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Express Tribune
15-06-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Untangling the Spider's Web of Ukraine
On June 1, Ukraine launched one of the boldest and most complex operations of the drone warfare era. Codenamed Spider's Web, the mission saw over 100 drones strike deep into Russian territory — far beyond the frontlines of the war, and seemingly out of nowhere. According to Russia's Defence Ministry, airbases in five regions — Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur — came under attack. Moscow acknowledged aircraft damage in Murmansk and Irkutsk, while insisting the remaining drones were repelled. Ukraine, however, claimed the assault was far more devastating: 41 strategic bombers hit and 'at least' 13 destroyed. The aircraft targeted were some of Russia's most prized strategic bombers: Tu-95s, Tu-22s and Tu-160s, all of them long-range, missile-carrying platforms that are no longer in production and have no immediate replacements. These Cold War-era bombers form a key component of Russia's nuclear triad. Independent analysis lends weight to Ukraine's claim of damages. The BBC, citing satellite imagery from Capella Space, confirmed at least four long-range bombers were destroyed at Belaya airbase. Ukrainian drone footage released shortly after showed direct hits on a Tu-95, reinforcing the evidence. 18 months in the making Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly orchestrated the operation over a period of 18 months. In a statement, SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk revealed how the drones had been stealthily smuggled into Russia: packed inside wooden cabins mounted on trucks, hidden beneath remotely operated, detachable roofs. These trucks, Maliuk said, were driven to locations near airbases by unsuspecting drivers who were allegedly unaware of the drones inside. Once in position, the drones were launched straight from the lorries. Footage circulating online shows one such drone emerging through the roof of a vehicle. Russian Telegram channel Baza, known to have ties to state security services, reported that all drivers gave similar testimonies. They had been hired by intermediaries posing as businessmen to transport wooden cabins and were later instructed via phone where to park. Once the trucks were in place, the drones were activated remotely. The SBU also released photos showing dozens of sleek, compact black drones — reportedly first-person view (FPV) drones — neatly packed in wooden crates inside a warehouse. Russian military bloggers later geolocated the site to Chelyabinsk. The drones were piloted remotely using ArduPilot, an open-source software platform that supports autonomous navigation through dead reckoning — a method that calculates position based on a drone's previously known location, direction, and speed, without relying on satellite navigation. This allowed the drones to remain operational even in areas where GPS jamming is prevalent. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later confirmed that each drone had its own human pilot, launching and steering it from afar. One analyst noted that the drones' use of dead reckoning made them nearly immune to electronic interference. The same analyst also suggested the drones likely used local SIM cards to transmit positional data and digital communications over mobile networks, allowing for remote piloting and even real-time high-resolution video streaming. To overcome the inevitable delays in long-distance communication — and to maintain function even in the event of a signal loss — the drones may also have been equipped with onboard artificial intelligence (AI). According to a report by the Kyiv Post, Ukraine trained AI systems specifically for Spider's Web using hundreds of images of Russian bombers housed at the Poltava Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation. These images were used to identify vulnerable areas of the aircraft, allowing algorithms to guide drones in autonomously recognising and striking their targets, even without real-time human input. 'Strategic vulnerability laid bare' Following the operation, President Zelensky triumphantly posted on social media that Spider's Web had used 117 drones in total. The mission, he wrote, had taken 'one year, six months and nine days' to prepare. According to the SBU, the estimated cost of the damage inflicted on Russia's air power was $7 billion — a staggering figure in both financial and strategic terms. Speaking to The Express Tribune, Dr. James Rogers, Executive Director at Cornell's Brooks Tech Policy Institute, warns that this is not just a battlefield innovation — it's a strategic vulnerability now laid bare. 'You don't have to run the gauntlet across Russia anymore,' he says. 'These smaller systems can fly so low, and they are incredibly difficult to defend against.' For states that have long relied on geography for protection — like Russia's remote Arctic airbases or even NATO's scattered drone-operating outposts — this raises uncomfortable questions. 'Every airbase can't have bespoke air defences,' Dr. Rogers adds. 