Latest news with #TreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons
NDTV
2 days ago
- Politics
- NDTV
What World's Nuclear Watchdog Does And What Its Dismissal Would Mean
What happens when a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program? Every peaceful program starts with a promise not to build a nuclear weapon. Then, the global community verifies that stated intent via the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Once a country signs the treaty, the world's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, provides continuous and technical proof that the country's nuclear program is peaceful. The IAEA ensures that countries operate their programs within the limits of non-proliferation agreements: low enrichment and no reactor misuse. Part of the agreement allows the IAEA to inspect nuclear-related sites, including unannounced surprise visits. These are not just log reviews. Inspectors know what should and should not be there. When the IAEA is not on site, cameras, tamper-revealing seals on equipment, and real-time radiation monitors are working full-time to gather or verify inside information about the program's activities. Safeguards toolkit The IAEA safeguards toolkit is designed to detect proliferation activities early. Much of the work is fairly technical. The safeguards toolkit combines physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics, and scientific sampling. Inspectors are chemists, physicists, and nuclear engineers. They count spent fuel rods in a cooling pond. They check tamper seals on centrifuges. Often, the inspectors walk miles through hallways and corridors carrying heavy equipment. That's how the world learned in April 2021 about Iran pushing uranium enrichment from reactor-fuel-grade to near-weapons-grade levels. IAEA inspectors were able to verify that Iran was feeding uranium into a series of centrifuges designed to enrich the uranium from 5%, used for energy programs, to 60%, which is a step toward the 90% level used in nuclear weapons. Around the facilities, whether for uranium enrichment or plutonium processing, closed-circuit surveillance cameras monitor for undeclared materials or post-work activities. Seals around the facilities provide evidence that uranium gas cylinders have not been tampered with or that centrifuges operate at the declared levels. Beyond seals, online enrichment monitors allow inspectors to look inside centrifuges for any changes in the declared enrichment process. When the inspectors are on-site, they collect environmental swipes: samples of nuclear materials on surfaces, in dust, or in the air. These can reveal if uranium has been enriched to levels beyond those allowed by the agreement. Or if plutonium, which is not used in nuclear power plants, is being produced in a reactor. Swipes are precise. They can identify enrichment levels from a particle smaller than a speck of dust. But they take time, days, or weeks. Inspectors analyze the samples at the IAEA's laboratories using sophisticated equipment called mass spectrometers. In addition to physical samples, IAEA inspectors look at the logs of material inventories. They look for diversion of uranium or plutonium from normal process lines, just like accountants trace the flow of finances, except that their verification is supported by the ever-watching online monitors and radiation sensors. They also count items of interest and weigh them for additional verification of the logs. Beyond accounting for materials, IAEA inspectors verify that the facility matches the declared design. For example, if a country is expanding centrifuge halls to increase its enrichment capabilities, that's a red flag. Changes to the layout of material processing laboratories near nuclear reactors could be a sign that the program is preparing to produce unauthorized plutonium. Losing access Iran announced on June 28, 2025, that it has ended its cooperation with the IAEA. It removed the monitoring devices, including surveillance cameras, from centrifuge halls. This move followed the news by the IAEA that Iran's enrichment activities are well outside of allowed levels. Iran now operates sophisticated uranium centrifuges, like models IR-6 and IR-9. Removing IAEA access means that the international community loses insight into how quickly Iran's program can accumulate weapon-grade uranium, or how much it has produced. Also lost is information about whether the facility is undergoing changes for proliferation purposes. These processes are difficult to detect with external surveillance, like satellites, alone. An alternative to the uranium enrichment path for producing nuclear weapons material is plutonium. Plutonium can't be mined, it has to be produced in a nuclear reactor. Iran built a reactor capable of producing plutonium, the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor at the Arak Nuclear Complex. Iran modified the Arak reactor under the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to make plutonium production less likely. During the June 2025 missile attacks, Israel targeted Arak's facilities with the aim of eliminating the possibility of plutonium production. With IAEA access suspended, it won't be possible to see what happens inside the facility. Can the reactor be used for plutonium production? Although a lengthier process than the uranium enrichment path, plutonium provides a parallel path to uranium enrichment for developing nuclear weapons. Continuity of knowledge North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors in 2009. Within a few years, they restarted activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor. The international community's information about North Korea's weapons program now relies solely on external methods: satellite images, radioactive particles like xenon - airborne fingerprints of nuclear activities - and seismic data. What is lost is the continuity of the knowledge, a chain of verification over time. Once the seals are broken or cameras are removed, that chain is lost, and so is confidence about what is happening at the facilities. When it comes to IAEA inspections, there is no single tool that paints the whole picture. Surveillance plus sampling, plus accounting provide validation and confidence. Losing even one weakens the system in the long term. The existing safeguards regime is meant to detect violations. The countries that sign the nonproliferation treaty know that they are always watched, and that plays a deterrence role. The inspectors can't just resume the verification activities after some time if access is lost. Future access won't necessarily enable inspectors to clarify what happened during the gap.
