our challenge in the immediate future. This article was originally published as the introduction to China Trends 23, the quarterly publication of the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne. Institut Montaigne is a nonprofit, independent think tank based in Paris, France.
Bangkok Post
04-07-2025
- Business
- Bangkok Post
Explainer: What is Japan's trade policy on rice?
TOKYO - US President Donald Trump has complained that Japan was not buying American rice, putting pressure on Tokyo as it struggles to seal a trade deal before so-called "reciprocal" tariffs are set to kick in on July 9. Tokyo has not budged on rice, a staple food and cultural heritage that it says is fundamental to its national food security. The rice market is largely protected with trade barriers, although a domestic shortage and a spike in prices have led to a surge in imports this year. What is Japan's trade policy on rice? Under a World Trade Organization (WTO) "minimum access" framework introduced in 1995, Japan imports about 770,000 metric tonnes of rice tariff-free every year. Up to 100,000 tonnes of that is earmarked for staple rice, equivalent to about 1% of total domestic consumption of about 7 million tonnes. Of the total 767,000 tonnes Japan imported in the last fiscal year to March 2025, 45% came from the United States. Beyond the "minimum access" framework, Japan imposes a levy of 341 yen (76 baht) per kilogramme, which has, for the most part, effectively priced imports out of the market. As domestic rice prices soared over the past year, a panel advising the Finance Ministry proposed expanding imports of staple rice - which is eaten at meals rather than used for feed or as an ingredient in other products - saying that lifting the 100,000-tonne tariff-free cap could help stabilise supply. In the annual report released by the US Trade Representative in March, Washington criticised Japan's rice import and distribution system as "highly regulated and nontransparent" and said that it limited US exporters' ability to have "meaningful access" to Japanese consumers. Is Japan importing more rice? A doubling in domestic rice prices from the levels of a year ago has fuelled a surge in imports, as businesses and consumers clamour for cheaper options. In the fiscal year that ended in March 2025, tariff-free imports of staple rice hit the 100,000-tonne cap for the first time in seven years. About 60,000 tonnes came from the US. In an effort to provide cheaper rice to consumers more quickly, the Farm Ministry brought forward to June a tender usually held in September for the first 30,000 tonnes of tariff-free, imported staple rice for this year. Of the total tendered, 25,541 tonnes were from the US, followed by 1,500 tonnes from Australia and 708 tonnes from Thailand. For tariffed staple rice, private companies imported some 10,600 tonnes in May alone, of which about three-quarters came from the US, according to Finance Ministry data. That compares with total imports of 3,004 tonnes for all of fiscal 2024. What happened in the last US-Japan trade deal? The last bilateral trade deal was sealed in 2019 during Trump's first term, with then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The US aimed to restore its farmers' lost market share after Trump pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact in 2017. Japan made concessions on US beef and pork, agreeing to gradually lower or eliminate tariffs, but rice was left out. Under TPP, Japan would have accepted 70,000 tonnes of US staple rice per year tariff-free under a US-specific quota, but this was not included in the bilateral deal.
Yahoo
23-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Mark Carney names Kirsten Hillman chief negotiator with U.S.
OTTAWA — Canada's Ambassador to the U.S. Kirsten Hillman will take on the role of top negotiator for Canada as the country seeks a new trade and security pact with the Donald Trump administration. Prime Minister Mark Carney's office confirms Hillman has been named to the position, making her U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's opposite number in the bilateral trade talks. Emily Williams, Carney's director of communications, also confirms Hillman will stay on as Canada's ambassador to the U.S., as first reported by The Globe and Mail newspaper. Hillman has worked at the Canadian embassy in Washington since 2017 and has served as ambassador since her acting appointment in 2019. There is no fixed term limit for Canadian ambassadors in the U.S. but it's rare for someone to last longer than seven years in the role. Hillman was a key Canadian negotiator under the first Trump White House when Canada renegotiated NAFTA, and served as Canada's chief negotiator for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 23, 2025. The Canadian Press
Global News
23-06-2025
- Business
- Global News
Canada's ambassador to U.S. will take the lead on trade talks: PMO
Canada's Ambassador to the U.S. Kirsten Hillman will take on the role of top negotiator for Canada as the country seeks a new trade and security pact with the Donald Trump administration. Prime Minister Mark Carney's office confirms Hillman has been named to the position, making her U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's opposite number in the bilateral trade talks. Emily Williams, Carney's director of communications, also confirms Hillman will stay on as Canada's ambassador to the U.S., as first reported by The Globe and Mail newspaper. 1:48 Carney to increase U.S. steel, aluminum tariffs if trade talks with Trump stall Hillman has worked at the Canadian embassy in Washington since 2017 and has served as ambassador since her acting appointment in 2019. Story continues below advertisement There is no fixed term limit for Canadian ambassadors in the U.S. but it's rare for someone to last longer than seven years in the role. Hillman was a key Canadian negotiator under the first Trump White House when Canada renegotiated NAFTA, and served as Canada's chief negotiator for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal.
Winnipeg Free Press
23-06-2025
- Business
- Winnipeg Free Press
Mark Carney names Kirsten Hillman chief negotiator with U.S.
OTTAWA – Canada's Ambassador to the U.S. Kirsten Hillman will take on the role of top negotiator for Canada as the country seeks a new trade and security pact with the Donald Trump administration. Prime Minister Mark Carney's office confirms Hillman has been named to the position, making her U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's opposite number in the bilateral trade talks. Emily Williams, Carney's director of communications, also confirms Hillman will stay on as Canada's ambassador to the U.S., as first reported by The Globe and Mail newspaper. Hillman has worked at the Canadian embassy in Washington since 2017 and has served as ambassador since her acting appointment in 2019. There is no fixed term limit for Canadian ambassadors in the U.S. but it's rare for someone to last longer than seven years in the role. Hillman was a key Canadian negotiator under the first Trump White House when Canada renegotiated NAFTA, and served as Canada's chief negotiator for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 23, 2025.