'Urban areas can't deploy GPS jammers or microwave weapons without impacting civilian life. And even in rural areas, the numbers just don't add up. Russia likely deprioritised Murmansk and Siberia for this reason.' The same logic could soon apply to US and NATO's expeditionary micro-bases and even civilian infrastructure. Dr. Rogers cites recent sabotage incidents across Europe — 'the Heathrow substation, the Cannes Film Festival blackout, the French rail system disruptions' — as troubling signs of hybrid threats that may soon include commercial surface and underwater drones. Fleeting win or game-changer? Dr. Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), calls the attack 'an important strategic strike with high symbolic value.' Though he stops short of comparing it to a 'Russian Pearl Harbor', as some observers immediately labeled it, Dr. Davis notes the precision and scale: 'Containerised munitions, precision FPV drones, Russian drivers unwittingly carrying payloads — this was 18 months of sophisticated intelligence and operational planning.' Yet he also cautions against overstating its impact. One especially sensitive concern is whether the attack's targeting of strategic bombers, technically part of Russia's nuclear triad, risked escalation. Dr. Davis notes that while Tu-95s and Tu-22s were struck, the Tu-160 fleet seemingly remains intact, and Russia has not reached the nuclear red line. 'Yes, it hit Russia's long-range bomber fleet hard, especially Tu-95s and Tu-22s. But many Tu-160 Blackjacks remain. Russia retaliated quickly with bomber-led strikes on Ukrainian cities. Strategically, the war remains unchanged unless Ukraine's international backing falters,' he shares. 'Technically, yes — this could be seen as an attack on nuclear forces,' Dr. Davis explains. 'But using that as a justification for tactical nuclear retaliation is far more complex. It would break the nuclear taboo that's held since Nagasaki. The global political cost — alienating BRICS allies like China or inviting direct NATO intervention — would likely outweigh any benefit for Russia.' Still, the threshold exists. The danger is not that Spider's Web will provoke nuclear retaliation today, but that future strikes — perhaps by actors without the same geopolitical constraints — might not show such restraint. That strategic dimension carries existential weight. Dr. Davis warns that if the United States abandons Ukraine, and European nations fail to fill the void, 'we're either looking at a prolonged stalemate — or a probable Russian victory.' In that context, Spider's Web may be a fleeting tactical win rather than a game-changer. 'The cheap, the small, the many' That said, the attack exposed an uncomfortable truth for advanced militaries worldwide: traditional platforms — like bombers, tanks, and airbases — are now vulnerable to low-cost, high-impact systems. Dr. Davis calls this the era of 'the cheap, the small, and the many.' 'Drone warfare is here, and it's here to stay,' he says. 'For a fraction of the cost of advanced jets or warships, you can build precision strike capabilities that produce outsized effects.' What Ukraine demonstrated was disruptive innovation in real time, a warning to military planners still invested in expensive, legacy systems. Whether Moscow confirms the full scale of the losses or not, Spider's Web marks a turning point in modern warfare: a glimpse into a future where remotely operated, AI-guided weapons can be smuggled across borders and launched from within. Blueprint for non-state actors? While this particular operation was carried out by a state actor — Ukraine — against an invading force in the context of open war, it also raises disquieting questions about the future. Spider's Web may not only represent the evolution of state-led asymmetric warfare — it may also serve as a dark prototype for tactics that could be adopted by non-state actors. Could a similar operation be replicated by terror groups or insurgent movements — organisations that lack access to fighter jets, long-range missiles, or satellite infrastructure, but have access to consumer drones, open-source software, and Internet connectivity? Could this technology serve as a great equaliser, enabling them to threaten or damage the strategic capabilities of far more powerful militaries? The most chilling prospect is that Spider's Web may be copied not just by states, but also by militant groups. Dr. Rogers points out that the parts used in such attacks — consumer-grade drone components, open-source flight software, SIM card-based communication — are nearly impossible to regulate through export controls. 'During a UN investigation, we found no single piece of tech you could realistically lock down to stop this threat,' he says. 'We're entering a phase where violent non-state actors can leverage large language models to become self-taught engineers — capable of designing, modifying, and deploying advanced military technologies,' says Dr. Rogers. 