News18
2 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Iran Out Of IAEA: How Does The Global Watchdog Monitor Nuclear Activities? Explained
Last Updated: Iran Out Of IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard toolkit includes physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics and scientific sampling In a world with multiple ongoing wars, the role of a nuclear watchdog like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains crucial. Iran announced on June 28 that it has ended its cooperation with the IAEA. It removed the monitoring devices, including surveillance cameras, from centrifuge halls. This move followed the news by the IAEA that Iran's enrichment activities are well outside of allowed levels. Iran now operates sophisticated uranium centrifuges, like models IR-6 and IR-9. What exactly is the role of IAEA? Can countries opt out of it? What happens then? What does IAEA do? When a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, with a promise not to build a nuclear weapon, the global community verifies that stated intent via the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Once a country signs the treaty, IAEA provides continuous and technical proof that the country's nuclear program is peaceful. The Associated Press reported that the IAEA ensures that countries operate their programs within the limits of non-proliferation agreements: low enrichment and no reactor misuse. Part of the agreement allows the IAEA to inspect nuclear-related sites, including unannounced surprise visits. These are not just log reviews. Inspectors know what should and should not be there. When the IAEA is not on site, cameras, tamper-revealing seals on equipment, and real-time radiation monitors are working full-time to gather or verify inside information about the program's activities. — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 19, 2025 What is the IAEA safeguards toolkit? The IAEA safeguards toolkit is designed to detect proliferation activities early. Much of the work is fairly technical. The safeguards toolkit combines physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics, and scientific sampling. Inspectors are chemists, physicists, and nuclear engineers. They count spent fuel rods in a cooling pond. They check tamper seals on centrifuges. Often, the inspectors walk miles through hallways and corridors carrying heavy equipment. How does IAEA keep track of a nuclear program? According to the AP report, around the facilities, whether for uranium enrichment or plutonium processing, closed-circuit surveillance cameras monitor for undeclared materials or post-work activities. Seals around the facilities provide evidence that uranium gas cylinders have not been tampered with or that centrifuges operate at the declared levels. Beyond seals, online enrichment monitors allow inspectors to look inside centrifuges for any changes in the declared enrichment process. When the inspectors are on-site, they collect environmental swipes: samples of nuclear materials on surfaces, in dust, or in the air. These can reveal if uranium has been enriched to levels beyond those allowed by the agreement. Or if plutonium, which is not used in nuclear power plants, is being produced in a reactor. Swipes are precise. They can identify enrichment levels from a particle smaller than a speck of dust. But they take time, days, or weeks. Inspectors analyze the samples at the IAEA's laboratories using sophisticated equipment called mass spectrometers. In addition to physical samples, IAEA inspectors look at the logs of material inventories. They look for diversion of uranium or plutonium from normal process lines, just like accountants trace the flow of finances, except that their verification is supported by the ever-watching online monitors and radiation sensors. They also count items of interest and weigh them for additional verification of the logs. Beyond accounting for materials, IAEA inspectors verify that the facility matches the declared design. For example, if a country is expanding centrifuge halls to increase its enrichment capabilities, that's a red flag. Changes to the layout of material processing laboratories near nuclear reactors could be a sign that the program is preparing to produce unauthorized plutonium. In its 20th year, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material has expanded the treaty to include nuclear smuggling and sabotage of nuclear facilities as on: — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 14, 2025 Has IAEA ever spotted a violation? Thanks to the IAEA, the world learned in April 