Latest news with #TwelveDayWar
Telegraph
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
Trump fired 14 bombs, humiliated Iran, and saved Taiwan from annexation
Now that the smoke has cleared from the Twelve-Day War, what effects will Israel and America's decisive victory have on Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the wider world? Some are already clear; others will take time to emerge. Together, they will be enormous. The biggest uncertainty is whether Iran's theocratic regime will survive its humiliation at the hands of what the Ayatollah and his regime call the 'Zionist entity'. Even the word 'Israel' is poisonous in their mouths. The sources of that humiliation cannot be hidden from the Iranian people, despite the regime's adamantine effort to keep the information from them. They know about the regime's defeat and its inability to control the skies over its own country. They know the defeat came mainly at the hands of a Jewish state one tenth of Iran's size. They know the Israelis struck Iranian targets at will. And they know the regime's costly, decades-long project to dominate the Middle East has failed. Its proxy network has been smashed and so have the mullahs' efforts to spread Shia Islam by force. Those disasters are too big to hide, even for a totalitarian regime. Nor can it hide its isolation. None of its proxies could help in its hour of need because Israel had already decimated them. Nor did help come from Iran's Great Power allies, Russia and China. They stayed silent. The result is that Iran's Grand Strategy, like its military infrastructure, lies in ruins – very expensive ruins. Successful as Israel's military campaign was, however, Donald Trump stopped the IDF before it could complete two crucial elements. One was destroying the remainder of Iran's stockpile of missiles and launchers, so the regime still has significant weapons to threaten Israel and the Gulf States. The second was dismantling the regime's formidable apparatus of internal repression, which controls a young population that does not support the mullahs' rigid version of Shia Islam. Iran's internal security forces may still be powerful enough to keep the regime in power since the opposition is neither unified nor well-armed. But even if the mullahs do survive, their humiliation will have far-reaching effects throughout the Persian Gulf and in Iran's relations with Russia and China. Within the region, the biggest effect will be to pause the grim prospect of regional nuclear proliferation. The spread of those weapons was likely if Iran developed nuclear warheads and its ability to deliver them. The Saudis had already declared that they would develop their own nuclear capacity if Iran did, and nearby states would have had strong incentives to follow suit. One of the world's most unstable regions would have ended up bristling with the world's most dangerous weapons. That won't happen, at least for several years, thanks to Israel and the United States. Israel has also saved itself, for now, from the looming threat of a second Holocaust. True, the Islamic Republic might well have been deterred by Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal. But such deterrence refers to 'normal times' and 'normal regimes'. In Iran's case, the most dangerous moment would occur if the theocratic regime, having acquired deliverable nuclear weapon s, was collapsing. That's when the Ayatollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard might seek to fulfil their oft-stated goal of wiping out the Jewish State. There is historical precedent for this 'Samson Option'. The Nazi regime accelerated its mass murder of the Jews as the Wehrmacht retreated from the Soviet Union. Facing certain defeat, Hitler and his regime devoted scarce resources to implementing the 'Final Solution'. Finally, Iran's defeat will reshape the region in ways that benefit both Israel and the United States. Tehran's effort to become a regional hegemon is finished for at least a decade and possibly longer. The Middle East's strongest power is now Israel, militarily, economically, and technologically. The Jewish state, with America's backing, will try to consolidate its position by extending the Abraham Accords, which began during Trump's first term and stalled after Joe Biden abandoned the project and Hamas launched its murderous attack on October 7. Indeed, preventing Saudi Arabia's inclusion in that regional bargain was Iran's aim in sponsoring the attacks on Israel. There are two obstacles to this next step. One is the perennial sore of Gaza. Can Muslim states make peace with Israel while the Palestinians in Gaza face an uncertain future? The problem is notthat Gulf leaders love the Palestinian cause. They don't, except for Qatar. It is that all the Gulf regimes are narrowly-based, legitimated partly by their support for Muslim causes. They fear internal unrest if they make peace with Israel while Gaza is unresolved. The other obstacle is geostrategic. The Gulf States' security rationale for partnering with Israel was mainly to counter a strong and rising Iranian threat. Trump had demonstrated his reluctance to protect the Gulf States in September 2019 when he failed to retaliate after Iran's proxies bombed Saudi Arabia's huge oil facility at Abqaiq and its oilfield at Khurais. (Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Houthis in Yemen, but their weapons and technical know-how all came from Iran.) With the US stepping back militarily, the Saudis and their allies had to seek another powerful partner. They found it in Israel, the region's strongest military power and Iran's fiercest foe. That rationale is far weaker now that Iran has been debilitated. But the military logic behind the Abraham Accords was reinforced by the other advantages of cementing ties with Israel, the most sophisticated economy in the region. Economic ties with Israel are especially enticing as Gulf States work to diversify their economies and limit their dependence on petroleum production. Despite the countervailing currents, therefore, the likely outcome of the war and Israel's steady economic