'The second threat is what happens when the Ukraine-Russia war eventually ends. Both sides have produced millions of advanced drones. If even a fraction of that arsenal enters the global arms market, it's only a matter of time before these capabilities end up in the hands of insurgent groups or proxies And who knows what drone capabilities were left behind by departing US forces deployed elsewhere.' Some aspects of that future are no longer theoretical. The January 2024 drone strike that killed three US personnel in Jordan — conducted by an Iranian-aligned militia — was the first time hostile enemy airpower claimed American lives since Korea. Spider's Web, in this light, may be less an anomaly than a warning. The ingredients used in Spider's Web — commercially available drones, repurposed open-source software, AI trained on publicly accessible imagery, and civilian transport vehicles — are, disturbingly, within reach of many well-funded non-state actors. The concept of smuggling drones into a target country in innocuous-looking trucks, hiding them in wooden crates, and launching them via remote command is alarmingly replicable. Moreover, the operation hints at a future where nation-states may use such tactics through proxies, employing drones to carry out precision strikes under a veil of plausible deniability. With no boots on the ground and no need for overt military engagement, Spider's Web-style attacks could blur the line between cyber operations, sabotage, and conventional warfare. A deniable drone strike that cripples an adversary's airbase or power grid may one day fall into the grey zone between war and peace — a tempting tool in an era of hybrid conflict. Just as roadside IEDs reshaped the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, these low-cost, high-impact drone tactics could redefine the modern theatre of war. What Ukraine achieved with Spider's Web was unprecedented. But what it may have inadvertently unleashed is a new doctrine of distributed, deniable, and devastating warfare — one that doesn't require control of the skies, only control of the code. The consequences are profound — not only for military strategists and national security planners but also for civilian infrastructure, global arms control regimes, and the future of warfare itself.
LeMonde
03-06-2025
- General
- LeMonde
Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian air bases expose Russia's vulnerability
Arrests, searches, road checks: Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) and police were on high alert on Monday, June 2, as they sought to track down those responsible for the Ukrainian drone attack on several airfields that house Russia's strategic aviation. The operation, dubbed "Spider Web," took place the previous day across the Russian Federation, from Murmansk in the far north to Amur in the far east, including the central regions of Ivanovo and Ryazan as well as Irkutsk, in Siberia. Coordinated by Ukraine's security service, the operation caught Russian intelligence by surprise. Although no fully verified account has yet been established, Kyiv claimed the strike destroyed or damaged 41 Russian military aircraft, including 11 strategic bombers – Tu-95s and Tu-22s. The destruction of several bombers was confirmed by open-source footage from the Olenya air base in Murmansk and from Belaya air base in Irkutsk, near Lake Baikal.
India Today
02-06-2025
- Politics
- India Today
5 takeaways from Ukraine's Operation Spider's Web against Russia
Ukrainian special forces carried out simultaneous strikes across the length of the Russian Federation, striking air bases and damaging or destroying 41 Russian strategic bombers while they were on the ground. Estimates suggest that over 30 per cent of the Russian Federation's bomber fleet- Tu-95 and Tu-22s and A-50 airborne radars were destroyed by Ukrainian 100 drones were flown out of shipping containers which discharged the pre-programmed vertical lift drones as they passed near Russian airbases. The bombers were those used to target Ukrainian positions during the war using stand-off weapons like cruise missiles and bombs. Russian media has termed these attacks a 'Pearl Harbour', referring to the Imperial Japanese Navy's surprise attack on the US Fleet in Hawaii in 1941. That attack brought the US into the Second World Ukrainian attacks, however, come in a war that is now in its fourth year. It is one of the tactical high-points of the conflict and just before the second round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul on June 2. The first round, on May 16, led to the largest prisoner swap between the two sides.1. THE LARGEST EVER: In sheer size, scale and complexity, Ukraine has carried out one of the world's largest special forces strikes— hitting two air bases in Olenya, Murmansk and Irkutsk, Siberia— over 6000 km apart and in three time zones. It ticks all the boxes of Admiral William McRaven's theory of Special Operations — a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with speed, surprise and purpose. It weaponised civilian logistics, remotely carrying out the attacks without any of its personnel being carried out two of the world's most complex special missions — the hostage rescue