2021 about Iran pushing uranium enrichment from reactor-fuel-grade to near-weapons-grade levels. IAEA inspectors were able to verify that Iran was feeding uranium into a series of centrifuges designed to enrich the uranium from 5%, used for energy programs, to 60%, which is a step toward the 90% level used in nuclear weapons. What does removing IAEA access mean? Removing IAEA access means that the international community loses insight into how quickly Iran's program can accumulate weapon-grade uranium, or how much it has produced. Also lost is information about whether the facility is undergoing changes for proliferation purposes. These processes are difficult to detect with external surveillance, like satellites, alone. An alternative to the uranium enrichment path for producing nuclear weapons material is plutonium. Plutonium can't be mined, it has to be produced in a nuclear reactor. Iran built a reactor capable of producing plutonium, the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor at the Arak Nuclear Complex. Iran modified the Arak reactor under the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to make plutonium production less likely. During the June 2025 missile attacks, Israel targeted Arak's facilities with the aim of eliminating the possibility of plutonium production. With IAEA access suspended, it won't be possible to see what happens inside the facility. Can the reactor be used for plutonium production? Although a lengthier process than the uranium enrichment path, plutonium provides a parallel path to uranium enrichment for developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre offers state-of-the-art nuclear security courses to help countries maintain the highest level of nuclear security. Watch this ⤵️ — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 19, 2025 Has it ever been done in the past? top videos View all North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors in 2009. Within a few years, they restarted activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor. The international community's information about North Korea's weapons program now relies solely on external methods: satellite images, radioactive particles like xenon – airborne fingerprints of nuclear activities – and seismic data. With AP Inputs About the Author News Desk The News Desk is a team of passionate editors and writers who break and analyse the most important events unfolding in India and abroad. From live updates to exclusive reports to in-depth explainers, the Desk More Get Latest Updates on Movies, Breaking News On India, World, Live Cricket Scores, And Stock Market Updates. Also Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : iaea iran nuclear view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 21, 2025, 15:36 IST News explainers Iran Out Of IAEA: How Does The Global Watchdog Monitor Nuclear Activities? 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Gulf Insider
2 days ago
- Politics
- Gulf Insider
Trump Threatens To Destroy Iran Nuclear Asset
President Trump has doubled (or tripled) down on his insistence that Iran's nuclear capabilities were completely obliterated by last month's US bomber raid on three key Iranian nuclear facilities. He wrote Saturday on Truth Social, 'All three nuclear facilities in Iran are completely ruined and/or destroyed. It would take years to restore them to operational status, and if Iran wanted to do so, it would be much more advantageous for them to start everything from scratch in three different locations before these facilities are destroyed — if they decide to do so.' His words were issued the same day that official spokesman of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Rezaei, threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and begin enriching uranium beyond the 60% level, in the event that Washington sanctions continue to ramp up anti-Tehran sanctions. 'In light of recent developments, we will take an appropriate decision. Government has to enforce parliament bills but such a proposal is just being prepared and we will coordinate in the later stages with parliament,' he first announced last month. Trump's weekend statement appeared to primarily be responding to a new US intelligence assessment revealed in media reports Thursday which said that Iran's nuclear enrichment site in Fordow was mostly destroyed during the June 21 strikes. It indicated that the two other crucial sites, Natanz and Isfahan, were not badly damaged. The White House and Department of Defense (DoD) have still rallied around the president's position, and have tended to downplay the assessment as but one, partial and unvetted point of view from an intelligence source. 