progress is closer ties between the Gulf States and Israel, inhibited only by the lingering problems of Palestinians in Gaza. What about the impact of the Twelve Day War beyond the Middle East? The largest impact is likely to be on China. Trump's demonstrated willingness to use military force reinforces American deterrence in the Taiwan Straits. A stronger American deterrent makes Beijing's goal of seizing the island much riskier. With Iran now contained, America can also reorient its military power projection to the Indo-Pacific in order to cope with China. All US strategists consider that country America's most formidable long-term threat. The threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has probably diminished for another reason, unrelated to stronger American deterrence. Xi Jinping, the most persistent advocate of a military attack on Taiwan, might well be losing his grip on power. There are indications that leaders of the People's Liberation Army, who know how risky an invasion would be, are beginning to worry Xi. These internal changes complement America's greater deterrent power, making an invasion of Taiwan even less likely. China's economy is also struggling, partly because of events in Iran, partly because of Trump's other actions, and mostly because it's hard to run an economy with top-down orders. Chinese economic growth has long been driven by exports, not internal consumption, and the biggest market for those exports is America. China's dependence on Walmart and Amazon gives Trump leverage, and he has used it to squeeze Beijing. China is facing problems with its energy imports, too, which it has been buying at a discount from Iran and Russia. Trump's sanctions make it difficult even to sell to China. The president will not relax his sanctions on Iran without a peace deal and may well increase them on Russia, which has exasperated him by its truculence on Ukraine. Russia is also weakened by losing its Middle Eastern allies and the leverage that comes with them. Russia lost its Syrian partner when the Assad regime was overthrown. And what did Moscow do when faced with Iran's imminent defeat? Nothing. Nothing despite mutual defence treaties. As the war unfolded, Putin clearly became so sure Israel would win that he opted to stay out of the fray rather than provide Tehran with real military support. Russia's military prowess also took a hit when Israel easily eliminated Iran's Russian radar and Western jets flew across the country undetected. Not a good advertisement for Russian military sales. Now that Vladimir Putin's entire Middle Eastern project lies in ruins, the question is whether he will seek closer relations with Israel? He is likely to, if Israel is receptive. The larger message is that the Israeli-American victory in Iran has sent shockwaves far beyond Tehran. The big questions now are whether the regime in Tehran will survive and, if it does, whether it will seek a compromise deal or continue to rail at the Great Satan. The fatwa to kill Trump is surely an indication. We know, too, that Iran's regional power has sharply decreased and Israel's has risen dramatically. We know that America's deterrence is now far stronger in the Taiwan Straits and that America's two great antagonists, China and Russia, have suffered major setbacks. All those are tectonic changes, the result of Western victory in a brief war.
Forbes
01-07-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Israel Cannot Invade Iran, But It Can Attempt An ‘Air Occupation'
Israeli Air Force F-15 fighter jets en route to Iran during Operation Rising Lion. (Israel Defense ... More Forces handout photo published on June 25, 2025) Israel has expressed its intent to lock in the strategic gains it made over Iran during the recent June 13-24 'Twelve Day War' with Tehran, including air superiority. Doing so could entail Israel imposing an 'air occupation' on its arch-enemy, something almost unimaginable just a few weeks ago. In a recent post on X, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that he had ordered the Israeli military to 'prepare an enforcement plan against Iran that includes maintaining Israel's air superiority, preventing nuclear advancement and missile production, and responding to Iran for supporting terror activity against Israel.' 'We will act regularly to thwart such threats,' he said. While Katz did not use the term 'air occupation,' maintaining air superiority and preventing Iran from doing those things might inevitably require one. Possible precedents for an Iran air occupation include Israel's aerial dominance over the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and the past U.S.-led no-fly zones covering large swathes of the airspace of Saddam Hussein's Iraq between 1991 and 2003. Still, none of these precedents were nearly as logistically challenging as a sustained, long-term Israeli air occupation of Iran could become. The absence of 'any ground element' was observed early in the Twelve-Day War. Iran's most powerful militia proxy, Hezbollah in Israel's northern neighbor Lebanon, sat out the whole war, having endured a fatal bludgeoning by Israel in the September-November 2024 conflict. Aside from covert operatives launching short-range drones from within Iran to strike strategic targets, Israel also relied overwhelmingly on its airpower to hit strategic and leadership targets during the campaign. Israel had already caused considerable damage to Iran's strategic air defenses in a four-hour campaign of airstrikes on October 26, 2024, using air-launched standoff missiles. The Twelve-Day War saw Israeli fighters penetrate deep inside Iranian airspace with little to no resistance, including non-stealthy fourth-generation fighters like F-16s. Israel did not lose any crewed aircraft and only a small number of drones. The Israeli military had long categorized Iran as a third-circle enemy or threat in reference to the fact that it is an adversary located three borders away. It established the Strategy and Third-Circle Directorate in 2020 and later shuttered it in March 2025 in a move Iran's state-run media prematurely boasted had exposed 'Israel's inability to confront Iran's military and intelligence prowess.' In reality, Israel overpowered Iran's military and outwitted its intelligence with stunning efficiency, demonstrating years, if not decades, of careful preparation in under two weeks. The chief of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate, Shlomi Binder, wasn't exaggerating early in the war when he said the military was 'succeeding in turning Iran from some distant place, 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) away, into a military we know how to deal with as if it were in our first circle.' 