at Entebbe airport, Uganda in July 1976, where over 100 Israeli soldiers flew over 3000 km across hostile territory to rescue 106 Israeli passengers, killing the terrorists and destroying one-fourth of the Ugandan Air Force on the ground. In 2023, Mossad booby-trapped pagers in 2023 to kill and wound over 1000 Hezbollah operatives in largest special forces operation. Operation Jackpot, planned by the Indian Navy and carried out by Mukti Bahini naval commandos on the night of August 15, 1971, simultaneously attacked four Pakistani ports across (then) East Pakistan, sinking and damaging 22 merchant ships. The attacks were carried out at four ports — Chittagong, Chalna-Mongla, Narayanganj and Chandpur — in a 500 square km box.2. DENIABILITYThe Russia-Ukraine war, it can be argued, is a proxy war between Moscow and NATO. Ukrainian soldiers fight on the ground using Western-supplied weapons and communications gear. These have been sore points for Russia, which has threatened to attack NATO bases and ammunition dumps in Spider's Web however, Ukraine has emphasised that the attacks were carried out on its own without NATO / Western support. President Volodomyr Zelenesky emphasised in a post on X that the 'result was achieved solely by Ukraine'. This was done to minimise potential fallout on the West. The attack used Ukrainian drones and was quickly owned up by the Ukrainian government. No Western-supplied weapons like the long-range Taurus missiles were used. Ukraine released images to show they used commercially available high-resolution satellite imagery to target the bombers parked in the open.3. WILL RUSSIA USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?advertisementRussia has threatened to use nuclear weapons at least once during the four-year conflict. The June 1 attack is problematic because it struck Russia's strategic bomber fleet. This means Russia now has fewer aircraft to launch nuclear weapons with in case of a full-scale war. Russian officials have threatened retaliation for the June 1 Ukrainian attacks. Russia launched a wave of over 400 drones on Ukraine on June 1, soon after the Ukrainian attacks. It could do what it has done in the past-- fire the Oreshnik, hypersonic but conventionally armed missile, which cannot be intercepted.4. THE AGE OF DRONE WARFARE HAS ARRIVEDEven before 2022, there were indications of this in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and in the Houthis' strike on the Saudi Arabian oil refineries suggested drones were an adjunct of all conflict. The Russia-Ukraine war ushered in a new age of drone warfare where drones have replaced every single platform from manned fighter aircraft to small arms. Both Russia and Ukraine are using tens of thousands of First Person View (FPV) drones, and their descendants, the wire-guided FPV drones (which cannot be jammed), to create dense, impenetrable drone has led to a World War 1 kind of scenario where the advent of artillery and the machine gun made open movement on the battlefield incredibly dangerous, leading to trench warfare where both sides dug into the earth for protection, creating elaborate trench systems.5. LESSONS FOR INDIAIndia extensively used drones to target Pakistan during the four-day Operation Sindoor air strikes, using them as decoys and to attack Pakistani military targets. But the bigger lessons are for Pearl Harbour-style attacks on Indian targets. In 2021, Pakistani non-state actors struck at an Indian air base in attack saw two quadcopter sized drones dropping two improvised explosive devices which exploded without killing anyone. It was a warning shot because the attackers missed several helicopters parked in the open. The composition of the IED- a military-grade shaped charge - suggested state involvement in the attack. Pakistan could use similar tactics to carry out mass, simultaneous strikes on Indian airbases and other installations. Aircraft and helicopters are most vulnerable when they are parked on the ground, and in the open. The easy availability of commercial satellite imagery means the location of all aircraft and warships and submarines is easily is an urgent need for all military aircraft to be covered in blast-proof structures. All air bases must be secured with multiple indigenous counter-UAS systems.
Time of India
01-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Russian Iskander-M Missile Strike Ukrainian Drone Launchers In Sumy, Kharkiv: Video
Russian Iskander-M Missile Strike Ukrainian Drone Launchers In Sumy, Kharkiv: Video Source: Russia released footage of Iskander missile strikes destroying Ukrainian drone launchers in Sumy and Kharkiv, just as Ukraine claimed a major cross-border drone offensive on Russian airbases. Ukraine says it damaged or destroyed 40 Russian bombers—including Tu-22s and Tu-95s—and even struck an A-50 radar plane. Fires were reported at the Olenya and Belaya airbases. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian special operation named "Pavutyna" reportedly hit a Russian military unit in Siberia's Irkutsk region, marking one of Kyiv's deepest strikes into Russian territory.