'The credibility of the Fake News Media is similar to that of the current state of the Iranian nuclear facilities: destroyed, in the dirt, and will take years to recover,' the DoD's chief spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement. 'President Trump was clear and the American people understand: Iran's nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz were completely and totally obliterated.' Following the 12-day Israel-Iran war, if Tehran was not previously pursuing nuclear weapons, there are likely very much thinking about it now. Top European powers plan new Iran nuclear talks as threat of sanctions looms➡️ — FRANCE 24 (@FRANCE24) July 20, 2025 What the war may have done is to actually speed up Iran's nuclear ambitions, also as the Iranians realize it's impossible to negotiate with the West, given that 'good faith' talks with the US were underway at the very moment Israel launched a surprise attack. Also read: Pepsi Exec Floats Switch To Sugar After Trump Coca-Cola Announcement
Middle East Eye
6 days ago
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
Most Turkish people say Turkey should obtain nuclear weapons in new poll
A recent survey in Turkey reveals a significant shift in public opinion over nuclear weapons, with a majority of respondents now supporting their development in response to heightened regional tensions, particularly following Israeli strikes on Iran last month. The poll, conducted by Research Istanbul between 1-5 July, surveyed 2,000 people nationwide. Its findings highlight growing insecurity among Turkish citizens regarding national defence and Turkey's ability to withstand potential threats. Despite Turkey being a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1979, which legally prohibits Ankara from developing, acquiring or testing nuclear weapons, 71 percent of respondents believe Turkey should start developing such arms, with only 18 percent opposed. While the Turkish government has made heavy investments in the defence industry in recent years, public confidence regarding air defence systems remains low. Nearly half of those surveyed doubt the effectiveness of Turkey's air defence systems in the event of an attack. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters The recent success of Iranian ballistic missiles in penetrating Israel's advanced air defences and causing considerable damage has further fuelled debate within Turkey over the nation's own defensive capabilities. Scepticism also extends to Turkey's alliances. According to the poll, 72 percent of respondents do not believe Nato would effectively defend Turkey if it were attacked. 'Pervasive sense of external threat' 'These findings reflect growing public anxiety amid escalating regional conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus,' said Erdi Ozturk, a professor at London Metropolitan University. 'The pervasive sense of external threat is driving Turkish society to consider security measures that were previously taboo, including the pursuit of nuclear deterrence.' Ozturk added that, despite longstanding political divisions, security concerns are increasingly uniting Turkish society around a common mindset. To address immediate concerns over its ageing air fleet, Ankara has recently negotiated deals to purchase F-16 and Eurofighter jets as a stopgap measure until its own fifth-generation aircraft, the Kaan, is delivered - expected as early as 2028. 'Many citizens believe Turkey must rely more heavily on its own military capabilities' - Erdi Ozturk, London Metropolitan University 'Many citizens believe Turkey must rely more heavily on its own military capabilities,' Ozturk explained, 'especially as ongoing negotiations over fighter jets like the F-16 and F-35 fuel public scepticism about the reliability of foreign partners.' Ankara has not yet made any statements or taken any steps indicating research into nuclear weapons. Turkey is currently building its first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, in partnership with Russia's Rosatom. Estimated at costing $20bn, it will consist of four reactors with a combined capacity of 4,800 megawatts (MW), expected to provide around 10 percent of Turkey's electricity needs when it goes into operation next year. Ozturk further noted that widespread scepticism regarding Nato's willingness or ability to defend Turkey is closely linked to deep-seated anti-American sentiment, which continues to be a significant factor shaping public attitudes toward security and defence policy.