'You've turned the third circle into the first circle,' he added. Such statements and Katz's post-war declaration of intent to 'prepare an enforcement plan' and 'act regularly' against perceived threats signal that Israel intends to treat Iran as a first circle threat like Hamas and Hezbollah from now on. Israel has long dominated the airspace over its first circle threats. While it withdrew all its troops and 9,000 settlers from Gaza in 2005, its subsequent air and naval blockade against the coastal enclave led critics to charge that it still occupied Gaza by other means. Israel pulled its troops from the security zone it had occupied in South Lebanon for 18 years in 2000 and briefly fought Hezbollah again in the summer of 2006 in a war that ended after a brief and inconclusive ground incursion. Israeli aircraft violated Lebanon's airspace 22,111 times between 2007 and 2022 inclusive, according to research released in 2022 by the Lebanese organization 'The combined duration of these flights amounts to 3,098 days,' the website noted at the time. 'That is 8.5 years of jets and drones continually occupying the sky.' While the sounds of fighter jets and drones in Lebanese skies weren't uncommon in those interwar years, Israel didn't strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon as it did Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza throughout the same period. That changed with the onset of the post-October 7, 2023, wars. In September 2024, the same month as the pager attack and assassination of Hezbollah's leader, Israel launched the most extensive campaign of airstrikes in the air force's history hitherto, destroying much of Hezbollah's strategic surface-to-surface missile stockpiles. Even though Israel reached a ceasefire with Hezbollah in November 2024, it continuously strikes the group across Lebanon to this day. For example, on June 27, the air force struck a suspected underground Hezbollah military site in southern Lebanon's Nabatieh using bunker buster bombs and hit an apartment building, in the latter incident killing a woman and injuring 11 people. A ceasefire officially ended the Twelve-Day War on June 24, and no known Israeli strikes on Iran or airspace violations have taken place since then. Of course, that could rapidly change if the Israeli military implements Katz's plan soon. Historically, the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War may also offer some general precedent. Known as the Six-Day War, it also ended with a tenuous ceasefire after Israel's stunning series of victories and territorial conquests against its Arab neighbors. Within less than a month, the War of Attrition with Egypt began and lasted until August 1970. It was anything but a swift and decisive war. Today, Israel has entered a much more direct and consequential war with Iran than the covert War Between the Wars it fought against Tehran and its allies and proxies throughout the region for over a decade. After all, Katz's 'enforcement plan' entails ensuring Iran cannot recover the means to adequately defend its airspace on top of 'regularly' acting preemptively against suspected missile and nuclear threats. During the recent conflict, the Israeli Air Force demonstrated an impressive capability to reach targets deep inside Iran while relying on its aged Boeing 707 tankers for refueling its fighter jets. That operation doubtlessly pushed the air force to its limits while breaking some world records in the process. Continuously conducting such long-range air operations against Iran regularly, albeit on a smaller scale, would doubtlessly prove immensely challenging logistically and risky, especially if Israel ends up playing years of whack-a-mole with Iran's, presumably underground, missile and nuclear programs. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States enforced two no-fly zones covering vast swathes of northern and southern Iraq, patrolling them until the 2003 ground invasion that deposed Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. Those no-fly zones were invariably dubbed an air occupation of Iraq by U.S. Air Force officials throughout the 1990s. The U.S. carried out an average of 34,000 sorties each year to enforce them for over a decade. Despite this, those no-fly zones didn't compel Baghdad to fully comply with inspections of its suspected weapons of mass destruction program, nor prevent remnants of Iraq's air force and air defense from, albeit unsuccessfully, attempting to intercept air patrols. Only the 2003 invasion conclusively revealed that Iraq had indeed destroyed its WMD program. The U.S. and its allies were in a much better position to enforce those no-fly zones in the 1990s than Israel with Iran. In those days, the U.S. Air Force could use strategic airbases in neighboring Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Navy could deploy aircraft carriers and destroyers armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles within easy striking distance of Iraq. Israel presently has none of these options with Iran, and its air force must fly significantly further and cover vaster and more varied terrain. And, it should really go without saying that it cannot conduct a 2003-style invasion of Iran to conclusively ensure Tehran isn't clandestinely building or hiding nuclear weapons. Consequently, Israel may find itself facing many similar, if not significantly greater, challenges and problems the U.S. did with Iraq in the 1990s if it does ultimately attempt an air occupation of Iran.