Sky News AU
13-07-2025
- Politics
- Sky News AU
‘Extreme agenda': Northern Beaches Greens councillors caught obsessing over woke motions despite slugging ratepayers with massive tax hike
Greens councillors on the Northern Beaches have been caught out proposing a raft of woke motions about international conflicts, treaties and climate change while asking locals to pay 25 per cent more in rates. The Northern Beaches Council, which is dominated by the Teal affiliate group Your Northern Beaches, voted in favour of a 29 per cent rate hike in mid-June, drawing the ire of local residents. The four Northern Beaches Greens councillors who voted in support of the historic rate rise then opted to 'hijack' the same June 17 council meeting and advance a detailed motion titled "support for the Beaches Palestinian community and a ceasefire in Gaza." The motion, advanced by 21 year-old Greens councillor Ethan Hrnjak, lobbied for the council to call for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and boycott companies linked to Israel. Despite raising rates to cover growing costs, the Mr Hrnjak also tried to push the council to write to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and seven other federal government ministers and MPs "advising them of council's position on the issue.' Instead of pushing back against the tax increase, which stands as the largest in the council's history, the Greens spent the majority of their designated speaking time during the meeting expressing solidarity with activist groups including the Australian Palestine Advocacy Network and Medical Aid for Palestinians. 'This council has a duty to speak out. While this may be symbolic, it matters to our community,' Mr Hrnjak said after voting to increase ratepayers annual council bills by $168. Independent councillor Vincent De Luca raised an amendment in response noting there 10,000 foreign conflicts and the local council was "not the appropriate jurisdiction to debate international matters such as international conflicts." The Greens have seperatly tabled a motion for the upcoming July 15 meeting to debate nuclear weapons and to urge the locality to adopt a raft of recommendations including flying the flag of the International Campaign to Abolish nuclear weapons. The motion also calls on Sophie Scamps and Zali Steggall, the two federal members for the Northern Beaches area, to raise the gesture with the federal government. Ms Scamps and Ms Steggall have already both signed a declaration to the federal government advocating for nuclear non-proliferation. The federal government banned nuclear power as an energy source in the 1990s, is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is a founding member of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Instead of interrogating the council allocating $173 million - or 40 per cent of its budget - to fund the salaries of its employees, the Greens councillors put forward a notice of motion on 15 April titled "Clean, Green and Local NSW 2024 Policy Reform". The motion called on the council to "examine the 'Clean, Green and Local NSW 2024' policy platform of the Nature Conservation Council of NSW and prepare a high-level summary". The council is guided by the Draft Northern Beaches Environment Study. Councillor Hrnjak introduced another motion at the March 18 meeting named "Condemnation of Modern Slavery" which argued for council to receive a report on the implications of amending the Procurement and Contracts policy to ensure "modern slavery compliance". The vote resulted in an even split, with opposing councillors arguing that Australia has some of the strictest anti-modern slavery laws in the entire world. Mr De Luca railed against the Greens for discarding crucial local issues. He said were instead focused on their 'extreme agenda to dominate local council with international matters that have no concern for local people'. 'The main concern of our everyday citizen is the cost of living, decreasing rates at the Northern Beaches Council and all of the other works that need to be done such as the resealing of roads and yet the Greens are abusing time and resources at council meetings to push their own agenda," Mr De Luca told Mr De Luca, who stands as one of the last points of opposition to the Your Northern Beaches/Greens bloc, labelled the Greens performative stunts in council meetings as 'frustrating' and said they were 'misusing council as a political stepping stone'. Despite Northern Beaches council overseeing an expanding budget, Greens councillors have continued to flood notices of motions calling for repeated reviews into what Mr De Luca claims are secondary issues. Greens councillor Miranda Korzy has submitted a motion for the July 15 meeting lobbying for council to commission a complete review of plastic use in council infrastructure. Mr De Luca said the minor party's councillors were "insulting" Northern Beaches residents who primarily want council to minimise costs and rates. 'The Greens are out of touch with our local community, they voted for the 29 per cent rate increase. If they showed any compassion, they'd be voting against that, instead they are talking about Gaza and they're talking about nuclear weapons disarmament,' he said.