New York Post
27-06-2025
- Politics
- New York Post
President Trump predicts Gaza ceasefire ‘within the next week'
President Donald Trump predicted there will be a ceasefire in Gaza sometime 'within the next week.' Speaking with reporters in the Oval Office on Friday, Trump called the situation in Gaza a 'terrible situation' but expressed optimism there could soon be a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. 'I think it's close. I just spoke with some of the people involved,' said the president, adding, 'We think within the next week we're going to get a ceasefire.' Trump also addressed the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, saying, 'we're supplying, as you know, a lot of money and a lot of food to that area because we have to, I mean, you have to. In theory we're not involved in it, but we're involved because people are dying.' He called on other countries to also send humanitarian aid to Gaza. 'You see the the lines of people just to get one meal, essentially. But it's too bad other countries aren't helping out,' he said. 'Nobody's helping out where we're doing that because I think we have to on a humanitarian basis,' he went on. President Trump says a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas War could occur sometime next week. AP 'I look at those crowds of people that have no food, no anything. And, you know, we're the ones that are getting it there. Some of it's being taken by some bad people, you know, as you give it and you give it out, and they're supposed to be taking care of the people, and they end up stealing the food and selling it. But we have a pretty good system now, so we're helping with that.' Trump told reporters that while the situation in Gaza is terrible, there is still hope that a ceasefire can happen. APAImages/Shutterstock 'We're working on Gaza, trying to get it taken care of and again, you know, a lot of lot of food has been sent there. And other countries throughout the world should be helping also,' he said. This comes after Trump authorized U.S. strikes on three Iranian nuclear development sites and subsequently declared a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, ending what he called 'the Twelve Day War.' President Trump also took a number of questions on other matters, including one on Ukraine weapons, where he said he 'may' authorize Patriot missiles for Ukraine's air defenses.
Indian Express
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Have Iran, Israel reached a ceasefire? What we know so far
US President Donald Trump said Monday that Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire after the former launched missiles at a US military base in Qatar. Trump announced on his Truth Social platform, 'The ceasefire is now in effect. Please do not violate it!' Despite this, Trump said on Tuesday that both countries had broken the truce. He was particularly critical of Israel, accusing it of continuing air strikes after agreeing to stop. Trump says Israel and Iran have both violated the ceasefire, but that he was 'really unhappy' with Israel. According to Reuters, Trump spoke directly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and urged him to halt the attacks. 'ISRAEL. DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS. IF YOU DO IT IS A MAJOR VIOLATION. BRING YOUR PILOTS HOME, NOW!' Trump wrote in a Truth Social post. Netanyahu's office later said that while Israel carried out one more strike near Tehran after Trump's call, it would avoid further attacks for now. The statement added that Israel had achieved its main aims against Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. On Monday, Iran fired missiles at the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Qatar said it intercepted most of the missiles and no casualties were reported. Qatar's prime minister condemned the attack as 'unacceptable' and said Doha had worked hard to reduce tensions. Iran said the attack was aimed at the US base, not Qatar, and was carried out in self-defence following US military action. Israel said it had accepted Trump's proposal for a ceasefire. 'In full coordination with President Trump, Israel has agreed to the president's proposal for a bilateral ceasefire,' Netanyahu's office said, adding that Israel had met its military objectives. Israel says will 'refrain from additional attacks' after Trump dials Netanyahu over Iran ceasefire However, Defence Minister Israel Katz later said Israel launched strikes on Tehran after accusing Iran of violating the truce. Iran rejected the claim. Iran's Supreme National Security Council confirmed on Tuesday that it had agreed to the ceasefire. But it said it did not trust Israel and its forces were ready to respond if attacked. 'Our hands are on the trigger,' it said in a statement. An Iranian missile struck a building in Beersheba, Israel, on Tuesday, killing at least four people, according to Al Jazeera. Israel said it intercepted two more missiles. Iran denied launching any missiles at Israel after the ceasefire began. Qatar's prime minister urged both sides to stick to the truce, which was brokered by the US with Qatar's help. Trump said the ceasefire timeline involved Iran stopping attacks at 04:00 GMT on Tuesday and Israel following 12 hours later. He said this would mark the official end of what he called the 'Twelve Day War'.
